One document matched: draft-ohba-pana-pemk-01.txt
Differences from draft-ohba-pana-pemk-00.txt
PANA Working Group Y. Ohba
Internet-Draft Toshiba
Expires: May 20, 2008 A. Yegin
Samsung
November 17, 2007
Definition of Master Key between PANA Client and Enforcement Point
draft-ohba-pana-pemk-01
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
This document defines PaC-EP Master Key (PEMK), a master key used
between a PANA client and an enforcement point, for bootstrapping
lower-layer ciphering. A PEMK is derived from EAP Master Session Key
as a result of successful PANA authentication. The PEMK is defined
to guarantee cryptographic independence among enforcement points
across different types of lower-layers.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PaC-EP Master Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Key Name of PEMK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Scope of PEMK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Context of PEMK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Lifetime of PEMK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Guideline for distributing PEMK from PAA to EP . . . . . . 5
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 8
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1. Introduction
PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access)
[I-D.ietf-pana-pana] is designed to facilitate network access
authentication and authorization of clients in access networks. It
carries EAP [RFC3748] between a PaC (PANA Client) and a PAA (PANA
Authentication Agent) where the PAA functions as an authentication
gateway to the Authentication Server (AS). The PANA framework
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] defines an another entity referred to as an
EP (Enforcement Point) which resides in the access network and allows
access (data traffic) of authorized PaCs while preventing access by
others depending on the PANA authentication and authorization result.
The EP and PAA may be implemented on the same device or separate
devices.
The EP uses non-cryptographic or cryptographic filters to selectively
allow and discard data packets. These filters may be applied at the
link-layer or the IP-layer [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. When cryptographic
access control is used, a secure association protocol [RFC3748] needs
to run between the PaC and EP. After completion of the secure
association protocol, link or network layer per-packet security (for
example TKIP, IPsec ESP) is enabled for integrity protection, data
origin authentication, replay protection and optionally
confidentiality protection.
This document defines PaC-EP Master Key (PEMK) that is used by a
secure association protocol as the pre-shared secret between the PaC
and EP to enable cryptographic filters in the access network. The
PEMK is defined to guarantee cryptographic independence among EPs
across different lower-layer types. This document also describes
guideline for distributing PEMKs from the PAA to EP.
This document does not specify a mechanism for a PaC to know whether
the lower-layer requires a secure association protocol or the pre-
shared secret for the secure association protocol needs to be
bootstrapped from PANA authentication. Such a mechanism may be
defined by each lower-layer protocol.
1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. PaC-EP Master Key
A PEMK (PaC-EP Master Key) is derived from the available MSK. The
PEMK is 64 octets in length and it is calculated as follows:
PEMK = prf+(MSK, "PaC-EP master key" | SID | KID | EPDID)
o The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-
random function used for the prf+ function is specified in the
PRF-Algorithm AVP carried in a PANA-Auth-Request message with 'S'
(Start) bit set.
o MSK is a Master Session Key generated by EAP and exported to PANA.
o SID is a four-octet PANA session identifier [I-D.ietf-pana-pana].
o KID is the content of the PANA Key-ID AVP associated with the MSK
[I-D.ietf-pana-pana].
o EP-Device-ID is the identifier of the EP. The first two octets of
EP-Device-ID represents the AddressType, which contains an Address
Family defined in [IANAADFAM]. The AddressType is used to
discriminate the content and format of the remaining octets for
the address value. The use of address family and address value
guarantees the cryptographic independence of PEMKs among multiple
EPs across multiple lower-layer protocols. How a PaC configures
the identifier of the EP is out of the scope of this document.
2.1. Key Name of PEMK
The key name of the PEMK is defined as follows.
TBD.
2.2. Scope of PEMK
A PEMK is used between a PaC and an EP. A PEMK MUST NOT be shared
among multiple PaCs or EPs.
2.3. Context of PEMK
A PEMK is used as the pre-shared key of the secure association
protocol in the scope of the PEMK. A PEMK MUST NOT be used for any
other usage.
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2.4. Lifetime of PEMK
The lifetime of a PEMK MUST be no greater than the lifetime of the
MSK.
3. Security Considerations
The following considerations are specifically made to follow the AAA
key management guidance [RFC4962]. Other AAA key management
requirements such as key lifetime, key scope, key context and key
name are described under Section 2.
3.1. Channel Binding
Since the device identifier of the EP is involved in the key
derivation function, Channel Binding on a PEMK is made between the
PaC and PAA at the time when the PEMK is generated. If a malicious
EP advertises a different device identifier than that is registered
with the PAA, the malicious attempt will not succeed since the secure
association protocol will fail due to the difference between the PEMK
calculated by the PaC and the PEMK calculated by the PAA and
distributed to the EP.
3.2. Guideline for distributing PEMK from PAA to EP
When an EP is implemented on the same device as the PAA, no protocol
needs to be used for distributing a PEMK from the PAA to the EP. It
is assumed that an EP is implemented on the same device as the PAA
when the device identifier of the EP is equals to a link-layer
address or an IP address of the PAA. Otherwise, it is assumed that
the EP is implemented on a separate device from the PAA.
In the case where the EP is implemented on a separate device from the
PAA, a protocol is needed to distribute a PEMK from the PAA to the
EP. Such a key distribution protocol may depend on the lower-layer
protocol over which PANA operates. A key distribution protocol for a
PEMK MUST ensure that the PEMK is encrypted as well as integrity and
replay protected, with a security association between the PAA and EP,
where the security association MUST be cryptographically bound to the
identities of the PAA and EP known to the PaC. The HOKEY (Handover
Keying) key distribution protocol [I-D.ietf-hokey-key-mgm] is such a
key distribution protocol.
4. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
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5. Acknowledgments
TBD.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-pana-pana]
Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA)", draft-ietf-pana-pana-18 (work in
progress), September 2007.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[IANAADFAM]
IANA, "Address Family Numbers",
http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4962] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance for Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management",
BCP 132, RFC 4962, July 2007.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., Ohba, Y., Parthasarathy, M., and A. Yegin,
"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
(PANA) Framework", draft-ietf-pana-framework-10 (work in
progress), September 2007.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress),
July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-hokey-key-mgm]
Nakhjiri, M. and Y. Ohba, "Derivation, delivery and
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management of EAP based keys for handover and re-
authentication", draft-ietf-hokey-key-mgm-01 (work in
progress), November 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc.
1 Telcordia Drive
Piscateway, NJ 08854
USA
Phone: +1 732 699 5365
Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Alper E. Yegin
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology
Istanbul,
Turkey
Phone: +90 533 348 2402
Email: alper.yegin@yegin.org
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