One document matched: draft-salowey-tls-ticket-00.txt
Network Working Group
Internet Draft N. Cam-Winget
D. McGrew
J. Salowey
H. Zhou
Document: draft-salowey-tls-ticket-00.txt Cisco Systems
Expires: October 2004 May 2004
A TLS Hello Extension for Ticket Based Pre-Shared Keys
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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Abstract
This document describes a TLS extension that makes use of a pre-
established ticket to distribute the shared secret for establishing a
TLS session. The mechanism uses extensions to the TLS session resume
hello exchange. In particular the ticket enables the client to
maintain state so the server does not have to maintain per-client
session state. The use of a hello extension allows fallback to a
full ciphersuite handshake. Considerations for the initial
establishment of the ticket material are discussed.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction........................................... 2
2. Basic operation........................................ 2
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2.1 TLS Hello Ticket Extension......................... 3
2.2 Generating the master secret ...................... 4
2.3 TLS Hello Ticket extension format.................. 4
3. Ticket Considerations.................................. 5
3.1 Ticket Contents.................................... 5
3.2 Ticket Issuance.................................... 5
3.3 Ticket Format...................................... 6
4. Security Considerations................................ 7
Normative References...................................... 7
Informative References.................................... 7
Acknowledgments........................................... 8
Author's Addresses........................................ 8
1. Introduction
This document describes an extension to TLS that allows shared keys
to be used similar to [TLS-SHARED-KEY] but enables one of the peers
to be stateless. The extension is modeled after [RFC 3546] and
employs the session resume logic. The proposal allows for the session
state to be stored on the client in a ticket issued by the server or
some central authority. This relieves the server from maintaining
per-client session state. This mechanism is based on work done for
[EAP-FAST] which discusses this extension as well as a method for
distributing the initial ticket.
An extension to the TLS resume functionality instead of a new cipher
suite was chosen because it allows the protocol to fall back to full
authentication cipher suite if the ticket provided in the hello
message is not valid. This extension can be used in conjunction with
any TLS cipher suite including those specified in [TLS-PSK].
2. Basic operation
The basic operation assumes that a ticket has been previously issued
to the client. The ticket consists of a ticket key which is known to
the client, an opaque portion which contains information for the
server and optional informational section which describes information
in the ticket to the client. A suggested format for the distribution
of the ticket is described in section 3.3. Since the ticket contains
secret key material it MUST be distributed by a mechanism that
protects the integrity and the confidentiality of the ticket. In
addition the distribution mechanism SHOULD authenticate and authorize
the issuer. The exact means for distributing this ticket is not
specified in this document; however suggestions and considerations
are discussed in section 3.2 and in [EAP-FAST]. In EAP-FAST this
ticket is called the PAC.
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The exchange for establishing a session is the same as that used by
TLS abbreviated handshake for session resume from [RFC 2246]:
Client Server
ClientHello -------->
ServerHello
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
Application Data <-------> Application Data
A new extension to the client hello is defined to contain the opaque
part of the ticket held by the client.
2.1 TLS Hello Ticket Extension
The TLS Hello ticket extension is an extension to the client hello
message and is included in the client_hello_extension_list defined in
[RFC 3546]. The extension is used as follows.
When then client wants to establish a session with the server, it
creates a TLS client hello record. It includes the appropriate
protocol version, new random value, acceptable cipher suites and
compression methods just as in standard TLS [RFC 2246]. Since the
session state is not stored on the server the Session ID SHOULD be
set to 0. The client includes a client hello extension which
contains only the opaque part of the client=92s ticket. For the
remainder of this section the word ticket indicates only the opaque
portion of the ticket held by the client. It MUST NOT be feasible
for an eavesdropper to extract valuable information, such as the
ticket key, from the opaque portion of the ticket.
When the server receives a client hello containing a ticket extension
it extracts the ticket information and attempts to decode it. The
opaque portion of the ticket is opaque to the client, not the server. =
If the server cannot process the ticket or the ticket is not usable
for any reason (for example it may have expired) then it may initiate
the normal full TLS handshake with the client. Alternatively, if the
server is unable to process the ticket it may send a TLS-Alert
indicating handshake_failure.
If it can decode the ticket then it uses the information in the
ticket to re-generate the ticket key (this will typically require the
server to decrypt the ticket). The server derives the TLS master
secret from the ticket key as described in the section 2.2. The
server then continues with the abbreviated handshake for TLS session
Resume. It chooses appropriate ciphersuite and compression data based
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on the client request and any additional data in the ticket if any
exists.
The server may return a session-id in the server hello message. The
client may then store this session-id along with the required
cryptographic state so that session resume can be performed as in
standard TLS. In the case that the client wants to use the standard
session resume it includes the session-id issued by the server in the
client hello.
2.2 Generating the master secret
A 48 byte TLS master secret is generated from the ticket key (TK) in
the TLS Hello ticket as follows.
master_secret =3D T-PRF (TK, "PAC to master secret label hash",
server_random + client_random, 48)
T-PRF is defined in [EAP-FAST] as
T-PRF (Key, label, seed, OutputLength) =3D T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 + ...
Where + denote concatenation;
S =3D label + 0x00 + seed;
and
T1 =3D HMAC-SHA1 (Key, S + OutputLength + 0x01)
T2 =3D HMAC-SHA1 (Key, T1 + S + OutputLength + 0x02)
T3 =3D HMAC-SHA1 (Key, T2 + S + OutputLength + 0x03)
T4 =3D HMAC-SHA1 (Key, T3 + S + OutputLength + 0x04)
The master secret is then used to generate the key block as described
in [RFC 2246].
2.3 TLS Hello Ticket extension format
The format of the TLS Hello ticket extension can be described as
follows.
The extension type number for TLS ticket extension is 35.
The TLS ticket extension format is defined as:
struct {
opaque _Hello ticket<1..2^16-1>
} HelloTicket;
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3. Ticket Considerations
3.1 Ticket Contents
The TLS Hello ticket consists of three discreet components: the
ticket key, the ticket opaque data and the ticket informational data.
The ticket key is a symmetric key of at least 16 bytes in length.
This is the key that is used to derive the TLS master secret.
The ticket opaque data is data to be processed by the server and its
contents must be completely opaque to the client or any eavesdropper. =
At the very least it MUST contain enough information for the TLS
server to derive the TLS master secret. The ticket should also
contain information restricting its validity in time. The ticket
opaque data may contain additional data such as identity information,
ciphersuite information, capabilities and authorization attributes.
How this information is processed is up to the entities that issue
and process the ticket.
Ticket informational data consists of data for the client which
provides information about the usage of the ticket. The ticket
information data may contain validity data such as an expiry time or
information on which ciphersuite to use. This information is
optional. If the client cannot interpret any of the data it should
ignore the data it does not understand.
The ticket MUST be transmitted and stored in a manner that maintains
its confidentiality and authenticity.
The client may maintain a cache of tickets it shares with respective
servers. Since these tickets contain keys access to this cache must
be restricted to authorized entities.
3.2 Ticket Issuance
The client may obtain a ticket in many different ways. It may be
issued by the same server that processes the ticket or it may be
issued by a trusted third party. How this is done is beyond the
scope of this document. In [EAP-FAST] the TLS Hello ticket is
distributed within an established TLS tunnel after user
authentication is performed.
As stated above the ticket MUST be transmitted in a manner that
maintains its confidentiality and authenticity. In addition if the
ticket is meant to convey identity or authorization then the system
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must ensure that only the intended party can obtain the ticket. In
this case the ticket must only be issued after appropriate
authentication and authorization has taken place.
3.3 Ticket Format
In order to promote interoperable implementation the PAC format from
EAP-FAST is used when transporting the ticket. The format MUST be
used with a security mechanism to protect the ticket key.
The basic format consists of a series type-length-value (TLV)
structures. A TLV is defined as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R Reserved
The first two bytes are reserved and set to 0
TLV Type
Enumerated type value
Length
Two byte length value in network byte order
Value
Variable length value
The ticket key (PAC-key) has a TLV type of 1 and a length of at least
16 bytes. The value contains the key used to derive the TLS Master
Secret.
The ticket opaque data (PAC-Opaque) has a TLV type of 2 and a length
of at least 16 bytes. The value contains the opaque data which is
treated as opaque data by the client.
The ticket lifetime (CRED_LIFETIME) has a TLV type of 3 and a length
of 4 bytes. The value contains the expiration time of the credential
in UNIX UTC time.
The ticket issuer ID (A-ID) has a TLV type of 4 and a variable
length. The value contains a name used to identify the issuer of the
ticket.
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Values 5-9 are defined in [EAP-FAST].
4. Security Considerations
The ticket opaque is transmitted in the clear during the TLS
handshake; therefore it MUST NOT reveal sensitive information to an
eavesdropper.
The master secret key in the ticket is used to derive the TLS master
secret. It should be generated in a way that ensures that it has
sufficient entropy. It SHOULD NOT be derived directly from a
password, however the ticket may be issued as a result of password
based authentication.
When the ticket is cached it MUST be stored so that access to the
cache is restricted to only allow authorized parties.
If the ticket contains authorization information then it should only
be issued after successful authentication and authorization have
occurred. Various aspects of credentials management such as
revocation, expiry and renewal need to be considered when placing
identity and authorization information in a ticket.
Normative References
[RFC 2246]
Dierks, Tim and Allen, Christopher, "The TLS Protocol", RFC
2246, January 1999.
[RFC 3546]
Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwwod, D., Mikkelsen, J.
and Wright, T., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions",
RFC 3546, June 2003
Informative References
[EAP-FAST]
Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., Zhou, H., "EAP
Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling (EAP-FAST)",
draft-cam-winget-eap-fast-00 (work in progress), February
2004
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[TLS-SHARED-KEY]
Gutmann, P., "Use of Shared Keys in the TLS Protocol",
draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02 (work in progress), October
2003.
[TLS-PSK]
Eronen, P., and Tschofenig, H. "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", draft-eronen-tls-psk-
00.txt (work in progress), February 2004
Acknowledgments
Author's Addresses
Nancy Cam-Winget
Cisco Systems
3625 Cisco Way
San Jose, CA 95134
US
Phone: +1 408 853 0532
Email: ncamwing@cisco.com
David McGrew
Cisco Systems
San Jose, CA 95134
US
Email: mcgrew@cisco.com
Joseph Salowey
Cisco Systems
2901 3rd Ave
Seattle, WA 98121
US
Email: jsalowey@cisco.com
Hao Zhou
Cisco Systems
4125 Highlander Parkway
Richfield, OH 44286
US
Phone : +1 330 523 2132
Email: hzhou@cisco.com
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