One document matched: draft-tschofenig-hiprg-hip-natfw-traversal-02.txt
Differences from draft-tschofenig-hiprg-hip-natfw-traversal-01.txt
HIPRG H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft A. Nagarajan
Expires: January 19, 2006 Siemens
J. Ylitalo
Ericsson
M. Shanmugam
TUHH
July 18, 2005
Traversal of HIP aware NATs and Firewalls
draft-tschofenig-hiprg-hip-natfw-traversal-02.txt
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2006.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
The Host Identity Protocol is a signaling protocol which adds another
layer to the Internet model and (optionally) establishes IPsec ESP
SAs to protect subsequent data traffic. HIP is designed to be a
middlebox friendly protocol; it allows middleboxes (such as NATs and
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Firewalls) to participate in the protocol exchange in order to learn
the flow identifier. Additionally, adding authentication and
authorization mechanisms can help the middlebox to prevent
unauthorized end hosts to gain access to the network. This document
provides a problem description, goals and lists a few scenarios.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Overview of HIP Base Exchange with Middleboxes . . . . . . . . 8
5.1 HIP Base Exchange with NAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2 HIP Base Exchange with Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1 Same Firewall at Initiator for both outgoing and
incoming packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2 Different Firewalls at Initiator for outgoing and
incoming packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3 Different Firewalls at Initiator and Receiver . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A. Solution Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.1 Flow identifier interception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.2 Sender Invariance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.3 Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.3.1 What is SPKI? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.3.2 SAML Usage in HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.3.3 SPKI usage for HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.3.4 Authentication and authorization for Base Exchange . . 28
A.3.5 Authentication and authorization for Readdressing . . 32
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 34
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1. Introduction
An IP address serves the dual role of a locator and an identifier for
every host on the Internet. Since, the transport layer connections
are bound to the IP address, end systems that use IP addresses as
identifiers cannot support dynamic changes in the mapping between the
identifier and the locator in case of multi-homing and mobility.
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [I-D.ietf-hip-base] proposes to
separate the identifier from the locator by adding an additional
layer between the transport layer and the network layer. The
transport layer uses a new, mobility-unrelated identifier called as
Host Identity Tags (HITs), in place of IP addresses, while the
network layer uses conventional IP addresses for routing. IPsec
security associations are bound to the HITs and are not modified with
IP address changes. In other words, a host despite being mobile or
multi-homed can use a single transport layer connection associated to
one HIT and multiple IP addresses.
One of the integral features of HIP protocol is, it provides a way to
establish IPsec ESP which are subsequently used to encrypt data
traffic between the two end hosts. HIP, being a mobility protocol,
supports dynamic changes in IP addresses. Because of this, HIP is
liable to all known incompatibilities of IPsec with middleboxes such
as NATs [RFC3022] and firewalls. This draft investigates some of
these problems and proposes a registration mechanism in order to
support the secure traversal of NATs and Firewalls.
This document is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some
terms, Section 3 provides the problem statement, the goals are listed
in Section 4, Section 5 explains the HIP base exchange, Section 6 and
in Section 7 we provide some security considerations.
Appendix A illustrates a possible solution. This section will be
moved into a separate document with a future draft version.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This draft used the terminology defined in [RFC3022], [I-D.ietf-hip-
base], [I-D.ietf-hip-esp] and [I-D.ietf-hip-arch] and [RFC2401].
The term SPI refers to the Security Parameter Index value used in
IPsec packets. The initiator selects one SPI(I) that can be found in
the ESP_info parameter, which is then used by the responder to create
an IPsec packet (ESP packet in this case) for traffic sent to the
initiator. The responder selects one SPI(R)(using ESP_info(R)
parameter) which is used by the initiator to encrypt all data sent to
the responder.
Other relevant abbreviations can be found in [I-D.ietf-hip-base] and
[I-D.ietf-hip-esp].
The concept of a flow identifier is described in [RFC4080].
2.1 Notation
[x] indicates that x is optional.
{x} indicates that x is encrypted.
<x>y indicates that "x" is encrypted with the key "y".
--> signifies "Initiator to Responder" communication (requests).
<-- signifies "Responder to Initiator" communication (replies).
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3. Problem Statement
This version of the document assumes that the data traffic following
the HIP base exchange is IPsec protected and uses the mechanism
described in [I-D.ietf-hip-esp] for exchanging the IPsec parameters.
However, this draft can also be extended to support other HIP based
key exchange mechanisms.
Besides the communicating hosts in the Internet, the entities such as
NATs and Firewalls play a major role in the event of delivering
packets to an appropriate host, and each meant for specific
functionality. For instance, NATs are used to combat the IPv4
address depletion problem, and Firewalls are erected to protect
unsolicited information flowing in and out of a corporate network.
NATs use <src IP ,dst IP, src port, dst port, protocol> as an flow
identifier to identify a particular traffic or connection. Because
of this, protocols like IPsec suffers from well-known NAT related
problems. The NAT traversal approach described in [RFC3947] and
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] allows the end hosts to detect one or more
NATs in between them and [RFC3948] proposes to use the UDP
encapsulation of IPsec ESP packets to traverse NATs.
Since HIP uses IPsec protection for the data traffic, the flow
identifier takes the shape of a <destination IP address, SPI and ESP>
(in order to support smooth traversal of the middleboxes) and the
middleboxes should learn this flow id in order to relay the data
packets. To achieve this, HIP aims to interact with middleboxes
actively whereby these devices need to understand the HIP protocol
and they need to be involved in the protocol exchange. HIP also
provides a way to deal with legacy NATs, as described in
[draft-nikander-hip-path-00.txt]. To support this functionality, it
is necessary to provide UDP encapsulation for both HIP signaling and
IPsec packets. Legacy NAT traversal does not require NATs to be HIP
aware or to understand the HIP message exchange.
Even though HIP allows the middleboxes to participate in the base
exchange, but scenarios like routing asymmetry poses a serious
challenge for the HIP to traverse a middlebox. Section 6 explains
some possible scenarios which have routing asymmetry. The inability
of HIP to handle routing asymmetry motivates to use an explicit
signaling mechanism for the HIP hosts in order to support secure and
smooth traversal of the middleboxes.
Although HIP is described as a two-party protocol, middleboxes are
supposed to intercept these messages in order to learn the flow
identifier and to process them correctly. In other words, a multi
party protocol is created such that the flow identifier is available
to middleboxes between the HIP hosts. To provide proper security,
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middleboxes should not be subject to denial of service attacks and
might want to authenticate or authorize entities which create state.
Note that the IPsec SA is unidirectional and therefore two IPsec SAs
(with two different SPIs, ESP_info contains the SPI value) have to be
established.
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4. Goals
The main goal of the draft is to find a suitable NAT/FW traversal
solution for the Host Identity Protocol. In the context of middlebox
signaling a few goals can be accomplished:
o Add some authentication and authorization capabilities to NAT
traversal. Many NAT/Firewall traversal solutions do not allow the
end host to interact with the middlebox. As a consequence, some
security vulnerabilities are introduced.
o Add secure firewall traversal functionality as another type of
middlebox signaling by using <destination IP address, SPI and
protocol> triplet. as a substitute for the typical < source IP,
destination IP, source port, destination port, transport protocol>
information.
Such a solution for HIP-based middlebox signaling has to provide the
following properties:
o A HIP-aware NAT/FW MUST be able to authenticate the entity
requesting a NAT binding or a firewall pinhole.
o A HIP-aware NAT/FW MUST authorize the entity requesting a NAT
binding or a firewall pinhole before storing state information.
This requirement might be accomplished by identity based
authorization or an identity independent authorization mechanism.
o A HIP-aware NAT/FW MUST be able to intercept HIP messages in order
to extract the flow identifier information and other related
information. HIP messages are base exchange messages during
context establishment and readdressing messages during IP address
changes. A NAT/FW MUST be able to distinguish these messages.
o A NAT/FW node MUST NOT introduce new denial of service attacks
based on authentication or key management mechanisms.
o A potential solution MUST respect the property of some middleboxes
which do not allow traffic (data and signaling traffic) to
traverse this middlebox without proper authorization.
Some requirements are taken from [I-D.ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw].
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5. Overview of HIP Base Exchange with Middleboxes
This section explains the HIP base exchange together with the
middleboxes and describes how the middleboxes behave during the base
exchange.
5.1 HIP Base Exchange with NAT
Figure 1 shows the HIP base exchange traversing a NAT.
I1 +-----------+ I1
+-------------------->| |----------------------+
| | | |
| | | |
R1 | Intercept | R1 v
+---------+ <-------------| the flow |<---------------- +---------+
|Initiator| I2 | identfier | I2 |Responder|
+---------+ ------------->| <Dest IP, |----------------> +---------+
^ | SPI,ESP> |
| | | |
| R2 | | R2 |
+---------------------| |<----------------------+
+-----------+
NAT
Figure 1: NAT and HIP Base Exchange
Subsequently, the HIP base exchange is described in more detail.
I -> R: I1: Trigger exchange
I <- R: R1: {Puzzle, D-H(R), HI(R), ESP Transform,
HIP Transform }SIG
I -> R: I2: {Solution, LSI(I), ESP_info(I), D-H(I),
ESP_Transform, HIP Transform, {H(I)}SK }SIG
I <- R: R2: {LSI(R), ESP_info(R), HMAC}SIG
A potential responsibility of the NAT, as shown in Figure 1, can be
the following
o Intercept the signaling messages
o Authenticate and authorize the HIP nodes by verifying the
signatures.
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o Process the flow identifier information
o Perform actions according to the state machine
o Create state based on the content of message I2 with ESP_info(I)
and R2 with ESP_info(R). Additionally, it might be necessary to
include support for storing the respective HITs and host
identities.
5.2 HIP Base Exchange with Firewall
In case of a firewall traversal, the routing asymmetry needs to be
considered i.e., the fact that the messages I1 and I2 do not
necessarily traverse the same devices as R1 and R2. The same is true
with more complex network topologies with a mixture of NATs and
Firewalls. This is an assumption made in the NSIS working group (and
therefore also with NAT/Firewall traversal). Pure NAT traversal is
therefore simpler to handle in comparison to middlebox traversal
which also includes devices such as Firewalls. Figure 3 shows this
circumstance graphically:
I1 +----------+ I1
+--------------------> | Firewall | -----------------------+
| I2 | 1 | I2 |
| +-----------------> | | ------------------+ |
| | +----------+ v v
+---------+ +---------+
|Initiator| |Responder|
+---------+ +---------+
^ ^ R1 +----------+ R1 | |
| +------------------ | Firewall | <-------------------+ |
| R2 | 2 | R2 |
+--------------------- | | <-----------------------+
+----------+
............... IPsec ESP protected traffic (SPI(R)).........>
<.............. IPsec ESP protected traffic (SPI(I))..........
Legend:
--- = HIP signaling
... = IPsec protected data traffic
Figure 3: Firewall and HIP Base Exchange
With one single NAT between the HIP nodes, all messages of the base
exchange are forced through it. With firewalls, it becomes obvious
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that the nice property of a NAT with respect to the symmetric
forwarding path is lost and the individual firewalls (Firewall 1 and
Firewall 2) are unable to create the necessary firewall pinholes.
SPI(I) is exchanged in I2 message (ESP_info(I)) through firewall 1,
however firewall 2 only needs it. Similarly firewall 2 needs SPI (R)
which is sent in message R2 (ESP_info(I)) through firewall 1.
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6. Scenarios
The following section describes some sample scenarios and the
possible solutions to learn the flow identifier:
6.1 Same Firewall at Initiator for both outgoing and incoming packets
This scenario assumes that the initiator I alone is behind a firewall
named FW(I). This firewall is both for the outgoing and incoming
packets and hence can look into all the base exchange messages. The
FW(I) is expected to authenticate and authorize the initiator to send
out going packets, receiver if necessary to let incoming packets and
intercept the flow identifier from the base exchange. With the E2M
messages, it can be achieved as follows. This is illustrated in
Figure 4
FW(I)
I1 +-----+ I1
+----------> | |--------------------------------------+
| I2 | | I2 |
| +-----> | |---------------------------------+ |
| | | | | |
| | | | v v
---------+ | | +--------+
Initiator| | | |Receiver|
---------+ | | +--------+
^ ^ | |
| | R2 | | R2 | |
| +------ | |< --------------------------------+ |
| R1 | | R1 |
+---------- | |< -------------------------------------+
+-----+
Figure 4: One FW only at initiator end
1. I1 packet is sent from the initiator I to receiver R.
2. FW(I) drops the packet and sends a R1' message back to I. This
is the End host-to-Middlebox or E2M message exchange initiation.
3. I sends I2' message with CERT(I) parameters to FW(I). It
requests the FW(I) to open up a pinhole.
4. FW verifies SPKI certificate and the signature of I.
Accordingly, it either sends a R2' to acknowledge I that it can
continue with the base exchange with message I1 or drops packet
if verification fails.
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5. On receiving R2',I sends message I1 to R again. Now the FW(I)
will let the packet through.
6. R sends the message R1 to I.
7. On receiving R1, if FW(I) wishes to authenticate/authorize the
receiver R, it should initiate E2M exchange here. It sends
message R1' to R forcing R to send an I2' in exchange.
8. R sends the CERT(R) parameter in I2'.
9. FW verifies SPKI certificate and the signature of R.
Accordingly, it either sends a R2' to acknowledge R that it can
continue with the base exchange with message R1 or drops packet
if verification fails.
10. On receiving R2', R sends message R1 to I again. Now the FW(I)
will let it through.
11. The base exchange continues until complete. Since all messages
I1,R1,I2 and R2 traverse through FW(I), it can look into these
messages to learn the flow identifier information.
6.2 Different Firewalls at Initiator for outgoing and incoming packets
This scenario assumes that the initiator I alone is behind firewalls
named FW1(I) and FW2(I).FW1(I) is for the incoming packets to I and
FW2(I) is for the outgoing packets to R. The FW(I) is expected to
authenticate and authorize the initiator to send out going packets,
while FW2(I) would authenticate and authorize the receiver, if
necessary to let incoming packets. It is sufficient that FW2(I)
alone learns the flow identifier information of I. It should store
the state <SPI(I),IP(I),HIT(I)> to forward IPsec protected payload
packets. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 5
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FW1(I)
I1 +-----+ I1
+----------> | |--------------------------------------+
| I2 | | I2 |
| +-----> | |---------------------------------+ |
| | +-----+ | |
| | v v
+---------+ +--------+
|Initiator| |Receiver|
+---------+ FW2(I) +--------+
^ ^ +-----+
| | R2 | | R2 | |
| +------ | |< --------------------------------+ |
| R1 | | R1 |
+---------- | |< -------------------------------------+
+-----+
Figure 5: Two FWs at initiator's end
1. I1 packet is sent from the initiator I to receiver R.
2. FW1(I) drops the packet and sends a R1' message back to I. This
is the E2M message exchange initiation.
3. I sends I2' message with CERT(I) parameters to FW1(I). It
requests the FW1(I) to open up a pinhole.
4. FW1(I) verifies SPKI certificate and the signature of I.
Accordingly, it either sends a R2' to acknowledge I that it can
continue with the base exchange with message I1 or drops packet
if verification fails.
5. On receiving R2',I sends message I1 to R again. Now the FW1(I)
will let the packet through.
6. R sends the message R1 to I.
7. On receiving R1, if FW2(I) wishes to authenticate/authorize the
receiver R, it should initiate E2M exchange here. It sends
message R1' to R forcing R to send an I2' in exchange.
8. R sends the CERT(R) parameter in I2'.
9. FW2(I) verifies SPKI certificate and the signature of R.
Accordingly, it either sends a R2' to acknowledge R that it can
continue with the base exchange with message R1 or drops packet
if verification fails.
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10. On receiving R2', R sends message R1 to I again. Now the FW2(I)
will let it through.
11. Since FW2(I) needs the store the state, once the base exchange
is complete, the initiator should inform the FW2(I) about the
SPI it has chosen for the exchange. This way, FW2(I) can
forward further IPsec payload packets from R to I
6.3 Different Firewalls at Initiator and Receiver
This scenario looks into a more complicated situation. Initiator I
is behind multiple firewalls FW1(I) for outgoing packets and FW2(I)
and FW3(I) are for incoming packets. Similarly, receiver R is behind
FW1(R) and FW2(R) for incoming packets and FW3(R) for outgoing
packets. The incoming firewalls are chosen based on the type of the
application and the hosts are unaware from which firewall they
receive packets. Here, however for our scenario we assume that
FW2(R) and FW2(I) are chosen about which also the hosts are unaware
of. The FW1(I) is expected to authenticate and authorize the
initiator to send outgoing packets to R, while FW2(R) would
authenticate and authorize the receiver to let outgoing packets to I.
FW2(R) should store the state <SPI(R),IP(R),HIT(R)> for the receiver
while FW2(I) should store the state <SPI(I),IP(I),HIT(I)> for the
initiator. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 6
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+-----+
| |
|FW1-R|
| |
+-----+ +-----+
I1 | | I1 +-----+
+------------| | -------------------> | |---------+
| I2 |FW1-I| I2 |FW2-R| |
| +-------| | -------------------> | |----+ |
| | | | +-----+ | |
| | +-----+ v v
+---------+ +--------+
|Initiator| |Receiver|
+---------+ +--------+
^ ^ +-----+
| | R2 | | R2 +-----+ | |
| +------ |FW2-I| <--------------------| |-----+ |
| R1 | | R1 |FW3-R| |
+---------- | | <--------------------| |----------+
+-----+ | |
+-----+ | |
| | +-----+
|FW3-I|
| |
+-----+
Figure 6: Multiple FWs at initiator's and receiver's end
1. I1 packet is sent from the initiator I to receiver R.
2. FW1(I) drops the packet and sends a R1' message back to I. This
is the E2M message exchange initiation.
3. I sends I2' message with CERT(I) parameters to FW1(I). It
requests the FW1(I) to open up a pinhole.
4. FW1(I) verifies SPKI certificate and the signature of I.
Accordingly, it either sends a R2' to acknowledge I that it can
continue with the base exchange with message I1 or drops packet
if verification fails.
5. On receiving R2',I sends message I1 to R again. Now the FW1(I)
will let the packet through.
6. This packet would reach FW2(R). If this firewall wishes to
authenticate and authorize the initiator I, then it can start a
E2M exchange with I. After this is successfully completed,
FW2(R) would open up a pinhole to send packets to R.
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7. R sends the message R1 to I.
8. When R sends R1 to I, FW3(R) would initiate a E2M message to
authenticate and authorize the receiver R. After this is
complete, it will forward the packet to the initiator. On
receiving R1, if FW2(I) wishes to authenticate/authorize the
receiver R, it should initiate E2M exchange here.
9. FW2(I) verifies SPKI certificate and the signature of R.
Accordingly, it either sends a R2' to acknowledge R that it can
continue with the base exchange with message R1 or drops packet
if verification fails.
10. On receiving R2', R sends message R1 to I again. Now the FW2(I)
will let it through.
11. This has completed only one round of authentication and
authorization. However, the states are still not established at
the firewalls. For this, the hosts have to signal their
incoming firewalls about the SPI that they have chosen for IPsec
ESP packets to follow.
When hosts are behind multiple incoming firewalls, there are unable
to decide to which firewall they have to inform their SPI values to.
The first option would be to somehow make the chosen FW to signal the
host about its requirement for a state to forward IPsec protected
packets (similar to a pull model). This could be possibly done along
with the first incoming packet which is R1. R1 packet could include
extra signaling as record route to the initiator. The second option
would be to inform firewall about the SPI values (like the push
model). Here, however it would be necessary to send an extra message
I3 from the initiator to the receiver which would include the
ESP_info(I) for FW(I) and to resend the ESP_info(R) in I2 message for
FW(R).
The second problem is to secure the SPI signaling message from the
end host to the FW. Since the end hosts authenticate and authorize
to the FW that lets outgoing packets, they share keys only with them.
However, they need to signal the SPI value to the FW on the other end
which forwards incoming packets . For the sake of securing the SPI
value, it might be necessary that the end hosts have to run a E2M
exchange with the firewalls on the receiving end also.
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7. Security Considerations
This document provides problem description and overview of the
scenarios for the Host identity protocol, when deployed with the
middleboxes. As motivated in the previous sections, in order to
provide a smooth traversal of middleboxes, an explicit signaling
mechanism is necessary. The solution approach should satisfy the
following properties:
o SHOULD be resistant to denial of service attacks.
o MUST authenticate and authorize the end hosts.
o A potential solution MUST respect the property of some middleboxes
which do not allow traffic (data and signaling traffic) to
traverse this middlebox without proper authorization.
o MUST not be vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
o MUST protect the end hosts against replay attacks.
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8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Pekka Nikander, Dieter Gollmann and
Thomas Aura for their feedback to this document.
This document is a byproduct of the Ambient Networks Project,
partially funded by the European Commission under its Sixth Framework
Programme. It is provided "as is" and without any express or implied
warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
fitness for a particular purpose. The views and conclusions
contained herein are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or
endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Ambient Networks
Project or the European Commission.
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9. References
9.1 Normative References
[I-D.ietf-hip-base]
Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol",
draft-ietf-hip-base-03 (work in progress), June 2005.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
9.2 Informative References
[I-D.ietf-hip-arch]
Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol Architecture",
draft-ietf-hip-arch-02 (work in progress), January 2005.
[I-D.ietf-hip-esp]
Jokela, P., "Using ESP transport format with HIP",
draft-ietf-hip-esp-00 (work in progress), July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2]
Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17 (work in progress),
October 2004.
[I-D.ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw]
Stiemerling, M., "NAT/Firewall NSIS Signaling Layer
Protocol (NSLP)", draft-ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw-06 (work in
progress), May 2005.
[I-D.saml-tech-overview-1.1-03]
Maler, E. and J. Hughes, "Technical Overview of the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V1.1",
March 2004.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2663] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations",
RFC 2663, August 1999.
[RFC3022] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
January 2001.
[RFC3947] Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
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Internet-Draft HIP aware NATs and Firewalls July 2005
"Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", RFC 3947,
January 2005.
[RFC3948] Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
RFC 3948, January 2005.
[RFC4080] Hancock, R., Karagiannis, G., Loughney, J., and S. Van den
Bosch, "Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS): Framework",
RFC 4080, June 2005.
[SPINAT] Ylitalo, J., Melen, J., Nikander, P., and V. Torvinen,
"Re-thinking Security in IP based Micro-Mobility", 7th
Information Security Conference (ISC-04), Palo Alto,",
September 2004.
[SPINAT1] Ylitalo, J., Melen, J., and P. Nikander, "SPINAT: A
Security Framework for Local IP Mobility Management,
unpublished manuscript", November 2003.
[draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v3-08]
Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v3-10 (work in progress) (work in
progress), March 2005.
[draft-koponen-hip-registration-00.txt]
Laganier, J., Koponen, T., and L. Eggert, "Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) Registration Extension",
draft-koponen-hip-registration-00.txt (work in progress),
February 2005.
[draft-nikander-hip-path-00.txt]
Nikander, P., Tschofenig, H., Henderson, T., Eggert, L.,
and J. Laganier, "Preferred Alternatives for Tunnelling
HIP (PATH)", draft-nikander-hip-path-00.txt (work in
progress) (work in progress), February 2005.
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Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.com
Aarthi Nagarajan
Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bayern 81739
Germany
Email: aarthi.nagarajan@tuhh.de
Jukka Ylitalo
Ericsson Research Nomadiclab
Jorvas FIN 02420
Finland
Phone: +358 9 299 1
Email: jukka.ylitalo@ericsson.com
Murugaraj Shanmugam
Technical Univeristy Hamburg-Harburg
Schwarzenbergstrasse 95
Harburg, Hamburg 21073
Germany
Email: murugaraj.shanmugam@tuhh.de
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Appendix A. Solution Approach
A.1 Flow identifier interception
The most important issue with the HIP NAT/FW traversal is to make the
flow identifier <destination IP address, SPI and ESP> available to
the middleboxes. In the presence of NATs, we are always sure that
the forward path and the backward path are same, since the NAT forces
the IP packets to flow through these devices. Hence all the 4
messages I1, R1, I2 and R2 traverse through a single NAT. This makes
it possible for the NATs to intercept the messages for the relevant
flow identifier information. But, in the presence of firewalls,
routing asymmetry has to be taken into consideration.
To enable the firewalls intercept the correct mapping triplet < dest
IP, SPI, ESP > certain values have to be resent with the base
exchange messages. This is illustrated in the Figure 7. While the
IP value of the flow identifier can be intercepted from the IP header
of any base exchange message, the SPI value can be intercepted only
in messages I2 (using ESP_info(I)) and R2 (using ESP_info(R)). I
generates its SPI(I) and sends it to R through FW-R. However, FW-I
needs this information to forward all packets from R to I. Therefore
there has to be someway FW-I can learn this information. One
possible method would be that message R2 could include the
ESP_info(I) value. However, changes to the base exchange are not
desired and we try to keep the base exchange unaffected. The only
other possibility would be that once the base exchange is complete,
the HIP host I could inform the FW-I in its domain about its SPI(I)
value. Similarly, the receiver R could inform the FW-R local to it
about its SPI(R).This way, the firewalls will be able to learn the
SPI values needed to create the state.
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FW-R
+-+
1.I1 | | I1
-------------------------------------> | |--------->
| |
FW-I +-+
+-+
2.R1 | | R1
<---------| | <------------------------------------
| |
+-+ FW-R
+-+
3.I2 | | I2
-------------------------------------->| |--------->
| |
FW-I +-+
+-+
4.R2 | | R2
<---------| | <------------------------------------
| |
+-+
FW-I FW-R
+-+ +-+
5.(ESP_info(I))| | | | 5.(ESP_info(R))
--------> | | | |<--------
| | | |
+-+ +-+
Figure 7: Firewalls and mapping information during Base exchange
A.2 Sender Invariance
The NAT/Firewall HIP node establishes state at possibly several
entities between the HIP Initiator and the HIP Responder. Providing
authentication of the signaling initiator to each individual HIP node
along the path might be possible but not particularly useful, since
the initiator is most likely unknown to some middlebox along the
path. Hence, authentication per se does not solve the security
problem.
With mobility, it might be possible that the intermediate HIP-aware
middlebox need some assurance that a particular node is the allowed
to modify existing state. No other entity should be allowed to
modify state since this would allow certain attacks (such as denial
of service or third party flooding). In some respect this issue is
similar to the authorization property in Mobile IP where the mobility
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binding state established at the CN needs to be protected against
unauthorized modifications.
It seems that the property of "sender Invariance" is required in this
case: "A party is assured that the source of the communication has
remained the same as the one that started the communication, although
the actual identity of the source is not important to the recipient."
This property is particularly important in the context of mobility
which requires a change in the NAT binding or the packet filter.
SPINAT (see [SPINAT] and [SPINAT1]) provided innovative aspects by
using a hash chain approach in combination with delayed authorization
to secure state modifications at NAT devices.
A future version of this document will address the aspect of sender
invariance in more details.
A.3 Authentication and Authorization
Before a middlebox can allocate a NAT binding or a pin hole, the HIP
nodes requesting them may need to be authenticated. Middleboxes
could potentially use information stored in the DNS to authenticate
the HIP end points. Since Host Identities are used to identify HIP
nodes, middleboxes can also use signature verification at relevant
HIP messages for authentication. This might raise some issues on
denial of service attacks at the middleboxes and these need to be
determined. Authorization is certainly more important than
authentication particularly since HIP supports ephemeral host
identities as a mechanism to preserve privacy. As such it would be
useful to use identity independent authorization assertions. SPKI
certificates, attribute certificates or similar mechanisms could be
of particular use, especially in cases where the HIP nodes prefer to
remain anonymous.
A.3.1 What is SPKI?
SPKI authorization certificates are used in access control and are
identity independent. Issuing and receiving an SPKI certificate is
completely local to the network domain and there is no need for a
higher certification authority to issue them. For a HIP protocol
this would mean whenever a HIP host wishes to create a NAT binding or
a FW pinhole, it can locally obtain the SPKI certificate for
authorization at middleboxes. The structure of the SPKI certificate
is shown in Figure 8.
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+--------+---------+-----------------+
| Key 1 | Key 2 | |
| Issuer | Receiver| Can delegate ? |
| | | |
+--------+---------+-----------------+
| |
| Rights |
| |
+------------------------------------+
| |
| Dates |Certificate signed
| |by issuer
+------------------------------------+
Figure 8: SPKI certificate structure
o Key 1 is the public key of the certificate issuer.
o Key 2 is the public key of the certificate receiver.
o If a subject gets the right to re-delegate its rights, it can re-
delegate its certificates to other subjects. In addition, he can
freely sign new certificates to other subjects.
o Rights define access control of the receiver.
o Dates define the validity period of the certificate.
o The complete certificate is signed by the private key of the
issuer.
When a subject wishes to use his certificates, it sends a request
that is signed by the subject's private key. Attached are a chain of
certificates that belong not only to it but also to those of its
delegates. When a verifier receives requests along with a chain of
certificates from a subject, the verifier verifies the requests and
the certificates. If the verifier is satisfied with the
certificates, then the requested operation is allowed. Otherwise,
the requests will be refused.
A.3.2 SAML Usage in HIP
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [I-D.saml-tech-overview-
1.1-03] is an XML extension for security information exchange. It is
being developed by OASIS. SAML enables entities to access resources
by providing assertions which allow authorization.
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A.3.2.1 Assertions
An Assertion is a package of information including authentication
statements, attribute statements and authorization decision
statements. All kinds of statements do not have to be present, but
at least one. An Assertion contains several elements:
Issuing information:
Who issued the assertion, when was it issued and the assertion
identifier.
Subject information:
The name of the subject, the security domain and optional subject
information, like public key.
Conditions under which the assertion is valid:
special kind of conditions like assertion validity period,
audience restriction and target restriction.
Additional advice:
explaining how the assertion was made, for example.
In an authentication statement, an issuing authority asserts that a
certain subject was authenticated by certain means at a certain time.
In an attribute statement, an issuing authority asserts that a
certain subject is associated with certain attributes which has
certain values. For example, user jon@cs.example.com is associated
with the attribute 'Department', which has the value 'Computer
Science'.
In an authorization decision statement, a certain subject with a
certain access type to a certain resource has given certain evidence
that the identity is correct. Based on this, the relying party then
makes the decision on giving access or not. The subject could be a
human or a program, the resource could be a webpage or a web service,
for example.
A.3.2.2 Artifact
The Artifact is a base-64 encoded string which is 40 bytes long. 20
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bytes consists of the typecode, which is the source id. The
remaining 20 bytes consists of a 20-byte random number that servers
use to look up an assertion. The entity creating an Assertion stores
it temporarily. The entity performing the authorization decision
uses the received Artifact to retrieve the assertion. The purpose of
the Artifact is to act as a token which references an Assertion.
SAML also defines a request/response protocol for obtaining
Assertions. The request asks for an Assertion or makes queries for
authentication, attribute and authorization decisions. The response
is carrying back the requested Assertion. The XML format for
protocol messages are defined within an XML schema.
A HIP-aware NAT/Firewall can use this request/response protocol to
fetch assertions from the indicated place.
HIP can use SAML Assertions in CER payloads to provide a mechanism
for HIP end points to authorize them towards middlebox using an
emerging technology. Furthermore, SAML Assertions can be used to
bind the authorization decision of different protocols sessions from
different layers in the ISO-OSI model together. As an example, the
authorization decision by an application layer entity can be used to
bind it to a subsequent HIP exchange. SAML provides a complete
solution for authorization using Artifacts and Assertions and the
corresponding protocols to obtain them. The assertions are based on
XML which allows extensibility beyond the initially envisioned
deployment area.
A.3.3 SPKI usage for HIP
HIP has already defined the CERT parameter that can carry
certificates. The HIP nodes requesting a NAT/FW traversal can send
their base exchange message with the CERT parameter. The CERT will
carry the SPKI certificate and the packet will be signed by the
requesting HIP node. This would mean, messages I2 and R2 should
include the CERT parameter to get them authorized at the middleboxes.
The structure of the SPKI certificate for HIP is shown in Figure 9.
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+------+-------+---------------+
| Key1 |HI(I/R)|Can Delegate? |
+------+-------+---------------+
| |
| Rights for NAT/FW traversal |
+------------------------------+
| |
| Date and further info |
+------------------------------+
| |
| Digital Signature |
+------------------------------+
Figure 9: SPKI certificate structure for HIP
A.3.4 Authentication and authorization for Base Exchange
When a HIP host requests a NAT binding or a FW pinhole, it has to be
first authenticated and authorized by the middleboxes.
Authentication is necessary in many cases,because, in case of
mobility, the middlebox should be authorized to change the flow id
and no other party forge the middlebox to change. Since all HIP
packets are signed using the private keys of the HIP hosts,
middleboxes can verify these packets using the signature
verifications. This, of course, will introduce certain kinds of
denial of service attacks. Denial of service attacks for signature
verification at middleboxes can be prevented by using the client
puzzle concept used by the HIP protocol. For more details the HIP
protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-base] can be consulted. This will force the
middleboxes to delay state creation and to also delay expensive
computational operations. As explained in the previous sections, we
seek to use non-identity based authorization mechanisms that can be
verified by the middleboxes before creating a NAT binding or FW
pinhole. Since NATs force the outbound and inbound packets to flow
through them, they are much easier to handle. For instance, the
mechanism used by SPINAT [SPINAT] can be used for authorization of
state modifications by utilizing hash chains and delayed
authentication with NATS. However, this is not presently suitable
for firewalls with asymmetric paths. More work needs to be done
towards extending this idea for a combination of NATs and firewalls
with routing asymmetry.
A HIP host behind a firewall might need to register itself with local
middleboxes before the base exchange can be initiated or completed.
Firewalls might not allow the traffic to bypass the firewall. For
this, we consider using messages I1',R1',I2' and R2' which are an
extended version of the normal base exchange messages used in HIP.
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However, these messages are exclusively used only for configuring the
HIP host with the firewalls such that authentication and
authorization is complete before the firewall opens up a pinhole.
With this approach, we make fewer changes to the base exchange by
avoiding the inclusion of certain authorization parameters into them.
We refer to this exchange as 'Registration Procedure', defined in
[draft-koponen-hip-registration-00.txt], as shown in Figure 10 which
provides more details of this lightweight protocol exchange.
End host-to-Middlebox or E2M messages
I -> R: I1: Trigger exchange
OR
I -> FW1: I1': Trigger exchange
I <- FW1: R1': {Puzzle, D-H(R), HI(R),HIP Transform}SIG
I -> FW1: I2': {Solution,D-H(I),HIP Transform,{H(I)},CERT(I)}SIG
I <- FW1: R2': {HMAC}SIG
Figure 10: HIP NAT/Firewall Registration Procedure
As an overview, we modify the HIP exchange protocol to authenticate
the middlebox towards the initiator, to authorize (and possibly
authenticate) the initiator towards the firewall and to establish a
security association between the initiator and the responder. We
reuse the HIP protocol for this purpose to use the same
infrastructure and to benefit from a lightweight protocol. Note that
the message flow in Figure 10 does not establish IPsec security
associations. These security associations are not necessary in most
scenarios.
When a host I wishes to create a pinhole with a FW on its side (named
as FW-I), it has two choices:
o It sends a regular I1 message to the firewall. This assumes that
the end host knows that a firewall is located in the network and
additionally the address of this firewall is also known to the end
host. This might be the case in a corporate network environment.
This is shown as the I1' message.
o The initiator I can also send a regular HIP I1 message towards a
destination host (denoted as R). This message will then be
intercepted by the firewall and a R1' is returned.
With R1' the firewall sends a puzzle to the initiator similar to the
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one sent from a HIP receiver to a HIP initiator. The initiator
solves the puzzle and sends the solution back to the FW along with
its SPKI certificate using the I2' message. Note that the Initiator
can send its certificate in the I1/I1' message. This will, however,
create a state even before the client puzzle solution is obtained
from the initiator. This raises some denial of service concerns.
The FW can validate this SPKI certificate and authorize the HIP host
I1. This packet is not liable to any denial of service or replay
attacks as the solution is dependent on the cookie that R1' included.
Hence, the FW can look into the cookie index to avoid unwanted
signature verifications. The ESP transforms are also dropped here as
the there will be no IPsec ESP packets exchanged between the HIP host
and the FW. There is also no need for the ESP_info values in I2' and
R2' messages.
Once the FW receives the I2' packet, it verifies the solution to make
sure that it is the entity to which it sent the R1' packet. It sends
a R2' packet back to the initiator as an acknowledgement for
authorization. The R2' packet however should include a HMAC to
prevent denial of service attacks on I.
After I receives the R2' packet, it can now initiate the normal base
exchange that the FW will forward to R.
On receiving I1, receiver R will send a R1 message back to the
initiator. However, since the FW-R at the receiver end also needs to
authenticate and authorize the receiver, we run the registration
procedure with the E2M messages similar to the previous step between
FW-R and receiver R. Once receiver R receives the acknowledgement
R2', it now sends packet R1 to the initiator that the FW-R will
forward. The rest of the base exchange continues as usual. However
for the sake of the ESP_info interception at the firewalls, as
mentioned before signaling messages have to be sent from the HIP
hosts to their local middleboxes about the SPI values (using ESP_info
parameter)they have agreed on.
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I1' FW-I
----------------> +-+
R1' | |
<---------------- | |
I2' | |
----------------> | |
R2' | |
<---------------- | |
I1 | | 1.I1
---------------> | | ----------------------------------->
+-+
FW-R R1
+-+<---------------
| | R1'
| |---------------->
| | I2'
| |<----------------
| | R2'
| |---------------->
2.R1 | | R1
<--------------------------------------| |<---------------
+-+
FW-I
+-+
3.I2 | | I2
---------------> | | ------------------------------------>
| |
+-+
FW-R
+-+
4.R2 | | R2
<-------------------------------------| |<------------------
| |
+-+
FW-I FW-R
+-+ +-+
5.(ESP_info(I)) | | | | 5.(ESP_info(R))
--------------->| | | |<------------------
| | | |
+-+ +-+
Figure 11: Authentication and authorization for base exchange
messages
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A.3.5 Authentication and authorization for Readdressing
After the base exchange is complete, IPsec payload packets are
exchanged among the HIP hosts. The middleboxes use the state that is
established with them to forward such packets to the HIP hosts. The
state at FW-R is < SPI(R), IP(R), HIT(R) > and state at FW-I will be
< SPI(I), IP(I), HIT(I) >.When one of the HIP hosts moves, it sends
an UPDATE message to its peer informing about the new IP addresses.
The peer will send a new SPI value back to the initiator to make a
return routability check. If the peer receives data from the
initiator on the new security association with this new SPI, it
confirms the mobile node has moved and is indeed reachable at the new
IP address. For middleboxes that use <destination IP address, SPI
and ESP> as the flow identifier to forward HIP packets, this
information needs to be updated with every UPDATE message. FW-I
(assuming that I is mobile) has to intercept the new IP address of I
while FW-R (behind which is the peer R) has to update the new SPI(R)
(using ESP_info(R) parameter( to forward packets correctly. This is
illustrated in Figure 12.
FW-R <SPI(R), IP(R), HIT(R)>
+-+
1.UPDATE with REA[new IP(I)] | |
---------------------------------+ |---------------->
| |
FW-I +-+
+-+
| | 2.UPDATE[new (ESP_info(R))] to IP(I)
<---------| |----------------------------------------
| |
| |
+-+
FW-R
+-+
| | 3.new (ESP_info(R))
| |<------------------
| |
+-+
FW-I
+-+
| | 4.Data on the new SA
---------| |---------------------------------------->
| |
| |
+-+
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Figure 12: Authentication and authorization for UPDATE messages
As seen, FW-R has the flow identifier information for receiver R and
FW-I has the flow identifier information for initiator I. When I
sends a UPDATE message with a REA parameter, R sends a new
ESP_info(R) parameter, which contains SPI(R), to check the
reachability of the new IP address. FW-I can intercept the
destination IP address from this message and can update its
information. After both the UPDATE and UPDATE reply messages have
been sent out, the receiver needs to signal the FW-R about it new
SPI(R). Denial of service attacks and replay attacks are
considerably reduced at firewalls if the firewalls keep track of the
UPDATE ID that is sent in the UPDATE messages. Every UPDATE REPLY
message carries the same number as the UPDATE message and hence the
middleboxes are able to keep up the sequence. Issues as to how the
receiver can inform the FW-R about its new SPI(R) even before it has
received a confirmation on the return routability test have to be
considered.
However, even this is true only if the new access point has the same
set of middleboxes. If the mobile node is behind a new firewall
while sending an UPDATE message, the firewall does not have any state
information to create a pin hole. Hence, it should send a trigger
message that will reinitiate the extended E2M messages between the
mobile node and the firewall as in Figure 11.
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