One document matched: draft-turner-additional-cms-ri-choices-04.txt
Differences from draft-turner-additional-cms-ri-choices-03.txt
NETWORK WG Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft Russ Housley, Vigil Security
Intended Status: Standards Track May 6, 2010
Expires: November 6, 2010
Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices
draft-turner-additional-cms-ri-choices-04.txt
Abstract
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) allows revocation information
to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types. The
preferred format for revocation information is the Certificate
Revocation List (CRL), but an extension mechanism supports other
revocation information choices. This document defines two additional
revocation information formats for Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) responses and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP).
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
The RevocationInfoChoices type defined in [CMS] provides a set of
revocation status information alternatives, which allows revocation
information to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,
AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types. The intent
is to provide information sufficient to determine whether the
certificates and attribute certificates carried elsewhere in the CMS
protecting content are revoked. However, there may be more
revocation status information than necessary or there may be less
revocation status information than necessary.
X.509 Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [PROFILE] are the primary
source of revocation status information, but any other revocation
information formats can be supported. This document specifies two
other formats: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses
[OCSP] and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
responses [SCVP].
Section 2 discusses the RevocationInformation structure. Section 3
defines a mechanism to carry OCSP responses. Section 4 defines a
mechanism to carry SCVP requests and responses. Appendix A provides
the normative ASN.1 syntax for the two mechanisms.
1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [WORDS].
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2. Revocation Information
For convenience, the ASN.1 definition of the RevocationInfoChoices
type from [CMS] is repeated here:
RevocationInfoChoices ::= SET OF RevocationInfoChoice
RevocationInfoChoice ::= CHOICE {
crl CertificateList,
other [1] IMPLICIT OtherRevocationInfoFormat }
OtherRevocationInfoFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevInfoFormat OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
otherRevInfo ANY DEFINED BY otherRevInfoFormat }
The other CHOICE MUST be used to convey OCSP responses, SCVP
requests, and SCVP responses.
The revocation information choices are defined under the following
object identifier arc:
id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }
3. OCSP Response
To carry an OCSP response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set to
id-ri-ocsp-response, which has the following ASN.1 definition:
id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }
In this case, otherRevInfo MUST carry the OCSP response using the
OCSPResponse type defined in [OCSP]. The responseStatus field MUST
be successful and the responseBytes field MUST be present.
4. SCVP Request and Response
Unlike OSCP, SCVP permits unprotected and protected responses, where
protected responses can be digitally signed or include message
authentication codes. While this provides more flexibility, it
complicates when an SCVP response can be validated by entities other
than the entity that generated the SCVP request. If a lower layer
provides authentication and integrity for the client-server
interaction and the response is not protected, then a third party
cannot validate the response because there is no way to know that the
response was returned over a protected connection. If a message
authentication code is used, then the third party will be unable to
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validate the message authentication code because it does not possess
the necessary private key. For these reasons, SCVP responses sent to
a third party MUST be signed by the SCVP server so that the third
party can validate them.
SCVP response validation requires matching it to the SCVP request.
This means that the SCVP request MUST always be included with the
response. SCVP permits the client to retain the response, and SCVP
permits the request to be returned in the response (in the requestReq
field). The request need not be protected for matching to be
performed; nonces and certIds can be checked.
To carry the SCVP request and response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set
to id-ri-scvp, which has the following ASN.1 definition:
id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }
In this case, the otherRevInfo MUST carry both the SCVP request and
response with the following structure:
SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
request [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
response ContentInfo }
The SCVPReqRes has the following fields:
o request contains the SCVP request. It contains the unprotected
request, authenticated request, or the signed request. The
request MUST be present if the response does not include the
requestRef fullRequest field.
o response contains the SCVP response. It MUST contain the signed
response. Additionally, the responseStatus MUST be okay.
Unprotected and authenticated responses MUST NOT be included.
5. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [CMS], [CMS-ASN], [OCSP], [SCVP], and
[PROFILE-ASN] apply.
To locally store unprotected or authenticated SCVP responses, a
client can encapsulate the unprotected or authenticated SCVP response
in a SignedData. It is a matter of local policy whether these SCVP
responses that are encapsulated and signed by the client are
considered valid by another entity.
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6. IANA Considerations
This document makes use of object identifiers. These object
identifiers are defined in an arc delegated by IANA to the PKIX
Working Group. No further action by IANA is necessary for this
document or any anticipated updates.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 5652,
September 2009.
[OCSP] Meyers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and
C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
June 1999.
[SCVP] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and
W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.
[WORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Information Object Specification.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Constraint Specification.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
Specifications, 2002.
7.2. Informative References
[CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
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[PROFILE-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress.
[PROFILE] Cooper, D. et. al., "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certification
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1.
Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the
2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix
A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix
A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
CMS-Other-RIs-2009-88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-88(63)
}
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS
-- FROM CMS [CMS]
ContentInfo
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
;
id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }
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-- RevocationInfoChoice for OCSP response
-- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat
-- signed OCSP response included in otherRevInfo
id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }
-- RevocationInfoChoice for SCVP response
-- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat
-- SCVPReqRes included in otherRevInfo
id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }
SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
request [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
response ContentInfo }
END
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module
CMS-Other-RIs-2009-02
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-93(64)
}
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORT ALL
IMPORTS
-- FROM [PROFILE-ASN]
OCSPResponse
FROM OCSP-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48) }
-- FROM [CMS-ASN]
ContentInfo, OTHER-REVOK-INFO
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }
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;
-- Defines OCSP and SCVP choices for RevocationInfoChoice
SupportedOtherRevokInfo OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
ri-ocsp-response |
ri-scvp,
... }
ri-ocsp-response OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
OCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-ocsp-response }
id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }
id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }
ri-scvp OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
SCVPReqRes IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-scvp }
id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }
SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
request [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
response ContentInfo }
END
Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA
EMail: turners@ieca.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
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