One document matched: draft-wu-sava-testbed-experience-01.txt
Differences from draft-wu-sava-testbed-experience-00.txt
Network Working Group J. Wu
Internet-Draft J. Bi
Intended status: Experimental X. Li
Expires: January 4, 2008 G. Ren
CERNET
M. Williams
Juniper Networks
Jul 3, 2007
SAVA Testbed and Experiences to Date
draft-wu-sava-testbed-experience-01
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2008.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
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Abstract
This draft describes the testbed installed at Tsinghua University and
other Universities in China attached to the CERNET-II IPv6 backbone,
some SAVA testing that has been carried out on that network and some
preliminary results of that testing.
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Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. SAVA Testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. CERNET2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. SAVA Testbed on CERNET2 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. SAVA Solutions Tested and Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Inter-ISP Case (Neighbouring AS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2. Inter-ISP Case (Intervening AS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3. Intra-ISP (Access Network) Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Test Experience and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1. Inter-AS (intervening) SAVA Solution Test . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.1. TsingHua University Inner Test . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.1.1. Tag Signature Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.1.1.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.1.1.2. Expected Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.1.1.3. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1.1.4. new section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1.2. Remove Signature Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1.2.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1.2.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1.2.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.1.3. Filtering of packets with forged IP address . . . 22
4.1.1.3.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.1.3.2. Expected Resut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.1.3.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.1.1.4. Update the flag(signature) between ASes . . . . . 23
4.1.1.4.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1.1.4.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1.1.4.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1.1.5. The protection to newly deployed AS . . . . . . . 23
4.1.1.5.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1.5.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1.5.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1.6. Add address space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.1.6.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.1.6.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.1.6.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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4.1.1.7. Delete address space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1.1.7.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1.1.7.2. Expected result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1.1.7.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.2. TsingHua (Beijing) <--> GZU (GuangZhou) Test . . . . . 27
4.1.2.1. Tag Signature(flag) Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.2.1.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.2.1.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1.2.1.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.2.2. Remove the Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.2.2.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.2.2.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1.2.2.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.2.3. Filtering of Forged Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.2.3.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.2.3.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1.2.3.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2.4. Update Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2.4.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2.4.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2.4.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2.5. The protection for newly joined member AS . . . . 31
4.1.2.5.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1.2.5.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.2.5.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.2.6. Add new address space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.2.6.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.2.6.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1.2.6.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1.2.7. Delete address space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1.2.7.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1.2.7.2. Expected result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1.2.7.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2. Inter-AS (neighbouring) SAVA Solution Test . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.1. Initialization of deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.1.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.1.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.1.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.2. Filtering of spoofed packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.2.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.2.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.2.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3. Intra-domain SAVA Solution Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3.1. Testing the validity of intra-domain filtering . . . . 36
4.3.1.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3.1.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3.1.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4. Access Network SAVA Solution Test . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
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4.4.1. Testing of authentication capability for access
network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.1.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.1.2. Expected result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.1.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.2. The authenticated network access . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.2.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.2.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.2.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.3. The filtering of forged packets . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.3.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.3.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.3.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5. Stability Test of Filtering Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5.1. Testing in the THU Trusty Internet Lab . . . . . . . . 39
4.5.1.1. Stability for intervening ASes solution. . . . . . 39
4.5.1.1.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.5.1.1.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.5.1.1.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.5.1.2. Stability for neighboring ASes solution. . . . . . 39
4.5.1.2.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.5.1.2.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.5.1.2.3. Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5.2. Deployment test between Tsinghua
University(Beijing) and GZU(Guangzhou) . . . . . . . . 40
4.5.2.1. Stability for intervening ASes solution . . . . . 40
4.5.2.1.1. Test Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5.2.1.2. Expected Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5.2.1.3. new section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 46
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1. Introduction
The problem addressed in the Source Address Validation Architecture
activity is outlined in [I-D.wu-sava-problem-statement] and a
proposed solution framework for discussion is outlined in
[I-D.wu-sava-framework].
Some potential procedures that could be used as solution elements in
the framework have been devised and one is introduced and discussed
in [I-D.wu-sava-solution-e2e-ipv6]. It should be stressed that at
this early stage, the solutions proposed in the solution document are
not intended to pre-empt work carried out by the IETF in the solution
space. Indeed, consensus must be reached on a framework before
solution work can be fully undertaken. The shape of the "holes"
needs to be established before the "pegs" can be carved.
Furthermore, it is envisaged that more than one solution could be
devised and deployed for each of the proposed solution elements
required under the framework, in keeping with the requirement for a
loosely-coupled architecture and, as far as possible, a plug-and-play
framework. The intention of the solutions documents is to provide
some solution ideas which can be implemented on the testbed described
in this document.
This document describes the testbed and the solutions implemented and
tested on it to date.
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2. SAVA Testbed
2.1. CERNET2
CERNET2 is one of the China Next Generation Internet (CNGI)
backbones. CERNET2 connects 25 core nodes distributed in 20 cities
in China at speeds of 2.5-10 Gb/s. The CERNET2 backbone is an IPv6-
only network.
2.2. SAVA Testbed on CERNET2 Infrastructure
It is intended that eventually the SAVA testbed will be implemented
directly on the CERNET2 backbone, but in the early stages the testbed
has been implemented as an overlay structure on top of CERNET2. This
is because first, some of the algorithms need to be implemented in
the testbed routers themselves and to date they have not been
implemented on any of the commercial routers forming the CERNET2
backbone. Second, since CERNET2 is a production backbone, any new
protocols and networking techniques need to be tested in a non-
disruptive way.
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---------------
| Transit AS |
---------------
| |
------ ------
|ASBR| |ASBR|
------ ------
| |
| | Inter-ISP
| | layer
........|...........|.................
------ ------
|ASBR| |ASBR|
------ ------
| |
----- -----
|AS1| |AS2|
----- -----
| | Intra-ISP
| | layer
........|...........|.................
| |
----- -----
|ASw| |ASw| Access
----- ----- layer
| |
---------- ----------
| access | | access |
| net | | net |
---------- ----------
| |
----- -----
| H1| |H2 |
----- -----
Figure 1: SAVA Framework Layers
Notwithstanding the aforementioned restrictions on the early testbed,
the testbed is fully capable of functional testing of solutions for
all parts of the SAVA solution framework. Namely, it is possible to
test procedures for ensuring the validity of IPv6 source addresses in
the access network and in packets sent from the access network to an
IPv6 service provider, packets sent within one service provider's
network, packets sent between neighboring service providers and
packets sent between service providers separated by an intervening
transit network.
The testbed is distributed across 7 universities connected to
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CERNET2, namely Tsinghua University, Beijing University, Beijing
University of Post and Telecommunications, Shanghai Jiaotong
University, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Southeast University in
Nanjing, and South China Polytechnic University in Guangzhou.
Each of the university installations is connected to the CERNET2
backbone through a set of inter-ISP filtering and monitoring
equipment. (Inter-ISP Layer).
Of the installations, the installation at Tsinghua University is the
most fully-featured, with inter-ISP, Intra-ISP and access layer
validation all able to be tested. In addition, a suite of
applications that could be subject to spoofing attacks or which can
be subverted to carry out spoofing attacks are installed on a variety
of servers. The Tsingua testbed consists of three separate
Autonomous systems joined by MBGP speakers.
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,.-.,, ,.-.,, ,.-.,,
-` ' -` ' -` '
|Beijing | | BUPT | | WuHan TU|
. Uni . . . . .
`''-''\ `''/''` .''-''`
\ | ,-`
+---'----+ +----\---+ +------`-+
,.-.,, |Filters | |Filters | |Filters | ,.-.,,
-` ' +--------+ +----/---+ +--.-----+ -` '
|Tsinghua| \ | .` | SE Uni |
. - `. | .` ,. .
`'.-''` `. . | .` _.-`` `''-''`
| ', \ ,,.--..\_ .` +---'`---+
| +----'---+ -'` `-` ,,-Filters |
| |Filters | ,' \ ,,-'`` +--------+
| +--------, / -'``
| `. | CERNET2 Backbone |
| `.| .-.,| inter-area filter system
| '\ / ip1 \ inter-area filter /---\
/----\ \ \ mac1-`. module | |
| | application `',_ `'-'` '--------+ |ip3|
| | access .''--''`` | ip2,ip5|------/ |ip6|
\____/ | +-----,--- | ,. |
/ \`.`., | `., | ,-` \---/
/ , ', '., +-\------+ ', /----\ control server
/ \ . '. |Filters | `| | monitoring server
' \ `, `', +--------+ \-.--/
+/-+ +-'+ +'-+ +`'+ | .`
| | | | | | | | | .`
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+ ,.-\,, .-.-`zebra Access Router
DNS,SIP,AAA,E-mail,Media, '` ' / ip4 \------..,,,,
Web Server |SC TU | /``\ mac2' \
. . \ `'-'` /
`''-''` ```'''''------''''``
Shanghai Jiaotong Uni SAVA Lab
Figure 2: CERNET2 Overlay SAVA Test Environment
,,.-.., * /----\
-` `', |Cont |
,' \ |Serv.|
/ CERNET2 , AS300 _. |
| -,, _-` |ASC3 |
\ ' `' ,.., ,.., _-` \----/ /----\
\ / ' ` ' ` /----`--\ |Reg. |
`-, _-` -| 300-4-------|300-3 -.,, | | |Serv.|
`''--'` . / . / ``''- SW31 ------------- |
`'-` ,.`'-`| | |-, |RegS |
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,-'` | \-------/ `', \----/
,..,-'` ,.., \ - `'.,
' ` ' ` `. +-------+
|300-2 |----| 300-1| \ | |
. / . - `. | client|
`'/` `'-` `, ', | |
/ . \ +-------+
+---------+ +----'----+ `,
| box300-1| | box300-2| +---'---+
+----/----+ +-----,---+ | Attack|
B | ', | A3 |
G | `. BGP | |
P | ``. +-------+
| ',
+------\--+ `.
| box100-1| +---`'----+
+-----/---+ | box200-2|
/ +---------+
,..--, |
' ` '..,
AS100 |100-1 | +---------+ +---------+ ' `
. /--| box100-2|-----------| box200-1|---| 200-1) AS200
_.'-` +---------+ BGP +---------+ . /
_-` `'-`
/-------\ ,..,-` | /----\
| | ' ` ,.., ,.., |Cont |
| SW11 -----| 100-2-.,, ' ` ,.., ' ` |Serv.|
| | . / ``'-| 100-3| ' `--------|-200-2|--| |
\--/----/ `'-` . / . 200-3| . / |ASC2 |
| `'-` ,` . /-, '-` \----/
| ,' `'-` '.
| / /--`'---\
| /----`--\ | |
/-\--\ | | | SW23 |
|Cont.| | SW22 | | |
|Serv.| | | \---/----, Validated
| | \---/---/ | '. Access
|ASC1 | | | `',
\----/ Unvalidated | | '.
Acess | /--\-\ +--`'---+
+---\---+ |Web/ | | Attack|
| Attack| |Media| | A1 |
| A2 | |Serv.| | |
| | | | +-------+
+-------+ \----/
Figure 3: Tsinghua University Trustable Internet Test Network
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AS100 .
`
OSPF Areas={100-1,100-3,100-4} +------1-+
MAC=0005:64FF:F988 |Box100-1|
@:4::1:1 _,,.-0---2----+
_,.-.,, .,.--,'``` |@:3::1:2
,' `.@:1::1:2 ,' '' \192.168.1.2
| 100-3 1--------------| 100-1 | |
| | @:1::1:1|_ |-, |
', 3- ', ,' `'., | .
`2'--'` \@:1::3:1 `''''''@:4::2:1`', | ,'
@:1::2:1| \ MAC=0005:64FF:F989 `'., -
| \ |`'., +------1-+
| \ | `0Box100-2|
| \ | +------2-+
| \ | @:3::1:3
| `. \ 192.168.1.3
| , | |
@:1::2:2| . | |
_,.-1,, \ | /
,' `. \ | |
| 100-4 | \ \ |
| | \@:1::3:2 | /
', ,- \ | |
`''2-'` 0/-----\ | |
| | | | /
| | A | \/-----\-\
| | S | | |
| | C |@:3::1:1 | SW2-C |
\ | 1 1--------------------\ |
Application | |192.168.1.1 | |
Access | | \-------/
\-----/
Figure 4: Tsinghua University Network AS100 detail
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/-----\-------------------------------------------------------------------/
| | AS200 |
|SW2-C-.,,,_ +--------+ _,. OSPF Areas={200-1,200-3,200-4} |
| | ``''2|Box200-2|1` |
\-.---/ @:5::2:2+-----0--+ @:5::2:1|
, 192.168.2.2 \ ,.-., 192.168.2.1|
| \ @:2::1:2_,1` ` /--1-\
, | _,-'` | 200-3|3 | AA |
| | ,.-'` . /@:2::3:1 | SS |
, MAC=0004:9312:00FC,.-`` `2-'` `'., | CA |
|@:5::2:3 @:4::3:2'.-.-'`` @:2::2:1 `-| || |
192.168.2.3 .` `.@:2::1:1 - @:2::3:2| 22 |
\ | 200-1 | ,' | / |
+2-------+ _,,.-. ` ,` \----/
1.Box200-1-0'``@:4::2:2'-'` ,'
.`+--------+ MAC=0004:9312:00FD /
-` .` SAVA
,' Access client
,.-., @:2::2:2 @:2::4:7+---+
` `1-` _,| |
| 200-4 | ,.-'` | |
@:2::5:1,2. .3, _,-'`` +---+
_.-` `'-'` ''.,13 ,.-'`
/-----\ ,-` @:2::4:1 `-------'``
| -'` | |--22-----------------/
|SW22 | |SW23 | |
| | | -21 /----\ /--\-\
.\-----/ \--.--/ `'., | | | |
.` .23 `- | | |
+---+ .` ,-` | MS | | WS |
|A2 -` +---+ ,' | | | |
| | |A1 |-` | | | |
+---+ | | | | | |
@:2::5:9 +---+ \----/ \----/
@:2::4:9 @:2::4:2 @:2::4:3
Figure 5: Tsinghua University Test Network AS200 Detail
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AS300 client @:3::7:ffff
+--+ /---\
OSPF Areas={300-1,300-2, | |@:3::7:4 ,. R |
300-3,300-4} +--+ `., _.-` | e |
', ,-` | g |
,.-.,, ,.-.,, `'-----\-'` | S |
-` ' @:3::4:1-` '@:3::7:1 | | \---/
| 300-4 |-------------3 300-3 4----------------- SW31|
. @:3::4:2 . . | -, /---\
/''-''` `2'-.1` \--.--/ `'-, | A |
/ @:3::2:2` ,@:3::1:2 | `'-, | S |
/ Application ,` | @:3::7:9 | @:3::7:2'0 C |
/ Access - \ +-\+ | 3 |
- ,' | |A3| \1--/
/ | +--+ ,-` @:5::3:1
,' \ .` 192.168.3.1
/ | ,-`
,.-.,, @:3::2:1 |@:3::1:1 .`
-` 2` ,.\.,,. ,-`
| 300-2 3..,,,,_ -` 2001:250:c000:128::2/112
. @:3::3:2 ```'''--| 300-1 |-.,,, ,-`
1''-''` @:3::3:1 .. ```''-.,,,_
|@:4::1:2 `''-''_ _-` ``'2001:250:c000:128::1
MAC=0005:64FF:FD00 @:4::3:1\ .' ```'--.,,
| MAC=0005:64FF:F9C8 \_,' -` '
| ,'. | |
| _.` \ . .
| ,' \ `''-''`
| .` \ CERNET 2
| ,-` \
+--0-----+ /---`-\ +---0----+
|Box300-1|2----------- ----------2|Box300-2|
1--------+@:5::3:3 |SW3-C| @:5::3:2+--------1,
/ 192.168.3.3 | | 192.168.3.2 '.
- \-----/ `'
Figure 6: Tsinghua University Test Network AS300 Detail
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3. SAVA Solutions Tested and Experiences
3.1. Inter-ISP Case (Neighbouring AS)
---------
| AIMS |
------|-
|
-------------- -----------|-----
| AS-4 |----- ------| AS-1 | |-----
| |ASBR |----->|ASBR | ------|- |ASBR |---> Global IPv6
| |----- ------| | VRGE | |----- Network
--------------- | -------- |
----- -----------------
|ASBR| |ASBR|
------ ------
/ |
/ |
/ |
/ |
---------- -----
|ASBR, VE| |ASBR|
--------------- -------------
| AS-2 | | AS-3 |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
--------------- -------------
Key: AIMS == AS-IPv6 prefix Mapping Server, VRGE == Validation Rule
Generating Engine, VE == Validating Engine
Figure 7: Inter-ISP (Neighboring AS) Setup
In the solution implemented on the testbed, the solution for the
validation of IPv6 prefixes is separated into three functional
modules: The Validation Rule Generating Engine (VRGE), the Validation
Engine (VE) and the the AS-IPv6 prefix Mapping Server. (AIMS).
Validation rules (VR) that are generated by the VRGE are expressed as
IPv6 address prefixes.
The VRGE generates validation rules, and each AS has one. In the
testbed, these are implemented on a LINUX server. The VE loads
validation rules generated by VRGE to filter packets passed between
ASs (In the case of Figure 7, from neighbouring ASs into AS-1. In
the SAVA testbed, the VE is implemented as a simulated L2 device on a
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Linux-based machine inserted into the data path just outside each
ASBR interface that faces a neigbouring AS, but in a real-world
implementation it would probably be implemented as a packet filter
set on the ASBR. The AS-IPv6 prefix mapping server is also
implemented on a Linux machine and derives a mapping between IPv6
prefix and the AS of that prefix's "entry" into the region of
validated IPv6 prefixed by processing AS-Path information. The rules
are derived according to the table below, as described in [Gao].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
| \Export| Own | Customer's| Sibling's | Providor's | Peer's |
|To \ | Address | Address | Address | Address | Address |
|-----\-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Providor | Y | Y | Y | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Customer | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Peer | Y | Y | Y | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sibling | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 8: AS-Relation Based Inter-AS Filtering
Different ASes exchange and transmit VR information using the AS-
relation-based export rules in the VR generation server. As per
Figure 8, an AS exports the address prefixes of its own , its
customers, its providers, it siblings and its peers to its customers
and siblings as valid prefixes, while it only exports the address
prefixes of its own, its customers and its siblings to its providers
and peers as valid prefixes. With the support of AS Number to IPv6
Address Mapping service, only AS numbers of valid address prefixes
are transferred between ASes and the AS number is mapped to address
prefixes at the VRGE. Only changes of AS relation and changes of IP
address prefixes belonging to an AS require the generation of VR
updates.
The procedure's principle steps are as folows (as seen by AS-1 in
Figure 7):
1. When the VRG has initialised, it reads the AS neighbour table and
establishes TCP connections to all the VEs in its own AS.
2. The VRGE initiates a VR renewal. According to its export table,
it sends its own originated IPv6 prefixes to neighbouring ASs
VRGEs. Rules are expressed as AS numbers.
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3. When a VRGE receives the new rules from its neighbour, it then
uses its own export table to decide whether it should accept the
rules and, if it accepts a rule, whether or not it should re-
export the rule to other neighbouring ASs.
4. If the VRGE accepts a rule, it used the AIMS to transform AS-
expressed rules into IPv6 refix-expressed rules.
5. The VRGE then pushes the thus-generated rules to all the VEs in
its AS. The VEs then use these prefix-based rules to filter
incoming packets.
3.2. Inter-ISP Case (Intervening AS)
In the case where two ASs do not exchange packets directly, it s not
possibe to deploy a solution like that in the previous section.
However, it is highly desirable for non-neighbouring ISPs to be able
to form a trust alliance such that packets leaving one AS will be
recognised by the other and inherit the validation status they
possessed on leaving the first AS. There is more than one way to do
this. For the SAVA experiments to date, the signature method
detailed in [I-D.wu-sava-solution-e2e-ipv6] has been used. This
particular method uses a weak signature.
+-----+
| REG |
+-----+
,-------------- ,--------------
,' ` `. ,' ` `.
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
; +-----+ +----+ +----+ +-----+ ;
| | ASC | |AER | |AER | | ASC | |
: +-----+ +----+` +----+ +-----+ :
\ / \ /
\ / \ /
`. ,' `. ,'
'-------------' '-------------'
AS-1 AS-2
KEY: REG == Registration Server, ASC == AS Control Server, AER == AS
Edge Router.
Figure 9: Validation Setup Between non-Neighbouring ASs
There are three major components in the system: the Registration
Server(REG), the AS Control Server(ASC), and the AS Edge Router(AER).
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The Registration Server is the "center" of the trust alliance (TA) .
It maintains a member list for the TA. It performs two major
functions:
o Processes requests from the AS Control Server, to get the member
list for the TA.
o When the member list is changed, notifiy each AS Control Server.
Each AS deploying the method should have an AS Control Server. The
AS Control Server has three major functions:
o Communicate with the Registration Server, to get the up-to-date
member list of TA.
o Communicate with the AS Control Server in other member AS in the
TA, to exchange updates of prefix ownership information, and to
exchange signatures.
o Communicate with all edge routers of the local AS, to configure the
processing component on the edge routers.
The AS Edge Router does the work of adding signature to the packet at
the sending AS, and the work of verifying and removing the signature
at the destination AS.
In the design of this system, in order to decrease the burden on the
REG, most of the control traffic happens between ASCs.
3.3. Intra-ISP (Access Network) Case
Assuming an ISP has implemented source address validation on its
connection to peers and transit providers, the intra-ISP case reverts
to access validation. There are many options for access validation,
including BCP38 filtering, depending on the strength of validation
required. The solution tested in the SAVA testbed takes the
strongest requirement for validation in the access network. That is,
any IPv6 address should have a unique association with an entity that
is specifically authorised to use that IPv6 address. (BCP38
filtering, on the other hand typically only requires that the source
address of a packet entering the provider network belong to a prefix
that is allocated to or has transit through the attached access
network.)
An Extended Access Control Protocol is used in order to distribute
authorised IPv6 addreses to end-users and to ensure a record of the
authorised user and the corresponding IPv6 address and MAC address
for each port of the access switch. As a result it is possible for
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the access switch to filter any packets sent by the user (or sokmeone
pretending to be the user) that do not carry the authorised IPv6
source address and the corresponding MAC address. The SAVA extendes
access control used for this proof of concept follows the following 4
steps:
1. End user sends an identity verification supplication, and the
access switch sends a RADIUS request to the SAVA access
validation server.
2. On successful establishment of identity, the SAVA access
validation server issues an authorised IPv6 address for the user.
3. The access switch, on receiving the RADIUS authentication success
message combines the embedded IPv6 address, the end-user
identity, end-user MAC address and the switch port number into a
binding relationship. In addition, it sends the issued address
to the end-user host.
4. The access switch begins to filter packets sent from the end-user
host. Packets which do not conform to an authorised (MAC SA,
IPv6 SA, Switch Port) tuple are discarded.
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4. Test Experience and Results
The solutions outlined above have been implemented on the testbed
described above. Successful testing of all solutions has been
carried out. A more detailed discussion will be forthcoming in the
next version of this draft.
4.1. Inter-AS (intervening) SAVA Solution Test
4.1.1. TsingHua University Inner Test
4.1.1.1. Tag Signature Test
4.1.1.1.1. Test Content
200-2 and 300-2 are SAVA filtering devices between AS200 and AS300.
First, start filtering solution
1. telnet 200-2 and 300-2, start /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box.
2. Input '5' and enter to start filtering.
3. telnet ASC2 and ASC3, start /home/spm/as-union/control/output/
control
4. telnet login server RegS, start /home /spm/as-union/register/
output/register
Then, A3 in AS300 sends ICMPv6 packets to the media server in AS200
with its real source IP address.
Last, telnet 300-2, watch the content of inbound packets at eth0 of
300-2 and outbound packets at eth1 of 300-2 with tcpdump.
4.1.1.1.2. Expected Results
When AS300starts filtering, 300-2 should tag a flag into the received
IPv6 packets which come from AS300. The flag is type 0x21 in HOP-by-
HOP option, including a 6 bytes label and 6 bytes PAD. The expected
result is: the packet gets into eth0 have a ICMPv6 expand head after
first 40 bytes head, and the packet with the same seq number, which
comes from eth1, should have a type 0x21 HOP-BY-HOP option after the
first 40 bytes head, then is the ICMPv6 expand head. The upper
result will prove that the signature is tagged correctly.
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4.1.1.1.3. Results
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Source IP | Hop-By-Hop Type | Hop-By-Hop Flag | Result |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|Packets | 2001:250:cccc:3::7:f | NULL | NULL | pass |
| Received | | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|Packets | 2001:250:cccc:3::7:f | 0x21 | F241 B12E FB1E | pass |
|Sent | | | | |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.1.1.4. new section
4.1.1.2. Remove Signature Test
4.1.1.2.1. Test Content
At first, start Inter-AS (intervening) filtering solution.
1. telnet 200-2 and 300-2, start /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box
2. input '5' and enter to start filtering.
3. telnet ASC2 and ASC3, start /home/spm/as-union/control/output/
control
4. telnet login server RegS, start /home/spm/as-union/register/
output/register
Then A3 in AS300 sends ICMPv6 packets to the media server in AS200
with its real source IP address.
Last, telnet 200-2, watch the content of inbound packets at eth1 of
200-2 and outbound packets at eth0 of 200-2 with tcpdump.
4.1.1.2.2. Expected Result
When AS300 starts filtering, 200-2 should receive packets with a flag
from AS300. The flag is type 0x21 in HOP-by-HOP option, including a
6 bytes label and 6 bytes PAD. The expected result is: the packet
gets into eth1 have a type 0x21 HOP-BY-HOP option after the first 40
bytes head, then is the ICMPv6 expand head, and the packet with the
same seq number, which goes out of eth0, should have the ICMPv6
expand head directly after first 40 bytes head. The upper result
will prove that the signature is removed correctly.
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4.1.1.2.3. Result
------------------------------------------------------------
| | Hop-By-Hop Type | Hop-By-Hop Flag | Result |
|----------------------------------------------------------|
|Packets | 0x21 | 66FB 6A4E 325D | pass |
| Received | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------|
|Packets | NULL | NULL | pass |
|Sent | | | |
------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.1.3. Filtering of packets with forged IP address
4.1.1.3.1. Test Content
AS100, AS200 and AS300 are neighbor ASes and 100-1, 100-2, 200-1,
200-2, 300-1 ,300-2 are filtering devices. At first, start Inter-AS
(intervening) filtering solution.
1. telnet all, run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box
2. Input '5' and enter to start filtering.
3. telnet ASC1, ASC2 and ASC3, run /home/spm/as-union/control/
output/control
4. telnet login server RegS, start /home/spm/as-union/register/
output/register.
Then, A3 in AS300 uses(forges) IP address from AS100 to send forged
packets to MS(media server) in AS200.
At last, watch the received packets at MS with tcpdump.
4.1.1.3.2. Expected Resut
A3 in AS300 sends packets with forged source IP address(IP address in
AS100) to AS200. The packets won't contain the right flag, so the
filtering devices of AS200 would filter the forged packets. And MS
(the destination media sever) would not receive the forged packets.
4.1.1.3.3. Result
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--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SRC IP of Forged Pkt | DST IP of Forged Packet | Filter | Result |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|2001:250:cccc:1:7:f | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2 | Yes | pass |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
4.1.1.4. Update the flag(signature) between ASes
4.1.1.4.1. Test Content
AS200 and AS300 are neighbor ASes and 200-2, 300-2 are filtering
devices. At first, start Inter-AS (intervening) filtering solution.
1. telnet 200-2 and 300-2, start /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box
2. Input '5' and enter to start filtering.
3. telnet ASC2 and ASC3, start /home/spm/as-union/control/output/
control
4. telnet login server RegS, start /home /spm/as-union/register/
output/register
Then A3 in AS300 sends ICMPv6 packets to the media server in AS200
with its real source IP address.
At last, telnet 300-2, track record of packets coming from eth1 of
300-2, last for 2T, where T is the period of flag update.
4.1.1.4.2. Expected Result
300-2 would tag a flag into every out-going packet. Find out the
time between flag changes, and this time should be around the period
T.
4.1.1.4.3. Result
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|T | first change time | 1st flag | Second change time | 2nd flag | Change period |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|60s | 10:27:55 | 8fd7 0b58 38a4 | 10:29:03 | ec42 236a b074 | 68s |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.1.5. The protection to newly deployed AS
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4.1.1.5.1. Test Content
AS200 and AS300 have filtering devices 200-2 and 300-2 between them.
But there are no filtering devices between AS100 and AS200 or AS100
and AS300.
At first, start Inter-AS filtering solution.
1. telnet login server, run /home/spm/as-union/registration/output/
register to start the server.
2. telnet 200-2 and 300-2, run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box,
but don't start Inter-AS solutions between them.
3. telnet ASC2 and ASC3, run /home/spm/as-union/control/outbox/
control.
4. telnet login server RegS, run /home/spm/as-union/register/output/
register
Then, a testing machine in AS100 sends forged packets (IP address in
AS 300 is forged) to the MS(media server) in AS200.
Telnet MS in AS200, watch if it receives the forged packets with
tcpdump.
At last, start filtering at 200-2 and 300-2. Telnet MS in AS200,
watch if MS still receives the forged packets.
4.1.1.5.2. Expected Result
The SAVA solution supports incremental deployment. This experiment
is to verity the newly deployed AS is protected from source IP forge
attack and being forged as the source. At first, filtering is not
started and forged packets are found at MS. When the filtering is
started, forged packets are blocked. Even if AS100 doesn't belong to
the solution union, it can't forge the source addresses in the ally
(AS300).
4.1.1.5.3. Result
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| SRC IP of Forged Pkt | DST IP of Forged Packet | Filter | Filter | Result |
| | | Before?| After? | |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|2001:250:cccc:3::7:f | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2 | No | Yes | Pass |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.1.6. Add address space
4.1.1.6.1. Test Content
200-1 and 300-1 are filtering devices between AS200 and AS300. There
are no filtering devices between AS200 and AS100, AS300 and AS100.&#
65306;
At first, start Inter-AS filtering solution.
1. telnet registration server, run /home/spm/as-union/registration/
output/register to start.
2. telnet 200-1 and 300-1, run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box,
start filtering.
3. telnet ASC2 and ASC3, run /home/spm/as-union/control/outbox/
control.
4. telnet RegS, run /home/spm/as-union/register/output/register
The a testing machine in AS100 sends forged packets to MS(media
server) in AS200 with a new forged source IP address (3ffe:5555::7:f)
which doesn't belong to AS100, AS200 or AS300.
Telnet MS in AS200, watch if it receives the forged packet with
tcpdump.
Then telnet ASC3 and input 'add' to add a new address space (e.g,
3ffe:5555: ).
At last, telnet MS in AS200 to watch if the forged packet is
received.
4.1.1.6.2. Expected Result
The Source IP Authentication Union supports management of the address
space. The member AS may gets new address space, it could request
the registration server to add the new address space. This
experiment tests this situation. Before the new address space is
added, the forged packet could be found at MS. After added, the
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forged packet can't be found. This proves that address space can be
added correctly.
4.1.1.6.3. Result
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| SRC IP | DST IP | Filter | Filter | Result |
| | | Before?| After? | |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| 3fffe:5555::7:f | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2 | No | Yes | Pass |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.1.7. Delete address space
4.1.1.7.1. Test Content
200-1 and 300-1 are filtering devices between AS00 and AS300. There
are no filtering devices between AS200 and AS100, AS300 and AS100.
At first, start Inter-AS filtering solution.
1. telnet registration server, run /home/spm/as-union/registration/
output/register to start.
2. telnet 200-1 and 300-1, run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/ box,
start filtering.
3. telnet ASC2 and ASC3, run /home/spm/as-union/control/outbox/
control.
4. telnet RegS, run /home/spm/as-union/register/output/register
Then A3 in AS300 send packets with its real address to MS in AS200.
Telnet 200-2, watch the packet content at eth0 with tcpdump.
Telnet ASC and input 'del' to delete the address space of A3.
At last, telnet 200-2, use tcpdump to watch the packets from eth0 of
200-2.
4.1.1.7.2. Expected result
The Source IP Authentication Union supports management of the address
space. The member AS may omit a used address space, it could request
the registration server to delete the old address space. This
experiment tests this situation. Before ASC3 deletes the address
space, packet arriving 200-2 has a signature (flag). After the
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address space is deleted, packet arriving 200-2 has no signature any
more. This proves that address space can be deleted correctly.
4.1.1.7.3. Result
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| SRC IP | DST IP | Flag exist | Flag exist | Result |
| | | before deleted? | after deleted? | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------|
| 3fffe:5555::7:f | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2 | Yes | No | Pass |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.2. TsingHua (Beijing) <--> GZU (GuangZhou) Test
4.1.2.1. Tag Signature(flag) Test
4.1.2.1.1. Test Content
AS65001 and AS65002 deploy filtering devices THU-BOX and GZ-BOX.
First, start the filtering solution.
1. ssh THU-BOX and GZ-BOX, run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box
2. Input '5' and 'Enter', start filtering.
3. ssh control server THU-CTRL and GZ-CTRL, run /home/spm/as-union/
control/output/control
4. ssh registration sever REG, run /home/spm/as-union/register/
output/register
Then telnet THU-CTRL, execute: ping6 2001:da8:e2::3
At last, telnet THU-BOX, execute
tcpdump -X -vvv host 2001:da8:e1::3 i eth0
tcpdump -X -vvv host 2001:da8:e1::3 i eth1
and watch packets getting into eth0 of THU-BOX and coming out of eth1
of THU-BOX.
4.1.2.1.2. Expected Result
After AS65001 starts filtering, THU-BOX would tag a signature(type
0x21, HOP-by-HOP) into each packet from AS65001. The expected result
is: the packet gets into eth0 have a ICMPv6 expand head after first
40 bytes head, and the packet with the same seq number, which comes
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out of eth1, should have a type 0x21 HOP-BY-HOP option after the
first 40 bytes head, then is the ICMPv6 expand head. This proves
that the signature is tagged correctly.
4.1.2.1.3. Result
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Source IP | Hop-By-Hop Type | Hop-By-Hop Flag | Result |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|Packets | 2001:da8:e1::4 | NULL | NULL | |
| Received | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| PASS |
|Packets | 2001:da8:e1::4 | 0x21 | 51DC B074 FF5C | |
|Sent | | | | |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.2.2. Remove the Signature
4.1.2.2.1. Test Content
THU-BOX and GZ-BOX are filtering devices between AS65001 and AS65002.
At first, start Inter-AS (intervening) filtering solution.
1. telnet THU-BOX and GZ-BOX, start /home/spm/as-union/box/output/
box
2. Input '5' and enter to start filtering.
3. telnet THU-CTRL and GZ-CTRL, start /home/spm/as-union/control/
output/control
4. telnet login server RegS, start /home/spm/as-union/register/
output/register
Telnet THU-CTRL, execute: ping6 2001:da8:e2::3
Telnet GZ-BOX, excute:
tcpdump -X -vvv host 2001:da8:e1::3 i eth0
tcpdump -X -vvv host 2001:da8:e1::3 i eth1
Watch packets getting into eth1 and coming out of eth0 of GZ-BOX.
4.1.2.2.2. Expected Result
When AS65001 and AS65002 starts filtering, GZ-BOX should receive
packets with a flag from AS65001. The flag is type 0x21 in HOP-by-
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HOP option, including a 6 bytes label and 6 bytes PAD. The expected
result is: the packet gets into eth1 have a type 0x21 HOP-BY-HOP
option after the first 40 bytes head, then is the ICMPv6 expand head.
And the packet with the same seq number, which goes out of eth0,
should have ICMPv6 expand head directly after the first 40 bytes
head, this will prove that GZ-BOX removes this signature correctly.
4.1.2.2.3. Result
------------------------------------------------------------
| | Hop-By-Hop Type | Hop-By-Hop Flag | Result |
|----------------------------------------------------------|
|Packets | 0x21 | 51DC B074 FF5C | |
| Received | | | |
|------------------------------------------------ | PASS |
|Packets | NULL | NULL | |
|Sent | | | |
------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.2.3. Filtering of Forged Packets
4.1.2.3.1. Test Content
THU-BOX, GZ-BOX and PKU-BOX are filtering devices among
AS65001,AS65002 and AS65005. At first, start filtering devices:
1. ssh THU-BOX, GZ-BOX, PKU-BOX, run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/
box
2. Input 5 and press 'enter', start filtering.
3. ssh THU-CRTL, PKU-CTRL, GZ-CTRL, run /home/spm/as-union/control/
output/control
4. ssh Registration server REG, run /home/spm/as-union/register/
output/register.
Then connect SmartBits test device to AS65001 and configure the
gateway as 2001:da8:e1::1. SmartBits sends packets to
2001:da8:e2::3, using forged source IP 2001:da8:e5:3::7:f.
At last, ssh GZ-CTRL, execute tcpdump -X -vvv 2001:da8:e5:3::7:f.
4.1.2.3.2. Expected Result
AS65005 has joined the Source IP Authentication Union. SmartBits
device of AS65001 sends packets with forged source IP, which belongs
to AS6005. The packets won't contain the right signatures, hence
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they would be filtered by GZ-BOX of AS65002
4.1.2.3.3. Result
-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SRC IP of Packet | DST IP of Packet | Filtered? | Result |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------|--------|
| 2001:da8:e5:0:0:0:7:f | 2001:da8:e2:0:0:0:0:3 | Yes | pass |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
4.1.2.4. Update Signature
4.1.2.4.1. Test Content
THU-BOX and GZ-BOX are filtering devices between AS65001 and AS65002.
At first, start Inter-AS filtering solution.
1. ssh THU-BOX and GZ-BOX, start /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box
2. Input '5' and enter to start filtering.
3. ssh THU-CTRL and GZ-CTRL, start /home/spm/as-union/control/
output/control
4. ssh registration server RegS, start /home/spm/as-union/register/
output/register.
Login THU-CTRL, execute: ping6 2001:da8:e2::3
At last, login THU-BOX, execute: tcpdump -X -vvv host 2001:da8:e1::3
> tmp.txt
Last for 2T(time), T is the signature update period.
4.1.2.4.2. Expected Result
THU-BOX would tag signature to each outbound packet. Find out the
time of the first change of the signature t1 and the second change
time t2, t2-t1 is close to signature period T.
4.1.2.4.3. Result
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|T | first change time | 1st Signature | Second change time | 2nd flag | Change period |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|60s | 18:46:19 | 51dc b074 ff5c | 18:47:27 | 4a94 e82a ec58 | 68s |
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.2.5. The protection for newly joined member AS
4.1.2.5.1. Test Content
THU-BOX and GZ-BOX are deployed between AS65001 and AS65002.
Firstly, start the inter-AS filtering solution.
1. SSH the Register, and run /home/spm/as-union/register/output/
register
2. SSH THU-BOX and GZ-BOX, and run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box
and enter '5' to begin filtering.
3. SSH THU-CTRL and GZ-CTRL, and run /home/spm/as-union/control/
output/control
Then, connect the testing apparatus SmartBits to the Switch in
AS65001, and use it to send forged packets to GZ-CTRL in AS65002.
The address of forged packets is set to 2001:da8:e5:3::7:f.
Then, SSH to the GZ-CTRL, and execute: tcpdump -X -vvv host 2001:da8:
e5:3::7:f
Observe the captured packets to see whether the forged packets can
reach the GZ-CTRL.
After that, telnet PKU-BOX in AS65005, and run /home/spm/as-union/
box/output/box
Enter '5' to begin filtering.
Then telnet PKU-CTRL in AS65005, run /home/spm/as-union/control/
output/control
Lastly, SSH to the GZ-CTRL, run tcpdump -X -vvv host
2001:da8:e5:3::7:f
Observe the captured packets to see whether the forged packets can
reach the GZ-CTRL.
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4.1.2.5.2. Expected Result
The inter-AS filtering solution for intervening ASes supports the
increment of AS members. New AS can participate in the union when
the policy is deployed. The intention of this testing is to prove
that the address of the participant AS can not be used to attack
other ASes in the union. We expect that before the PKU-BOX is
started, forged packets can reach the PKU-CTRL, and after that, they
can not.
4.1.2.5.3. Result
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| SRC IP | DST IP | Filter | Filter | Result |
| | | Before?| After? | |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|2001:da8:e5::7:f | 2001:da8:e2::3 | No | Yes | Pass |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.2.6. Add new address space
4.1.2.6.1. Test Content
THU-BOX, GZ-BOX and PKU-BOX are deployed among AS65001, AS65002 and
AS65005.
Firstly, start up the inter-AS filtering solution.
1. SSH Register REG, and run /home/spm/as-union/register/output/
register
2. SSH THU-BOX, GZ-BOX and PKU-BOX, and run /home/spm/as-union/box/
output/box And enter '5' to begin filtering.
3. SSH THU-CTRL ,GZ-CTRL and PKU-CTRL, and run /home/spm/as-union/
control/output/control
Then, connect the testing apparatus SmartBits to the Switch in
AS65001, and use it to send forged packets to GZ-CTRL in AS65002.
The source address of packets doesn't belong to any of the three ASes
above.
Then, SSH to the GZ-CTRL, and execute: tcpdump -X -vvv host 3ffe:
5555::7:f
Observe the captured packets to see whether the forged packets can
reach the GZ-CTRL.
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Then telnet PKU-CTRL in AS65005 and add the address space of the
forged packets to its address space.
Lastly, SSH to the GZ-CTRL, run tcpdump -X -vvv host 3ffe:5555::7:f
Observe the captured packets to see whether the packets can reach the
GZ-CTRL.
4.1.2.6.2. Expected Result
The inter-domain filtering policy for non-neighboring ASes supports
the management of addresses. The member AS can apply for protection
of the newly applied address space. The intention of this testing is
to check whether the participant AS can add new address space.
Before adding the new prefix into PKU-CTRL, spoofing packets can
arrive at GZ-CTRL. After the new prefix is added, spoofing packets
disappear. Then the support of this policy for address increment is
proved.
4.1.2.6.3. Result
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| SRC IP | DST IP | Filter | Filter | Result |
| | | Before?| After? | |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|3fffe:5555::7:f | 2001:da8:e2::3 | No | Yes | Pass |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.2.7. Delete address space
4.1.2.7.1. Test Content
THU-BOX, GZ-BOX and PKU-BOX are deployed among AS65001, AS65002 and
AS65005
Firstly, start up the inter-AS filtering solution.
1. SSH Register REG, and run /home/spm/as-union/register/output/
register
2. SSH THU-BOX, GZ-BOX and PKU-BOX, and run /home/spm/as-union/box/
output/box And enter '5' to begin filtering.
3. SSH THU-CTRL ,GZ-CTRL and PKU-CTRL, and run /home/spm/as-union/
control/output/control
Then, connect the testing apparatus SmartBits to the Switch in
AS65001, and use it to send packets to GZ-CTRL in AS65002. The
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address of packets is set to 3ffe:5555::7:f.
Then, SSH to the GZ-CTRL, and run command: tcpdump -X -vvv host 3ffe:
5555::7:f -I inet0
Observe the captured packets to see the content of the packets.
Then telnet THU-CTRL in AS65001,and delete the address space 3ffe:
5555::0/64.
Lastly, SSH to the GZ-CTRL, run tcpdump -X -vvv host 3ffe:5555::7:f
-I inet0
Observe the captured packets to see the content of packets.
4.1.2.7.2. Expected result
The inter-domain filtering policy for non-neighboring ASes supports
the management of addresses. An AS may partition its address space
for some reason. The intention of this testing is to check whether
the participant AS can delete address space. Before deleting the
prefix in THU-CTRL, arriving packets have a label. After the prefix
is deleted, the label disappears.
4.1.2.7.3. Result
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| SRC IP | DST IP | Flag exist | Flag exist | Result |
| | | before deleted? | after deleted? | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------|
| 3fffe:5555::7:f | 2001:da8:e2::3 | Yes | No | Pass |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.2. Inter-AS (neighbouring) SAVA Solution Test
4.2.1. Initialization of deployment
4.2.1.1. Test Content
Filtering devices 100-1, 100-2, 200-1, 200-2, 300-1 and 300-2 are
deployed on the links among AS100, AS200 and AS300.
Start up VRGE.
1. telnet all the filtering devices, run /home/spm/as-union/box/
output/box
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2. Enter '6' to begin filtering.
3. Telnet controller ASC1, ASC2 and ASC3, run /home/vrge/src/output/
vrge
4.2.1.2. Expected Result
Every filtering device will receive the address prefix of the
neighboring ASes. E.g. the filtering table of 100-1 will contain the
prefix of AS300. (Enter '4' to check.) The VRGE of every AS will
send their prefixes to the neighboring ASes. Enter 'rtShow' on VRGE
console to check whether the prefixes are received.
4.2.1.3. Result
Prefix of AS100: 2001:250:cccc:1::1/64 Prefix of AS200: 2001:250:
cccc:2::1/64 Prefix of AS300: 2001:250:cccc:3::1/64 Every filtering
device only receives the prefix of neighboring AS. 100-1 receives
prefix from AS300, and can not receive prefix from AS200. Result:
PASS
4.2.2. Filtering of spoofed packets
4.2.2.1. Test Content
Filtering devices 100-1, 100-2, 200-1, 200-2, 300-1 and 300-2 are
deployed on the links among AS100, AS200 and AS300.
Firstly, start up filtering policy:
1. Telnet filtering devices, run /home/spm/as-union/box/output/box
2. Enter '6' to begin filtering.
3. Telnet ASC1, ASC2 and ASC3, run /home/vrge/src/output/vrge
Then send forged packets to the media server MS from A3 in AS300,
using a IP address not belonging to the address space of AS100, AS
200 and AS300.
Lastly, using tcpdump at MS to observe the receiving packets.
4.2.2.2. Expected Result
The filtering device drops the packets that are not in accord with
the filtering rules. MS in AS200 will not receive the forged
packets.
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4.2.2.3. Result
--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Spoofed SRC IP of Packet| DST IP of Spoofed Packet | Filtered? | Result |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|--------|
| 2001:250:cccc:10::7:f | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2 | Yes | pass |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
4.3. Intra-domain SAVA Solution Test
4.3.1. Testing the validity of intra-domain filtering
4.3.1.1. Test Content
200-4 is the router with intra-domain policy deployed. A testing
apparatus is connected to sub-Switch SW22, and its IP address is set
to 2001:250:cccc:2::5:9.
Firstly, send forged packets to MS with the address
2001:250:cccc:2::4:2. The source address of forged packets does not
belong to 2001:250:cccc:2::5/112. Use tcpdump at MS to observe the
received packets.
Then, stop sending packets. Log on router 200-4 using serial port.
Configure the router:
o 200-4>enable
o 200-4#configure t
o 200-4#ipv6 access-list standard 2
o 200-4#ipv6 host 2001:250:cccc:2::5::/112
o 200-4#deny ipv6 any
o 200-4# interface vlan 2
o 200-4# ipv6 access-group 2 in
Then restart sending forged packets, and observe packets arriving at
MS using tcpdump.
4.3.1.2. Expected Result
Before router 200-4 starts intra-domain filtering, spoofing packets
can pass 200-4, and reach MS. After the filtering starts, MS can not
receive spoofing packets.
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4.3.1.3. Result
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Spoofed SRC IP of Packet| DST IP of Spoofed Packet | Filtered | Filtered |Result |
| | | before? | after? | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|----------|-------|
| 2001:250:cccc:2::7:2 | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2 | No | Yes | Pass |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
4.4. Access Network SAVA Solution Test
4.4.1. Testing of authentication capability for access network
4.4.1.1. Test Content
Before applying for authentication, SmartBits sends packets with
random source address. After the failure of applying, SmartBits
sends packets with random source address.
4.4.1.2. Expected result
Under the conditions described above, no packet can pass the Switch
4.4.1.3. Result
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | SRC IP | Filtered? | Result |
|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------|--------|
| Before Authentication | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:98f | Yes | |
------------------------------------------------------------------| Pass |
| Authentication Fails | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:98f | Yes | |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.4.2. The authenticated network access
4.4.2.1. Test Content
After the success of authentication, SmartBits sends packets with
source IP address set to ADDRESS1, and source MAC address set to
MAC1. ADDRESS1 and MAC1 are both legal.
4.4.2.2. Expected Result
The packets can pass Switch.
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4.4.2.3. Result
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| SRC IP Address | SRC MAC Address | Filtered? | Result |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------|----------|
| 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2315 | 00-15-c5-37-e1-eb | No | Pass |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.4.3. The filtering of forged packets
4.4.3.1. Test Content
After the success of authentication, SmartBits sends these kinds of
packets:
o Source IP Address = ADDRESS2, Source MAC Address = MAC1;
o Source IP Address = ADDRESS1, Source MAC Address = MAC2;
o Source IP Address = ADDRESS2, Source MAC Address = MAC2;
(ADDRESS2!=ADDRESS1 && MAC2!=MAC1).
ADDRESS1 and MAC1 are legal, but ADDRESS2 and MAC2 are forged.
4.4.3.2. Expected Result
None of the packets can pass Switch
4.4.3.3. Result
ADDRESS1: 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2315; MAC1: 00-15-c5-37-e1-eb; ADDRESS2:
2001:250:cccc:2::4:98f; MAC2: 00-15-c5-37-e1-ec;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | SRC IP | SRC MAC | Filtered? | Result |
|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------|--------|
| ADDRESS2 - MAC1 | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:98f | 00-15-c5-37-e1-eb | Yes | Pass |
|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------|--------|
| ADDRESS1 - MAC2 | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:2315 | 00-15-c5-37-e1-ec | Yes | Pass |
|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------|--------|
| ADDRESS2 - MAC2 | 2001:250:cccc:2::4:98f | 00-15-c5-37-e1-ec | Yes | Pass |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.5. Stability Test of Filtering Device
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4.5.1. Testing in the THU Trusty Internet Lab
4.5.1.1. Stability for intervening ASes solution.
4.5.1.1.1. Test Content
Start up 200-2 to begin filtering using intervening policy. Connect
the interface 1 of SmartBits to SW31 in AS300, and connect interface
2 to SW23. The respective addresses are 2001:250:cccc:3::7:f and
2001:250:cccc:2::4:f. Start up a flow at interface 1, with
destination set to 2001:250:cccc:2::4:f, and bit rate set to 20Mbps.
The flow should last for 3 hours. Check the flow received at
interface 2.
4.5.1.1.2. Expected Result
The flow received at interface 2 should have a constant bit rate of
about 20Mbps. This proves the filtering device can process packets
at the rate of 20Mbps.
4.5.1.1.3. Result
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Duration | Bitrate | Bytes Sent | Bytes Received | Result |
|--------------|----------|---------|--------------|----------------|--------|
| Spoofed Flow | 3 hours | 20 Mbps | 27435920000 | 0 | Pass |
|--------------|----------|---------|--------------|----------------|--------|
| Legal Flow | 3 hours | 20 Mbps | 27435920000 | 27282710068 | Pass |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.5.1.2. Stability for neighboring ASes solution.
4.5.1.2.1. Test Content
Start up 200-2 to begin filtering using neighboring policy. Connect
the interface 1 of SmartBits to SW31 in AS300, and connect interface
2 to SW23. The respective addresses are 2001:250:cccc:3::7:f and
2001:250:cccc:2::4:f. Start up a flow at interface 1, with
destination set to 2001:250:cccc:2::4:f, source address set to 2001:
250:cccc:3::7:f/120,and bit rate set to 20Mbps. The flow should last
for 3 hours. Check the flow received at interface 2.
4.5.1.2.2. Expected Result
The flow received at interface 2 should have a constant bit rate of
about 20Mbps. This proves the filtering device can process packets
at the rate of 20Mbps.
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4.5.1.2.3. Result
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Duration | Bitrate | Bytes Sent | Bytes Received | Result |
|--------------|----------|---------|--------------|----------------|--------|
| Spoofed Flow | 3 hours | 20 Mbps | 27282024704 | 0 | Pass |
|--------------|----------|---------|--------------|----------------|--------|
| Legal Flow | 3 hours | 20 Mbps | 27282024704 | 27282024704 | Pass |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.5.2. Deployment test between Tsinghua University(Beijing) and
GZU(Guangzhou)
4.5.2.1. Stability for intervening ASes solution
4.5.2.1.1. Test Content
Start up the GZ-BOX to begin filtering. Connect the interface 1 of
SmartBits to THU-SWITCH of AS65001, interface 2 to GZ-SWITCH of
AS65002. The addresses of these interfaces are 2001:da8:e1::f and
2001:da8:e2::f. Start up a stream to 2001:da9:e2::f at interface 1,
with a bit rate of 20Mbps. The stream should last for 3 hours.
Check the flow at interface 2.
4.5.2.1.2. Expected Result
The bit rate of the receiving flow at interface 2 is always about
20Mbps. This proves that the filtering devices can process packets
at a rate of 20Mbps stably.
4.5.2.1.3. new section
After the filtering is started, the flow between AS65001 and AS65002
is limited to a rate of 1Mbps. The flow rate can be 20Mbps if the
filtering is shut down. Most of the packets are dropped in the
CERNET2 backbone.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
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6. Security Considerations
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7. Acknowledgements
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
8.2. Informative References
[Gao] Gao, L., "On Inferring Autonomous System Relationships in
the Internet", Infocom 2001, December 2001.
[I-D.wu-sava-framework]
Wu, J., "Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA)
Framework", draft-wu-sava-framework-00 (work in progress),
February 2007.
[I-D.wu-sava-problem-statement]
Wu, J., Bonica, R., Bi, J., Li, X., Ren, G., and M I.
Williams, "Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA)
Problem Statement", February 2007.
[I-D.wu-sava-solution-e2e-ipv6]
Wu, J., "An End-to-end Source Address Validation Solution
for IPv6", draft-wu-sava-solution-e2e-ipv6-00 (work in
progress), February 2007.
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Authors' Addresses
Jianping Wu
CERNET
Network Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn
Jun Bi
CERNET
Network Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: junbi@cernet.edu.cn
Xing Li
CERNET
Network Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: xing@cernet.edu.cn
Gang Ren
CERNET
Network Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: rg03@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Mark I. Williams
Juniper Networks
Suite 1508, W3 Tower, Oriental Plaza, 1 East Chang'An Ave
Dong Cheng District, Beijing 100738
China
Email: miw@juniper.net
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