One document matched: draft-mrw-nat66-00.txt
Network Working Group M. Wasserman
Internet-Draft Painless Security
Intended status: Standards Track F. Baker
Expires: April 21, 2011 Cisco Systems
October 18, 2010
IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Address Translation (NAT66)
draft-mrw-nat66-00.txt
Abstract
This document describes a stateless, transport-agnostic IPv6-to-IPv6
Network Address Translation (NAT66) function that provides the
address independence benefit associated with IPv4-to-IPv4 NAT (NAT44)
while minimizing, but not completely eliminating, the problems
associated with NAT44.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. What is Address Independence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. NAT66 Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. NAT66 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Mapping with No Per-Flow State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Checksum-Neutral Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. NAT66 Prefix Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Prefix Mapping Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Address Mapping for Longer Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Prefixes for Internal Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. NAT Behavioral Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12. A Note on Port Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
16. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
16.1. Changes Between draft-mrw-behave-nat66-00 and -01 . . . . 13
16.2. Changes between *behave-nat66-01 and -02 . . . . . . . . . 13
16.3. Changes between *behave-nat66-02 and *nat66-00 . . . . . . 14
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
This document describes a stateless, transport-agnostic IPv6-to-IPv6
Network Address Translation (NAT66) function that provides the
address independence benefit associated with IPv4-to-IPv4 NAT (NAT44)
while minimizing, but not completely eliminating, the problems
associated with NAT44.
3. What is Address Independence?
As used in this document, IPv6 Address Independence consists of the
following set of local network properties:
o The IPv6 addresses in use inside the local network (for nodes,
ACLs, logs) do not need to be renumbered if the ISP changes a
site's external address prefix.
o The IPv6 addresses in use inside the local network (for nodes,
ACLs, logs) or within other connected networks (such as a second
ISP for multihoming) do not need to be renumbered when a site
changes ISPs.
o It is not necessary for an administrator to convince an ISP to
route his or her internal IPv6 addresses.
This address independence requirement has been a primary driver for
IPv4 NAT deployment in medium to large-sized enterprise networks,
including NAT deployments in enterprises that have plenty of IPv4
provider-independent address space (from IPv4 "swamp space").
The Local Network Protection document [RFC4864] discusses a related
concept called "Address Autonomy" as a benefit of NAT44. RFC 4864
indicates that address autonomy can be achieved by the simultaneous
use of global addresses on all nodes within a site that need external
connectivity, and Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) [RFC4193] for all
internal communication. However, this solution fails to meet the
requirement for address independence, because if an ISP renumbering
event occurs, all of the hosts, routers, DHCP servers, ACLs,
firewalls and other internal systems that are configured with global
addresses from the ISP will need to be renumbered before global
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connectivity is fully restored.
The use of IPv6 Provider Independent (PI) addresses has also been
suggested as a means to fulfill the address independence requirement.
However, this solution requires that an enterprise qualify to receive
a PI assignment and persuade their ISP to install specific routes for
the enterprise's PI addresses. There are a number of practical
issues with this approach, especially if there is a desire to route
to a number of geographically and topologically diverse set of sites,
which can sometimes involve coordinating with several ISPs to route
portions of a single PI prefix. These problems have caused numerous
enterprises with plenty of IPv4 swamp space to choose to use IPv4 NAT
for part, or substantially all, of their internal network instead of
using their provider-independent address space.
4. NAT66 Applicability
NAT66 provides a simple and compelling solution to meet the Address
Independence requirement in IPv6. The address independence benefit
stems directly from the translation function of the network address
translator. To avoid as many of the issues associated with NAT44 as
possible, NAT66 is defined to include a two-way, checksum-neutral,
algorithmic translation function, and nothing else.
NAT66 does not include a port mapping function, and the defined
address mapping mechanism is checksum-neutral. This avoids the need
for a NAT66 device to re-write transport layer headers, making it
feasible to deploy new or improved transport layer protocols without
upgrading NAT66 devices. Because NAT66 does not involve re-writing
transport-layer headers, NAT66 will not interfere with encrypting the
full IP payload in many cases.
The default NAT66 address mapping mechanism is purely algorithmic, so
NAT66 devices do not need to maintain per-node or per-connection
state, allowing deployment of more robust and adaptive networks than
can be deployed using NAT44. Since the default NAT66 mapping can be
performed in either direction, it does not interfere with inbound
connection establishment, thus allowing internal nodes to participate
in direct peer-to-peer applications.
Although NAT66 compares favorably to NAT44 in several ways, it does
not eliminate all of the architectural problems associated with IPv4
NAT, as described in [RFC2993]. NAT66 involves modifying IP headers
in transit, so it is not compatible with security mechanisms that
involve end-to-end encryption of the IP header, or mechanisms, such
as AH, that provide integrity protection for the IP header. NAT66
may interfere with the use of application protocols that transmit IP
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addresses in the application-specific portion of the IP packet.
These applications currently require application layer gateways
(ALGs) to work correctly through NAT44 devices, and similar ALGs may
be required for these applications to work through NAT66 devices.
The use of separate internal and external address prefixes creates
complexity for DNS deployment, due the desire for internal nodes to
communicate with other internal nodes using internal addresses, while
external nodes need to obtain external addresses to communicate with
the same nodes. Typically, this results in the deployment of "split
DNS", which may add complexity to network configuration.
There are significant technical impacts associated with the
deployment of any address translation mechanism, including NAT66, and
we strongly encourage anyone who is considering the implementation or
deployment of NAT66 to read RFC 4864 [RFC4864], and to carefully
consider the alternatives described in that document, some of which
may cause fewer problems than NAT66.
5. NAT66 Overview
NAT66 may be implemented in an IPv6 router to map one IPv6 address
prefix to another IPv6 address prefix as each IPv6 packet transits
the router. A router that implements a NAT66 function is referred to
as a NAT66 device.
In its simplest form, a NAT66 device will be attached to two network
links, one of which is an "internal" network link attached to a leaf
network within a single administrative domain, and the other of which
is an "external" network with connectivity to the global Internet.
All of the hosts on the internal network will use addresses from a
single, locally-routed prefix, and those addresses will be translated
to/from addresses in a globally-routable prefix as IP packets transit
the NAT66 device.
The following picture shows a NAT66 device attached to two networks.
In this example, the internal network uses IPv6 Unique Local
Addresses (ULAs) [RFC4193] to represent the internal IPv6 nodes, and
the external network uses globally routable IPv6 addresses to
represent the same nodes.
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External Network: Prefix = 2001:0DB8:0001:/48
--------------------------------------
|
|
+---------+
| NAT66 |
| Device |
+---------+
|
|
--------------------------------------
Internal Network: Prefix = FD01:0203:0405:/48
When a NAT66 device forwards packets in the "outbound" direction,
from the internal network to the external network, NAT66 overwrites
the IPv6 source address (in the IPv6 header) with a corresponding
address from the external prefix. When packets are forwarded in the
"inbound" direction, from the external network to the internal
network, the IPv6 destination address is overwritten with a
corresponding address in the internal prefix. Using the prefixes
shown in the diagram above, as an IP packet passes through the NAT66
device in the outbound direction, the source address prefix (FD01:
0203:0405:/48) will be overwritten with the external address prefix
(2001:0DB8:0001:/48). In an inbound packet, the destination prefix
(2001:0DB8:0001:/48) will be overwritten with the internal network
prefix (FD01:0203:0405:/48). In both cases, it is the local IPv6
address that is overwritten; the remote IPv6 address remains
unchanged. Nodes on the internal network are said to be "behind" the
NAT66 device.
NAT66 can also be used between two private networks. In these cases,
both networks may use ULA prefixes, with each subnet in one network
mapped into a corresponding subnet in the other network, and vice
versa. Or, each network may use ULA prefixes for internal
addressing, and global unicast addresses on the other network.
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Internal Prefix = FD01:4444:5555:/48
--------------------------------------
V | External Prefix
V | 2001:0DB8:6666:/48
V +---------+ ^
V | NAT66 | ^
V | Device | ^
V +---------+ ^
External Prefix | ^
2001:0DB8:0001:/48 | ^
--------------------------------------
Internal Prefix = FD01:0203:0405:/48
In some cases, more than one NAT66 device may be attached to a
network. In those cases, NAT66 devices may be configured with the
same internal and external prefixes, or they may be configured with
the same internal prefix and different external prefixes.
External Network: Prefix = 2001:0DB8:0001:/48
--------------------------------------
| |
| |
+---------+ +---------+
| NAT66 | | NAT66 |
| Device | | Device |
| #1 | | #2 |
+---------+ +---------+
| |
| |
--------------------------------------
Internal Netowrk: Prefix = FD01:0203:0405:/48
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External Network #1: External Network #2:
Prefix = 2001:0DB8:0001:/48 Prefix = 2001:0DB8:5555:/48
--------------------------- --------------------------
| |
| |
+---------+ +---------+
| NAT66 | | NAT66 |
| Device | | Device |
| #1 | | #2 |
+---------+ +---------+
| |
| |
--------------------------------------
Internal Netowrk: Prefix = FD01:0203:0405:/48
6. Mapping with No Per-Flow State
When NAT66 is used as described in this document, no per-node or per-
flow state is maintained in the NAT66 device. Both inbound and
outbound packets are translated algorithmically, using only
information found in the IPv6 header. Due to this property, NAT66's
two-way, algorithmic address mapping can support both outbound and
inbound connection establishment without the need for state-priming
or rendevous mechanisms. This is a significant improvement over
NAT44 devices, but it also has significant security implications
which are described in the Security Considerations section.
7. Checksum-Neutral Mapping
When a change is made to one of the IP header fields in the IPv6
pseudo-header checksum (such as one of the IP addresses), the
checksum field in the transport layer header may become invalid.
Fortunately, an incremental change in the area covered by the
Internet standard checksum [RFC1071] will result in a well-defined
change to the checksum value [RFC1624]. So, a checksum change caused
by modifying part of the area covered by the checksum can be
corrected by making a complementary change to a different 16-bit
field covered by the same checksum.
The NAT66 mapping mechanisms described in this document are checksum-
neutral, which means that they result in IP headers that will
generate the same IPv6 pseudo-header checksum when the checksum is
calculated using the standard Internet checksum algorithm [RFC1071].
Any changes that are made during translation of the IPv6 prefix are
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offset by changes to other parts of the IPv6 address. This results
in transport layers that use the Internet checksum (such as TCP and
UDP) calculating the same IPv6 pseudo header checksum for both the
internal and external forms of the same packet, which avoids the need
for the NAT66 device to modify those transport layer headers to
correct the checksum value.
8. NAT66 Prefix Mapping
When a NAT66 device is configured with internal and external prefixes
that are 48 bits (a /48) or shorter, the NAT66 Prefix Mapping
described in this section MUST be used. All NAT66 devices MUST
support NAT66 prefix mapping.
To produce a checksum neutral transformation, the NAT66 device
calculates the 16-bit one's complement sum of both the internal and
external IPv6 prefixes, as described above. The difference between
the original and mapped prefix checksums is calculated using 16-bit
one's complement arithmetic, and the difference is added to the
original value of thes subnet value in bits 33-48 (inclusive) of the
address. If the resulting value is 0xFFFF, it is changed to 0x0000.
This mapping results in no modification of the Interface Identifier
(IID), which is held in the lower half of the IPv6 address, so it
will not interfere with future protocols that may use unique IIDs for
node identification. However, use of this mapping is restricted to
cases where both the internal and external prefixes are 48 bits long
(a /48) or shorter, leaving at least 16 subnet bits that can be
modified to ensure checksum neutrality. The NAT66 Address mapping
described below handles cases where longer prefixes are in use.
8.1. Prefix Mapping Example
For the network shown in the first example diagram in the NAT66
Overview section above, we might have the following example:
Internal Prefix: FD01:0203:0405:/48 External Prefix: 2001:0DB8:
0001:/48
If a node with internal address FD01:0203:0405:0001::1234 sends an
outbound packet through the NAT66 device, the resulting external
address will be 2001:0DB8:0001:D550::1234. The resulting address is
obtained by calculating the checksum of both the internal and
external 48-bit prefixes, sutracting the internal prefix from the
external prefix using one's complement arithmetic and adding the
result to the 16-bit subnet field (in this case 0x0001).
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To show the work:
The one's complement checksum of FD01:0203:0405 is 0xFCF5. The one's
complement checksum of 2001:0DB8:0001 is 0xD245. Using one's
complement math, 0xD245 - 0xFCF5 = 0xD54F. The subnet mask in the
original packet is 0x0001. Using one's complement math, 0x0001 +
0xD54F = 0xD550. Since 0xD550 != 0xFFFF, it is not changed to
0x0000.
So, the value 0xD550 is written in the 16-bit subnet mask area,
resulting in a mapped external address of 2001:0DB8:0001:D550::1234.
When a response packet is received, it will contain the destination
address 2001:0DB8:0001:D550::0001, which will be mapped using the
same mapping algorithm, back to FD01:0203:0405:0001::1234.
In this case, the difference between the two prefixes will be
calculated as follows:
Using one's complement math, 0xFCF5 - 0xD245 = 0x2AB0. The subnet
mask in the original packet = 0xD550. Using one's complement math,
0xD550 + 0x2AB0 = 0x0001. Since 0x0001 != 0xFFFF, it is not changed
to 0x0000.
So the value 0x0001 is written into the subnet field, and the
internal value of the subnet field is properly restored.
9. Address Mapping for Longer Prefixes
In some cases, it may desireable to use NAT66 with global prefixes
longer than /48. In those cases, the checksum correction will need
to be performed in the IID portion (the lower 64-bits) of the
address, because the subnet portion of the address is not 16 bits or
longer. This section describes a two-way, algorithmic, checksum
neutral mapping algorithm for those cases. NAT66 devices will only
use this algorithm when mapping addresses with prefixes longer than
48 bits. All NAT66 devices SHOULD implement the address mapping
algorithm described in this section.
The address mapping algorithm consists of finding a 16-bit portion of
the IID that does not contain the value 0xFFFF, and performing the
checksum correction (as described above) in that portion of the IID.
Since all NAT66 devices will use the same algorithm to select the
location of the checksum correction, the mapping algorithm will
continue to be fully reversible.
The algorithm for finding a location for the checksum correction
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consists of checking the highest order 16-bits of the IID (bits 65-80
of the address). If those 16-bits do not equal 0xFFFF, the checksum
correction value is added to those bits. If those bits are equal to
OxFFFF, the next 16 bits (bits 81-96) are checked. If they do not
equal 0xFFFF, the checksum correction is added to those bits. If
necessary this check is performed for the remaining 16-bit values
(bits 97-112 and bits 113-128) in succession. Since the checksum
correction algorithm cannot result in a value of 0xFFFF, running this
algorithm in the other direction will result in the same IID used in
the original packet.
Although any 16-bit portion of an IPv6 IID could contain 0xFFFF, an
IID of all-ones is a reserved anycast identifier that should not be
used on the network [RFC2526]. If a NAT66 device discovers a packet
with an IID of all-zeros while performing address mapping, that
packet MUST be dropped, and an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem error SHOULD
be generated [RFC2463].
Note: this mechanism does involve modification of the IID, so it may
not be compatible with future mechanisms that use unique IIDs for
node identification.
10. Prefixes for Internal Addressing
NAT66 devices MUST support manual configuration of internal and
external address prefixes, and MUST NOT place any restrictions on
those prefixes except that they be valid IPv6 unicast address
prefixes, as described in [RFC4291].
11. NAT Behavioral Requirements
NAT66 devices MUST support hairpinning behavior, as defined in the
NAT Behavioral Requirements for UDP document [RFC4787]. This means
that when a NAT66 device receives a packet on the internal interface
that has a destination address that matches the site's external
prefix, it will translate the packet and forward it internally. This
allows internal nodes to reach other internal nodes using their
external, global addresses when necessary.
Because NAT66 does not perform port mapping and uses a one-to-one,
reversible mapping algorithm, none of the other NAT behavioral
requirements apply to NAT66.
NAT66 devices that do not have a manually configured internal prefix
SHOULD randomly generate a ULA prefix for the internal network and
advertise that prefix in router advertisements. NAT66 devices with
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more than one internal interface SHOULD assign a (non-0xFFFF) subnet
number to each link, and include the subnet number in router
advertisements on the corresponding link. NAT66 devices that
generate a ULA prefix MUST generate the prefix using a random number
as described in RFC4291 [RFC4193], and SHOULD store the randomly
generated prefix is non-volatile storage for continued use.
12. A Note on Port Mapping
In addition to overwriting IP addresses when packets are forwarded,
NAT44 devices often overwrite the source port number in outbound
traffic, and the destination port number in inbound traffic. This
mechanism is called "port mapping".
The major benefit of port mapping is that it allows multiple
computers to share a single IPv4 address. A large number of internal
IPv4 addresses (typically from the 10.0.0.0/8 prefix) can be mapped
into a single external, globally routable IPv4 address, with the
local port number used to identify which internal node should receive
each inbound packet. This address amplification feature should not
be needed in IPv6, where every attached network should be assigned at
least a /48 prefix, leaving room for 16 subnet bits and a 64 bit
Interface Identifier [RFC3587].
Since port mapping requires re-writing a portion of the transport
layer header, it requires NAT66 devices to be aware of all of the
transport protocols that they forward, thus stifling the development
of new and improved transport protocols. Modifying the transport
layer header is incompatible with security mechanisms that encrypt
the full IP payload, and restricts the NAT66 device to forwarding
transport layers that use weak checksum algorithms that are easily
recalculated in routers. Since there is significant detriment caused
by modifying transport layer headers and very little, if any, benefit
to the use of port mapping in IPv6, NAT66 devices that comply with
this specification MUST NOT perform port mapping.
13. Security Considerations
When NAT66 is deployed using either of the two-way, algorithmic
mappings defined in the document, it allows direct inbound
connections to internal nodes. While this can be viewed as a benefit
of NAT66 vs. NAT44, it does open internal nodes to attacks that would
not be possible in a NAT44 network. Although this situation is not
substantially worse, from a security standpoint, than running IPv6
with no NAT, some enterprises may assume that a NAT66 device will
offer similar protection to a NAT44 device. For this reason, it is
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RECOMMENDED that NAT66 devices include an IPv6 firewall function, and
the firewall function SHOULD be configured by default to block all
incoming connections. Administrators could then enable inbound
connectivity for specific ports by reconfiguring the firewall.
14. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA considerations.
15. Acknowledgements
The checksum-neutral algorithmic address mapping described in this
document is based on e-mail written by Iljtsch Van Beijnum.
The following people provided advice or review comments that
substantially improved this document: Jari Arrko, Iljtsch Van
Beijnum, Remi Depres, Tony Hain, Ed Jankiewicz, Dave Thaler, Mark
Townsley.
This document was written using the xml2rfc tool described in RFC
2629 [RFC2629].
16. Change Log
16.1. Changes Between draft-mrw-behave-nat66-00 and -01
There were several minor changes made between the *behave-nat66-00
and -01 versions of this draft:
o Added Fred Baker as a co-author.
o Minor mathematical corrections.
o Added AH to paragraph on NAT security issues.
o Added additional NAT topologies to overview (diagrams TBD).
16.2. Changes between *behave-nat66-01 and -02
There were further changes made between *behave-nat66-01 and -02:
o Removed topology hiding mechanism.
o Added diagrams.
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o Made minor updates based on mailing list feedback.
o Added discussion of IPv6 SAF document.
o Added applicability section.
o Added discussion of Address Independence requirement.
o Added hairpining requirement and discussion of applicability of
other NAT behavioral requirements.
16.3. Changes between *behave-nat66-02 and *nat66-00
There were further changes made between behave-nat66-02 and nat66-02:
o Added mapping for prefixes longer than /48.
o Change draft name to remove reference to the behave WG.
o Resolved various open issues and fixed typos.
17. References
17.1. Normative References
[RFC1071] Braden, R., Borman, D., Partridge, C., and W. Plummer,
"Computing the Internet checksum", RFC 1071,
September 1988.
[RFC1624] Rijsinghani, A., "Computation of the Internet Checksum via
Incremental Update", RFC 1624, May 1994.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2463] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998.
[RFC2526] Johnson, D. and S. Deering, "Reserved IPv6 Subnet Anycast
Addresses", RFC 2526, March 1999.
[RFC3587] Hinden, R., Deering, S., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Global
Unicast Address Format", RFC 3587, August 2003.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.
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[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[RFC4787] Audet, F. and C. Jennings, "Network Address Translation
(NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast UDP", BCP 127,
RFC 4787, January 2007.
17.2. Informative References
[I-D.thaler-ipv6-saf]
Thaler, D., "Source Address Finding (SAF) for IPv6
Translation Mechanisms", draft-thaler-ipv6-saf-02 (work in
progress), July 2009.
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
[RFC2993] Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT", RFC 2993,
November 2000.
[RFC4864] Van de Velde, G., Hain, T., Droms, R., Carpenter, B., and
E. Klein, "Local Network Protection for IPv6", RFC 4864,
May 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Margaret Wasserman
Painless Security
356 Abbott Street
North Andover, MA 01845
USA
Phone: +1 781 405 7464
Email: mrw@painless-security.com
URI: http://www.painless-secuirty.com
Fred Baker
Cisco Systems
Santa Barbara, California 93117
USA
Phone: +1-408-526-4257
Email: fred@cisco.com
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