One document matched: draft-thubert-3122bis-01.txt
Differences from draft-thubert-3122bis-00.txt
Network Working Group P. Thubert, Ed.
Internet-Draft E. Levy-Abegnoli
Updates: 3122 (if approved) Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track February 27, 2009
Expires: August 31, 2009
IPv6 Inverse Neighbor Discovery Update
draft-thubert-3122bis-01.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material
from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly
available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the
copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF
Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the
IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from
the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this
document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and
derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards
Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to
translate it into languages other than English.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 31, 2009.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Abstract
This draft updates the Inverse Discovery Specification [RFC3122] to
provide Secure Neighbor Discovery. The behaviour of the protocol is
slightly amended to enable an easier management of the addresses on a
link and enable Secure ND.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message . . . . . 4
2.2. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Message . . . . . 5
3. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Source/Target Address List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Secure Inverse Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Interface Type and usages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Point to Multipoint Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Point-to-Point Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Broadcast Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
1. Introduction
This draft updates the Inverse Neighbor Discovery Specification
[RFC3122]. Any behaviour or format that is not explicitely changed
is preserved.
The behaviour of the protocol is slightly amended :
o Secure Inverse Neighbor Discovery is added for unicast addresses
with a 64bit interface ID. This specification provides the
additional options that are required to sign Inverse ND messages
with the properties that are defined in [RFC3971] and details how
they may be used to prove the ownership of advertised addresses.
o Fragmentation of ND messages is accepted but not required.
[RFC3122] requires the use of multiple Advertisement messages when
the Target Address List does not fit within MTU. With this
specification, it is acceptable to fragment a message, but it is
still possible to use multiple Advertisement messages, which can
be necessary in particular in the context of Secure Inverse
Neighbor Discovery.
o [RFC3122] does not allow a crisp management of all Addresses that
a peer may use on an interface. When multiple Advertisement
messages are used, it is possible to miss one and thus miss some
information. With this specification, Address Management is
improved in such a way that it is possible to advertise the
addition or the deletion of a single address and to get the
exhaustive list of all the addresses that a neighbor might use to
source packets on an interface.
o With IPv4, Inverse ARP is traditionally applied to Point to
Multipoint networks only. [RFC3122] claims to apply to "Frame
Relay networks", and "also apply to other networks with similar
behavior". This specification extends the domain of applicability
of Inverse Neighbor Discovery and provides some additional
information on how and why Inverse ND MAY be used on all types of
interface.
o Typos such as the length field in the Source/Target Address List
are corrected.
The concept of transaction is introduced to group multiple messages
into a single set to enable the advertisement of the complete list of
all addresses used to source packets on on an interface. Whenever
possible, a node should use one message per transaction.
This is problematic when:
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
o The list of addresses is so large that it causes the message to be
larger than MTU and the node can not fragment.
o Secure Inverse ND is applied and not all of the addresses are
based on a same CGA modifier (see [RFC3972]).
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Messages
This section updates the Inverse Neighbor Discovery Messages defined
in [RFC3122] section 2.
A new field from the ICMP reserved part is used to indicate the
version and preserve backward compatibility. Version 0 is [RFC3122].
Version 1 is this specification. A node proposes a version in the
Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message and responds with the
smallest of its own preferred version and the received proposed
version in an Advertisement.
Another new field from the ICMP reserved part is used to indicate the
Transaction ID of a Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message, in order
to correlate multiple Advertisement messages that may result from one
Solicitation Message. When the information about an address is not
seen after 2 consecutive advertisement of a full List of addresses
that address is considered as removed. This decision is made upon
the reception of an advertisement with a Transaction ID that is
sequentially later then the 2 consecutive advertisements.
2.1. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message
The Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message can be used to
obtain the full list of IPv6 addresses from the remote end of a Point
to Point link such as a PPP link, a tunnel or a Virtual Channel.
The Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation can also be used as a
heartbeat mechanism to verify whether a Point to Point link such as a
tunnel is still up when there is no signal from the lower layers to
indicate a failure.
The Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message is changed as
follows:
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version | Trans ID | Reserved |F| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Modified Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message
This specification adds the following fields:
Type: 8bit field. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation.
Version: 8bit field. Version of 0 indicates the support of
[RFC3122] only. Version of 1 indicates the desire to follow this
specification and the backward compatibility with version 0.
Transaction ID: 8bit field. The Transaction ID is incremented with
each Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message sent to the
same neighbor. The transaction ID can not be set to zero so it
starts at 1 and wraps from 255 directly to 1.
F: 1bit field. The "F" flag indicates a request of the Full List of
addresses on the peer side of the Link.
2.2. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Message
The Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Message can be used as a
response to an Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message or
asynchronously at any point of time once a first Inverse Neighbor
Discovery Solicitation Message was received indicating that the
remote peer supports this specification.
Multiple Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Messages might be
needed to report the full list of addresses. Those messages are
correlated by a same transaction ID.
An unsolicited Advertisement is used to advertise the addition or the
deletion of a single address and is contained in a single Inverse
Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Message, with a transaction ID of 0.
The Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Message is changed as
follows:
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version | Trans ID | Reserved |F| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Modified Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Message
This specification adds the following fields:
Type: 8bit field. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement.
Version: 8bit field. Version of 0 indicates the support of
[RFC3122] only. Version of 1 indicates the desire to follow this
specification. Version can only be set to 1 if the Version in the
Solicitation Message was 1 or above.
Transaction ID: 8bit field. The Transaction ID echoes that of the
Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message that this Message
is responding to. The transaction ID zero is used for unsolicited
Advertisements.
F: 1bit field. The "F" flag indicates that the Full List of
addresses will be provided for that transaction.
Upon a request by the remote peer of the Full List of addresses, this
node SHOULD answer with all the addresses that can be used to reach
it over this link in the modified Target Address List.
If the IND Solicitation does not request the full list then his node
MAY answer with all the addresses that can be used to reach it over
this link in the modified Target Address List.
3. Inverse Neighbor Discovery Options
This section updates the Inverse Neighbor Discovery Options defined
in [RFC3122] section 3.
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
3.1. Source/Target Address List
With this specification, the Source/Target Address List may be
partial or full. It can be used to indicate addition or deletion of
individual addresses. This new support can only be used once the
first Inverse Neighbor Discovery Solicitation Message is received
from the remote peer indicating the support of this specification.
Until the Version that is supported by the peer is known, the only
Inverse Neighbor Discovery Messages that this node should send are
Solicitations, and this option if present can only be a Source
Address List option with a list of addresses that can be used to
reach this node over this link.
This specification uses a Length field of 8 bits, assuming that most
implementations of [RFC3122] also use a Length field of 8 bits and
that the misalignment in section 3.1 is commonly undestood as an
undetected typo. An error in reading the Length field can be
detected when confronting the length of the IPv6 packet and the
expected length of this option.
The Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement Message is changed as
follows:
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Mode | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ IPv6 Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ IPv6 Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
~
|
+-+-+-+-+...
Modified Source/Target Address List option
This specification adds the following fields:
Mode 8bit enumeration
RFC3122: Mode of 0 indicates that the list is built conforming to
[RFC3122]. All the addresses listed are usable but the list
might not be complete.
Full: Mode of 1 indicates that the list might contain addresses
that are defined on another interface but may be used to source
or receive packets over this interface. This is the mode that
is used to in reply to a Solicitation with the "F" bit set.
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
Added: Mode of 2 indicates that the list is a list of recently
added addresses but not necessarily part of a full report.
Deleted: Mode of 3 indicates that the list is a list of recently
removed addresses that may no more be used on this link.
Upon receiving an Address List, a node should verify that the
addresses in the list don't collide with any of its own address. In
case it does, the duplicate address received in the list will be
ignored.
When Secure IND is being used, all the addresses listed in the Target
Address List option in one Inverse Neighbor Discovery Advertisement
Message must be based on the same CGA modifier. If multiple
modifiers are used or some addresses were not built based on CGA,
then they must be split in multiple Inverse Neighbor Discovery
Advertisement Messages.
4. Secure Inverse Neighbor Discovery
The list of addresses provided in Source/Target address list can be
defended using the CGA and the RSA options specified in [RFC3972] and
[RFC3971]. However, in the case of Secure Inverse Neighbor
Discovery, several addresses announced in one message (IND
Solicitation or Advertisement) are defended by a single CGA option
and a single RSA option. T hat mandates that all addresses in the
list are based on CGA and were computed with the same public key,
modifier, collision count, and the same security parameter sec. In
this case, the CGA option is as following:
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Modifier (16 octets) +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Subnet Prefix = 0 (8 octets) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Col.Count = 0 | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
~ Public Key (variable length) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Extension Fields (optional, variable length) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Since each address in the list is going to carry its own prefix (/64
if CGA is used), the Subnet Prefix in the CGA option is set to zero.
Therefore, it should not be checked by the receiver against the
prefix (/64 bits) of each CGA address found in the Address List.
The collision count is always zero, since no Duplicate Address
Detection is performed, other than the node ignoring peer addresses
colliding with one of its own.
The remaining of the CGA algorithm, as described in [RFC3972]
applies. The 16*Sec leftmost bits of Hash2 should equal zero. Hash1
is computed separately for each address in the list, using the first
64 bits as the Subnet Prefix, and the interface identifier should
match Hash1 (except for bits 0, 1, 2, 6, and 7, which encode the
collision count and the "u" and "g" bits).
The RSA option must also be provided in the message, and the
signature must verify with the public key provided in the CGA option
In order to protect against replays, Timestamp and Nonce options,
should also be used in the message, with similar rules as one
described in [RFC3971]. When the message is a solicitation (INS), it
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
should have a nonce option. When the message is sollicited (INA as a
response to INS), it should repeat the nonce value seen in the
solicitation. As far as unsolicited message and solicitation, the
timestamp option is required.
5. Interface Type and usages
Because of IPv4 and the ARP legacy, Inverse Neighbor Discovery is
usually associated to Point to Multipoint (P2MP) or Non-Broadcast
Multi-Access (NBMA) networks. And certainly, this specification is
usable on such networks as Frame Relay or Multidrop tunnels.
But the similarity with IPv4 is limited and this specification
enables a lot more:
5.1. Point to Multipoint Networks
IPv6 Secure Inverse Neighbor Discovery can be applied to P2MP and
NBMA networks to prevent the theft an address by another Node.
5.2. Point-to-Point Links
As opposed to IPv4, using Inverse Neighbor Discovery makes a lot of
sense on Point-to-Point link such as PPP or tunnels:
This specification inherits from [RFC3122] the support of the
authentication header to authenticate the remote peer on the link.
For P2P links, this might prove more relevant than Secure ND itself.
Because IPv6 operates purely at layer 3, the PPP Network Control
Protocol for IPv6 defined in [RFC5072] provides a way to negotiate a
unique, 64bit interface identifier to be used for the address
autoconfiguration but does not enable to advertise an IPv6 address.
This would not fit anyway since IPv6 might use many addresses of
various lifetimes on a same interface. This specification provides
the means to create and maintain the list of addresses that can be
used to reach the remote peer at any point of time.
A number of Denial of Service attacks are documented when using
[RFC4861] by sending packets to addresses that are not assigned but
belong to a prefix that is associated to the P2P link. On those
links, Inverse Neighbor Discovery enables a proactive model that
defeats those attacks. Any packet that is received for a destination
that is not in the ND table is simply dropped.
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
5.3. Broadcast Networks
A multihomed host attached to a broadcast network might use an
address that belongs to another interface on another subnet to source
a packet. This makes the validation of source addresses very
problematic. With this specification, a router may solicit the full
list of all addreses that this host might use to source packets on
that interface, and prove the ownership using SeND. The router might
then accept packets that are sourced off-link and may install a host
route to that address.
6. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
7. Security Considerations
This draft improves the security model in [RFC3122] by adding the
capability to use Secure Neighbor Discovery
8. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Tony Cheneau and Wojciech Dec for useful feedback and
discussion.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC3122] Conta, A., "Extensions to IPv6 Neighbor Discovery for
Inverse Discovery Specification", RFC 3122, June 2001.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft RFC3122bis February 2009
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
[RFC5072] S.Varada, Haskin, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6 over
PPP", RFC 5072, September 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Pascal Thubert (editor)
Cisco Systems
Village d'Entreprises Green Side
400, Avenue de Roumanille
Batiment T3
Biot - Sophia Antipolis 06410
FRANCE
Phone: +33 4 97 23 26 34
Email: pthubert@cisco.com
Eric Levy-Abegnoli
Cisco Systems
Village d'Entreprises Green Side
400, Avenue de Roumanille
Batiment T3
Biot - Sophia Antipolis 06410
FRANCE
Phone: +33 4 97 23 26 20
Email: elevyabe@cisco.com
Thubert & Levy-Abegnoli Expires August 31, 2009 [Page 13]
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-21 18:26:14 |