One document matched: draft-saito-mmusic-sdp-ike-01.txt
Differences from draft-saito-mmusic-sdp-ike-00.txt
MMUSIC Working Group M. Saito
Internet-Draft NTT Communications
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: December 27, 2007 Cisco Systems
June 25, 2007
Media Description for IKE in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)
draft-saito-mmusic-sdp-ike-01
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
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Abstract
This document extends the protocol identifier of SDP so that it could
negotiate the use of IKE for media session in SDP offer/answer model.
And it also specifies the method to generate VPN based on tunnel mode
IPsec using self-signed certificate under the mechanism of comedia-
tls. This document extends RFC 4572. In addition, it defines a new
attribute "udp-setup", which is similar to "setup" attribute defined
in RFC 4145, to enable endpoints to negotiate their roles in the IKE
session.
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Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Approach to Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Application to IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Changes since draft-saito-mmusic-sdp-ike-00 . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
In this section, the background of the problem in accessing home
network which this document tries to solve, and the approach to the
solution are described.
1.1. Problem Statement
When a device outside the home network connects to another device
inside the home network, it often becomes a problem to traverse a NAT
(Network Address Translation) device between them. One of the
effective solutions for this problem is VPN remote access to the NAT
device, usually a home router. With this approach, once the external
device participates in the home network securely, it will be easy to
establish connections with all the devices inside the home. However,
because a global IP address of the home router is not always fixed,
it is necessary to make use of an effective name resolution
mechanism.
On the other hand, there is also a problem how a remote client and a
home router authenticate each other over IKE [RFC4306] which
establishes VPN. It wouldn't be always possible that both parties
exchange a pre-shared key securely in advance. It would be also
impractical to distribute authentication certificates signed by well-
known root certification authority (CA) to all the devices because of
their cost and administrative overhead, and after all, it is
inefficient to publish a temporary certificate to the device which
does not have a fixed IP address or hostname. Therefore, if it is
possible to use a self-signed certificate for authentication
securely, that will be one of the effective solutions in this case.
1.2. Approach to Solution
As for the name resolution mechanism noted in 1.1, SIP [RFC3261] is
one of the possible protocols. Today, SIP is applied to not only
VoIP but also various applications and recognized as a general
protocol for session initiation. Therefore, it can be used to
initiate VPN sessions, too.
On the other hand, there is also a specification which uses a self-
signed certificate for authentication in the SIP/SDP [RFC4566]
framework. Actually, comedia-tls [RFC4572] specifies the method to
exchange a fingerprint of self-signed certificate to establish a TLS
[RFC4346] connection. This specification defines a mechanism that
allows self-signed certificates can be used securely, provided that
the integrity of the SDP description is assured. Because a
certificate itself can be used for authentication not only in TLS but
also in IKE which is used to launch VPN, this mechanism will be
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applied to the establishment of VPN based on tunnel mode IPsec by
extending the protocol identifier of SDP so that it could specify
IKE.
One of the easy methods to protect the integrity of SDP description,
which is the premise of this spec, is to use SIP identity [RFC4474]
mechanism. This approach is also referred in
[I-D.fischl-sipping-media-dtls]. Because SIP identity mechanism can
protect the integrity of a body part as well as the value of From
header in a SIP request by a valid Identity header, the receiver of
the request can establish the secure IPsec connections with the
sender by confirming that the hash value of the certificate sent
during IKE negotiation matches the fingerprint in the SDP. Although
SIP identity does not protect the identity of the receiver of the SIP
request, SIP connected identity [RFC4916] does it.
Considering above background, this document defines a new media
format "IKE" which can be used when the protocol identifier is "UDP"
to enable the negotiation of using IKE for media session over SDP
exchange on condition that the integrity of SDP description is
assured. And it also specifies the method to generate VPN based on
tunnel mode IPsec by exchanging fingerprints of self-signed
certificates following comedia-tls, and notes the example of SDP
offer/answer [RFC3264] and the points which implementation should
take care. In addition, it defines an attribute "udp-setup" for UDP
media sessions, similar to the "setup" attribute for TCP-based media
transport defined in RFC 4145 [RFC4145]. It is used to negotiate the
role of each endpoint in the IKE session.
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2. Protocol Overview
As shown in Figure 1, for example, there is a case of VPN remote
access from a device outside the home to the home router whose IP
address is not fixed. In this case, the external device, a remote
client recognizes Address of Record of the home router, but does not
have any information about its contact address and certificate.
Generally, it is difficult to establish tunnel mode IPsec dynamically
and securely in this situation. However as specified in comedia-tls,
if the integrity of SDP session descriptions is assured, it is
possible for the home router and the remote client to have a prior
relationship with each other by exchanging certificate fingerprints,
secure one-way hashes of the DER (distinguished encoding rules) form
of the certificates.
REGISTRATION +----------+ REGISTRATION
(1) | SIP | (1)
+---------->| Proxy |<------+
| +------->| |-----+ |
| |INVITE +----------+ | |
| | (2) | | +--------+
| | V | | Home |
+----------+ IKE(Media Session) +--------+ Net. |
| |<--------(3)-------->| Home | |
| Remote | | Router | |
| Client ==========(4)==================== |
| | Tunnel Mode IPsec +--------+ |
+----------+ | |
+--------+
Figure 1: Remote Access to Home Network
1. Both Remote Client and Home Router generate secure signaling
channels. They may REGISTER to SIP Proxy using TLS.
2. Both Remote Client (SDP offerer) and Home Router (SDP answerer)
exchange the fingerprints of their self-signed certificates in
SDP during an INVITE transaction.
3. After SDP exchange, Remote Client (SDP offerer) initiates IKE
with the SDP answerer to establish tunnel mode IPsec. Both the
offerer and the answerer validate that the certificate presented
in the IKE exchange has a fingerprint that matches the
fingerprint from SDP. If they match, IKE negotiation proceeds as
normal.
4. Remote Client joins in the Home Network.
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Using this method, the self-signed certificates of both parties are
used for authentication in IKE, but SDP itself is not concerned with
all the negotiations related to key-exchange such as those of
encryption and authentication algorithms. These negotiations are up
to IKE. And in many cases that tunnel mode IPsec is used for remote
access, a remote client needs to obtain a private address inside the
home network dynamically while initiating the remote access,
therefore IPsec security policy also needs to be set dynamically at
the same time. However, such a management function of security
policy is on the responsibility of the high-level VPN application.
SDP is not concerned with it. The roles of SDP here are to determine
the IP addresses of both parties used for IKE connection with c-line
in SDP, and exchange fingerprints of certificates used for
authentication in IKE with fingerprint attribute in SDP.
If the high-level application thinks a VPN session as the media
session, it will discard the security policy and terminate IKE when
that media session is terminated by BYE request. But each party can
cache the certificate of the other party as described in Security
Consideration of comedia-tls.
The above example is for tunnel mode IPsec used for remote access,
but the actual usage of negotiated IPsec is not limited. For
example, IKE can negotiate transport mode IPsec to encrypt multiple
media sessions between two parties with only a pair of IPsec security
associations. Only one thing that SDP offer/answer model is
responsible for is to exchange the fingerprints of certificates used
for IKE, therefore, it does not take care of security policy.
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3. Protocol Identifiers
This document defines a new media format description "IKE", which can
be used when the protocol identifier is "UDP" and indicates that the
described media is IKE. Both offerer and answerer can negotiate IKE
by specifying "UDP" in the "proto" field and "IKE" in the "fmt" field
in SDP.
In addition, this document defines a new attribute "udp-setup", which
can be used when the protocol identifier is "UDP" and the "fmt" field
is "IKE", in order to describe how endpoints should perform the IKE
session setup procedure. The "udp-setup" attribute indicates which
of the end points should initiate the IKE session establishment. The
"udp-setup" attribute is charset-independent and can be a session-
level or a media-level attribute. The following is the ABNF of the
"udp-setup" attribute.
udp-setup-attr = "a=udp-setup:" role
role = "active" / "passive" / "actpass"
'active' : The endpoint will initiate an outgoing session.
'passive' : The endpoint will accept an incoming session.
'actpass' : The endpoint is willing to accept an incoming
session or to initiate an outgoing session.
As defined in 4.1 of RFC 4145, both endpoints negotiate the value of
"udp-setup" using the offer/answer model. However, "holdconn"
defined in RFC 4145 is not defined here because UDP doesn't establish
a connection.
Offer Answer
----------------------------
active passive
passive active
actpass active / passive
The semantics of "active", "passive", and "actpass" in the offer/
answer exchange is the same as the definition described in 4.1 of RFC
4145. The default value of the udp-setup attribute is "active" in
the offer and "passive" in the answer.
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4. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange
The example of SDP exchanged to negotiate IKE following this
specification is as follows.
(Note: due to RFC formatting conventions, this document splits SDP
across lines whose content would exceed 72 characters. A backslash
character marks where this line folding has taken place. This
backslash and its trailing CRLF and whitespace would not appear in
actual SDP content.)
offer SDP
...
m=application 500 UDP IKE
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10
a=udp-setup:active
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
...
answer SDP
...
m=application 500 UDP IKE
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20
a=udp-setup:passive
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
D2:9F:6F:1E:CD:D3:09:E8:70:65:1A:51:7C:9D:30:4F:21:E4:4A:8E
...
Following comedia-tls specification, the fingerprint attribute may be
either a session-level or a media-level SDP attribute. If it is a
session-level attribute, it applies to all IKE sessions and TLS
sessions for which no media-level fingerprint attribute is defined.
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5. Application to IKE
After sharing fingerprints of both parties securely over the SDP
exchange, SDP offerer MAY start the IKE session to the other party.
To follow this specification, digital signature MUST be chosen as an
authentication method in IKE phase 1. In this process, certificate
whose hashed value matches the fingerprint exchanged over SDP MUST be
used. If the certificate used in IKE does not match the original
fingerprint, the endpoint MUST terminate the IKE session with
detecting an authentication failure.
In addition, each party MUST present a certificate and be
authenticated by each other.
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6. Security Considerations
This entire document concerns itself with security, but the security
considerations applicable to SDP in general is described in SDP
specification. And the security issues which should be considered in
using comedia-tls are described in Section 7 in its specification.
This section describes the security considerations specific in the
negotiation of IKE using comedia-tls.
Offering IKE in SDP (or agreeing to one in SDP offer/answer mode)
does not create an obligation for an endpoint to accept any IKE
session with the given fingerprint. On the other hand, the endpoint
must engage in the standard IKE negotiation procedure to ensure that
the IPsec security associations (including encryption and
authentication algorithms) chosen meet the security requirements of
VPN that the higher-level application needs. When IKE has finished
negotiating, the decision to conclude IKE and establish an IPsec
security association with the remote peer is entirely the decision of
each endpoint. This procedure is similar to how VPNs are typically
established in the absence of SIP.
In the general authentication process in IKE, subject DN or
subjectAltName is recognized as the identity of the remote party.
However by using SIP identity and SIP connected identity mechanisms
in this spec, certificates are used just as a carrier for the public
keys of the peers and there is no need for the information about who
is the signer of the certificate and whom subject DN indicates.
In this document, the purpose of using IKE is launching the IPsec
tunnel for VPN, and not for the security mechanism of RTP and RTCP
packets. Actually, this mechanism cannot provide end-to-end security
inside the virtual private network as long as using tunnel mode
IPsec, therefore other security methods such as SRTP must be used to
secure them.
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7. IANA Considerations
This document defines a session and media level SDP attribute, "udp-
setup". This attribute should be registered by the IANA under
"Session Description Protocol (SDP) Parameters" under "att-field
(both session and media level)".
This document defines a media format "IKE". This media format value
should be registered by the IANA. A media format "IKE" is associated
with a proto value "UDP".
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
June 2002.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
[RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572, July 2006.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.fischl-sipping-media-dtls]
Fischl, J., "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Protocol for Protection of Media Traffic Established with
the Session Initiation Protocol",
draft-fischl-sipping-media-dtls-02 (work in progress),
March 2007.
[RFC4145] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in
the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4145,
September 2005.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
[RFC4916] Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, June 2007.
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Appendix A. Changes since draft-saito-mmusic-sdp-ike-00
Instruction to RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to
publication as an RFC
o Added that SIP identity and SIP connected identity mechanisms can
be used to protect the integrity of SDP to 1.2.
o The port number 9500 in the m-line of the offer SDP described in
the chapter 4 was corrected to 500.
o Clarified that the security consideration to the establishment of
VPN between an offerer and an answerer was the same as that of
general VPN, added that the information about signer and owner of
the certificate would be unnecessary for security by using SIP
identity and SIP connected identity mechanisms with this spec and
deleted the previous description about identity in Chapter 6.
o Minor grammatical edits.
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Authors' Addresses
Makoto Saito
NTT Communications
3-20-2 Nishi-Shinjuku, Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo 163-1421
Japan
Email: ma.saito@nttv6.jp
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
United States
Email: dwing@cisco.com
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