One document matched: draft-jiang-csi-cga-config-dhcpv6-01.txt
Differences from draft-jiang-csi-cga-config-dhcpv6-00.txt
Network Working Group Sheng Jiang
Internet Draft Sam(Zhongqi) Xia
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Expires: April 25, 2010 October 26, 2009
Configuring Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) using DHCPv6
draft-jiang-csi-cga-config-dhcpv6-01.txt
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Abstract
A Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) is an IPv6 addresses
binding with a public/private key pair. However, the current CGA
specifications are lack of procedures to enable proper management of
CGA generation. Administrators should be able to configure parameters
used to generate CGA. The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6), which enables network management to dynamically
configure hosts, can be used in the CGA configuration. Furthermore,
CGA generation consumes large computation power. This computational
burden can be delegated to the DHCPv6 server. A new DHCPv6 options
are also defined in this document to enable hosts delegate CGA
generation to a DHCPv6 server.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction..................................................3
2. Terminology...................................................3
3. Requirements..................................................4
3.1. Configuration of the parameters required for the generation
of CGA........................................................4
3.2. Offloading the large computational burden................5
4. DHCPv6 Approach...............................................5
4.1. Node requests CGA-related configuration parameters to the
DHCPv6 server.................................................6
4.2. Node requests CGA generation to the DHCPv6 server........6
5. New CGA-related DHCPv6 Options................................6
5.1. DHCPv6 CGA Sec Option....................................6
5.2. DHCPv6 CGA Generation Request Option.....................7
6. Security Considerations.......................................8
7. IANA Considerations...........................................9
8. Acknowledgments...............................................9
9. References....................................................9
9.1. Normative References.....................................9
9.2. Informative References..................................10
Author's Addresses..............................................11
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1. Introduction
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA, [RFC3972]) provide means
to verify the ownership of IPv6 addresses without requiring any
security infrastructure such as a certification authority. The use
of CGAs allows identity verification in different protocols, such as
SEure Neighbor Discovery (SEND, [RFC3971]), Enhanced Route
Optimization for MIPv6 [RFC4866] or Site Multihoming by IPv6
Intermediation (SHIM6 [RFC5533]).
However, as [PS-DC] analyses, in the current specifications, there is
a lack of procedures to enable proper management of CGA generation,
in particular, in the configuration of the parameters that define the
security properties of the addresses. Administrators should be able
to configure parameters used to generate CGA. The Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6), which enables network
management to dynamically configure hosts, can be used in the CGA
configuration. For example, DHCPv6 server should be able to assign
subnet prefix or other relevant parameters to CGA address owner. In
some scenarios, the administrator may further want to enforce some
parameters, particularly, the demanded security related parameters
such as SEC value.
Additionally, CGA generation is computational consumption. It can be
a heavy burden for end-user devices, particular slow or battery-
dependant devices. Currently, there are no means to delegate the
computation of the modifier, a CPU intensive operation, to faster or
non battery-dependant resources. It is possible that the whole or
part of CGA generation procedure is delegated to the DHCPv6 server.
This draft analyses the requirements raised by CGA configuration and
computational delegation for CGA generation. This draft provides
solutions for CGA configuration and delegated CGA generation. Two
existing DHCPv6 options are re-used. Two new DHCPv6 options are also
defined in this document.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [RFC2119].
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3. Requirements
The CGA specifications [RFC3972] define the procedure to generate a
CGA. However, these procedures do not allow the enforcement of a
given configuration to a group of hosts. It does also not consider
the delegation of CPU-intensive operations to other nodes. In this
section, we analyze the scenarios in which these operations are
required.
3.1. Configuration of the parameters required for the generation
of CGA
The CGA associated Parameters used to generate a CGA includes several
parameters [RFC3972]:
- a Public Key,
- a Subnet Prefix,
- a 3-bit security parameter Sec. Additionally, it should be noted
that the hash algorithm to be used in the generation of the CGA is
also defined by the Sec value [RFC4982],
- a modifier that is selected so that the result of a hash to
comply with the requirements introduced by the value of a security
parameter Sec in order to provide protection against brute-force
attacks,
- a Collision Count value, increased each time the address
generated results in a collision in the subnet considered,
- any Extension Fields that could be used.
Currently, there are convenient mechanisms for allowing an
administrator to configure the subnet prefix for a host, by Router
Advertisement [RFC4862]. But other parameters used for generating the
CGA could not be configured by the administrator.
It would be useful if these parameters could also be configured by
the administrator. For instance, the administrator can determine,
according to the type of infrastructure and the security needs, the
Sec value that should be used by the hosts to generate the CGA. When
appropriate, the Extension Fields could also be mandated by the
administrator.
Upon reception of this information, the end hosts SHOULD generate
addresses compliant with the received parameters. If the parameters
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change, the end hosts SHOULD generate new addresses compliant with
the parameters propagated.
3.2. Offloading the large computational burden
An important case to consider is the large computational consumption
of the generation of the modifier field. The modifier is a 128
unsigned integer that is selected so that the Hash2 operation defined
in RFC 3972 results in the required number of leftmost 0 bits. The
higher the number of bits required being 0, the more secure a CGA is
against brute-force attacks. However, high number of bits also
results in additional computational cost for the generation process,
cost that could be deemed excessive in certain environments, such as
mobile terminals with low computing power.
As an example, consider a Sec value equals 2, requesting the leftmost
32 bits of a SHA-1 Hash2 to be zero. For assuring this, a system has
to generate in mean 2^32 different modifiers, and perform the Hash2
operation to check the bits required to be 0. An estimation of the
CPU power required to do this can be obtained as following: openSSL
can perform in an Intel Core2-6300 on an Asus p5b-w motherboard close
to 0.87 million of SHA-1 operations on 16 byte blocks per second.
Since the input data of Hash2 operation is larger than 16 bytes, this
value is an upper bound for the number of hash operations that can be
performed for generating the modifier. Checking 2^32 different
modifiers requires around 5000 seconds. The high number of required
operations can represent a problem for end hosts (i.e. mobile devices)
with much lower computing power than considered in the example,
and/or with restrictions in battery resources.
For these cases, a mechanism for delegating the computation of the
modifier should be provided. It is also possible that the whole CGA
generation procedure is delegated.
4. DHCPv6 Approach
Among the mechanisms in which configuration parameters could be
pushed to the end hosts and/or CGA related information sent back to a
central administration, we discuss the stateful configuration
mechanism based on DCHPv6 in this document. Other mechanisms may also
provide similar functions, but out of scope.
DHCPv6 can be extended to:
- propagate to the end hosts the values of the parameters required
to configure CGAs,
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- receive requests for generating a CGA according to a given
security configuration, and returning the result to the end host.
4.1. Node requests CGA-related configuration parameters to the
DHCPv6 server
A node may initiate a request for the relevant CGA configuration
information needed to the DHCPv6 server. The server responds with the
configuration information for the node. The Option Request Option,
defined in Section 22.7 in [RFC3315], can be used for node to
indicate which options the client requests from the server. To
propagate the CHA-related parameters, the Identity Association for
Prefix Assignment Option defined in [HGID] and a new CGA-Sec Option
defined in Section 5.1 can be used. Of course, a node can also use
the sub-prefix received through Router Advertisement message
[RFC4861]. Future specification may define more options to carry CGA-
related configuration parameters.
After receiving the configuration information, the node SHOULD
generate a CGA based on its public key and the configuration
information. The configuration of the client key pair or certificate
is out of scope.
4.2. Node requests CGA generation to the DHCPv6 server
A node may initiate a request for the computation of the modifier or
the CGA address for a certain security configuration to the DHCPv6
server. The node includes the values selected for the CGA associated
parameters, such as its public key, the value of the Sec parameter,
etc. The server either computes by itself, or redirects the
computation to other node using a mechanism that is out of the scope
of this document. Once the server generates or obtains the CGA, it
responds to the node with the resulting address and the CGA
Parameters Data Structure using the CGA Generation Request Option
defined in Section 5.2.
5. New CGA-related DHCPv6 Options
5.1. DHCPv6 CGA Sec Option
DHCPv6 CGA Sec Option is used to carry a Sec value, the parameters
associated with CGA generation on a client. After receiving the CGA
Sec Option, the client SHOULD generate a CGA using a Sec value that
is not lower than the option indicated.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_CGA_SEC | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| CGA SEC |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_CGA_SEC (TBA).
option-len 1.
CGA SEC a digit between 0 and 7, the SEC level.
5.2. DHCPv6 CGA Generation Request Option
DHCPv6 CGA Generation Request Option is sent by a client to request a
DHCPv6 server to generate a CGA address. After a DHCPv6 server
receives CGA-relevant parameters sent by the client, it generates a
CGA address based on these parameters and its own configuration. It
then replies the CGA address and associated CGA Parameters data
structure back to the client.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_CGA_GR | option-len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| CGA SEC | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Subnet Prefix (64-bit) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Public Key (variable length) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Extension Fields (optional, variable length,) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
option-code OPTION_CGA_GR (TBA).
option-len 16 + Length of public key field in octets.
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CGA SEC a digit between 0 and 7, the SEC level require
by the client.
Reserved A 24-bit field reserved for future use. The
value MUST be initialized to zero by the sender,
and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Subnet Prefix An IPv6 prefix provided by the client, used for
CGA generation. If set all 0, DHCPv6 server will
use its own configured IPv6 subnet prefix.
Public Key This is a variable-length field contain the
public key of the client. This public key will
be used for CGA generation.
Extension Fields This is an optional variable-length field that
is not used in the current specification. Future
versions of this specification may use this
field for additional data items that need to be
included in the CGA Parameters data structure.
Implementations MUST ignore the value of any
unrecognized extension fields.
DHCPv6 server MAY use IA-NA or IA TA option with a CGA Parameter Data
Structure IA sub-option to return the CGA address and associated CGA
Parameters data structure back to the client.
DHCPv6 server MAY generate only a modifier and associated CGA
Parameters data structure if it can not perform duplicate address
detection, as per [RFC3971].
6. Security Considerations
The mechanisms based on DHCPv6 are all vulnerable to DOS attacks to
the server, such as request for large number of CGA generations.
Proper use of DHCPv6 autoconfiguration facilities [RFC3315], such as
AUTH option or Secure DHCP [SDHCP] can prevent these threats,
provided that a configuration token is known to both the client and
the server.
Note that, as expected, it is not possible to provide secure
configuration of CGA without a previous configuration of security
information at the client (either a trust anchor, a DHCPv6
configuration token...). However, considering that the values of
these elements could be shared by the nodes in the network segment,
these security elements can be configured more easily in the end
nodes than its addresses.
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Regarding to the configuration of the Sec parameter, one risk is that
a malicious node could propagate a Sec value providing less
protection than intended by the network administrator, facilitating a
brute force attack against the hash, or the selection of the weakest
hash algorithm available for CGA definition. However, even in the
worst case, if the hash algorithm cannot be inverted, the expected
number of iterations required for a brute force attack is O(2^59) in
order to find a CGA Parameters data structure that matches a given
CGA. Another risk is the use of a Sec, higher than intended by the
administrator, which would require a large number of resources of the
client to compute the modifier, requiring a long time before the
device can communicate. This can be considered a kind of DOS attack.
A variation of this attack is the propagation of different Sec values.
This kind of attack may be prevented by server authentication.
An attacker could send malicious CGA Generation Requests in order to
exhaust the server resources, since the CPU cost for the server can
be high, especially considering that the attacker could select a Sec
value requiring the highest number of computations for the server.
This kind of attack may be prevented by host-based authentication.
7. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new DHCPv6 [RFC3315] options, which must be
assigned Option Type values within the option numbering space for
DHCPv6 messages:
The DHCPv6 CGA Sec Option (TBA1), described in Section 5.1.
The DHCPv6 CGA Generation Request Option (TBA2), described in Section
5.2.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Marcelo Bagnulo Braun and Alberto
Garcia-Martinez from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid for been
involved in the early requirement identification.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC2119, March 1997.
[RFC3315] R. Droms, Ed., "Dynamic Host Configure Protocol for IPv6",
RFC3315, July 2003.
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[RFC3971] J. Arkko, J. Kempf, B. Zill, P. Nikander, "SEcure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) ", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] T. Aura, "Cryptographically Generated Address", RFC3972,
March 2005.
[RFC4861] T. Narten, et al., "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 4861, September 2007.
[RFC4862] S. Thomson, T. Narten, T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC4862, September 2007.
[RFC4866] J. Arkko, C. Vogt, W. Haddad, "Enhanced Route Optimization
for Mobile IPv6", RFC4866, May 2007.
[RFC4982] M. Bagnulo, "Support for Multiple Hash Algorithms in
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) ", RFC4982,
July 2007.
[RFC5533] E. Nordmark and M. Bagnulo "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming Shim
Protocol for IPv6" FRC 5533, June 2009
9.2. Informative References
[PS-DC] S. Jiang, "DHCPv6 and CGA Interaction: Problem Statement",
draft-ietf-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-00.txt (work in progress),
October, 2009.
[SDHCP] S. Jiang, "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs", draft-jiang-dhc-
secure-dhcpv6-02.txt (work in progress), July 2009.
[HGID] F. Xia, B. Sarikaya, S. Jiang, "Usage of Host Generating
Interface Identifier in DHCPv6", draft-xia-dhc-host-gen-id-
02.txt (work in progress), October 2009.
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Author's Addresses
Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
KuiKe Building, No.9 Xinxi Rd.,
Shang-Di Information Industry Base, Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100085
P.R. China
Email: shengjiang@huawei.com
Sam(Zhongqi) Xia
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
KuiKe Building, No.9 Xinxi Rd.,
Shang-Di Information Industry Base, Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100085
P.R. China
Email: xiazhongqi@huawei.com
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