One document matched: draft-richardson-ipsec-fragment-00.txt
Independent submission M. Richardson
Internet-Draft SSW
Expires: May 14, 2004 November 14, 2003
An interim solution to the Path MTU discovery problem for IPsec
gateways
draft-richardson-ipsec-fragment-00.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
Path MTU discovery depends upon proper respect for the Don't Fragment
(DF) bit. IPsec gateways often present an Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) constraint, and therefore must send ICMP Fragment Needed
messages when the DF bit is set. This document proposes to ignore it
in certain cases.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Step 0 - selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Step 1 - tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Step 2 - size check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4 Step 3 - error throttling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5 Step 4 - send . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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1. Introduction
Path MTU discovery [1] depends upon proper respect for the Don't
Fragment (DF) bit. IPsec gateways often present an Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) constraint, and therefore must send ICMP
Fragment Needed messages when the DF bit is set.
At the same time, increasing numbers of firewalls and networks are
misconfigured, and drop all ICMP messages. For road-warriors that
operate on an extruded IP address (i.e. one from behind their
security gateway, and route all traffic through the corporate
firewall), they find that they can not reach certain sites. When
full size datagrams arrive at the VPN gateway with the DF bit set
(such as from a web server's response), they are too big to enter the
tunnel. An ICMP is sent (rate limited) and the oversize datagram is
discarded. The ICMP is filtered out, and the sender never reduces
its segment size. The result is that the web site stalls.
Ironically, this occurs more often for more efficient web servers, as
they tend to fill the datagram more regularly.
Although the site in question is misconfigured, the IPsec system is
blamed, since the site "works fine" when the IPsec tunnel is removed.
The result is that many IPsec security gateway vendors are resorting
to ignoring the DF bit, and fragmenting the datagram anyway (either
before encapsulation, or fragmenting the resulting ESP packet).
To complicate the situation, the PMTUD WG, realizing the
proliferation of misconfigured systems wrt ICMP, is going to propose
a new method of determining the MTU. The new method will not rely on
ICMPs, but rather on occasionals probes. This method requires that
all systems respect the DF bit, otherwise the probes would be
incorrect. Further, for high speed networks, that employ larger TCP
windows, the result of the fragmentation can cause TCP segments to
become corrupted. {ref please}
This document proposes a heuristic for IPsec security gateways to
observe such that they will interop with the both the current PMTU
methods (given that ICMP is broken) and new mechanisms.
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2. Heuristic
Summary: If the system is keeping per flow state, preferentially
error packets that suddenly reach a new high-water mark for each
particular flow, because they arelikely to be probes, or classic
PMTUD.
For systems that have per-flow [Host to Host] (Ed. per-microflow -
5-tuple?) tracking, step 1 is included. Otherwise, it is skipped.
2.1 Step 0 - selection
Is the datagram is too big for the tunnel, and has the DF bit set? If
not, encapsulate as normal.
2.2 Step 1 - tracking
Keep track of the largest datagram size received. When there is a
new high water mark, do standard ICMP Need Fragment processing. If
this is the first time the datagram was too big, then goto step 4.
If not, then drop datagram.
2.3 Step 2 - size check
Is the amount that the packet is too big exactly due to the tunnel
overhead? (In particular, this would never apply when the media on
both sides is dissimilar). If not, do standard ICMP processing, and
drop the datagram.
2.4 Step 3 - error throttling
Does error rate limiting permit an ICMP error message be sent at this
time? (rate limited to about 1 packet per second) If so, then do
standard ICMP Need Fragment processing, and drop the datagram.
2.5 Step 4 - send
Fragment the datagram prior to encapsulation. Divide the datagram
into two equal pieces and encapsulate each one seperately. No
attempt to send an ICMP is made.
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3. Example
A 1500 packet to which a 20 byte IP and 28 byte ESP header is added,
trying to fit on a 1500 byte network is fragmented anyway.
A 9000 byte packet with a 20 byte IP and 28 byte ESP header trying to
fit on a 1500 byte network is dropped.
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Normative references
[1] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
November 1990.
Author's Address
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7
CA
EMail: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/
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Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
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Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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