One document matched: draft-zorn-radius-keywrap-12.txt
Differences from draft-zorn-radius-keywrap-11.txt
Network Working Group G. Zorn
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Updates: 2865, 2866, 3576, 3579 T. Zhang
(if approved) 3e Technologies International
Expires: June 22, 2007 J. Walker
Intel Corporation
J. Salowey
Cisco Systems
December 19, 2006
RADIUS Attributes for the Delivery of Keying Material
draft-zorn-radius-keywrap-12.txt
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 22, 2007.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document defines a set of RADIUS Attributes designed to allow
both the secure transmission of cryptographic keying material and
strong authentication of any RADIUS message.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1 Keying-Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2 MAC-Randomizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Message-Authentication-Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1 Attribute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2 Attribute Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
Many remote access deployments (for example, deployments utilizing
wireless LAN technology) require the secure transmission of
cryptographic keying material from a RADIUS [RFC2865] server to a
network access point. Typically, this material is produced as a by-
product of an EAP [RFC3748] authentication and is of a form that may
be used in virtually any cryptographic algorithm after appropriate
processing.
This document defines a set of RADIUS Attributes that can be used to
securely transfer cryptographic keying material using standard
techniques with well understood security properties. In addition,
the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute may be used to provide
strong authentication for any RADIUS message, including those used
for accounting and dynamic authorization.
Discussion of this draft may be directed to the authors.
2. Specification of Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Attributes
The following subsections describe the Attributes defined by this
document. This specification concerns the following values:
[TBD1] Keying-Material
[TBD2] MAC-Randomizer
[TBD3] Message-Authentication-Code
3.1 Keying-Material
Description
This Attribute MAY be used to transfer cryptographic keying
material from a RADIUS server to a client.
It MAY be sent in request messages (e.g., Access-Request, etc.),
as well; if the Keying-Material Attribute is present in a request,
it SHOULD be taken as a hint by the server that the client prefers
this method of key delivery over others, the server is not
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obligated to honor the hint, however. When the Keying-Material
Attribute is included in a request message the Key ID, Lifetime,
IV and Key Material fields MAY be omitted.
If the client requires the use of the Keying-Material Attribute
for keying material delivery and it is not present in the Access-
Accept or Access-Challenge message, the client MAY ignore the
message in question and end the user session.
Any packet that contains a Keying-Material Attribute MUST also
include the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute.
Any packet that contains an instance of the Keying-Material
Attribute MUST NOT contain an instance of any other attribute
(e.g., MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys [RFC2548], Tunnel-Password [RFC2868],
etc.) encapsulating identical keying material.
The Keying-Material Attribute MUST NOT be used to transfer long-
lived keys (i.e., passwords) between RADIUS servers and clients.
A summary of the Keying-Material attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Reserved | Enc Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| App ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| KEK ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEK ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEK ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEK ID (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| KM ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KM ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KM ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KM ID (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Lifetime |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
IV (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
[TBD1] for Keying-Material
Length
>= 24
Reserved
This field is reserved for future usage and MUST be zero-
filled.
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Enc Type
The Enc Type field indicates the method used to encrypt the
contents of the Data field. This document defines only one
value (decimal) for this field:
0 AES Key Wrap with 128-bit KEK [RFC3394]
Implementations MUST support Enc Type 0 (AES Key Wrap with 128-
bit KEK); other values are to be assigned by IANA.
Implementation Note
A shared secret is used as the key-encrypting-key (KEK) for
the AES key wrap algorithm. Implementations SHOULD provide
a means to provision a key (cryptographically separate from
the normal RADIUS shared secret) to be used exclusively as a
KEK.
App ID
The App ID field is 4 octets in length and identifies the type
of application for which the key material is to be used. This
allows for multiple keys for different purposes to be present
in the same message. This document defines two values for the
App ID:
0 Unspecified
1 EAP MSK
Other values are to be assigned by IANA; further specification
of the content of this field is outside the scope of this
document.
KEK ID
The KEK ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an
identifier for the KEK. The KEK ID MUST refer to an encryption
key of a type and length appropriate for use with the algorithm
specified by the Enc Type field (see above). This key is used
to protect the contents of the Data field (below). Further
specification of the content of this field is outside the scope
of this document.
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KM ID
The KM ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an
identifier for the contents of the Data field. The KM ID MAY
be used by communicating parties to identify the material being
transmitted. The combination of App ID and KM ID MUST uniquely
identify the keying material between the parties utilizing it.
The KM ID is assumed to be known to the parties that derived
the keying material. Further specification of the content of
this field is outside the scope of this document.
Lifetime
The Lifetime field is an integer [RFC2865] representing the
period of time (in seconds) for which the keying material is
valid.
Note: Applications using this value SHOULD consider the
beginning of the lifetime to be the point in time when the
keying material is first used.
IV
The length of the IV field depends upon the value of the Enc
Type field, but is fixed for any given value thereof. When the
value of the Enc Type field is 0 (decimal), the IV field MUST
be 8 octets in length (as illustrated above) and the value of
the IV field MUST be as specified in [RFC3394].
Data
The Data field is variable length and contains the actual
encrypted keying material.
3.2 MAC-Randomizer
Description
The MAC-Randomizer Attribute MUST be present in any message that
includes an instance of the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute.
The Random field MUST contain a 32 octet random number which
SHOULD satisfy the requirements of [RFC4086].
Implementation Note
The Random field MUST be filled in before the MAC is computed.
The MAC-Randomizer Attribute SHOULD be placed at the beginning
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of the RADIUS message if possible.
A summary of the MAC-Randomizer attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Random...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
[TBD2] for MAC-Randomizer
Length
34
Random
This field MUST contain a 32 octet random number which SHOULD
satisfy the requirements of [RFC4086].
3.3 Message-Authentication-Code
Description
This Attribute MAY be used to "sign" messages to prevent spoofing
If it is present in a request, the receiver should take this a
hint that the sender prefers the use of this Attribute for message
authentication; the receiver is not obligated to do so, however.
The Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be included in any
message that contains a Key attribute.
Any packet that contains an instance of the Message-
Authentication-Code Attribute SHOULD NOT contain an instance of
the Message-Authenticator Attribute [RFC3579]. If both attributes
are to be included in a message (e.g., for backward compatibility
in a network containing both old and new clients), the value of
the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be computed first.
If any message is received containing an instance of the Message-
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Authentication-Code Attribute, the receiver MUST calculate the
correct value of the Message-Authentication-Code and silently
discard the packet if the computed value does not match the value
received.
If a received message contains an instance of the MAC-Randomizer
Attribute (Section 3.2), the received MAC-Randomizer Attribute
SHOULD be included in the computation of the Message-
Authentication-Code Attribute sent in the response, as described
below.
A summary of the Message-Authentication-Code attribute format is
shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Reserved | MAC Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC Key ID
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAC Key ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAC Key ID (cont'd)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAC Key ID (cont'd) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MAC...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
[TBD3] for Message-Authentication-Code
Length
>20
Reserved
This field is reserved for future usage and MUST be zero-
filled.
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MAC Type
The MAC Type field specifies the algorithm used to create the
value in the MAC field. This document defines six values for
the MAC Type field:
0 HMAC-SHA-1 [FIPS.180-2.2002] [RFC2104]
1 HMAC-SHA-256 [FIPS.180-2.2002] [RFC4231]
2 HMAC-SHA-512 [FIPS.180-2.2002] [RFC4231]
3 CMAC-AES-128 [NIST.SP800-38B]
4 CMAC-AES-192 [NIST.SP800-38B]
5 CMAC-AES-256 [NIST.SP800-38B]
Implementations MUST support MAC Type 0 (HMAC-SHA-1); other
values are to be assigned by IANA.
MAC Key ID
The MAC Key ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an
identifier for the key. The MAC Key ID MUST refer to a key of
a type and length appropriate for use with the algorithm
specified by the MAC Type field (see above). Further
specification of the content of this field is outside the scope
of this document.
MAC
Both the length and value of the MAC field depend upon the
algorithm specified by the value of the MAC Type field. If the
algorithm specified is HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-
512, the MAC field MUST be 20, 32 or 64 octets in length,
respectively. If the algorithm specified is CMAC-AES-128,
CMAC-AES-192 or CMAC-AES-256, the MAC field SHOULD be 64 octets
in length. The derivation of the MAC field value for all the
algorithms specified in this document is identical, except for
the algorithm used. There are differences, however, depending
upon whether the MAC is being computed for a request message or
a response. These differences are detailed below, with the
free variable HASH-ALG representing the actual algorithm used.
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Request Messages
For requests (e.g., CoA-Request [RFC3576], Accounting-
Request [RFC2866], etc.), the value of the MAC field is a
hash of the entire packet except the Request Authenticator
in the header of the RADIUS packet, using a shared secret as
the key, as follows.
MAC = MAC-ALG(Key, Type + Identifier + Length + Attributes)
where '+' represents concatenation
The MAC-Randomizer Attribute (Section 3.2) MUST be included
in any request in which the Message-Authentication-Code
Attribute is used. The Random field of the MAC-Randomizer
Attribute MUST be filled in before the value of the MAC
field is computed.
If the Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute is included in a
client request, the server SHOULD ignore the contents of the
Request Authenticator.
Implementation Notes
When the hash is calculated, both the MAC field of the
Message-Authenticator-Code attribute and the String field
of the Message-Authenticator Attribute (if any) MUST be
considered to be zero-filled.
Implementations SHOULD provide a means to provision a key
(cryptographically separate from the normal RADIUS shared
secret) to be used exclusively in the generation of the
Message-Authentication-Code.
Response Messages
For responses (e.g., CoA-ACK [RFC3576], Accounting-Response
[RFC2866], etc.), the value of the MAC field is a hash of
the entire packet except the Response Authenticator in the
header of the RADIUS packet using a shared secret as the
key, as follows.
MAC = HASH-ALG(Key, Type + Identifier + Length + Attributes)
where '+ ' represents concateation
If the request contained an instance of the MAC-Randomizer
Attribute and the responder wishes to include an instance of
the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute in the
corresponding response, then the MAC-Randomizer Attribute
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from the request MUST be included in the response.
If the Message-Authenticator-Code Attribute is included in a
server response, the client SHOULD ignore the contents of
the Response Authenticator.
Implementation Notes
When the hash is calculated, both the MAC field of the
Message-Authenticator-Code attribute and the String field
of the Message-Authenticator Attribute (if any) MUST be
considered to be zero-filled.
The Message-Authentication-Code Attribute MUST be created
and inserted in the packet before the Response
Authenticator is calculated.
Implementations SHOULD provide a means to provision a key
(cryptographically separate from the normal RADIUS shared
secret) to be used exclusively in the generation of the
Message-Authentication-Code.
4. IANA Considerations
This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for
assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document.
The "Specification Required" policy is used here with the meaning
defined in BCP 26 [RFC2434].
4.1 Attribute Types
Upon publication of this document as an RFC, IANA must assign
numbers to the Keying-Material [TBD1], MAC-Randomizer [TBD2] and
Message-Authentication-Code [TBD3] Attributes.
4.2 Attribute Values
As defined in Section 3.1, numbers may need to be assigned for future
values of the Enc Type field of the Keying-Material attribute. These
numbers may be assigned by applying the "Specification Required"
policy. In particular, specifications MUST define the length of the
IV field for the algorithm used.
As defined in Section 3.2, numbers may need to be assigned for future
values of the MAC Type field of the Message-Authentication-Code
attribute. These numbers may be assigned by applying the
"Specification Required" policy.
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As defined in Section 3.2, numbers may need to be assigned for future
values of the App ID field of the Keying-Material attribute. These
numbers may be assigned by applying the "First Come First Served"
policy.
5. Security Considerations
It is RECOMMENDED in this memo that two new keys be shared by the
RADIUS client and server. If implemented, these two keys MUST be
different from each other and SHOULD NOT be based on a password.
These two keys SHOULD be cryptographically independent of the RADIUS
shared secret used in calculating the Response Authenticator
[RFC2865], Request Authenticator [RFC2866] [RFC3576] and Message-
Authenticator Attribute [RFC3579]; otherwise if the shared secret is
broken, all is lost.
To avoid the possibility of collisions, the same MAC key SHOULD NOT
be used with more than 2^(n/2) messages, where 'n' is the length of
the MAC value in octets.
If a packet that contains an instance of the Keying-Material
Attribute also contains an instance of another, weaker key transport
attribute (e.g., MS-MPPE-Recv-Key [RFC2548]) encapsulating identical
keying material, then breaking the weaker attribute might facilitate
a known-plaintext attack against the KEK.
6. Contributors
Hao Zhou, Nancy Cam-Winget, Paul Funk and John Fossaceca all
contributed to this document.
7. Acknowledgements
Thanks (in no particular order) to Keith McCloghrie, Kaushik Narayan,
Murtaza Chiba, Bill Burr, Russ Housley, David McGrew, Pat Calhoun,
Joel Halpern, Jim Schaad and Greg Weber for useful feedback.
8. References
8.1 Normative References
[FIPS.180-2.2002]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002, <http://
.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/
fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf>.
[NIST.SP800-38B]
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Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", May 2005, <h
ttp://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/
800-38_Series_Publications/SP800-38B.pdf>.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege,
M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol
Support", RFC 2868, June 2000.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC3575] Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service)", RFC 3575,
July 2003.
[RFC3576] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576,
July 2003.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
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[RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
RFC 4231, December 2005.
8.2 Informative References
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
RFC 2548, March 1999.
[RFC3078] Pall, G. and G. Zorn, "Microsoft Point-To-Point Encryption
(MPPE) Protocol", RFC 3078, March 2001.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
Authors' Addresses
Glen Zorn
Cisco Systems
2901 Third Avenue, Suite 600
SEA1/5/
Seattle, WA 98121
US
Phone: +1 (425) 344 8113
Email: gwz@cisco.com
Tiebing Zhang
3e Technologies International
700 King Farm Blvd.
Rockville, MD 20850
US
Phone: +1 (301) 944-1322
Email: tzhang@3eti.com
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Jesse Walker
Intel Corporation
JF3-206
2111 N.E. 25th Ave
Hillsboro, OR 97214-5961
US
Phone: +1 (503) 712-1849
Email: jesse.walker@intel.com
Joseph Salowey
Cisco Systems
2901 Third Avenue
SEA1/6/
Seattle, WA 98121
US
Phone: +1 (206) 256-3380
Email: jsalowey@cisco.com
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