One document matched: draft-morris-geopriv-core-01.txt
Differences from draft-morris-geopriv-core-00.txt
Internet Draft J. Morris
Document: draft-morris-geopriv-core-01.txt Center for Democracy
Expires September 2003 and Technology
D. Mulligan
Samuelson Law, Technology,
and Public Policy Clinic
J. Cuellar
Siemens AG
March 2003
Core Privacy Protections for
Geopriv Location Object
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
The working group has generally agreed that the Geopriv Location
Object MUST be able to contain a limited set of Privacy Rules. This
Internet-Draft suggests the set of Privacy Rules that the authors
believe should be includable in the Location Object.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview..................................... 2
2. Conventions used in this document............................. 3
3. Privacy Rules to be Includable in a Geopriv Location Object... 3
3.1. Human- AND Machine-Readable Privacy Elements and Rules...... 4
3.2. Machine-Readable Privacy Elements and Rules................. 4
4. Additional Discussion of Proposed Privacy Elements and Rules.. 7
5. Reasons to Include Privacy Rules in Location Object........... 8
6. Security Considerations....................................... 9
7. Acknowledgements.............................................. 9
8. References.................................................... 9
9. Author's Addresses............................................ 10
10. Full Copyright Statement...................................... 10
1. Introduction and Overview
The authors believe that there exists working group consensus that
that the Geopriv Location Object (LO) MUST be able to contain a
limited set of Privacy Rules. This document suggests the set of
Privacy Rules that the authors believe should be includable in the
Location Object.
The threshold question of whether the LO should contain any Privacy
Rules was discussed at IETF-55 in Atlanta. A brief explanation as to
why a limited set of Privacy Rules should be includable in the LO is
set out in Section 5 below.
The proposal in this _01 document is intended to reflect the "back of
the napkin" modification to the proposal in the _00 version of this
document. This modification was presented and briefly discussed at
the working group meeting at IETF-55 in Atlanta.
An important element of the "back of the napkin" modification was to
separate the proposed Privacy Rules into two groups, both of which
must be includable in a Geopriv Location Object. The first group
would contain three of the most basic Privacy Rules, and can be
transmitted between and among any of the entities in a Geopriv
transaction. Two different forms of this first group would be
defined - a compact form suitable for low bandwidth applications, and
a human-readable form suitable for transmission to the Viewer (i.e.,
the final recipient of Location Information). (For those familiar
with the -00 version of this document, this group contains what was
previously designated as Elements A, B, and F.)
The second group of Privacy Rules that can be contained in a LO is
intended for use in transmissions between Location Servers. This
second group will contain a limited core set of Privacy Rules, in
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Core Privacy Protections March 2003
machine-readable form. It is the authors' expectation that a high
percentage of users' complete Privacy Rules will be expressible
entirely using these two groups of Privacy Rules discussed here.
(For those familiar with the -00 version of this document, this group
contains what was previously designated as Elements C, D, and E, plus
some additional possible elements discussed in Section 5 of the -00
draft.)
One small part of the "back of the napkin" modification to the -00
document was to remove one proposed element (the former Element G)
from consideration as a "privacy rule," and instead designate the
proposed functionality simply as a feature to be included in a final
definition of a Geopriv Location Object. The resulting proposal is
that the LO should be able to contain the following instruction:
Promptly transmit my location to [abc] individual or entity,
along with [xyz] instruction (where the contents of [xyz] are
NOT defined by Geopriv except for technical parameters such as
maximum size).
Although this proposal does not itself directly advance a privacy
objective, it would greatly facilitate the future development of
privacy protecting (and other) business models. It would also
promote the ability of a Target to bypass the location services
offered by a Location Generator (such as a wireless carrier) in favor
of location services offered by a competitive third party. This
specific proposal is not further discussed in this document.
2. Conventions used in this document
Terms with initial capitals (such as, for example, "Location Object,"
"Privacy Rule," and "Viewer") have the same meaning as defined in the
Geopriv Requirements document, draft-ietf-geopriv-reqs-03.txt.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [1].
3. Privacy Rules to be Includable in a Geopriv Location Object
This section details two groups of core elements of Privacy Rules
that should be expressible in the Geopriv Location Object. For each
of the core elements (designated as Elements A through L), a more
precisely stated "rule" is also provided, with Elements D through L
being stated in a permissions table as part of a single rule.
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Section 4 below contains some additional substantive discussion of
these elements (such as, for example, why elements D and E should be
separately articulated).
Note that some of the elements and rules discussed below are phrased
in terms of prohibitions ("do not disclose except to . . ."), but
could probably as effectively be phrased in terms of permissions
("permitted to disclosed only to . . . ").
3.1. Human- AND Machine-Readable Privacy Elements and Rules
This first group of privacy elements and resulting rules represent
the most basic Privacy Rules, and can be transmitted between and
among any of the entities in a Geopriv transaction.
Two different forms of this first group would be defined - a compact
and machine-readable form suitable for low bandwidth applications,
and a human-readable form suitable for transmission to the Viewer
(i.e., the final recipient of Location Information). This latter
approach would permit, for example, the return of a Location Object
in response to a HTTP request from a web browser.
The three privacy elements in this group are:
Element A: Requirement that external privacy rules be followed
Element B: Limitation on length of data retention
Element C: Limitation on any retransmission or further
disclosure
The following expresses these three broad elements in more precise
language:
Rule 1: Do not retransmit or further disclose my location
information except in full compliance with the
privacy rules located at [url/uri]. (Element A)
Rule 2: Do not retain my location information [past xyz
time+date OR longer than xyz duration]. (Element B)
Rule 3: Do not retransmit or further disclose my location
information. (Element C)
3.2. Machine-Readable Privacy Elements and Rules
The second group of Privacy Rules that can be contained in a LO is
intended for use in transmissions between Location Servers, in
machine-readable form.
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The authors believe that, taken together, Elements A - L would allow
the expression of a very high percentage of users' complete set of
Privacy Rules, and thus in many cases could obviate the need for
reference to any external set of Privacy Rules.
The privacy elements in this group are:
Element D: Permission to disclose only to specified individual
or entity
Element E: Permission to disclose only to someone presenting a
specified key (for instance, a shared key or the
private key corresponding to a particular public
key), or a special type of credential (an e-token to
be defined).
Element F: Requirement that the granularity/precision of
location information be reduced
Element G: The ability to provide additional Privacy Rules for
specific requestors or groups of requestors
Element H: The ability to define a time until which a permission
is valid
Element I: The ability to define a geographical area for which
the permission is valid ("if I am in area x then you
can tell y my location")
Element J: The ability to define a repeatable time window (such
as weekdays during office hours) during which a
permission is valid
Element K: The ability to require that express consent of the
Target/Rule Maker be obtained prior to disclosing
location
Element L: The ability to require that notice be provided to the
Target if location is provided
Elements D through L can be expressed in the form of a single
permissions table:
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Rule 4: Do not retransmit or further disclose my location
information EXCEPT in accordance to the following
permissions table:
|LocSeek|Credent|Accuracy|Policy|Valid|LocRes|TimeRes|Consent|Notice|
| | | | | | | | | |
| abc1 | xyz1 | uvw1 | p1 | v1 | r1 | t1 | c1 | n1 |
| abc2 | xyz2 | uvw2 | p2 | v2 | r2 | t2 | c2 | n2 |
| abc3 | xyz3 | uvw3 | p3 | v3 | r3 | t3 | c3 | n3 |
| abc4 | xyz4 | uvw4 | p4 | v4 | r4 | t4 | c4 | n4 |
where
abc Location Seeker: allows for wildcards including "any" or
"any@some-specific-domain" (Element D)
xyz Credential: allows for wildcards and "no additional
credential required beyond [abc] identity" (Element E)
uvw Accuracy: has one of the following values (Element F):
A = no granularity change required
B = 10 kilometer radius (or within lat/long quadrant)
C = 100 kilometer radius (or within larger quadrant)
D = local or municipal civil designation (e.g., city)
E = state or regional civil designation (e.g., state)
F = national designation (e.g., country)
G = time zone
p Policy: pointer to the privacy rules/policy that must be
followed for this specific Location Seeker (Element G)
v Validity: this permission is valid until time v (Element
H)
r Location Restriction: r represents a region where this
permission applies (for instance, if I am in Munich,
then it is OK to pass this information) (Element I)
t Time Restriction: this permission is only valid within
the recurring time window t (for instance, only during
working hours may my boss obtain my location) (Element
J)
c Consent Bit: ask me for permission in real time (and let
the Location Seeker abc wait until I tell you) (Element
K)
n Notification Bit: send me a notification if you send
this Location Information to Location Seeker abc
(Element L)
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4. Additional Discussion of Proposed Privacy Elements and Rules
The following are additional comments and explanations of the above
privacy elements and rules:
a. Rules 1 - 3 should be expressible in both machine-readable
form as well as an optional human-readable form. Rule 4 is primarily
intended to be read by Location Servers that have sufficient
intelligence to process the rules. When sending Location Information
to an ultimate Viewer, it is possible that the Geopriv Location
Object (LO) itself would need to contain human-readable information
(for example, if the LO is sent to a Viewer using SMTP or HTTP).
This approach is analogous to the full and compact versions of
privacy policies under P3P.
b. Element C and Rule 3 could possibly be omitted as a separate
flag or field, because a "do not distribute" instruction should be a
fundamental default for the Geopriv Location Object. Nevertheless,
there is value in having an express "do not redistribute" indicator,
especially to emphasize that instruction to an ultimate Viewer (who,
as discussed above, may well be a human receiving the LO essentially
directly).
c. Elements D (disclose only to specified individual) and E
(disclose only to someone presenting a key or credential) could
theoretically be consolidated, because establishing the identity in C
would effectively be using some form of credential. The elements,
however, are expressed separately to emphasize that a Rule Maker
should be able to allow access to defined individuals or groups of
individuals, and ALSO to anonymous requestors who present a specified
key or credential. In the proposed Rules, those two elements are
consolidated into Rule 4, but the possibility of an anonymous-but-
credentialed Location Seeker is preserved.
e. To be clear, the proposal of making specific Privacy Rules
includable in a Location Object does NOT mean that all of the
proposed privacy rules would be transmitted in every Location Object
within a given location transaction. It is quite possible that a LO
at an early stage of a location transaction might carry full
specifics on Rules 1 - 4. But a later stage of the same location
transaction (say, from a Location Server to an ultimate Viewer) might
only carry Rules 1 - 3 (which would be the only rules directly
applicable to the Viewer).
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5. Reasons to Include Privacy Rules in Location Object
It is not the purpose of this Internet-Draft to explain in full the
reasons why a limited set of Privacy Rules should be includable in
the Location Object. A brief discussion, however, may assist a
reader who is unfamiliar with past working group discussions on the
topic.
A critical question that faced the Geopriv working group was whether
the Location Object (LO) to be designed should include fields for
particular privacy-protecting rules, or instead should simply refer
to an external set of privacy rules. The three most plausible
answers to this question would be:
(1) "Entirely External" -- the LO should only contain a URI
reference to an external set of privacy rules that must be
followed by any recipient of the LO.
(2) "Limited Internal" -- the LO should contain a limited set
of rules that cover the great bulk of likely privacy
situations (as well as the ability to include a URI
reference to an external set of privacy rules if more
robust rules are needed, or external rule storage is
preferred).
(3) "Full Internal" -- the LO should be defined to be able to
contain a full, robust, and potentially complex set of
privacy rules.
The "Full Internal" option would yield the most complex LO, would be
the most complex to define and implement, and may not be consistent
with the goal of enabling the use of the Geopriv LO on constrained
devices or with limited bandwidth.
The "Entirely External" approach would be the quickest for the
working group to accomplish, and if fully implemented in the
marketplace this approach could give end users a great deal of
control and flexibility in the protection of Location Information.
Under this approach, however, privacy protection would heavily depend
on marketplace developments wholly external to the work of Geopriv,
and thus may not fulfill the mission of the working group as defined
by its charter.
Certain working group participants (including the authors here)
argued that the most effective way to ensure that users have some
privacy control is for the Location Object to be able to carry a
limited number of privacy rules. In discussions at IETF-55 in
Atlanta, the working group agreed to pursue the "Limited Internal"
approach, although the group did not determine the precise elements
to be included in a "Limited Internal" approach. It is to this
latter question that this document is addressed.
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Note that the "Limited Internal" approach is effectively a superset
of the "Entirely External" approach, so that both of those models
could be implemented in appropriate situations even if the LO can
carry a larger set of rules. Thus, where a particular location
service application in fact offers users robust and effective means
to create and maintain an external set of privacy rules, that
application could simply transmit the URI/URL of those external rules
in the Location Object. But where an application lacks robust and
effective external rule servers, the "Limited Internal" approach
would allow a core set of rules to be carried with the LO.
6. Security Considerations
Security is, of course, is a core goal of the Geopriv working group.
The questions addressed in this Internet-Draft -- what privacy rules
should be includable in the Geopriv Location Object -- have
significant security implications, most directly on the security of
the privacy rules themselves. The inappropriate disclosure of some
privacy rules could itself harm privacy, and thus a decision to
include some privacy rules in the Location Object could expose those
rules to a higher chance of security (and thus privacy) violation.
On the other hand, if including rules in the Location Object
increases the likelihood that those privacy rules would in fact be
known and followed, then the added security risk of transmitting
those rules may be outweighed by the added privacy protection
afforded.
7. Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Jon Peterson for his constructive criticism of the
proposals advanced in the prior version of this document.
8. References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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9. Author's Addresses
John B. Morris, Jr.
Director, Internet Standards, Technology & Policy Project
Center for Democracy and Technology
1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20006 Email: jmorris@cdt.org
USA http://www.cdt.org
Deirdre K. Mulligan
Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic
Boalt Hall School of Law
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-7 Email: dmulligan@law.berkeley.edu
USA
Jorge R Cuellar
Siemens AG
Corporate Technology
CT IC 3
81730 Munich Email: Jorge.Cuellar@siemens.com
Germany
10. Full Copyright Statement
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Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar 10
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