One document matched: draft-shen-udp-traceroute-ext-01.txt
Differences from draft-shen-udp-traceroute-ext-00.txt
Internet N. Shen
Internet-Draft C. Pignataro
Intended status: Standards Track R. Asati
Expires: December 6, 2008 E. Chen
Cisco Systems, Inc.
June 4, 2008
UDP Traceroute Message Extension
draft-shen-udp-traceroute-ext-01
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2008.
Abstract
This document specifies an extension to UDP traceroute messages that
allows the UDP traceroute probe packets to be authenticated by the
intermediate nodes and the destination node. This extension can also
include requests for node specific information that the sender is
interested to receive from one or more nodes via the traceroute
replies.
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Table of Contents
1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. UDP Traceroute Message Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Original Length Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. UDP Traceroute Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.1. Traceroute Common Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.2. Traceroute TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2.1. Traceroute Authentication TLV . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2.2. Traceroute Information-Request TLV . . . . . . . . 7
4. Implementation and Operation Considerations . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Traceroute Probe Sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Traceroute Probe Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Specification of Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
Traceroute is a tool widely used in the diagnosis of network
problems. Majority of the traceroute tools are implemented by
sending out UDP [RFC0768] probe messages and receiving ICMP messages.
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP/ICMPv6) [RFC0792] [RFC4443]
has been extended to support multi-part message inside ICMP
[RFC4884]. Some of the applications [I-D.atlas-icmp-unnumbered]
[RFC4950] [I-D.shen-icmp-routing-inst] are designed mainly for
internal network troubleshooting by network operators. Network
providers may want to limit those applications only to trusted
senders of traceroute probes due to security or policy reasons.
Although one may employ a rudimentary control mechanism to limit the
trusted senders by defining access control lists specifying IPv4/IPv6
source addresses of the UDP traceroute message, such mechanism is
deemed configuration intensive, static, and error-prone. Moreover,
such mechanism would be susceptible to address spoofing.
Additionally, such mechanism does not provide the sender with dynamic
control of the different kind of extensions to be requested.
This document defines an extension for UDP traceroute messages to
optionally include authentication signature. The intermediate and
destination nodes can authenticate the sender of the traceroute
packet before providing the requested information in the traceroute
response.
This document also includes an Information-Request TLV for the
traceroute extension. This TLV specifies the types of information
the sender expects to be included in the traceroute response (i.e.,
in the ICMP message elicited by the UDP packet and generated by the
intermediate or destination node or nodes).
This extension is backwards compatible with the existing Internet
traceroute mechanism, and it is applied to both IPv4 and IPv6
networks.
This extension is applicable to only the UDP type of traceroute
probe, similar scheme might be used with other types of traceroute
probe and it is outside the scope of this document.
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3. UDP Traceroute Message Extension
This proposed extension is to reserve the lowest 4 bits in the UDP
source port field, and a traceroute structure within UDP data field.
3.1. Original Length Field
This "original length" field is defined as the lowest nibble of the
UDP source port field, and specifies the position at which the
traceroute data structure begins. The value represents 32-bit words
ranges from 0x0 to 0xF, with value 0xF as reserved. Thus the
position of the traceroute data structure can start from 0 to 56
octets inside UDP data field. The "original length" field value 0xF
indicates there is no traceroute data structure inside the UDP data
field.
The "original length" field is defined within UDP "source port" as
the following:
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |Ori-Len|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Ori-Len: 4 bits. The value (Ori-Len) represents the traceroute data
structure start position in 32-bit words. The Ori-Len value
0xF is reserved.
3.2. UDP Traceroute Structure
The UDP traceroute structure starts in UDP data field location from 0
to 56 octets specified in the "original length" in 32-bit boundary.
It MUST have exactly one traceroute common header followed by one or
more UDP traceroute TLVs.
3.2.1. Traceroute Common Header
The Common Header is a 8 octets structure has the following format:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| Length | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Magic-Number (0x54726163) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields of the Common Header are defined as follows:
Version: 4 bits. It is defined as 1 in this document.
Length: 12 bits. The total length of the traceroute data structure
specifying number of 32-bit words (includes the common
header and all the TLVs).
Checksum: 16 bits. The one's complement of the one's complement sum
of the traceroute data structure, with the checksum field
replaced by zero for the purpose of computing the checksum.
Magic Number: 32 bits. It is defined as Hex value of 0x54726163 in
this document. This is used mainly for structure
identification of this extension version.
3.2.2. Traceroute TLV
Traceroute TLVs (Type-Length-Value tuples) have the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value |
. .
. .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: 16 bits.
Length: 16 bits. length of the Value field in octets.
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Value: depends on the Type. It is zero padded to align to a
4-octet boundary.
This document defines two TLVs below.
3.2.2.1. Traceroute Authentication TLV
This TLV carries the HMAC authentication related information. It
verifies both the data integrity and the authenticity of the entire
message. This TLV has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 1 (Authentication) | Length (variable) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type | Key ID | Auth Data Len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Auth Data (Variable) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Auth Type: 16 bits. The following values are proposed:
* Type=0 signifies no authentiction
* Type=1 signifies simple password based
authentication.
* Type=2 signifies Cryptographic authentication.
Please note that the above type values are in line with IANA
allocated values for other protocols (e.g., OSPF).
Key ID: 8 bits. This allows multiple secret keys to be active
simultaneously. Using Key IDs makes the key rollover
convenient. Each secret key must be associated with the
hash algorithm. This may be done through provisioning on
each node.
Auth Data Len: 8 bits. This specifies the length of the
authentication data (and allows for the support of current
and future authentication schemes).
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Auth Data: Variable length. This field carries the result (e.g.,
HMAC code) of the HMAC alogorithm applied over the entire
traceroute IP/IPv6 packet. When the Auth data is
calculated, the shared key is stored in this field, and the
checksum fields in the IP header, UDP header and traceroute
common header are set to zero. The result of the algorithm
is placed in the Auth Key field. The following lists
algorithms that could be commonly supported:
* HMAC-MD5
* HMAC-SHA1
* HMAC-SHA2 variants (e.g., 224, 256, 384, 512, etc.)
At least HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 algorithms should be
supported on all the nodes compliant with this
specification.
3.2.2.2. Traceroute Information-Request TLV
The Information-Request TLV has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 2 (Info-Req) | Length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Info Request |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Info-Req: 32 bits. This bitflag field lists the request items the
traceroute sender is interested. The bit number ranges from
the right most bit to the left most bit. Currently defined
as the following:
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Bit Number Information Item
0 MPLS label related attributes
1 Interface related attributes
2 IP/IPv6 address related attributes
3 Routing Instance related attributes
4. Implementation and Operation Considerations
There is no change in this extension for the normal traceroute
implementation and operation except for reserving the lowest 4 bits
in the UDP source port field. The implementations for the sender can
use the same semantics with the UDP source port; and it makes no
difference to the receivers if they don't support this extension.
4.1. Traceroute Probe Sender
The sender supports this extension MAY include the Traceroute
structure in it's UDP probe to specify the request types and
authentication key. The sender SHOULD set the "original length"
value to 0xF if there is no Traceroute structure present inside the
UDP probe. The sender MAY request one or multiple types of
information defined in the traceroute "Info-Req" TLV.
4.2. Traceroute Probe Receiver
When the traceroute probe receiver, the intermediate and destination
node, processes the UDP probe, it MAY check the UDP Traceroute
structure to verify if the sender is from an authenticated host and
to see what types of information it requested. This check is only
needed when the receiver tries to authenticate the UDP probe sender,
or when the receiver is formating the ICMP and ICMPv6s that support
multi-part messages and it has certain internal information that can
be included in the ICMP packets.
If the "original length" value is not 0xF, UDP traceroute structure
may be present. The receiver MUST verify the integrity of the data
structure by examining the "version" field, the Magic-Number value,
and the length of the structure. It MUST perform the checksum to
verify the data structure. If the authentication TLV is present and
the local policy requires it to perform the verification, the
receiver MUST use it's locally stored shared key to validate the
checksum in the TLV. Multiple Authentication Keys can be used which
can be useful in the case the UDP probes are from trusted peer
networks.
If the "Info-Req" TLV is included, the receiver SHOULD fetch the
related information when formating the ICMP packets, but MUST NOT
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inlcude information that has the corresponding bitflag cleared.
5. Security Considerations
This extension enhances the security of traceroute operation in a
backwards-compatible fashion. The mechanism allows the receiver to
verify the sender of the UDP traceroute packet such that certain
sensitive interface and network related information can be supplied
in the internal network or across trusted networks.
The use of Cryptographic authentication (i.e., an Auth Type value of
2) allows for a strong authentication mechanism since the keys cannot
be discerned by intercepting the packets. The proposed Keyed
authentication does not prevent replay attacks. However, in the case
of replay attacks, since the packet source IP/IPv6 address of the
traceroute probe can not be changed, there is no easy way for the
attacker to retrieve the ICMP messages.
A router needs to protect against purposefully-bogus UDP Traceroute
packets with extensions that fail the authentication, as a high rate
of messages can require significant processing time. [RFC1812]
specifies how rate-limiting is applied to the generation of ICMP
messages, and this rate-limiting deterrs the threat when applied
before checking the Authentication. Additionally, when using
Cryptographic authentication, the HMAC includes the source IP
address, which means the HMAC will not validate if the UDP packet is
sent over a NAT.
6. IANA Considerations
The UDP Traceroute Extension contains traceroute TLVs. IANA should
establish a registry of UDP Traceroute Extension Types. This
document defines Type 1 and Type 2 for authentication and
information-request. Types 3-0xF6 are allocated through Expert
Review [RFC5226]. Types 0xF7 to 0xFF are reserved for private use.
IANA should also establish a registry for UDP Traceroute Info-Request
Bits. This document defines bits 0 - 3 in section 3.2.2.2. Bits
4-29 are allocated through Expert Review. Bits 30 - 31 are reserved
for private use.
7. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Dan Wing, for his insighful comments and valuable
suggestions regarding this document.
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8. Normative References
[I-D.atlas-icmp-unnumbered]
Atlas, A., Bonica, R., Systems, N., Shen, N., and E. Chen,
"Extending ICMP to Identify the Receiving Interface",
draft-atlas-icmp-unnumbered-04 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[I-D.shen-icmp-routing-inst]
Shen, N. and E. Chen, "ICMP Extensions for Routing
Instances", draft-shen-icmp-routing-inst-00 (work in
progress), November 2006.
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
August 1980.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, September 1981.
[RFC1812] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, June 1995.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, "Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006.
[RFC4884] Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro,
"Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages", RFC 4884,
April 2007.
[RFC4950] Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro, "ICMP
Extensions for Multiprotocol Label Switching", RFC 4950,
August 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
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Authors' Addresses
Naiming Shen
Cisco Systems, Inc.
225 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: naiming@cisco.com
Carlos Pignataro
Cisco Systems, Inc.
7200 Kit Creek Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
USA
Email: cpignata@cisco.com
Rajiv Asati
Cisco Systems, Inc.
7025 Kit Creek Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
USA
Email: rajiva@cisco.com
Enke Chen
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: enkechen@cisco.com
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