One document matched: draft-yegin-fmip-sa-00.txt

MIPSHOP Working Group                                           A. Yegin
Internet-Draft                                                   Samsung
Expires: October 2, 2007                                    K. Chowdhury
                                                        Starent Networks
                                                          March 31, 2007


                      FMIPv6 Security Association
                         draft-yegin-fmip-sa-00

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism to dynamically generate a
   security association between the mobile node and the FMIPv6 access
   router to secure the FMIPv6 protocol messages.  The mechanism relies
   on generating a local security association based on the network
   access authentication.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  FMIPv6 Security Association  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1   Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2   Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Using the SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Support for non-EAP-based Architectures  . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . .  9






































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1.  Introduction

   The current Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) protocol
   [RFC4068] lacks a mechanism to secure the signaling between the
   mobile node (MN) and the access router (AR).  At the core of this
   problem is the absence of a security association (SA) between the two
   nodes.  When the SA is present, it can be used with Binding
   Authorization Data for FMIPv6 (BADF) option to provide authentication
   and integrity protection for the protocol messages.

   EAP [RFC3748] is used in various mobile and wireless network
   architectures (e.g., WiFi, WiMAX, cdma2K).  One important feature of
   EAP is its ability to dynamically generate a secret key shared by the
   EAP peer running on the MN and the authenticator running on the
   network access server (NAS).  This shared secret key (MSK -- master
   session key [RFC3748]) can be utilized to derive another secret key
   (FMIP-key) to be shared by the MN and the AR in the access network.

   This document describes how FMIP-key can be derived and used to
   secure FMIPv6 protocol messages.































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2.  FMIPv6 Security Association

   FMIPv6 security association (FMIP-SA) includes four parameters: The
   peer identifier (FMIP-PID), the shared secret key (FMIP-key), the SPI
   (FMIP-SPI), and the SA lifetime (FMIP-lifetime).

   FMIP-PID of the MN is the Identity used during the EAP
   authentication.  FMIP-PID of the AR is the IP address of the AR.

   FMIP-key is generated according to the following subsections.

   FMIP-SPI value MUST be set to 1 upon initial EAP authentication with
   the authenticator, increased by 1 for each subsequent EAP re-
   authentication with the same authenticator, and set back to 1 after
   wrapping around.

   FMIP-lifetime is set to the lifetime of the MSK.

2.1  Key Derivation

   The following formula is used to generate FMIP-key.

   FMIP-key = HMAC-SHA1(MSK, "FMIPv6 key derivation" | MN-ID | AR-
   IPaddr)

   MSK is the secret key generated by the EAP method execution and
   shared by the MN and the NAS [RFC3748].

   MN-ID is the Indetity presented by the MN during the EAP
   authentication.

   AR-IPaddr is the IP address of the AR used for FMIPv6 protocol
   messaging.

2.2  Key Distribution

   Since the EAP peer and FMIPv6 mobile node implementations reside on
   the same MN, derivation and delivery of the FMIP-SA is internal to
   that node.  There is no additional protocol needed to carry the SA
   parameters.

   In typical architectures and deployments, the AR and the NAS are co-
   located.  In case they are not, there needs to be a protocol to carry
   the SA parameters from the NAS to the AR.  The choice and details of
   that protocol are architecture-specific and therefore outside the
   scope of this document.





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3.  Using the SA

   The dynamically generated SA can be directly used with Binding
   Authorization Data for FMIPv6 (BADF) option.















































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4.  Support for non-EAP-based Architectures

   The same mechanism can be used with any architecture as long as there
   is an equivalent of MSK shared between the MN and the NAS.  Since
   such a key would be architecture specific, it is hard to define it in
   a generic but interoperable way in this document.[TBD: Give an
   example from 3GPP.]












































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5.  Security Considerations

   TBD.
















































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6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

7.  Normative References

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4068]  Koodli, R., "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6", RFC 4068,
              July 2005.


Authors' Addresses

   Alper E. Yegin
   Samsung


   Phone:
   Email: alper01.yegin@partner.samsung.com


   Kuntal Chowdhury
   Starent Networks


   Phone:
   Email: kchowdhury@starentnetworks.com





















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