One document matched: draft-turner-md4-to-historic-00.txt
Network Working Group S. Turner
Internet Draft IECA
Updates: 1320 (once approved) L. Chen
Intended Status: Informational NIST
Expires: January 5, 2011 July 5, 2010
MD4 to Historic
draft-turner-md4-to-historic-00.txt
Abstract
This document recommends the retirement of MD2 and discusses the
reasons for doing so. This document recommends RFC 1319 be moved to
Historic status.
Status of this Memo
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1. Introduction
MD4 [MD4] is a message digest algorithm that takes as input a message
of arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or
"message digest" of the input. This document recommends that MD2 be
retired. Specifically, this document recommends RFC 1320 [MD4] be
moved to Historic status. The reasons for taking this action are
discussed.
[HASH-Attack] summarizes the use of hashes in many protocols and
discusses how attacks against a message digest algorithm's one-way
and collision-free properties affect and do not affect Internet
protocols.
2. Rationale
MD4 was published in 1992 as an Informational RFC. Since its
publication, MD4 has been under attack [MD4-Analysis1]
[MD4-Analysis2] [MD4-Analysis3] [MD4-Analysis4] [MD4-Analysis5]
[MD4-Analysis6]. In fact, RSA, in 1996, suggested that MD4 should
not be used [RSA-AdviceOnMD4]. Microsoft also made similar
statements [MS-AdviceOnMD4].
In Section 6, this document discusses attacks against MD4 that
indicate use of MD4 is no longer appropriate when collision
resistance is required. Section 6 also discussed attack against
MD4's pre-image and second pre-image resistance. Additionally,
attacks against MD4 used in message authentication with a shared
secret (i.e., HMAC-MD4) are discussed.
3. Documents that reference RFC 1320
MD4 has been specified in the following RFCs:
Internet Standard (IS):
o [RFC2289] A One-Time Password System.
Draft Standard (DS):
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o [RFC1629] Guidelines for OSI NSAP Allocation in the Internet.
Proposed Standard (PS):
o [RFC3961] Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5.
Best Current Practice:
o [RFC4086] Randomness Requirements for Security.
Informational:
o [RFC1760] The S/KEY One-Time Password System.
o [RFC1983] Internet Users' Glossary.
o [RFC2433] Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions.
o [RFC2759] Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2.
o [RFC3174] US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1).
o [RFC4757] The RC4-HMAC Kerberos Encryption Types Used by
Microsoft Windows.
o [RFC5126] CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES).
There are other RFCs that refer to MD4, but their status is either
Historic or Obsoleted. References and discussions about these RFCs
are omitted.
4. Impact on Moving MD4 to Historic
The impact of moving MD4 to Historic is minimal with one exception,
as described below.
Concentrating on the standards track RFCs:
o The initial One-Time Password systems, based on [RFC2289],
have ostensibly been replaced by HMAC based mechanism, as
specified in HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm
[RFC4226]. [RFC4226] suggests following recommendations in
[RFC4086] for random input, and in [RFC4086] weakness of MD4
are discussed.
o MD4 was used in the Inter-Domain Routing Protocol (IDRP); each
IDRP message carries a 16-octet hash that is computed by
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applying the MD-4 algorithm (RFC 1320) to the context of the
message itself. Over time IDRP was replaced by ???
o Kerberos Version 5 [RFC3961] specifies the use of MD4 for DES
encryption types and checksum types. They were specified,
never really used, and are in the process of being deprecated
by [I-D.des-die-die-die]. Further, the mandatory to implement
encrypted types and checksum types specified by Kerberos are
based on AES-256 and HMAC-SHA1 [RFC3962].
Looking at the informational track RFCs:
o Randomness Requirements [RFC4086] does mention MD4, but not in
a good way; it explains how the algorithm works and that there
have been a number of attacks found against it.
o The Internet Users' Glossary [RFC1983] provided a definition
for Message Digest and listed MD4 as one example.
o The S/Key implementations in the wild have started to use MD5
in lieu of MD4.
o The CAdES document [RFC5126] lists MD4 as hash algorithm,
disparages it, and then does not mention it again.
o The SHA-1 document [RFC3174] mentions MD4 in the
acknowledgements section.
o The three Microsoft RFCs, [RFC2433], [RFC2759], and [RFC4757],
are very widely deployed. MS-CHAP Version 1 is supported
Microsoft's Windows XP, 2000, 98, 95, NT 4.0, NT 3.51, NT 3.5,
but support has been dropped in Vista. MS-CHAP Version 2 is
supported in Microsoft's Windows 7, XP, 2000, 98, 98, and NT
4.0. Both versions of MS-CHAP are also supported by RADIUS
[RFC2548], AAA [RFC4962], and EAP [RFC5281]. The RC4-HMAC is
supported in Microsoft's Windows 2000 and later.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Need to the last bullet and make sure it doesn't
have additional legs.
5. Other Considerations
rsync [RSYNC], a non-IETF protocol, once specified the use of MD4,
but as of version 3.0.0 published in '08 it has adopted MD5 [MD5].
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6. Security Considerations
This section addresses attacks against MD4's collisions, pre-image,
and second pre-image resistance. Additionally, attacks against HMAC-
MD4 are discussed.
Some may find the guidance for key lengths and algorithm strengths in
[SP800-57] and [SP800-131] useful.
6.1. Collision Resistance
A practical attack on MD4 was shown by Dobbertin in 1996 with
complexity 2^20 of MD4 hash computations [MD4-Analysis3]. In 2004, a
more devastating result presented by Xiaoyun Wang showed that the
complexity can be reduced to 2^8 of MD4 hash operations. At the Rump
Session of Crypto 2004, Wang said that as a matter of fact, finding a
collision of MD4 can be accomplished with a pen on a piece of paper.
The formal result was presented at EUROCRYPT 2005 in [MD4-Analysis5].
6.2. Pre-image and Second Pre-image Resistance
The first pre-image attack on full MD4 was accomplished in [MD4-
Analysis6] with complexity 2^100. Some improvements are shown on
pre-image attack and second pre-image attack of MD4 with certain pre-
computations [MD4-Analysis4], where complexity is reduced to 2^78.4
and 2^69.4 for pre-image and second pre-image respectively. The pre-
image attacks on MD4 are practical. It cannot be used as a one-way
function. For example, it must not be used to hash a cryptographic
key 80 bits or longer.
6.3. HMAC
The attacks on HMAC presented so far can be classified in three
types: distinguishing attacks, existential forgery attacks, and key
recovery attacks. Of course, among all these attacks, key recovery
attacks are the most severe attacks.
The best results on key recovery attacks on HMAC-MD4 were published
at EUROCRYPT 2008 with 2^72 queries and 2^77 MD4 computations
[MD4-Analysis7].
7. Recommendation
Despite MD4 seeing some deployment on the Internet, this
specification recommends obsoleting MD4 because MD4 is not a
reasonable candidate for further standardization and should be
deprecated in favor of one or more existing hash algorithms (e.g.,
SHA-256 [SHS]).
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It takes a number of years to deploy crypto and it also takes a
number of years to withdraw it. Algorithms need to be withdrawn
before a catastrophic break is discovered. MD4 is clearly showing
signs of weakness and implementations should strongly consider
removing support and migrating to another hash algorithm.
8. IANA Considerations
None.
9. Informative References
[HASH-Attack] Hoffman, P., and B. Schneier, "Attacks on
Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC
4270, November 2005.
[MD4] Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm",
RFC 1320, April 1992.
[MD4-Analysis1] B. den Boer and A. Bosselaers. An attack on the
last two rounds of MD4. In Advances in Cryptology
-Crypto '91, pages 194-203, Springer-Verlag, 1992.
[MD4-Analysis2] H. Dobbertin. Alf swindles Ann.
CryptoBytes, 1(3): 5, 1995.
[MD4-Analysis3] H. Dobbertin. Cryptanalysis of MD4. In Proceedings
of the 3rd Workshop on Fast Software Encryption,
Cambridge, U.K., pages 53-70, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 1039, Springer-Verlag, 1996.
[MD4-Analysis4] Guo, J., Ling, S., Rechberger, C., and H. Wang,
"Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks:
First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results
on MD4 and SHA-2",
http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/016.pdf.
[MD4-Analysis5] X. Wang, X. Lai, D. Feng, H. Chen, and X. Yu.
Cryptanalysis of Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD.
LNCS 3494. Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT2005,
Springer 2005.
[MD4-Analysis6] G. Leurent. MD4 is Not One-Way. Fast Software
Encryption 2008, Lausanne, Switzerland, February
10-13, 2008, LNCS 5086. Springer, 2008.
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[MD4-Analysis7] L. Wang, K. Ohta, and N. Kunihiro. New Key-
recovery Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4 and NMAC-MD5.
EUROCRYPT 2008.LNCS 4965, Springer, 2008.
[MD5] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
RFC 1321, April 1992.
[MS-AdviceOnMD4] Howard, M., "Secure Habits: 8 Simple Rules For
Developing More Secure Code",
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/magazine/dvdarchive/cc163518.aspx#S6
[RFC1629] Colella, R., Callon, R., Gardner, E., and Y.
Rekhter, "Guidelines for OSI NSAP Allocation in
the Internet", RFC 1629, May 1994.
[RFC1760] Haller, N., "The S/Key One-Time Password System",
RFC 1760, February 1995.
[RFC1983] Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18,
RFC 1983, August 1996.
[RFC2289] Haller, N., Metz, C., Nesser, P. and M. Straw, "A
One-Time Password System", RFC 2289, February
1998.
[RFC2433] Zorn, G. and S. Cobb, "Microsoft PPP CHAP
Extensions", RFC 2433, October 1998.
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS
Attributes", RFC 2548, March 1998.
[RFC2759] Zorn, G., "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version
2", RFC 2759, January 2000.
[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash
Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum
Specifications for Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February
2005.
[RFC3962] Raeburn, K., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Encryption for Kerberos 5", RFC 3962, February
2005.
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[RFC4086] R Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106,
RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC4226] Nikander, P., Arkko, J., Aura, T., Montenegro, G.,
and E. Nordmark, "Mobile IP Version 6 Route
Optimization Security Design Background", RFC
4226, December 2005.
[RFC4757] Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and J. Brezak, "The RC4-
HMAC Kerberos Encryption Types Used by Microsoft
Windows," RFC 4757, December 2006.
[RFC4962] Housley, R., and Aboba, B., "Guidance for
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
(AAA) Key Management", RFC 4962, July 2007.
[RFC5126] Pinkas, D., Pope, N., and J. Ross, "CMS Advanced
Electronic Signatures (CAdES)", RFC 5126, February
2008.
[RFC5281] Funk, P., and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer
Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP-
TTLSv0)", RFC 5281, August 2008.
[RSA-AdviceOnMD4] Robshaw, M.J.B., "On Recent Results for MD2, MD4
and MD5", November 1996,
ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pdfs/bulletn4.pdf
[RSYNC] http://www.samba.org/rsync/
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash
Standard, October 2008.
[SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation
for Key Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007.
[SP800-131] National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Special Publication 800-131: DRAFT
Recommendation for the Transitioning of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes, June 2010.
[I-D.des-die-die-die] Astrand, L.H., "Deprecate DES support for
Kerberos", draft-lha-des-die-die-die-04, work-in-
progress.
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Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA
EMail: turners@ieca.com
Lily Chen
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
USA
EMail: lily.chen@nist.gov
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