One document matched: draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00.txt
DHC Working Group Sheng Jiang
Internet Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Intended status: Proposed Standard Sean Shen
Update: RFC3315 CNNIC
Expires: December 31, 2013 June 29, 2013
Secure DHCPv6 with Public Key
draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
Abstract
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) enables
DHCPv6 servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
various attacks, particularly spoofing attacks. This document
analyzes the security issues of DHCPv6 and specifies a Secure DHCPv6
mechanism. This mechanism is based on public/private key pairs. The
authority of the sender may depend on either pre-configuration
mechanism or Public Key Infrastructure.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................ 3
2. Terminology ................................................. 3
3. Security Overview of DHCPv6 ................................. 3
4. Secure DHCPv6 Overview ...................................... 4
4.1. New Components ......................................... 5
4.2. Support for algorithm agility .......................... 5
5. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6 ................................ 6
5.1. Key/Certificate Option ................................. 6
5.2. Signature Option ....................................... 6
6. Processing Rules and Behaviors .............................. 8
6.1. Processing Rules of Sender ............................. 8
6.2. Processing Rules of Receiver ........................... 9
6.3. Processing Rules of Relay Agent ....................... 10
6.4. Timestamp Check ....................................... 11
7. Security Considerations .................................... 12
8. IANA Considerations ........................................ 13
9. Acknowledgments ............................................ 14
10. References ................................................ 14
10.1. Normative References ................................. 14
10.2. Informative References ............................... 14
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
1. Introduction
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6 [RFC3315])
enables DHCPv6 servers to pass configuration parameters. It offers
configuration flexibility. If not secured, DHCPv6 is vulnerable to
various attacks, particularly spoofing attacks.
This document analyzes the security issues of DHCPv6 in details. This
document provides mechanisms for improving the security of DHCPv6:
- the identity of a DHCPv6 message sender, which can be a DHCPv6
server, a relay agent or a client, can be verified by a
receiver.
- The integrity of DHCPv6 messages can be checked by the receiver
of the message.
The security mechanisms specified in this document is based on self-
generated public/private key pairs. It also integrates timestamps for
anti-replay. The authentication procedure defined in this document
may depend on either deployed Public Key Infrastructure (PKI,
[RFC5280]) or pre-configured sender's public key. However, the
deployment of PKI or pre-configuration is out of the scope.
Secure DHCPv6 is applicable in environments where physical security
on the link is not assured (such as over wireless) and attacks on
DHCPv6 are a concern.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Security Overview of DHCPv6
DHCPv6 is a client/server protocol that provides managed
configuration of devices. It enables DHCPv6 server to automatically
configure relevant network parameters on clients. In the basic DHCPv6
specification [RFC3315], security of DHCPv6 message can be improved
in a few aspects.
a) The basic DHCPv6 specifications can optionally authenticate the
origin of messages and validate the integrity of messages using an
authentication option with a symmetric key pair. [RFC3315] relies
on pre-established secret keys. For any kind of meaningful
security, each DHCPv6 client would need to be configured with its
own secret key; [RFC3315] provides no mechanism for doing this.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
For the key of the hash function, there are two key management
mechanisms. Firstly, the key management is out of band, usually
manual, i.e., operators set up key database for both server and
client before running DHCPv6. Usually multiple keys are deployed
one a time and key id is used to specify which key is used.
Manual key distribution runs counter to the goal of minimizing the
configuration data needed at each host. [RFC3315] provides an
additional mechanism for preventing off-network timing attacks
using the Reconfigure message: the Reconfigure Key authentication
method. However, this method provides no message integrity or
source integrity check. This key is transmitted in plaintext.
Comparing to this, the public/private key pair security mechanism
only require a key pair on the sender. The key management
mechanism is very simple.
b) Communication between a server and a relay agent, and
communication between relay agents, can be secured through the use
of IPsec, as described in section 21.1 in [RFC3315]. However,
IPsec is quite complicated. A simpler security mechanism, which
can be easier to deploy, is desirable.
4. Secure DHCPv6 Overview
To solve the above mentioned security issues, we introduce the use of
public/private key pair mechanism into DHCPv6, also with timestamp.
The authority of the sender may depend on either pre-configuration
mechanism or PKI. By combining with the signatures, sender identity
can be verified and messages protected.
This document introduces a Secure DHCPv6 mechanism that uses the
public/private key pair to secure the DHCPv6 protocol. It assumes:
a) the secured DHCPv6 message sender already has a public/private key
pair; b) the receiver has already been have the public key of the
sender, which may be pre-configured or recorded from previous
communications, or the public key of CA (Certificate Authority),
which issues the sender's certificate and is trusted by the receiver.
In this document, we introduce a key/certificate option and two
signature options with a corresponding verification mechanism.
Timestamp is integrated into signature options. A DHCPv6 message
(from a server, a relay agent or a client), with a key/certificate
option and carry a digital signature, can be verified by the receiver
for both the timestamp and authentication, then process the payload
of the DHCPv6 message only if the validation is successful.
This improves communication security of DHCPv6 messages. The
authentication options [RFC3315] may also be used for replay
protection.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
Because the sender can be a DHCPv6 server, a relay agent or a client,
the end-to-end security protection can be from DHCPv6 servers to
relay agents or clients, or from clients to DHCPv6 servers. Relay
agents MAY add its own Secure DHCPv6 options in Relay-Forward
messages when transmitting client messages to the server.
4.1. New Components
The components of the solution specified in this document are as
follows:
- A public/private key pair has been generated by a node itself.
The node may request a CA to sign its public key to get a
trustable certificate, which contains the original public key.
Two new DHCPv6 option are defined to carry the public key or
the certificate of the sender.
- Signatures signed by private key protect the integrity of the
DHCPv6 messages and authenticate the identity of the sender.
- Timestamp, a value that indicates the relative time in second.
4.2. Support for algorithm agility
Hash functions are the fundamental security mechanism. "...they have
two security properties: to be one way and collision free." "The
recent attacks have demonstrated that one of those security
properties is not true." [RFC4270] It is theoretically possible to
perform collision attacks against the "collision-free" property.
Following the approach recommended by [RFC4270] and [NewHash], recent
analysis shows none of these attacks are currently possible,
according to [RFC6273]. "The broken security property will not affect
the overall security of many specific Internet protocols, the
conservative security approach is to change hash algorithms."
[RFC4270]
However, these attacks indicate the possibility of future real-world
attacks. Therefore, we have to take into account that attacks will
improved in the future, and provide a support for multiple hash
algorithms. Our mechanism, in this document, supports not only hash
algorithm agility but also signature algorithm agility.
The support for algorithm agility in this document is mainly a
unilateral notification model from a sender to a receiver. If the
receiver cannot support the algorithm provided by the sender, it
takes the risk itself. Senders in a same network do not have to
upgrade to a new algorithm simultaneously.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
5. Extensions for Secure DHCPv6
This section extends DHCPv6. Three new options have been defined. The
new options MUST be supported in the Secure DHCPv6 message exchange.
5.1. Key/Certificate Option
The Key/Certificate option carries the public key or certificate of
the sender. The format of the Public Key option is described as
follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION Key/Certificate | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K/C Flag | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ .
. Public Key or Certificate (variable length) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_KC_PARAMETER (TBA1).
option-len 1+ length of public key/certificate in octets.
K/C Flag Flag to indicate whether the value is a public
key or certificate. 00x for public key; FFx for
certificate. Other values may be extended in the
future.
Public key A variable-length field containing public key or
certificate.
5.2. Signature Option
The Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
attached to a DHCPv6 message. The Signature option could be any place
within the DHCPv6 message. It protects the entire DHCPv6 header and
options, except for the Signature option itself and the
Authentication Option. The format of the Signature option is
described as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_SIGNATURE | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA-id | SA-id |
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp (64-bit) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Signature (variable length) .
. .
. +-+-+-+-+-+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_SIGNATURE (TBA2).
option-len 12 + Length of Signature field and Padding field
in octets.
HA-id Hash Algorithm id. The hash algorithm is used
for computing the signature result. This design
is adopted in order to provide hash algorithm
agility. The value is from the Hash Algorithm
for Secure DHCPv6 registry in IANA. The initial
values are assigned for SHA-1 is 0x0001.
SA-id Signature Algorithm id. The signature algorithm
is used for computing the signature result. This
design is adopted in order to provide signature
algorithm agility. The value is from the
Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 registry
in IANA. The initial values are assigned for
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is 0x0001.
Reserved A 16-bit field reserved for future use. The
value MUST be initialized to zero by the sender,
and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Timestamp The current time of day (NTP-format timestamp
[RFC5905], a 64-bit unsigned fixed-point number,
in seconds relative to 0h on 1 January 1900.).
It can reduce the danger of replay attacks.
Signature A variable-length field containing a digital
signature. The signature value is computed with
the hash algorithm and the signature algorithm,
as described in HA-id and SA-id. The signature
constructed by using the sender's private key
protects the following sequence of octets:
1. The 128-bit Source IPv6 Address.
2. The 128-bit Destination IPv6 Address.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
3. The DHCPv6 message header.
4. All DHCPv6 options except for the Signature
option and the Authentication Option.
5. The content between the option-len field and
the signature field in this Signature option, in
the format described above.
Padding This variable-length field contains padding, as
many bits long as remain after the end of the
signature. This padding is only needed if the
length of signature is not a multiple of 8
bits.
Note: a Relay-Reply message is constructed by a DHCPv6 server in
segments. The server first constructs the server message for client,
which includes a Signature Option that covers the server message. In
the signed data, the destination address is the address of the
client. It then constructs the Relay-Reply message by encapsulating
the server message into a Relay Message Option. If there is
additional option for relay, the server MUST include another
Signature Option, which covers the entire Relay-Reply message. In the
signed data, the destination address is the address of the target
relay agent.
6. Processing Rules and Behaviors
6.1. Processing Rules of Sender
The sender of a Secure DHCPv6 message could be a DHCPv6 server, a
DHCPv6 relay agent or a DHCPv6 client.
The node MUST have a public/private key pair in order to create
Secure DHCPv6 messages. The node may have a certificate which is
signed by a CA trusted by both sender and receiver.
To support Secure DHCPv6, the Secure DHCPv6 enabled sender MUST
construct the DHCPv6 message following the rules defined
in [RFC3315].
A Secure DHCPv6 message MUST contain both the Key/Certificate option
and the Signature option, except for Relay-forward and Relay-reply
Messages.
Senders SHOULD set the Timestamp field to the current time, according
to their real time clocks.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
If a relay agent adds its own options in a Relay-forward message, it
MUST contain the Key/Certificate option and the Signature option. If
it does not any add new options it MUST NOT add either the
Key/Certificate option or the Signature option into Relay-forward
message. If there are more than a number of Relay agents (the number
depends on the lengths of public key and signature, typical number is
four) in the way and each of them adds their own options, it may
exceed the IPv6 MTU. However, this can be considered as a rare
deployment scenario.
Relay-reply Messages MUST NOT contain the Key/Certificate option
since it appears in the Relay Message Option. If a server adds
addition options for relay agents in Relay-reply message, it MUST
contain a Signature Option. If it does not add any addition options,
it MUST NOT add the Signature Option into the Relay-reply message.
The Signature option MUST be constructed as explained in Section 5.2.
It protects the message header and the message payload and all DHCPv6
options except for the Signature option itself and the Authentication
Option.
6.2. Processing Rules of Receiver
When receiving a DHCPv6 message (except for Relay-Forward and
Relay-Reply messages), a Secure DHCPv6 enabled receiver SHOULD
discard the DHCPv6 message if either the Key/Certificate option or
the Signature option is absent. If both options are absent, the
receiver MAY fall back the unsecure DHCPv6 model.
The receiver SHOULD first check the authority of this sender. If the
sender uses public key in the Key/Certificate option, the receiver
SHOULD trust it by finding a match public key from the local trust
public key list, which is pre-configured or recorded from previous
communications. If the sender uses certificate in the Key/Certificate
option, the receiver SHOULD validation the sender's certificate
following the rules defined in [RFC5280]. An implementation may then
create a local trust certificate record, too. The receiver may choose
to further process the message from an unauthorized sender so that a
leap of faith may be built up.
Then, the receiver MUST verify the Signature and check timestamp. The
order of two procedures is left as an implementation decision. It is
RECOMMENDED to check timestamp first, because signature verification
is much more computational expensive.
The signature field verification MUST show that the signature has
been calculated as specified in Section 5.2.
Only the messages that get through both the signature verifications
and timestamp check are accepted as secured DHCPv6 messages and
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
continue to be handled for their contained DHCPv6 options as defined
in [RFC3315]. Messages that do not pass the above tests MUST be
discarded or treated as unsecure messages.
The receiver MAY record the verified public key or certificate for
future authentications.
Furthermore, the node that supports the verification of the Secure
DHCPv6 messages MAY record the following information:
Minbits The minimum acceptable key length for public
keys. An upper limit MAY also be set for the
amount of computation needed when verifying
packets that use these security associations.
The appropriate lengths SHOULD be set according
to the signature algorithm and also following
prudent cryptographic practice. For example,
minimum length 1024 and upper limit 2048 may be
used for RSA [RSA].
A Relay-forward message without any addition option to Relay Message
option or a Relay-forward message with both addition options and the
Signature option is accepted for a Secure DHCPv6 enabled server.
Otherwise, the message SHOULD be discarded or treated as unsecure
message. If Signature option is presented in the Relay-forward
message, the signature verification and timestamp check are needed.
The server MUST also verify signature for the encapsulated client
DHCPv6 message in the Relay Message Option.
A Relay-reply message without any addition option to Relay Message
option or a Relay-reply message with both addition options and the
Signature Option is accepted for a Secure DHCPv6 enabled server.
Otherwise, the message SHOULD be discarded or treated as unsecure
message. If the Signature Option is presented in the Relay-reply
message, the signature verification and timestamp check are needed.
The relay agents obtain the public key or certificate of the server
from the Key/Certificate option encapsulated in the Relay Message
option.
6.3. Processing Rules of Relay Agent
To support Secure DHCPv6, relay agents MUST follow the same
processing rules defined in [RFC3315].
In the client-relay-server scenario, the relay agent MAY verify the
signature as a receiver before relaying the client message further,
following verification procedure define in Section 6.2. In the case
of failure, it MUST discard the DHCPv6 message. However, the
verification procedure on relay agents does not save the load of the
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
DHCPv6 server. The server still MUST verify the signature by itself
in order to prevent the attack between the relay agent and server.
In the server-relay-client scenario, if the Signature Option and
addition options are presented, the relay agent MUST verify the
signature before relaying the server message further, following
verification procedure define in Section 6.2. In the case of failure,
it MUST discard the DHCPv6 message.
The relay agent MAY also verify the signature for the encapsulated
DHCPv6 message in the Relay Message Option. This can be helpful if
the DHCPv6 response traverses a separate administrative domain, or if
the relay agent is in a separate administrative domain. However, this
is not necessary because the DHCPv6 client validation will catch any
modification to the response.
6.4. Timestamp Check
Receivers SHOULD be configured with an allowed timestamp Delta value,
a "fuzz factor" for comparisons, and an allowed clock drift
parameter. The recommended default value for the allowed Delta is
300 seconds (5 minutes); for fuzz factor 1 second; and for clock
drift, 0.01 second.
To facilitate timestamp checking, each receiver SHOULD store the
following information for each sender:
o The receive time of the last received and accepted DHCPv6
message. This is called RDlast.
o The time stamp in the last received and accepted DHCPv6 message.
This is called TSlast.
An accepted DHCPv6 message is any successfully verified (for both
timestamp check and signature verification) DHCPv6 message from the
given peer. It initiates the update of the above variables.
Receivers SHOULD then check the Timestamp field as follows:
o When a message is received from a new peer (i.e., one that is not
stored in the cache), the received timestamp, TSnew, is checked,
and the message is accepted if the timestamp is recent enough to
the reception time of the packet, RDnew:
-Delta < (RDnew - TSnew) < +Delta
The RDnew and TSnew values SHOULD be stored in the cache as
RDlast and TSlast.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
o When a message is received from a known peer (i.e., one that
already has an entry in the cache), the timestamp is checked
against the previously received SEND message:
TSnew + fuzz > TSlast + (RDnew - RDlast) x (1 - drift) - fuzz
If this inequality does not hold, the receiver SHOULD silently
discard the message. If, on the other hand, the inequality holds,
the receiver SHOULD process the message.
Moreover, if the above inequality holds and TSnew > TSlast, the
receiver SHOULD update RDlast and TSlast. Otherwise, the receiver
MUST NOT update RDlast or TSlast.
An implementation MAY use some mechanism such as a timestamp cache to
strengthen resistance to replay attacks. When there is a very large
number of nodes on the same link, or when a cache filling attack is
in progress, it is possible that the cache holding the most recent
timestamp per sender will become full. In this case, the node MUST
remove some entries from the cache or refuse some new requested
entries. The specific policy as to which entries are preferred over
others is left as an implementation decision.
7. Security Considerations
This document provides new security features to the DHCPv6 protocol.
Using public key based security mechanism and its verification
mechanism in DHCPv6 message exchanging provides the authentication
and data integrity protection. Timestamp mechanism provides anti-
replay function.
The Secure DHCPv6 mechanism is based on the pre-condition that the
receiver knows the public key of senders or the sender's certificate
can be verified through a trust CA. It prevents DHCPv6 server
spoofing. The clients may decline the DHCPv6 messages from
unknown/unverified servers, which may be fake servers; or may prefer
DHCPv6 messages from known/verified servers over unsigned messages or
messages from unknown/unverified servers. The pre-configuration
operation also needs to be protected, which is out of scope. The
deployment of PKI is also out of scope.
However, when a DHCPv6 client first encounters a new public key or
new unverified certificate, it can make a leap of faith. If the
DHCPv6 server that used that public key/certificate is in fact
legitimate, then all future communication with that DHCPv6 server can
be protected by caching the public key. This does not provide
complete security, but it limits the opportunity to mount an attack
on a specific DHCPv6 client to the first time it communicates with a
new DHCPv6 server.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
Downgrade attacks cannot be avoided if nodes are configured to accept
both secured and unsecured messages. A future specification may
provide a mechanism on how to treat unsecured DHCPv6 messages.
[RFC6273] has analyzed possible threats to the hash algorithms used
in SEND. Since the Secure DHCPv6 defined in this document uses the
same hash algorithms in similar way to SEND, analysis results could
be applied as well: current attacks on hash functions do not
constitute any practical threat to the digital signatures used in the
signature algorithm in the Secure DHCPv6.
A window of vulnerability for replay attacks exists until the
timestamp expires. Secure DHCPv6 nodes are protected against replay
attacks as long as they cache the state created by the message
containing the timestamp. The cached state allows the node to protect
itself against replayed messages. However, once the node flushes the
state for whatever reason, an attacker can re-create the state by
replaying an old message while the timestamp is still valid.
Attacks against time synchronization protocols such as NTP [RFC5905]
may cause Secure DHCPv6 nodes to have an incorrect timestamp value.
This can be used to launch replay attacks, even outside the normal
window of vulnerability. To protect against these attacks, it is
recommended that SEND nodes keep independently maintained clocks or
apply suitable security measures for the time synchronization
protocols.
8. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new DHCPv6 [RFC3315] options, which MUST be
assigned Option Type values within the option numbering space for
DHCPv6 messages:
The Key/Certificate Parameter Option (TBA1), described in Section
5.1.
The Signature Option (TBA2), described in Section 5.2.
This document defines two new registries that have been created and
are maintained by IANA. Initial values for these registries are given
below. Future assignments are to be made through Standards Action
[RFC5226]. Assignments for each registry consist of a name, a value
and a RFC number where the registry is defined.
Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this name space are
16-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are assigned
for Hash Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document:
Name | Value | RFCs
-------------------+---------+------------
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
Reserved | 0x0000 | this document
SHA-1 | 0x0001 | this document
SHA-256 | 0x0002 | this document
Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6. The values in this name space
are 16-bit unsigned integers. The following initial values are
assigned for Signature Algorithm for Secure DHCPv6 in this document:
Name | Value | RFCs
-------------------+---------+------------
Reserved | 0x0000 | this document
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 | 0x0001 | this document
9. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Bernie Volz, Ted Lemon, Ralph Droms,
Jari Arkko, Sean Turner, Stephen Kent, Thomas Huth, David Schumacher,
Dacheng Zhang, Francis Dupont and other members of the IETF DHC
working groups for their valuable comments.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC3315] R. Droms, et al., "Dynamic Host Configure Protocol for
IPv6", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley,
and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5905] D. Mills, J. Martin, Ed., J. Burbank and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", c, March 1997.
[RFC4270] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic
Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC 4270, November 2005.
[RFC5226] T. Narten and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, May 2008.
[RFC6273] A. Kukec, S. Krishnan and S. Jiang "The Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) Hash Threat Analysis", RFC 6274, June
2011.
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft draft-jiang-dhc-sedhcpv6-00 June 2013
[NewHash] S.Bellovin and E. Rescorla, "Deploying a New Hash
Algorithm", November 2005.
[RSA] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1",
PKCS 1, November 2002.
[sha-1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIBS PUB 180-1, April 1995,
http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm.
Author's Addresses
Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus
No.156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100095
P.R. China
EMail: jiangsheng@huawei.com
Sean Shen
CNNIC
4, South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing 100190
P.R. China
EMail: shenshuo@cnnic.cn
Jiang & Shen Expires December 31, 2013 [Page 15]| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 11:36:49 |