One document matched: draft-lee-ipsec-nat-pt-applicability-00.txt




Network Working Group                                             S. Lee
Internet-Draft                                                  S. Jeong
Intended status: Informational                                  H-J. Kim
Expires: December 28, 2007                                          ETRI
                                                           June 26, 2007


         Applicability Issues for IPsec NAT-Traversal in NAT-PT
              draft-lee-ipsec-nat-pt-applicability-00.txt

Status of this Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This memo describes how to apply IPsec protocol based on NAT-
   Traversal mechanisms and applicability issues at NAT-PT.








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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Scenarios for NAT-PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Case 1: Transport Mode operation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Case 2: Tunneling Mode operation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  IPsec Applicabilty Issues in a NAT-PT environment  . . . . . .  4
     4.1.  Issues for Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE . . . .  5
       4.1.1.  Basic IP operation Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       4.1.2.  IDii Payload Type Issue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       4.1.3.  IKE Phase 2 step(Quick Mode) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  Transport Mode issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.3.  Tunneling Mode issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 10






























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1.  Introduction

   Network Address Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT) is one of
   the IPv6/IPv4 translation mechanisms, which can be possible allowing
   IPv6-only node to communicate with IPv4-only node and vice versa.

   But NAT-PT has some limitations to apply IPsec based application to
   the NAT-PT environment.  To solve the similar problem the NAT in IPv4
   network, some documents were suggested for traversal such as NAT-
   Travesal [RFC3947][RFC3948].

   This memo just describes the applicabiltiy issues while applying
   IPsec protocol to the NAT-PT environment and the reasons why the
   problems was raised.


2.  Terminology

    o IPv6-only node :  A host that implements IPv6 and does not support
      IPv4 network stack.
    o IPv4-only node :  A host that implements IPv4 and does not support
      IPv6 network stack.
    o NAT-PT :  The NAT-PT refers to translation of an IPv4 address into
      an IPv6 address and vice versa[RFC2766].


3.  Scenarios for NAT-PT

   IPv6-only node can communicate with IPv4-only node via NAT-PT.  To
   secure bi-directional traffic security between IPv6-only node and
   IPv4-only node in the NAT-PT environment, the IPv6-only node can use
   IPsec protocols[AH],[ESP] with two kinds of IPsec mode.

   IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security --
   Authentication Header(AH) and Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP).
   Both protocols are described in more detail in their respective RFCs
   [RFC2402][RFC2406].

   These protocols may be applied alone or in combination with each
   other to provide a desired set of security services in IPv4 and IPv6.

   In this document, AH is out of scope in this memo, just ESP protocol
   will be used the reason for simplify scenarios.  Each protocol
   supports two secure mode operations to apply in the NAT-PT: Transport
   mode and Tunnel mode.  The detailed cases will be described below.






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3.1.  Case 1: Transport Mode operation

   Transport Mode is most commonly used to provide end-to-end security
   beween IPv6-only and IPv4-only node across the NAT-PT.  IPv6-only
   node initiates IKE negotiation with the IPv4-only node to make
   security association across the NAT-PT before encapsulating UDP
   Tunneling packtes for NAT-PT traversal.


    IPv6-only node ------------ NAT-PT----------------- IPv4-only node
         | |                                                 | |
         | |                                                 | |
         | | ----------Security Association 1----------------| |
         |                (ESP transport)                      |
         |                                                     |
         |-------------Security Association 2------------------|
                         (AH transport)

                    Figure 1: Transport Mode in NAT-PT

3.2.  Case 2: Tunneling Mode operation

   When Tunneling Mode is applied, the peer node does not involve the
   IPsec steps.  Contrary to as noted above, IPv6-only and IPv4-only
   node are not the endpoints to negotiation for security association.
   GW-1(Gateway),GW-2(Gateway) will be charge of the IKE negotiation and
   Tunneling for eacapsulation/decapsuation procedures.


IPv6-only node ----GW-1-------- NAT-PT----------GW-2----- IPv4-only node
                   | |                          | |
                   | |                          | |
                   | |--Security Association 1--  |
                   |       (ESP transport)        |
                   |                              |
                   |----Security Association 2----|
                           (AH transport)

                    Figure 2: Tunneling Mode in NAT-PT


4.  IPsec Applicabilty Issues in a NAT-PT environment

   This section is split two parts.  The first describes the issues
   while applying the IKE Phase1, Phase2 for NAT-Travesal mechanism in
   NAT-PT environment.

   The second part describes the detailed issues when applied with



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   Tunneling Mode and Transport Mode.

4.1.  Issues for Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE

   If there is no SA(Security Association) in IPv6-only node, it starts
   the IKE negotiation and creates the SAs when it finished.  For
   example, linux will lunch the Racoon,which is IKE Daemon to exchange
   IKE messages.

   To support the IKE negotiation in the NAT-PT, IPv6-only node sends
   the dectection packets to the IPv4-only node to check whether there
   is one or more NATs between the peers using a NAT-Travesal technique
   [RFC3947].

   The following example is Phase1 Exchange using NAT-Travesal with Main
   Mode(Authentication with pre-shared key) in a NAT-PT :


   IPv6 Host A              NAT-PT                     IPv4 Host B
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   UDP(500,500) HDR, SA, VID -->
                                    <----  UDP(500,X) HDR, SA, VID

   UDP(500,500) HDR, KE, Ni, NAT-D, NAT-D -->
                    <----  UDP(500,X) HDR, KE, Ni, NAT-D, NAT-D

   UDP(4500,4500) <non-ESP market> HDR*#, IDii, HASH_I -->
                    <--- UDP(4500,Y)<non-ESP market>HDR*#, IDir, HASH_R
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------

                     Figure 3: NAT-Travesal in NAT-PT

   ping6 aaaa:bbbb:cccc::129.254.114.20 -->

        * NAT-PT Prefix : aaaa:bbbb:cccc::/96
        * NAT-PT address pool :129.254.144.1-15
        * Router Advertisement Prefix : 220:220:101a:3::1/64
        * Host A :220:220:101a:3::213:d4ff:fec2:a2bd/64
        * Host B : 129.254.114.20

4.1.1.  Basic IP operation Issue

   IPv6 Host A wants to communicate with the IPv4 Host B in the NAT-PT.
   Thus, IPv6 Host A create a packet with :







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   Source Address, SA = 220:220:101a:3::213:d4ff:fec2:a2bd/64
            (The /64 prefix is NAT-PT's advertisement message)
   Destination Address, DA = aaaa:bbbb:cccc::129.254.114.20/96
                                          (NAT-PT PREFIX::/96)

   This packet routed to the NAT-PT gateway, where the packet will be
   translated to IPv4 address[RFC2766]

   i.e : SA = 129.254.114.1 (one of the NAT-PT's IPv4 address pool),
         DA = 129.254.114.20

4.1.2.  IDii Payload Type Issue

   This issue was caused by applying IKE to the NAT-PT environment
   because IKE address identifier is being used as an identifier in
   Internet Key Exchange protocol(IKE) Phase1 or Phase2 :

   o  IPv6 Host A sets the ID type value to ID_IPV6_ADDR(5) in the IDii
      payload

   o  IPv4 Host B receives the packet with IPv4 SRC, IPv4 DST which
      address was changed via NAT-PT, but IDii payload's Identifer type
      still has a IPv6 address type.


   Because the IP source or desination address modification was caused
   by the NAT-PT, the IKE's indentifier will mismatch.  Thus to apply
   IPsec to the NAT-PT, peer's identifier should be used the ID_FQDN or
   ID_USER_FQDN[RFC2766].

4.1.3.  IKE Phase 2 step(Quick Mode)

   After the phase1 step, the second phase of IKE operation will start
   to get some IPsec parameters such as the type of UDP encapuslated
   IPsec packets in IKE's Quick Mode.

   These encapsulation modes are:
           UDP-Encapsulated-Tunnel          3
           UDP-Encapuslated-Transport       4

   The two types of encapsulation mode will be support in NAT-PT, but
   some reasons below secion 5.2 It recommend that use just the
   transport mode in NAT-PT environment.

4.2.  Transport Mode issues

   In case of applying the UDP-Encapuslated-Transport mode between IPv6
   Host and IPv4 Host, both peers know how to calculate the incremental



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   TCP checksum.  To solve the problem, [RFC3977] suggests the NAT-OA
   (NAT Original Address)payload.  NAT-OA payload is sent the first and
   second packets of Quick Mode.

   In the NAT-PT environment, Host A sends the NAT-OA Payload
   encapsulated UDP with IDii type is ID_IPv6_ADDR and IPv6 address
   embedded the Identifier data field.

   If the IPv6 packets accrossing the NAT-PT, they will be changed their
   outer IPv6 HDR to IPv4 HDR.  But inner the NAT-OA payload will not be
   chanaged.  Because the above transport layer is encrypted by
   authentication algorithm.

   On receving the packets to the IPv4 host, the packets may recalculate
   using NAT-OA payload to verify TCP/IP checksum.  But, IPv4 host has
   only native IPv4 network protocol stack, so it cannot parse the
   NAT-OA option.  This will may raise the issues for IPsec to apply in
   NAT-PT environment.

4.3.  Tunneling Mode issues

   When a tunneling mode has been applied to secure packets between
   peers, the outer IP header is changed by NAT-PT from IPv6 HDR to IPv4
   HDR.  This will cause the tunneling issue for IPsec application to
   the NAT-PT.

   Below is a diagram for the tunneling mode :

   STEP-1 :/* Before Applying ESP/UDP from IPv6 Host */
   [IPv6 HDR][TCP][DATA]
   STEP-2 : /* After Applying ESP/UDP from IPv6 Host */
   [IPv6 HDR][UDP HDR][ESP HDR][IPv6 HDR][TCP][DATA][ESP Trailer][ESP
   AUTH]
   STEP-3 : /* via the NAT-PT  */
   [IPv4 HDR][UDP HDR][ESP HDR][IPv6 HDR][TCP][DATA][ESP Trailer][ESP
   AUTH]

   The IPv4 Host is waiting the UDP-Encapsulated ESP packets on port
   4500.  The procedures for incoming packets below :

   o  On receiving the packets, IPv4 host removes outer IPv4 HDR and UDP
      HDR.

   o  Using a existing SA(Security Association) value, the packets will
      be decrpyted by authentication algorithm using pre-shared key.


   But,the decrypted IPv6 packet cannot forward to the local network



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   protocol stack, because the IPv4 host did not support the IPv6 header
   processing[Re ferece to the STEP-3].

   Therefore, the tunneling mode opeation is not suitable for IPsec
   travesal for in the NAT-PT.


5.  IANA Considerations

   This draft does not require any actions from IANA.


6.  Security Considerations

   TBD


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2402]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
              RFC 2402, November 1998.

   [RFC2406]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
              Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [RFC2766]  Tsirtsis, G. and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address
              Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766,
              February 2000.

   [RFC3715]  Aboba, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address Translation
              (NAT) Compatibility Requirements", RFC 3715, March 2004.

   [RFC3947]  Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
              "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", RFC 3947,
              January 2005.

   [RFC3948]  Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
              Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
              RFC 3948, January 2005.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.choi-v6ops-natpt-ipsec]
              Choi, I., "IPsec support for NAT-PT in IPv6",
              draft-choi-v6ops-natpt-ipsec-00 (work in progress),
              October 2004.



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Authors' Addresses

   Sangdo Lee
   ETRI
   161 Gajeong-dong, Yuseong-gu
   Daejeon,   305-350
   Korea

   Phone: +82-42-860-6679
   Email: doyaa2@gmail.com


   Sangjin Jeong
   ETRI
   161 Gajeong-dong, Yuseong-gu
   Daejeon,   305-350
   Korea

   Phone: +82-42-860-1877
   Email: sjjeong@gmail.com


   Hyoung-Jun Kim
   ETRI
   161 Gajeong-dong, Yuseong-gu
   Daejeon,   305-350
   Korea

   Phone: +82-42-860-6576
   Email: khj@etri.re.kr





















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