One document matched: draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-variants-01.txt
Differences from draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-variants-00.txt
Internet Draft David M'Raihi
VeriSign
Category: Johan Rydell
Informational Portwise
Document: David Naccache
draft-mraihi-mutual-oath-hotp-variants-01.txt ENS
Salah Machani
Diversinet
Expires:
June 2006 December 2005
Mutual OATH: HOTP Extensions for mutual authentication
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This document describes Mutual OATH, a mechanism for mutual
authentication based on the HOTP algorithm [HOTP] introduced
recently by OATH (initiative for Open AuTHentication) [OATH] and
submitted as an individual draft to the IETF last year. The
security and strength of Mutual OATH depends on the properties of
the underlying building block HOTP, which is a construction based
on HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-1 as the hash function.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction...............................................2
2. Requirements Terminology...................................3
3. Algorithm Requirements.....................................3
4. Mutual OATH Definition.....................................4
4.1 HOTP Algorithm.............................................4
4.2 Algorithm Identifier.......................................5
4.3 Mutual OATH Authentication.................................6
4.4 Dual-key Mode..............................................6
4.5 Chained Mode...............................................7
4.6 PIN/Password "salted" HOTP Response........................7
4.7 Signature - Using HOTP with challenge and fixed value......8
5. Security Considerations....................................8
6. IANA Considerations........................................9
7. Conclusion.................................................9
8. Acknowledgements...........................................9
9. References.................................................9
10.1 Normative................................................9
10.2 Informative..............................................9
10. Authors' Addresses........................................10
12. Full Copyright Statement...................................11
13. Intellectual Property......................................11
1. Introduction
The HOTP algorithm is counter based and intended for synchronous
authentication mode systems. It has been implemented under various
form factors such as USB tokens, software client applications,
validation servers, applets for smart-cards, etc.
OATH has identified several user cases and scenarios that require
an asynchronous variant to accommodate users who do not want to
maintain a synchronized authentication system. The commonly
accepted method for this is to use a challenge-response scheme.
This draft introduces the concept of randomized versions of HOTP,
where the counter field is replaced or extended by a function of
several parameters such as a random question and a personal
identification code or password.
Challenge response mode of authentication is widely adopted in the
industry. Several vendors already offer software applications and
hardware devices implementing challenge-response - but each of
those uses vendor-specific proprietary algorithms. For the benefits
of users we need a standardized challenge-response algorithm to
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allow multi-sourcing of token purchases and validation systems to
facilitate the democratization of strong authentication.
2. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14.
3. Algorithm Requirements
This section presents the main requirements that drove this
algorithm design. A lot of emphasis was placed on flexibility and
usability, under the constraints and specificity of the HOTP
algorithm and hardware token capabilities.
R1 - The shared secret MUST be embedded in a tamper resistance
device or securely implemented in a software application.
R2 - The secret SHOULD be stored in a hardware device for
additional flexibility (mobility) and security.
R3 - The algorithm MUST be capable of supporting different modes of
authentications.
R4 - The challenge value MUST be randomly generated for each use of
the authentication protocol and SHALL NOT be re-used.
R5 - The algorithm MUST allow for the challenge to be presented to
the user in numeric or alphanumeric form.
R6 - If the challenge is displayed to the user, the challenge
length SHOULD be selectable; the specification should define the
maximum length for a challenge.
R7 - There MUST be a fixed randomly generated secret (key) for each
token/soft token that is shared between the token and the
authentication server.
R8 - The challenge MAY be generated with integrity checking (e.g.,
parity bits). This will allow tokens with pin pads to perform
simple error checking if the user enters the value into a token.
R9 - The algorithm MAY include a counter function.
R10 - The algorithm SHOULD be used in dual-key mode. The single key
is mainly to support legacy tokens.
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R11 - All the HOTP communications MUST take place over a secure
channel e.g. SSL/TLS, IPsec connections.
4. Mutual OATH Definition
In this section, we introduce the HOTP algorithm variants for
mutual authentication.
Words used in this chapter:
K - Key, a shared secret known to all parties
C - Counter, a predefined sequence of values that can be calculated
by all parties
P - Hashed version of PIN (Personal Identification Number) or
password that is known to all parties
Q - Challenge, a predefined value that may change and is known to
all parties during execution of the algorithm
T - Fixed value that is used in a transaction
AI - Algorithm identifier, described in details in section 4.2
4.1 HOTP Algorithm
The HOTP algorithm is based on an increasing counter value and a
static symmetric key known only to the prover and verifier parties.
HOTP has been introduced as an internet draft and is currently in
the RFC-editor queue for final review.
As a reminder:
HOTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))
Where Truncate represents the function that converts an HMAC-SHA-1
value into an HOTP value of 6 to 8 digits.
The Key (K), the Counter (C) and Data values are hashed high-order
byte first. The HOTP values generated by the HOTP generator are
treated as big endian.
We refer the reader to [HOTP] for the full description and further
details on the rationale and security analysis of HOTP.
We introduced in [HOTP] the notion of a Data field that would be
used for generating the One-Time Password values. Using a Data
field opens for more flexibility in the algorithm implementation,
provided that the Data field is clearly specified.
A straightforward variant is to replace the counter value C by a
random question Q to define a Response as a function of the
challenge Q:
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Response = HOTP (K,Q) = Truncate (HMAC-SHA-1(K,Q))
The present draft describes the different variants based on similar
constructions.
4.2 Algorithm Identifier
It is important for both parties willing to interact to know the
operations to be performed, namely which variant is to be used.
Let AI bit a binary string, and the different bits indicate which
combination of parameters is used to compute an HOTP response.
We could also specify the algorithm itself - by default, HOTP is
based on HMAC-SHA-1 but recent attacks on hash functions and new
standard works might result in recommendations to use another
function for HMAC.
We define the algorithm identifier AI as follows:
AI = Type | Pb | Qb | Cb | Tb | Mode
Where:
Type is a 4-bit value to specify the algorithm type; at the
moment, 4 types are defined:
0000: HMAC-SHA-1 without truncation
0001: HMAC-SHA-1 with Dynamic Truncation for 6-digit
0010: HMAC-SHA-1 with Dynamic Truncation for 7-digit
0011: HMAC-SHA-1 with Dynamic Truncation for 8-digit
Pb - single bit that indicates whether or not a hash of a PIN or
Password will be used in the computation;
Qb - single bit that indicates whether or not a random Q will be
used in the computation;
Cb - single bit that indicates whether or not a counter C will
be used in the computation;
Tb - single bit that indicates whether or not a fixed value T
will be used in the computation.
Mode is a 4-bit value that defines the different modes of
computation; at the moment, 4 types are defined:
0000: plain mode, single key
0001: plain mode, dual key
0010: chained mode, single key
0011: chained mode, dual key
With the chained mode as described in section 4.5
For instance, if the algorithm used is HOTP (K, C) with Dynamic
Truncation to generate 6-digit HOTP values as described in [HOTP]
as default mode then AI = 0001 0010 0000.
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4.3 Mutual OATH Authentication
A straightforward variant is to replace the counter value C by a
random question Q to define a randomized Response as a function of
the challenge Q:
Response = HOTP (K,Q) = Truncate (HMAC-SHA-1(K,Q))
The challenge-response sequence is the following for parties A and
B sharing knowledge of secret (key) K and willing to perform Mutual
OATH authentication:
1- A sends a random question Q_A to B and AI = 0001 0100 0000
2- B computes Response_B = HOTP (K,Q_A) and sends it to A with
his own random question Q_B
3- A checks Response_B and if correct, computes Response_A =
HOTP (K,Q_B)
4- B checks Response_A and if correct, acknowledges party A
Both parties are authenticated.
4.4 Dual-key Mode
The key SHOULD be pre-divided into different usages. K1 is used for
computing responses and K2 to check responses. The opposite is used
for the other party. Depending on whether storage or computation is
cheaper, we could either store a longer key K = K1 | K2 or set K1 =
K and K2 = K xor Constant or K2 = SHA-1(K) for instance.
The challenge-response sequence is the following for parties A and
B sharing knowledge of secret (key) K. K is divided into K1 and K2.
1- A sends a random question Q_A to B and AI = 0001 0100 0001
2- B computes Response_B = HOTP (K2,Q_A) and sends it to A with
his own random question Q_B
3- A checks Response_B and if correct, computes Response_A =
HOTP (K1,Q_B)
4- B checks Response_A and if correct, acknowledges party A
Both parties are authenticated. Separating into K1 and K2 protects
against another party sending predefined questions "Q_A"'s to B for
querying specific information.
We recommend this mode of computation for mutual OATH.
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4.5 Chained Mode
Another interesting computation mode is to chain the computations
of different responses. It might have valuable applications such as
to verify that a certain sequence of operations has taken place.
The challenge-response sequence is the following for parties A and
B sharing knowledge of secret (key) K and willing to perform Mutual
OATH authentication in chained mode:
1- A sends a random question Q_A to B and AI = 0001 0100 0011
2- B computes Response_B = HOTP (K2,Q_A) and sends it to A with
his own random question Q_B
3- A checks Response_B and if correct, computes Response_A =
HOTP (K1,Q_B|Response_B)
4- B checks Response_A and if correct, acknowledges party A
Both parties are authenticated.
4.6 PIN/Password "salted" HOTP Response
In this case, the PIN/password value used to control the usage of
the token and/or protect access to the key embedded in the hardware
(or software) token can be injected in the Response computation, as
well as the random question Q:
Response = HOTP (K, Q|P)
Where | stands for concatenation.
The challenge-response sequence is the following for parties A and
B sharing knowledge of secret (key) K and willing to perform Mutual
OATH authentication:
1- A sends a random question Q_A to B and AI = 000110000
2- B computes Response_B = HOTP (K2,Q_A|P) and sends it to A
with his own random question Q_B
3- A checks Response_B and if correct, computes Response_A =
HOTP (K1,Q_B|P)
4- B checks Response_A and if correct, acknowledges party A
Obviously, the string P can be empty if party A or B does not have
a PIN or Password - e.g. a validation sever computing a response to
be authenticated by a user will probably not have the usage of a
PIN or password.
It opens for interesting combinations where the algorithm
identifier AI could be used to specify computations both ways -
e.g. the token could include the PIN in his computation and the
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server, knowing the hash checks the HOTP response; in its
calculation on the other hand, no PIN value would be included since
the server would not have one.
4.7 Signature - Using HOTP with challenge and fixed value
The combination of a fixed value and random value enables to
generate different signature values for different fixed values -
the computation is randomized by the question Q. This is important
when signing the same value more then once.
Signature = HOTP (K, Q|T) where | stands for concatenation.
The sequence for B generating a signature to be checked by A is the
following, assuming the mode of computation is dual-key plain mode:
1- A sends a fixed value C, a random question Q to B and AI =
0001 0110 0001
2- B computes Response_B = HOTP (K2,Q|T) and sends it to A
3- A checks Response_B and if correct, acknowledges party B has
validated the value T
In an hostile environment a third party can trick party B to reveal
the correct response for a given value. Again, all exchanges should
take place over a secure channel - using SSL/TLS, or similar
encryption mechanism.
5. Security Considerations
The keys for HOTP can be of any length equal or longer than 20
bytes. Keys longer than 20 bytes are acceptable; they are first
hashed using the supported hash function, e.g. SHA-1, to become
usable. Nevertheless, the extra length would not significantly
increase the cryptographic strength of Mutual OATH, provided the
randomness of the original key material is sufficient.
Keys need to be chosen at random or using a cryptographically
strong pseudo-random generator properly seeded with a random value.
We RECOMMEND to follow the recommendations in [RFC1750] for all
pseudo-random and random generations. The pseudo-random numbers
used for generating the keys SHOULD successfully pass the
randomness test specified in [CN].
The conclusion of the security analysis detailed in [HOTP] is that,
for all practical purposes, the outputs of the dynamic truncation
on distinct counter inputs are uniformly and independently
distributed strings.
The analysis demonstrates that the best possible attack against the
HOTP function is the brute force attack.
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6. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
7. Conclusion
This draft introduced several variants of HOTP for randomized
response and short signature-like computations.
The algorithm identifier AI provides for an easy integration and
support of different HOTP flavors within an authentication and
validation system.
Mutual OATH should enable cross-authentication both in connected
and off-line modes, with the support of different response sizes
and mode of operations.
8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Siddharth Bajaj, Philip Hoyer, Jon
Martinsson and Stu Vaeth for their comments and suggestions to
improve this draft document.
9. References
10.1 Normative
[RFC2104] M. Bellare, R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", IETF Network
Working Group, RFC 2104, February 1997.
[RFC1750] D. Eastlake, 3rd., S. Crocker and J. Schiller,
"Randomness Recommendantions for Security", IETF
Network Working Group, RFC 1750, December 2004.
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3668] S. Bradner, "Intellectual Propery Rights in IETF
Technology", BCP 79, RFC 3668, February 2004.
10.2 Informative
[HOTP] D. M'Raihi, M. Bellare, F. Hoornaert, D. Naccache and
O. Ranen, HOTP: HOTP: An HMAC-based One Time Password
Algorithm", Internet Draft, Informational.
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mraihi-oath-hmac-otp-
04.txt
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[BCK] M. Bellare, R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk, "Keyed Hash
Functions and Message Authentication", Proceedings of
Crypto'96, LNCS Vol. 1109, pp. 1-15.
[OATH] Initiative for Open AuTHentication
http://www.openauthentication.org
[CN] J.S. Coron and D. Naccache, "An accurate evaluation of
Maurer's universal test" by Jean-Sebastien Coron and
David Naccache In Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC
'98), vol. 1556 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
S. Tavares and H. Meijer, Eds., pp. 57-71, Springer-
Verlag, 1999
10. Authors' Addresses
Primary point of contact (for sending comments and question):
David M'Raihi
VeriSign, Inc.
685 E. Middlefield Road Phone: 1-650-426-3832
Mountain View, CA 94043 USA Email: dmraihi@verisign.com
Other Authors' contact information:
Johan Rydell
Portwise, Inc.
624 Ellis Street, Suite 102 Phone: 1-650-472-3582
Mountain View, CA 94043 USA Email: johan.rydell@portwise.com
David Naccache
ENS, DI
45 rue d'Ulm Phone: +33 6 16 59 83 49
75005, Paris France Email: david.naccache@ens.fr
Salah Machani
Diversinet Corp.
2225 Sheppard Avenue East
Suite 1801
Toronto, Ontario M2J 5C2 Phone: 1-416-756-2324 Ext. 321
Canada Email: smachani@diversinet.com
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12.
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