One document matched: draft-wu-sava-testbed-experience-02.txt
Differences from draft-wu-sava-testbed-experience-01.txt
Network Working Group J. Wu
Internet-Draft J. Bi
Intended status: Experimental X. Li
Expires: March 23, 2008 G. Ren
K. Xu
Tsinghua University
M. Williams
Juniper Networks
Sep 20, 2007
SAVA Testbed and Experiences to Date
draft-wu-sava-testbed-experience-02
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
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Abstract
Since the Internet uses destination-based packet forwarding,
malicious attacks have been launched using spoofed source addresses.
In an effort to enhance the Internet with IP source address
validation, we prototyped an implementation of the IP Source Address
Validation Architecture (SAVA) and conducted the evaluation on an
IPv6 network. This document reports our prototype implementation and
the test results, as well as the lessons and insights gained from our
experimentation.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. A Prototype SAVA Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. IP Source Address Validation at Access Network . . . . . . 6
2.3. IP Source Address Validation at Intra-AS/Ingress Point . . 7
2.4. IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case
(Neighboring AS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case
(Non-Neighboring AS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. SAVA Testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. CNGI-CERNET2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. SAVA Testbed on CNGI-CERNET2 Infrastructure . . . . . . . 12
4. Test Experience and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. Test Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Design Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 25
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1. Introduction
By design the Internet forwards data packets solely based on the
destination IP address. The source IP address is not checked during
the forwarding process in most cases. This makes it easy for
malicious hosts to spoof the source address of the IP packet. We
believe that it would be useful to enable the Internet security to
enforce the validity of the source IP address for all the packets
being forwarded. .
Enforcing the source IP address validity can help us achieve the
following goals:
o The packets which carry spoofed source addresses will not be
forwarded, making it impossible to launch network attacks with
spoofed source addresses.
o The packets which hold a correct source address can be traced back
accurately. This can benefit network diagnosis, management,
accounting and applications.
As part of the effort in developing a Source Address Validation
Architecture (SAVA), we have implemented a SAVA prototype on an
operational network, a native IPv6 backbone network of the China Next
Generation Internet project, and conducted evaluation experiments.
In this documents we first describes our prototype solution and then
report our experimental results. We hope that this document can
provide useful insights to those interested in the subject, and can
serve as an initial input to future IETF effort in the same area.
In recent years there have been a number of research and engineering
efforts to design IP source address validation
mechanisms[RFC2827][Park01][Li02][Brem05][Snoe01] Our SAVA prototype
implementation has borrowed some of the schemes from the proposed or
existing solutions. It should also be stressed that we are still in
an early stage in developing IP source address validation solutions.
Thus the prototype implementation and experimental results presented
in this report serve only as an input, and by no means pre-empt any
solution development that may be carried out by future IETF effort.
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2. A Prototype SAVA Implementation
2.1. Solution Overview
In the Internet at large, it is unrealistic to expect any single IP
source address validation mechanism to be universally supported
everywhere to eliminate the IP source address spoofing problem.
Furthermore, implementation bugs or configuration errors can also
render the intended implementation effectiveness. Therefore our
prototype SAVA implementation is a combination of multiple coexisting
and cooperate mechanisms. More specifically,we implement source IP
address checking at three levels: first-hop, local subnet source
address validation; intra-AS source address validation; and remote,
inter-AS source address validation, as shown in Figure 1.
__ ____ __ ____
.-'' `': .-'' `':
| | Inter-AS SAV | |
| +-+----+ | | +-+----+ |
| |Router+--+----------------+---+Router| |
| +--.---+ | | +--.---+ |
Intra-AS | | | Intra-AS | | |
SAV | +--+---+ | SAV | +--+---+ |
| |Router| | | |Router| |
'_ +--.---+ _ '_ +--.---+ _
`'---+---''' `'---+---'''
__..---+---..._ __..---+---..._
| | `| | | `|
|+-----+-------+| |+-----+-------+|
||Router/Switch|| ||Router/Switch||
|+-----.-------+| |+-----.-------+|
First Hop| | | First Hop| | |
SAV | +-'--+ | SAV | +-'--+ |
| |Host| | | |Host| |
'_ +----+ _,;' '_ +----+ _,;'
`'-------''' `'-------''
Key: SAV== Source Address Validation
Figure 1: Solution Overview
It is important to enforce IP source address validity at the first-
Hop and the local subnet level. That is, when an IP packet is sent
from a host, the first physical multiplexing box should check to make
sure that the packet carries a correct source IP address. If this
first hop source address checking is missing, then a host may be able
to spoof the source IP address which belongs to another local host.
We use the term "intra-AS source address validation" to mean the IP
source address checking at the attachment point of a customer network
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to its provider network, also called the ingress point. IP source
address checking at ingress points can enforce the source IP address
correctness at the IP prefix level, assuming the customer network
owns one or more IP address blocks. This practice has been adopted
as the Internet Best-Current-Practice [RFC2827][RFC3704]. Even in
the absence of the first-hop source address checking, this ingress
checking can still prevent the hosts within one customer network from
spoofing IP addresses belonging to other networks.
Inter-AS IP source address validation refers to mechanisms that
enforcement of the correctness of the source address of the packet at
AS boundaries is ensured, after a packet is injected into the
Internet backbone. The first two steps of source address checking
utilize the network physical connectivity of the first-hop and the
ingress points. Because the Internet backbone has a mesh topology,
and because different networks belong to different administrative
authorities, IP source address validation at Inter-AS level becomes
more challenging. Nevertheless we believe this third level of
protection is necessary to detect packets with spoofed source
addresses, when the first two levels of source address checking is
missing or non-effective.
In the rest of this section we describe the specific mechanisms
implemented at each of the three levels in detail.
2.2. IP Source Address Validation at Access Network
The main idea of the solution is based on creating a dynamic binding
between a switch port and valid source IP address, or a binding
between MAC address, source IP address and switch port.
Our design has three main modules: Source Address Request Client
(SARC) on the host, Source Address Validation Proxy (SAVP) on the
switch, and Source Address Management Server (SAMS).
Our solution has the following basic steps:
1. The SARC on the end host sends an IP address request. The SAVP
on the switch relays this request to the SAMS. If the address
has been predetermined by the end host, it still needs to put it
in the request message for verification by SAMS.
2. SAMS receives the IP address request, and generates an address
response to SARC based on the address allocation and management
policy of the local subnet. The allocation of the IP address is
stored in the history database of SAMS for traceback.
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3. The SAVP on the access switch receives the response, and binds
the IP address with the switch port on the binding table. In
addition, it forwards the issued address to SARC on the end host.
4. The access switch begins to filter packets sent from the end
host. Packets which do not conform to the tuple (IP address,
Switch Port) are discarded.
2.3. IP Source Address Validation at Intra-AS/Ingress Point
We adopted the solution of the source address filtering of IP packets
at ingress points described in [RFC2827]and[RFC3704]; the latter
describes source address filtering at the ingress points of multi-
homed customer networks.
2.4. IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case (Neighboring AS)
Our design for the Inter-AS Source Address Validation aimed at the
following characteristics: It should cooperate among different ASs
with different administrative authorities and different interests.
It should be light weight to support high throughput and not to
influence forwarding efficiency.
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---------
| AIMS |
------|-
|
-------------- -----------|-----
| AS-4 |-------- --------| AS-1 | |------- Global
| ------ |ASBR,VE|->|ASBR,VE| ------|- |ASBR,VE|--->IPv6
| |VRGE| |-------- --------| | VRGE | |------- Network
| ------ | | -------- |
--------------- ----- -----------------
|ASBR,VE| |ASBR,VE|
--------- ---------
/ |
/ |
/ |
/ |
---------- --------
|ASBR, VE| |ASBR,VE|
--------------- -------------
| AS-2 | | AS-3 |
| ----- | | ----- |
| |VRGE| | | |VRGE| |
| ----- | | ------ |
--------------- -------------
Key: AIMS == AS-IPv6 prefix Mapping Server, VRGE == Validation Rule
Generating Engine, VE == Validating Engine
Figure 2: Inter-ISP (Neighboring AS) Solution
In the solution implemented on the testbed, the solution for the
validation of IPv6 prefixes is separated into three functional
modules: The Validation Rule Generating Engine (VRGE), the Validation
Engine (VE) and the the AS-IPv6 prefix Mapping Server. (AIMS).
Validation rules (VR) that are generated by the VRGE are expressed as
IPv6 address prefixes.
The VRGE generates validation rules, and each AS has one. The VE
loads validation rules generated by VRGE to filter packets passed
between ASs (In the case of Figure 2, from neighboring ASs into AS-1.
In the SAVA testbed, the VE is implemented as a simulated L2 device
on a Linux-based machine inserted into the data path just outside
each ASBR interface that faces a neighboring AS, but in a real-world
implementation it would probably be implemented as a packet filter
set on the ASBR. The AS-IPv6 prefix mapping server is also
implemented on a Linux machine and derives a mapping between IPv6
prefix and the AS of that prefix's "entry" into the region of
validated IPv6 prefixed by processing AS-Path information. The rules
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are derived according to the table below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
| \Export| Own | Customer's| Sibling's | Provider's | Peer's |
|To \ | Address | Address | Address | Address | Address |
|-----\-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Provider | Y | Y | Y | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Customer | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Peer | Y | Y | Y | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sibling | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3: AS-Relation Based Inter-AS Filtering
Different ASes exchange and transmit VR information using the AS-
relation-based export rules in the VR generation server. As per
Figure 3, an AS exports the address prefixes of its own, its
customers, its providers, it siblings and its peers to its customers
and siblings as valid prefixes, while it only exports the address
prefixes of its own, its customers and its siblings to its providers
and peers as valid prefixes. With the support of AS Number to IPv6
Address Mapping service, only AS numbers of valid address prefixes
are transferred between ASes and the AS number is mapped to address
prefixes at the VRGE. Only changes of AS relation and changes of IP
address prefixes belonging to an AS require the generation of VR
updates.
The procedure's principle steps are as follows (Seeing from AS-1 in
Figure 2):
1. When the VRGE has initialized, it reads its neighboring SAVA-
compliant AS table and establishes connections to all the VEs in
its own AS.
2. The VRGE initiates a VR renewal. According to its exporting
table, it sends its own originated VR to VRGEs of neighboring
ASs. In this process, VR are expressed as AS numbers.
3. When a VRGE receives the new VR from its neighbor, it uses its
own export table to decide whether it should accept the VR and,
if it accepts a VR, whether or not it should re-export the VR to
other neighboring ASs.
4. If the VRGE accepts a VR, it uses the AIMS to transform AS-
expressed VR into IPv6 prefix-expressed VR.
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5. The VRGE pushes the VR to all the VEs in its AS.
The VEs use these prefix-based VRs to validate the source IP
addresses of incoming packets.
2.5. IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case (Non-Neighboring AS)
In the case where two ASs do not exchange packets directly, it s not
possible to deploy a solution like that in the previous section.
However, it is highly desirable for non-neighboring ISPs to be able
to form a trust alliance such that packets leaving one AS will be
recognized by the other and inherit the validation status they
possessed on leaving the first AS. There is more than one way to do
this. For the SAVA experiments to date, A signature method has been
used. This solution is inspired by the work [Brem05]. This
particular method uses a light-weight signature.
+-----+
.-----------------+.REG |-----------------.
| +-----+ |
| |
,-----+-------- ,------+-------
,' `| `. ,' ` | `.
/ | \ / | \
/ | \ / | \
; +--'--+ +----+ +----+ +-----+ ;
| | ASC +------+AER | |AER +-----+ ASC | |
: +--.--+ +----+` +----+ +--+--+ :
\ |__________________________________________| /
\ / \ /
`. ,' `. ,'
'-------------' '-------------'
AS-1 AS-2
KEY: REG == Registration Server, ASC == AS Control Server, AER == AS
Edge Router.
Figure 4: Inter-AS (Non-neighboring AS) Solution
There are three major components in the system: the Registration
Server (REG), the AS Control Server (ASC), and the AS Edge Router
(AER).
The Registration Server is the "center" of the trust alliance (TA) .
It maintains a member list for the TA. It performs two major
functions:
o Processes requests from the AS Control Server, to get the member
list for the TA.
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o When the member list is changed, notify each AS Control Server.
Each AS deploying the method should have an AS Control Server. The
AS Control Server has three major functions:
o Communicate with the Registration Server, to get the up-to-date
member list of TA.
o Communicate with the AS Control Server in other member AS in the
TA, to exchange updates of prefix ownership information, and to
exchange signatures.
o Communicate with all edge routers of the local AS, to configure the
processing component on the edge routers.
The AS Edge Router does the work of adding signature to the packet at
the sending AS, and the work of verifying and removing the signature
at the destination AS.
In the design of this system, in order to decrease the burden on the
REG, most of the control traffic happens between ASCs.
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3. SAVA Testbed
3.1. CNGI-CERNET2
The prototypes of our solutions for SAVA are implemented and tested
on CNGI-CERNET2. CNGI-CERNET2 is one of the China Next Generation
Internet (CNGI) backbones. CNGI-CERNET2 connects 25 core nodes
distributed in 20 cities in China at speeds of 2.5-10 Gb/s. The
CNGI-CERNET2 backbones are IPv6-only networks (the biggest in the
world), not the mixed IPv4/IPv6 infrastructure. The CNGI-CERNET2
backbones, CNGI-CERNET2 CPNs, and CNGI-6IX all have globally unique
AS numbers. Thus a multi-AS environment is provided.
3.2. SAVA Testbed on CNGI-CERNET2 Infrastructure
It is intended that eventually the SAVA testbed will be implemented
directly on the CNGI-CERNET2 backbone, but in the early stages the
testbed has been implemented across 7 universities connected to CNGI-
CERNET2. This is because first, some of the algorithms need to be
implemented in the testbed routers themselves and to date they have
not been implemented on any of the commercial routers forming the
CNGI-CERNET2 backbone. Second, since CERNET2 is a production
backbone, any new protocols and networking techniques need to be
tested in a non- disruptive way.
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__
,' \ _,...._
,' \____---------------+ ,'Beijing`.
/ \ |Inter-AS SAV(D)|-----| Uni |
+---------------+ | | +---------------+ `-._____,'
|Inter-AS SAV(D)+-----| |
+------.--------+ | | _,...._
| | CERNET2 |__---------------+ , SE `.
| | | |Inter-AS SAV(D)|-----| Uni |
Tsinghua|University | Backbone| +---------------+ `-._____,'
,,-|-._ | |
,' | `. | |
,'+---------+\ | |
| |Router(C)| | | | ...
| +---------+ | | |
| | | | |
| +---------+ | | | _,...._
| |Switch(B)| | | |__---------------+ , `.
| +---------+ | | | |Inter-AS SAV(D)|-----| BUPT |
| | | | | +---------------+ `-._____,'
| +-------+ | | |
\ |Host(A)| .' \ .'
\ +-------+,' \ |
`. ,' \ /
``---' -_,'
KEY: SAV=Source Address Validation
Rectangle(A) (B) (C) (D) are deployment point of source address
validation mechenism.
Figure 5: CERNET2 SAVA Test Environment
Notwithstanding the aforementioned restrictions on the early testbed,
the testbed is fully capable of functional testing of solutions for
all parts of the SAVA solutions. Namely, it is possible to test
procedures for ensuring the validity of IPv6 source addresses in the
access network and in packets sent from the access network to an IPv6
service provider, packets sent within one service provider's network,
packets sent between neighboring service providers and packets sent
between service providers separated by an intervening transit
network.
The testbed is distributed across 7 universities connected to CNGI-
CERNET2, namely Tsinghua University, Beijing University, Beijing
University of Post and Telecommunications, Shanghai Jiaotong
University, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Southeast University in
Nanjing, and South China Polytechnic University in Guangzhou.
Each of the university installations is connected to the CNGI-CERNET2
backbone through a set of inter-AS filtering and monitoring
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equipment. (Inter-AS Layer).
o When the member list is changed, notifiy each AS Control Server.
Each AS deploying the method should have an AS Control Server. The
AS Control Server has three major functions:
Of the installations, the installation at Tsinghua University is the
most fully-featured, with inter-AS, Intra-AS and first-hop layer
validation all able to be tested. In addition, a suite of
applications that could be subject to spoofing attacks or which can
be subverted to carry out spoofing attacks are installed on a variety
of servers.
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4. Test Experience and Results
The solutions outlined above have been implemented on the testbed
described above. Successful testing of all solutions has been
carried out, as detailed in the following sections.
4.1. Test Experience
We have test in Tsinghua University and tests between Tsinghua
University and other universities. We have Inter-AS (non-neighboring
AS) SAVA solution test, Inter-AS (neighboring AS) SAVA solution test,
Intra-AS SAVA solution test, and Access Network SAVA solution test.
For each one of the test scenarios, we have tested many cases.
Taking Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution test as an
example, we classified the test cases into three classes: normal
class, dynamic class and anti-spoofing class.
1. For normal class, there are three cases: Adding Signature Test,
Removing Signature Test and Forwarding packets with valid source
address.
2. For dynamic class, there are four cases: Updating the signature
between ASes, The protection for newly joined member AS, Adding
address space and Deleting address space.
3. For anti-spoofing class, there is one case: Filtering of packets
with forged IP address.
As is shown in Fig.5, We have "multiple-fence" design for our SAVA
testbed. A is an attacker's host sending spoofing packets. B is the
first-hop source address validation point. C is the Intra-AS source
address validation point. D is Inter-AS source address validation
point. If source address validation is deployed at B, we can get a
host granularity validation. If source address validation is
deployed at C, we can guarantee that the packets sent from this point
have a correct IP prefix. If source address validation is deployed
at D, we can guarantee that the packets sent from this point are from
a correct AS.
4.2. Test Results
1. The test results are consistent with the expected ones. For an
AS which has fully-featured SAVA deployment with inter-AS,
Intra-AS and First-Hop layer validation, packets that do not hold
an authenticated source address will not be forwarded in network.
As a result, it is not possible to launch network attacks with
spoofed source addresses. Moreover, the traffic in the network
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can be traced back accurately.
2. For the Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution, during the
period of signature update, the old and the new signature are
both valid, thus there are no packet loss.
3. For the Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution, the
validation function is implemented by software in a layer-two box
running Linux. During the test, If the box connected directly,
it can achieve a normal forwarding line speed. If the box is
connected with devices from other vendor, it can only achieve a
very limited line speed. The reason is that the signatures are
added on the IPv6 hop-by-hop option header and the network device
from vendors handled the hop-by-hop options just by software.
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5. Design Limitation
There are several design limitations for the solutions deployed in
CNGI-CERNET2 testbed.
1. For Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution, the difficulty
for guessing the signature between two AS members was discussed
in [Brem05]. It is relatively difficult and we can increase the
difficulty of guess by increasing the length of the signature.
In current CERNET2 SAVA testbed, a 128-bit signature is designed
in IPv6 hop-by-hop option header.
2. Inter-AS (neighboring AS) SAVA solution is based on AS relation,
thus it can not synchronized with the dynamics of route changes
very quickly.
3. The First-hop SAVA solution needs to be widely deployed in the
access network switches. For the environment where source
address validation is not deployed in the access network, because
we have a "multiple-fence" design for SAVA, we can still get a
source address validation of IP prefix granularity if Intra-AS
source address validation is deployed.
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6. Conclusion
Several conclusions can be made from the test experience and results.
It is possible to devise a loosely-coupled, and "multiple-fence"
design for SAVA. This provides for different granularities of
authenticity of source IP addresses. It also allows for different
providers to use different solutions, and the coupling of components
at different levels of granularity of authenticity can be loose
enough to allow component substitution.
The scalability of SAVA still need further consideration. CNGI-
CERNET2 testbed just provides an initial test environment for SAVA.
Although the overhead of maintain and exchanging signatures between
AS pairs is not O(N^2), but O(N), the traffic and processing overhead
are increased when the AS numbers are increased. SAVA must be
capable of scaling to the size of the global Internet.
Incrementally deployment should be another design principle for SAVA.
The tests have demonstrated that benefit is derived even when
deployment is incomplete, which gives providers an incentive to be
early adopters of the framework. Some DiffServe mechanism can also
be taken into consideration. Traffics from SAVA-compliant AS should
get a high priority service.
First-Hop, local subnet source address validation is an important
part of SAVA to achieve an authenticity of host IP granularity.
There are multiple access cases: Local subnet in Enterprise networks,
residential broadband, and wireless mobile, etc. For Enterprise
networks, there are multiple solutions from the research and
engineering community. Focusing on the appropriate framework and
solutions for first-hop source address validation could be a valuable
initial step for solving the source address spoofing problem in IETF.
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7. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
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8. Security Considerations
The purpose of the draft is to report experimental results. The
security considerations of the solution mechanisms of testbed are not
mentioned in this document.
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9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Jari Arkko and Lixia Zhang for their
detailed review comments on this draft, and thank Paul Ferguson and
Ron Bonica for their valuable advices on the solution development and
the testbed implementation.
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2827] Paul, F. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, 2004.
10.2. Informative References
[Brem05] Bremler-Barr, A. and H. Levy, "Spoofing Prevention
Method", INFOCOM 2005.
[Li02] Li,, J., Mirkovic, J., Wang, M., Reiher, P., and L.
Zhang, "SAVE: Source Address Validity Enforcement
Protocol", INFOCOM 2002.
[Park01] Park, K. and H. Lee, "On the effectiveness of route-based
packet filtering for distributed DoS attack prevention in
power-law internets", SIGCOMM 2001.
[Snoe01] Snoeren, A., Partridge, C., Sanchez, L., and C.
Jones......, "A Hash-based IP traceback", SIGCOMM 2001.
Wu, et al. Expires March 23, 2008 [Page 22]
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Authors' Addresses
Jianping Wu
Tsinghua University
Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn
Jun Bi
Tsinghua University
Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
Xing Li
Tsinghua University
Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: xing@cernet.edu.cn
Gang Ren
Tsinghua University
Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: rg03@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Ke Xu
Tsinghua University
Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: xuke@csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn
Wu, et al. Expires March 23, 2008 [Page 23]
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Mark I. Williams
Juniper Networks
Suite 1508, W3 Tower, Oriental Plaza, 1 East Chang'An Ave
Dong Cheng District, Beijing 100738
China
Email: miw@juniper.net
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Internet-Draft SAVA Testbed Sep 2007
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