One document matched: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-04.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-03.txt
TCPM WG J. Touch
Internet Draft USC/ISI
Obsoletes: 2385 A. Mankin
Intended status: Proposed Standard Johns Hopkins Univ.
Expires: September 2009 R. Bonica
Juniper Networks
March 9, 2009
The TCP Authentication Option
draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-04.txt
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This document specifies the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO), which
obsoletes the TCP MD5 Signature option of RFC-2385 (TCP MD5). TCP-AO
specifies the use of stronger Message Authentication Codes (MACs),
protects against replays even for long-lived TCP connections, and
provides more details on the association of security with TCP
connections than TCP MD5. TCP-AO is compatible with either static
master key configuration or an external, out-of-band master key
management mechanism; in either case, TCP-AO also protects
connections when using the same master key across repeated instances
of a connection, using traffic keys derived from the master key, and
coordinates key changes between endpoints. The result is intended to
support current infrastructure uses of TCP MD5, such as to protect
long-lived connections (as used, e.g., in BGP and LDP), and to
support a larger set of MACs with minimal other system and
operational changes. TCP-AO uses its own option identifier, even
though used mutually exclusive of TCP MD5 on a given TCP connection.
TCP-AO supports IPv6, and is fully compatible with the requirements
for the replacement of TCP MD5.
Table of Contents
1. Contributors...................................................3
2. Introduction...................................................4
2.1. Executive Summary.........................................4
2.2. Changes from Previous Versions............................6
2.2.1. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-04....................6
2.2.2. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-03....................6
2.2.3. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-02....................7
2.2.4. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-01....................8
2.2.5. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-00....................9
2.2.6. New in draft-touch-tcp-simple-auth-03................9
2.2.7. New in draft-touch-tcp-simple-auth-02...............10
2.2.8. New in draft-touch-tcp-simple-auth-01...............10
3. Conventions used in this document.............................10
4. The TCP Authentication Option.................................11
4.1. Review of TCP MD5 Option.................................11
4.2. The TCP-AO Option........................................11
5. The TCP-AO Activation and Parameter Database..................13
6. Per-Connection Parameters.....................................16
7. Cryptographic Algorithms......................................17
7.1. MAC Algorithms...........................................17
7.2. Key Derivation Functions.................................21
7.3. Traffic Key Establishment and Duration Issues............24
7.3.1. Master Key Reuse Across Socket Pairs................25
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7.3.2. Master Key Use Within a Long-lived Connection.......25
8. Additional Security Mechanisms................................25
8.1. Coordinating KeyID Changes...............................25
8.2. Preventing replay attacks within long-lived connections..26
9. TCP-AO Interaction with TCP...................................28
9.1. TCP User Interface.......................................29
9.2. TCP States and Transitions...............................30
9.3. TCP Segments.............................................30
9.4. Sending TCP Segments.....................................31
9.5. Receiving TCP Segments...................................32
9.6. Impact on TCP Header Size................................34
10. Obsoleting TCP MD5 and Legacy Interactions...................35
11. Interactions with Middleboxes................................36
11.1. Interactions with non-NAT/NAPT Middleboxes..............36
11.2. Interactions with NAT/NAPT Devices......................36
12. Evaluation of Requirements Satisfaction......................36
13. Security Considerations......................................42
14. IANA Considerations..........................................44
15. References...................................................45
15.1. Normative References....................................45
15.2. Informative References..................................46
16. Acknowledgments..............................................47
1. Contributors
This document evolved as the result of collaboration of the TCP
Authentication Design team (tcp-auth-dt), whose members were
(alphabetically): Mark Allman, Steve Bellovin, Ron Bonica, Wes Eddy,
Lars Eggert, Charlie Kaufman, Andrew Lange, Allison Mankin, Sandy
Murphy, Joe Touch, Sriram Viswanathan, Brian Weis, and Magnus
Westerlund. The text of this document is derived from a proposal by
Joe Touch and Allison Mankin [To06] (originally from June 2006),
which was both inspired by and intended as a counterproposal to the
revisions to TCP MD5 suggested in a document by Ron Bonica, Brian
Weis, Sriran Viswanathan, Andrew Lange, and Owen Wheeler [Bo07]
(originally from Sept. 2005) and in a document by Brian Weis [We05].
Russ Housley suggested L4/application layer management of the TAPD.
Steve Bellovin motivated the KeyID field. Eric Rescorla suggested the
use of ISNs in the traffic key computation and ESNs to avoid replay
attacks, and Brian Weis extended the computation to incorporate the
entire connection ID and provided the details of the traffic key
computation. Mark Allman, Wes Eddy, Lars Eggert, Ted Faber, Russ
Housley, Gregory Lebovitz, Tim Polk, Eric Rescorla, Joe Touch, and
Brian Weis developed the key coordination mechanism.
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2. Introduction
The TCP MD5 Signature (TCP MD5) is a TCP option that authenticates
TCP segments, including the TCP IPv4 pseudoheader, TCP header, and
TCP data. It was developed to protect BGP sessions from spoofed TCP
segments which could affect BGP data or the robustness of the TCP
connection itself [RFC2385][RFC4953].
There have been many recent concerns about TCP MD5. Its use of a
simple keyed hash for authentication is problematic because there
have been escalating attacks on the algorithm itself [Wa05]. TCP MD5
also lacks both key management and algorithm agility. This document
adds the latter, and provides a simple key coordination mechanism
giving the ability to move from one key to another within the same
connection. It does not however provide for complete cryptographic
key management to be handled in-band of TCP, because TCP SYN segments
lack sufficient remaining space to handle such a negotiation (see
Section 9.6). This document obsoletes the TCP MD5 option with a more
general TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO), to support the use of
other, stronger hash functions, provide replay protection for long-
lived connections and across repeated instances of a single
connection, coordinate key changes between endpoints, and to provide
a more structured recommendation on external key management. The
result is compatible with IPv6, and is fully compatible with
requirements under development for a replacement for TCP MD5 [Be07].
This document is not intended to replace the use of the IPsec suite
(IPsec and IKE) to protect TCP connections [RFC4301][RFC4306]. In
fact, we recommend the use of IPsec and IKE, especially where IKE's
level of existing support for parameter negotiation, session key
negotiation, or rekeying are desired. TCP-AO is intended for use only
where the IPsec suite would not be feasible, e.g., as has been
suggested is the case to support some routing protocols, or in cases
where keys need to be tightly coordinated with individual transport
sessions [Be07].
Note that TCP-AO obsoletes TCP MD5, although a particular
implementation may support both mechanisms for backward
compatibility. For a given connection, only one can be in use. TCP
MD5-protected connections cannot be migrated to TCP-AO because TCP
MD5 does not support any changes to a connection's security algorithm
once established.
2.1. Executive Summary
This document replaces TCP MD5 as follows [RFC2385]:
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o TCP-AO uses a separate option Kind for TCP-AO (TBD-IANA-KIND).
o TCP-AO allows TCP MD5 to continue to be used concurrently for
legacy connections.
o TCP-AO replaces MD5's single MAC algorithm with MACs specified in
a separate document and allows extension to include other MACs.
o TCP-AO allows rekeying during a TCP connection, assuming that an
out-of-band protocol or manual mechanism provides the new keys. In
such cases, a key ID allows the efficient concurrent use of
multiple keys, and a key coordination mechanism manages the key
change within a connection. Note that TCP MD5 does not preclude
rekeying during a connection, but does not require its support
either. Further, TCP-AO supports key changes with zero packet
loss, whereas key changes in TCP MD5 can lose packets in transit
during the changeover or require trying multiple keys on each
received segment during key use overlap because it lacks an
explicit key ID.
o TCP-AO provides automatic replay protection for long-lived
connections using an extended sequence number.
o TCP-AO ensures per-connection traffic keys as unique as the TCP
connection itself, using TCP's ISNs for differentiation, even when
static master keys are used across repeated instances of a socket
pair.
o TCP-AO specifies the details of how this option interacts with
TCP's states, event processing, and user interface.
o The TCP-AO option is 2 bytes shorter than TCP MD5 (16 bytes
overall, rather than 18) in the default case (using a 96-bit MAC).
This document differs from an IPsec/IKE solution in that TCP-AO as
follows [RFC4301][RFC4306]:
o TCP-AO does not support dynamic parameter negotiation.
o TCP-AO uses TCP's socket pair (source address, destination
address, source port, destination port) as a security parameter
index, rather than using a separate field as a primary index
(IPsec's SPI).
o TCP-AO forces a change of computed MACs when a connection
restarts, even when reusing a TCP socket pair (IP addresses and
port numbers) [Be07].
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o TCP-AO does not support encryption.
o TCP-AO does not authenticate ICMP messages (some ICMP messages may
be authenticated via IPsec, depending on the configuration).
2.2. Changes from Previous Versions
[NOTE: to be omitted upon final publication as RFC]
2.2.1. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-04
o Major revision to the document structure, including renaming the
TSAD to TAPD.
o Added a key change coordination mechanism in Section 8.1.
o Added a requirement for symmetric use of TCP-AO, required for the
key change coordination mechanism. This includes an update of the
TAPD to indicate that all master keys are bidirectional.
o Augmented the discussion of the available space for options.
o Fixed a bug in the ESN algorithm.
o Adds a text referring to the TCP-AO cryptography companion
document.
o Changed RFC-TBD to ao-crypto (until the RFC number is assigned).
2.2.2. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-03
o Added a placeholder to discuss key change coordination in Section
8.1.
o Moved discussion of required MAC algorithms and PRF to a separate
document, indicated as RFC-TBD until assigned. Included the PRF in
the TSAD master key tuple so that TCP-AO is PRF algorithm agile,
and updated general PRF input format.
o Revised the description the TSAD and impact to the TCP user
interface. Removed the description of the TSAD API. Access to the
API is assumed specific to the implementation, and not part of the
protocol specification.
o Clarified the different uses of the term key; includes master key
(from the TSAD) and connection key (per-connection key, derived
from the master via the PRF).
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o Explained the ESN pseudocode operation in detail.
o Added a contributors section up front.
o Update discussion of requirements to be sufficiently stand-alone;
update list to correlate more directly to Be07 (so that Be07 can
be dropped from consideration for publication).
o Provided detail on size of typical options (motivating a small
option).
o Confirmed WG consensus on IETF-72 topic - no algorithm ID and T-
bit (options excluded) locations in the header.
o Confirmed WG consensus on IETF-72 topic - no additional header
bits for in-band key change signaling (the "K" bit from [Bo07]).
2.2.3. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-02
o List issue - Replay Protection: incorporated extended sequence
number space, not using KeyID space.
o List issue - Unique Connection Keys: ISNs are used to generate
unique connection keys even when static keys used for repeated
instances of a socket pair.
o List issue - Header Format and Alignment: Moved KeyID to front.
o List issue - Reserved KeyID Value: Suggestion to reserve a single
KeyID value for implementation optimization received no support on
the WG list, so this was not changed.
o List issue - KeyID Randomness: KeyIDs are not assumed random; a
note was added that nonce-based filtering should be done on a
portion of the MAC (incorporated into the algorithm), and that
header fields should not be assumed to have cryptographic
properties (e.g., randomness).
o List issue - Support for NATs: preliminary rough consensus
suggests that TCP-AO should not be augmented to support NAT
traversal. Existing mechanisms for such traversal (UDP support)
can be applied, or IPsec NAT traversal is recommended in such
cases instead.
o IETF-72 topic - providing algorithm ID and T-bit (options
excluded) locations in the header: (No current consensus was
reached on this topic, so no change was made.)
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o IETF-72 topic - providing additional header bits for in-band key
change signaling (draft-bonica's "K" bit): (No current consensus
was reached on this topic, so no change was made.)
o Clarified TCP-AO as obsoleting TCP MD5.
o Clarified the MAC Type as referring to the IANA registry of IKEv2
transforms, not the RFC establishing that registry.
o Added citation to the Wang/Yu paper regarding attacks on MD5 Wa05
to replace reports in Be05 and Bu06.
o Explained why option exclusion can't be changed during a
connection.
o Clarified that AO explicitly allows rekeying during a TCP
connection, without impacting packet loss.
o Described TCP-AO's interaction with reboots more clearly, and
explained the need to clear out old state that persists
indefinitely.
2.2.4. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-01
o Require KeyID in all versions. Remove odd/even indicator of KeyID
usage.
o Relax restrictions on key reuse: requiring an algorithm for nonce
introduction based on ISNs, and suggest key rollover every 2^31
bytes (rather than using an extended sequence number, which
introduces new state to the TCP connection).
o Clarify NAT interaction; currently does not support omitting the
IP addresses or TCP ports, both of which would be required to
support NATs without any coordination. This appears to present a
problem for key management - if the key manager knows the received
addrs and ports, it should coordinate them (as indicated in Sec
8).
o Options are included or excluded all-or-none. Excluded options are
deleted, not just zeroed, to avoid the impact of reordering or
length changes of such options.
o Augment replay discussion in security considerations.
o Revise discussion of IKEv2 MAC algorithm names.
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o Remove executive summary comparison to expired documents.
o Clarified key words to exclude lower case usage.
2.2.5. New in draft-ietf-tcp-auth-opt-00
o List of TBD values, and indication of how each is determined.
o Changed TCP-SA to TCP-AO (removed 'simple' throughout).
o Removed proposed NAT mechanism; cited RFC-3947 NAT-T as
appropriate approach instead.
o Made several changes coordinated in the TCP-AUTH-DT as follow:
o Added R. Bonica as co-author.
o Use new TCP option Kind in the core doc.
o Addresses the impact of explicit declines on security.
o Add limits to TSAD size (2 <= TSAD <= 256).
o Allow 0 as a legitimate KeyID.
o Allow the WG to determine the two appropriate required MAC
algorithms.
o Add TO-DO items.
o Added discussion at end of Introduction as to why TCP MD5
connections cannot be upgraded to TCP-AO.
2.2.6. New in draft-touch-tcp-simple-auth-03
o Added support for NAT/NAPT.
o Added support for IPv6.
o Added discussion of how this proposal satisfies requirements under
development, including those indicated in [Be07].
o Clarified the byte order of all data used in the MAC.
o Changed the TCP option exclusion bit from a bit to a list.
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2.2.7. New in draft-touch-tcp-simple-auth-02
o Add reference to Bellovin's need-for-TCP-auth doc [Be07].
o Add reference to SP4 [SDNS88].
o Added notes that TSAD to be externally implemented; this was
compatible with the TSAD described in the previous version.
o Augmented the protocol to allow a KeyID, required to support
efficient overlapping keys during rekeying, and potentially useful
during connection establishment. Accommodated by redesigning the
TSAD.
o Added the odd/even indicator for the KeyID.
o Allow for the exclusion of all TCP options in the MAC calculation.
2.2.8. New in draft-touch-tcp-simple-auth-01
o Allows intra-session rekeying, assuming out-of-band coordination.
o MUST allow TSAD entries to change, enabling rekeying within a TCP
connection.
o Omits discussion of the impact of connection reestablishment on
BGP, because added support for rekeying renders this point moot.
o Adds further discussion on the need for rekeying.
3. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be
interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.
In this document, the characters ">>" proceeding an indented line(s)
indicates a compliance requirement statement using the key words
listed above. This convention aids reviewers in quickly identifying
or finding this RFC's explicit compliance requirements.
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4. The TCP Authentication Option
The TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) uses a TCP option Kind value
of TBD-IANA-KIND.
4.1. Review of TCP MD5 Option
For review, the TCP MD5 option is shown in Figure 1.
+---------+---------+-------------------+
| Kind=19 |Length=18| MD5 digest... |
+---------+---------+-------------------+
| |
+---------------------------------------+
| |
+---------------------------------------+
| |
+-------------------+-------------------+
| |
+-------------------+
Figure 1 The TCP MD5 Option [RFC2385]
In the TCP MD5 option, the length is fixed, and the MD5 digest
occupies 16 bytes following the Kind and Length fields, using the
full MD5 digest of 128 bits [RFC1321].
The TCP MD5 option specifies the use of the MD5 digest calculation
over the following values in the following order:
1. The TCP pseudoheader (IP source and destination addresses,
protocol number, and segment length).
2. The TCP header excluding options and checksum.
3. The TCP data payload.
4. A key.
4.2. The TCP-AO Option
The new TCP-AO option provides a superset of the capabilities of TCP
MD5, and is minimal in the spirit of SP4 [SDNS88]. TCP-AO uses a new
Kind field, and similar Length field to TCP MD5, a KeyID field, and a
NextKeyID field as shown in Figure 2.
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+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| Kind | Length | KeyID | NextKeyID|
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| MAC ...
+----------------------------------...
...-----------------+
... MAC (con't) |
...-----------------+
Figure 2 The TCP-AO Option
The TCP-AO defines the following fields:
o Kind: An unsigned 1-byte field indicating the TCP-AO Option. TCP-
AO uses a new Kind value of TBD-IANA-KIND.
>> An endpoint MUST NOT use TCP-AO for the same connection in
which TCP MD5 is used.
>> A single TCP segment MUST NOT have more than one TCP-AO option.
o Length: An unsigned 1-byte field indicating the length of the TCP-
AO option in bytes, including the Kind, Length, KeyID, NextKeyID,
and MAC fields.
>> The Length value MUST be greater than or equal to 4.
>> The Length value MUST be consistent with the TCP header length;
this is a consistency check and avoids overrun/underrun abuse.
Values of 4 and other small values are of dubious utility but are
not specifically prohibited.
o KeyID: An unsigned 1-byte field used to support efficient key
changes during a connection and/or to help with key coordination
during connection establishment, to be discussed further in
Section 8.1. Note that the KeyID has no cryptographic properties -
it need not be random, nor are there any reserved values.
o NextKeyID: An unsigned 1-byte field used to support efficient key
change coordination, to be discussed further in Section 8.1. Note
that the NextKeyID has no cryptographic properties - it need not
be random, nor are there any reserved values.
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o MAC: Message Authentication Code. Its contents are determined by
the particulars of the security association. Typical MACs are 96-
128 bits (12-16 bytes), but any length that fits in the header of
the segment being authenticated is allowed. The MAC computation is
described further in Section 7.1.
>> Required support for TCP-AO MACs as defined in [ao-crypto];
other MACs MAY be supported.
The TCP-AO option fields do not indicate the MAC algorithm either
implicitly (as with TCP MD5) or explicitly. The particular algorithm
used is considered part of the configuration state of the
connection's security and is managed separately (see Section 5).
The remainder of this document explains how the TCP-AO option is
handled and its relationship to TCP.
5. The TCP-AO Activation and Parameter Database
TCP-AO relies on a TCP-AO Activation and Parameter Database (TAPD),
which indicates whether a TCP connection requires TCP-AO, and its
parameters when so. TAPD entries are assumed to exist at the
endpoints where TCP-AO is used, in advance of the connection, and
consist of the following:
1. TCP connection identifier (ID), i.e., socket pair - IP source
address, IP destination address, TCP source port, and TCP
destination port [RFC793]. TAPD entries are uniquely determined by
their TCP connection ID, which is used to index those entries. A
TAPD entry may allow wildcards, notably in the source port value.
>> There MUST be no more than one matching TAPD entry per
direction for a fully-instantiated (no wildcards) TCP connection
ID.
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2. A TCP option flag. When 0, this flag allows default operation,
i.e., TCP options are included in the MAC calculation, with TCP-
AO's MAC field zeroed out. When 1, all options (excluding TCP-AO)
are excluded from all MAC calculations (skipped over, not simply
zeroed). The option flag applies to TCP options in both directions
(incoming and outgoing segments).
>> The TCP option flag MUST NOT change during a TCP connection.
The TCP option flag cannot change during a connection because TCP
state is coordinated during connection establishment. TCP lacks a
handshake for modifying that state after a connection has been
established.
3. A list of zero or more master key tuples.
>> Components of a TAPD master key tuple MUST NOT change during a
connection.
Keeping the tuple components static ensures that the KeyID
uniquely determines the properties of a packet; this supports use
of the KeyID to determine the packet properties.
>> The set of TAPD master key tuples MAY change during a
connection, but KeyIDs of those tuples MUST NOT overlap. I.e.,
tuple parameter changes MUST be accompanied by master key changes.
>> If there are multiple tuples in a TAPD entry, then one tuple
MUST be flagged as the preferred key; that key, when instantiated
as a traffic_key, becomes the current_key for the connection (see
Section 6).
Each tuple is defined as the following components:
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a. KeyID. The value as used in the TCP-AO option; used to
differentiate master keys in concurrent use, as well as to
indicate when master keys are ready for use.
>> A TAPD implementation MUST support at least two KeyIDs per
connection per direction, and MAY support up to 256.
>> A KeyID MUST support any value, 0-255 inclusive. There are
no reserved KeyID values.
KeyID values are assigned arbitrarily. They can be assigned in
sequence, or based on any method mutually agreed by the
connection endpoints (e.g., using an external master key
management mechanism).
>> KeyIDs MUST NOT be assumed to be randomly assigned.
Note that KeyIDs are unique only within a TAPD entry.
b. Master key. A byte sequence used for generating traffic keys,
this may be derived from a separate shared key by an external
protocol over a separate channel. This sequence is used in the
traffic key generation algorithm described in Section 7.2.
Implementations are advised to keep master key values in a
private, protected area of memory or other storage.
Implementations are also advised to indicate the length of
this key explicitly, because there are no reserved byte
values.
c. MAC algorithm. Indicates the MAC algorithm used for this
connection, explained further in Section 7.1 [ao-crypto]. The
MAC_algorithm indicates other properties, such as MAC
truncation, PRF algorithm, and KDF truncation, as explained
further in [ao-crypto]
The TAPD is consulted when new connections are established to
determine whether TCP-AO is required.
>> When a TAPD entry matches a new connection, TCP-AO is required.
This is true regardless of whether there are any master key tuples
present.
>> When TCP-AO is required, the TCP-AO option MUST occur in every
incoming and outgoing TCP segment. In this case, segments lacking the
TCP-AO option MUST be silently ignored.
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For a particular endpoint (i.e., IP address) there would be exactly
one TAPD that is consulted by all pending connections, the same way
that there is only one table of TCBs (a database can support multiple
endpoints, but an endpoint is represented in only one database).
Multiple databases could be used to support virtual hosts, i.e.,
groups of interfaces.
This document does not address how TAPD entries are created by
users/processes; it specifies how they must be destroyed
corresponding to connection states, but users/processes may destroy
entries as well. It is presumed that a TAPD entry affecting a
particular connection cannot be destroyed during an active connection
- or, equivalently, that its parameters are copied to an area local
to the connection (i.e., instantiated) and so changes would affect
only new connections. The TAPD can be managed by a separate
application protocol.
NOTE: an open issue is whether to require actions when master keys
are added to the TAPD. In particular, there is a suggestion to force
new added keys to update current_key to the newly added value, and to
set a timer or flag on previous current_key values. If a timer, the
value is unclear (2*MSL isn't appropriate, because we don't know how
long a key changeover may take, and we're not reacting to messages
from the other side). If a flag, this would require that flagged
entries could never be advertised as NextKeyID.
6. Per-Connection Parameters
TCP-AO uses a small number of parameters associated with each
connection that uses the TCP-AO option, once instantiated. These
values would typically be stored in the Transport Control Block (TCP)
[RFC793]. These values are explained in subsequent sections of this
document as noted; they include:
1. Current_key - the KeyID of the master key tuple currently used to
authenticate outgoing segments, inserted in outgoing segments as
KeyID (see Section 9.4, step 5). Incoming segments are
authenticated using the KeyID in the segment's TCP-AO header (see
Section 9.5, step 5). There is only one current_key at any given
time on a particular connection.
>> Every connection in a non-IDLE state MUST have exactly one
current_key value specified.
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2. Next_key - the KeyID of the master key tuple currently preferred
for future use, as inserted in outgoing segments as NextKeyID (see
Section 9.5, step 5).
>> Each connection in a non-IDLE state MUST have exactly one
next_key value specified.
3. A pair of Extended Sequence Numbers (ESNs). ESNs are used to
prevent replay attacks, as described in Section 8.2. Each ESN is
initialized to zero upon connection establishment. Its use in the
MAC calculation is described in Section 7.1.
4. One or more master key tuples. These are all the master key tuples
that match this connection's socket pair in the TAPD. When a new
tuple is added to the TAPD, it is added to the TCB of all matching
connections.
Master key tuples are used, together with other parameters of a
connection, to create traffic keys unique to each connection, as
described in Section 7.2. These traffic keys can be cached after
computation, and are typically stored in the TCB with the
corresponding master key tuple information. They can be considered
part of the per-connection parameters.
7. Cryptographic Algorithms
TCP-AO also uses cryptographic algorithms to compute the MAC (Message
Authentication Code) used to authenticate a segment and its headers;
these are called MAC algorithms and are specified in a separate
document to facilitate updating the algorithm requirements
independently from the protocol [ao-crypto]. TCP-AO also uses
cryptographic algorithms to convert master keys, which can be shared
across connections, into unique traffic keys for each connection.
These are called Key Derivation Functions (KDFs), and are specified
[ao-crypto]. This section describes how these algorithms are used by
TCP-AO.
7.1. MAC Algorithms
MAC algorithms take a variable-length input and a key and output a
fixed-length number. This number is used to determine whether the
input comes from a source with that same key, and whether the input
has been tampered in transit. MACs for TCP-AO have the following
interface:
INPUT: MAC_alg, MAC_truncation, traffic_key, data_block
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OUTPUT: MAC
where:
o MAC_alg - MAC algorithm used for this computation
o MAC_truncation - the number of bytes to truncate the output of the
MAC to. This is indicated by the MAC algorithm, as specified in
[ao-crypto].
o Traffic_key - traffic key used for this computation. This is
computed from the connection's current master key as described in
Section 7.2.
o Data_block - input data over which the MAC is computed. In TCP-AO,
this is the TCP segment prepended by the TCP pseudoheader and TCP
header options, as described in Section 7.1.
o MAC - the fixed-length output of the MAC algorithm, given the
parameters provided. If the MAC_alg output is smaller than the
desired MAC_truncation, it is padded with trailing zeroes as
needed.
At the time of this writing, the algorithms' definitions for use in
TCP-AO, as described in [ao-crypto] are each truncated to 96 bits.
Though the algorithms each output a larger MAC, we truncate the
output to 96 bits to provide a reasonable tradeoff between security
and message size, for fitting into the TCP-AO header. Though could
change in the future, so TCP-AO header sizes should not be assumed as
fixed length.
>> To allow a TCP-AO implementation to compute any implicit MAC
algorithm padding required, the specification for each algorithm used
with TCP-AO MUST specify the padding modulus for the algorithm, if
one is required.
The MAC algorithm employed for the MAC computation on any connection
is done so by policy definition in the TAPD entry, and is chosen from
a list of available MACs, where each MAC also infers an underlying
KDF, per [ao-crypto]'s definitions.
The mandatory-to-implement MAC algorithms for use with TCP-AO are
described in a separate RFC [ao-crypto]. This allows the TCP-AO
specification to proceed along the standards track even if changes
are needed to its associated algorithms and their labels (as might be
used in a user interface or automated master key management protocol)
as a result of the ever evolving world of cryptography.
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>> Additional algorithms, beyond those mandated for TCP-AO, MAY be
supported.
The data input to the MAC is the following fields in the following
sequence, interpreted in network-standard byte order:
1. The extended sequence number (ESN), in network-standard byte
order, as follows (described further in Section 8.2):
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| ESN |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Figure 3 Extended sequence number
The ESN for transmitted segments is maintained locally in the
SND.ESN value; for received segments, a local RCV.ESN value is
used. The details of how these values are maintained and used is
described in Sections 8.2, 9.4, and 9.5.
2. The TCP pseudoheader: IP source and destination addresses,
protocol number and segment length, all in network byte order,
prepended to the TCP header below. The pseudoheader is exactly as
used for the TCP checksum in either IPv4 or IPv6
[RFC793][RFC2460]:
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Source Address |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Destination Address |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| zero | Proto | TCP Length |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Figure 4 TCP IPv4 pseudoheader [RFC793]
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+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Source Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+ +
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Destination Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Upper-Layer Packet Length |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| zero | Next Header |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Figure 5 TCP IPv6 pseudoheader [RFC2460]
3. The TCP header, by default including options, and where the TCP
checksum and TCP-AO MAC fields are set to zero, all in network
byte order.
When the TCP option flag is 0, the TCP options are included in MAC
processing, except that the MAC field of the TCP-AO option is
zeroed-out.
When the TCP option flag is 1, all TCP options are omitted from
MAC processing, except for the non-MAC portions of the TCP-AO
option. In this case, the following field is used instead of the
options part of the TCP header:
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| Kind | Length | KeyID | NextKeyID|
+----------+----------+----------+----------+
4. The TCP data, i.e., the payload of the TCP segment.
Note that the traffic key is not included as part of the data; the
MAC algorithm indicates how to use the traffic key, e.g., as HMACs do
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in general [RFC2104][RFC2403]. The traffic key is derived from the
current master key as described in Sections 7.2.
7.2. Key Derivation Functions
TCP-AO's traffic keys are derived from the master key tuples using
Key Derivation Functions (KDFs). The KDFs used in TCP-AO have the
following interface:
INPUT: PRF_alg, master_key, output_length, data_block
OUTPUT: traffic_key
where:
o PRF_alg - the specific pseudorandom function (PRF) that is the
basic building block used in constructing the given KDF. This is
specified by the MAC algorithm as specified in [ao-crypto].
o Master_key - The master_key string, as will be stored into the
associated TCP-AO TAPD master key tuple.
o Output_length - The desired output length of the KDF, i.e., the
length to which the KDF's output will be truncated or padded. In
TCP-AO, the output_length is the PRF_truncation value of the
master key tuple. This is specified by the MAC algorithm as
specified in [ao-crypto].
o Data_block - The data block used as input in constructing the KDF.
The data block provided by TCP-AO is used as the "context" as
specified in [ao-crypto]. The specific way this context is used,
in conjunction with other information, to create the raw input to
the PRF is also explained further in [ao-crypto].
The data used as input to the KDF combines TCP socket pair with the
endpoint initial sequence numbers (ISNs) of a connection. This
provides context unique to each TCP connection instance, which
enables TCP-AO to generate unique traffic keys for that connection,
even from a master key used across many different connections or
across repeated connections that share a socket pair. Unique traffic
keys are generated without relying on external key management
properties. This data block is defined in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
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+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Source Address |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Destination Address |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Source Port | Dest. Port |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Source ISN |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Dest. ISN |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Figure 6 Data block for an IPv4 connection
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Source Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+ +
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Destination Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Source Port | Dest. Port |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Source ISN |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Dest. ISN |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Figure 7 Data block for an IPv6 connection
"Source" and "destination" are defined by the direction of the
segment being MAC'd; for incoming packets, source is the remote side,
whereas for outgoing packets source is the local side. This further
ensures that connection keys generated for each direction are unique.
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For SYN segments (segments with the SYN set, but the ACK not set),
the destination ISN is not known. For these segments, the connection
key is computed using the connection block shown above, in which the
Destination ISN value is zero. For all other segments, the ISN pair
is used when known. If the ISN pair is not known, e.g., when sending
a RST after a reboot, the segment should be sent without
authentication; if authentication was required, the segment cannot
have been MAC'd properly anyway and would have been dropped on
receipt.
>> TCP-AO SYN segments (SYN set, no ACK set) MUST use a destination
ISN of zero (whether sent or received); all other segments use the
known ISN pair.
Overall, this means that each connection will use up to four distinct
traffic keys for each master key:
o Send_SYN_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate
outgoing SYNs. The source ISN known (the TCP connection's local
ISN), and the destination (remote) ISN is unknown (and so the
value 0 is used).
o Receive_SYN_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate
incoming SYNs. The source ISN known (the TCP connection's remote
ISN), and the destination (remote) ISN is unknown (and so the
value 0 is used).
o Send_other_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate all
other outgoing TCP segments. The source ISN is the TCP
connection's local ISN, and the destination ISN is the TCP
connection's remote ISN.
o Receive_other_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate
all other incoming TCP segments. The source ISN is the TCP
connection's remote ISN, and the destination ISN is the TCP
connection's remote ISN.
The use of both ISNs in the KDF ensures that segments cannot be
replayed across repeated connections reusing the same socket pair
(provided the ISN pair does not repeat, which is unlikely because
both endpoints should select ISNs pseudorandomly [RFC1948], their 32-
bit space avoids repeated use except under reboot, and reuse assumes
both sides repeat their use on the same connection).
In general, a SYN would be MAC'd using a destination ISN of zero
(whether sent or received), and all other segments would be MAC'd
using the ISN pair for the connection. There are other cases in which
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the destination ISN is not known, but segments are emitted, such as
after an endpoint reboots, when is possible that the two endpoints
would not have enough information to authenticate segments. In such
cases, TCP's timeout mechanism will allow old state to be cleared to
enable new connections, except where the user timeout is disabled; it
is important that implementations are capable of detecting excesses
of TCP connections in such a configuration and can clear them out if
needed to protect its memory usage [Je07].
7.3. Traffic Key Establishment and Duration Issues
The TCP-AO option does not provide a mechanism for traffic key
negotiation or parameter negotiation (MAC algorithm, length, or use
of the TCP-AO option), or for coordinating rekeying during a
connection. We assume out-of-band mechanisms for master key
establishment, parameter negotiation, and rekeying. This separation
of master key use from master key management is similar to that in
the IPsec security suite [RFC4301][RFC4306].
We encourage users of TCP-AO to apply known techniques for generating
appropriate master keys, including the use of reasonable master key
lengths, limited traffic key sharing, and limiting the duration of
master key use [RFC3562]. This also includes the use of per-
connection nonces, as suggested in Section 7.2.
TCP-AO supports rekeying in which new master keys are negotiated and
coordinated out-of-band, either via a protocol or a manual procedure
[RFC4808]. New master key use is coordinated using the out-of-band
mechanism to update the TAPD at both TCP endpoints. When only a
single master key is used at a time, the temporary use of invalid
master keys could result in packets being dropped; although TCP is
already robust to such drops, TCP-AO uses the KeyID field to avoid
such drops. The TAPD can contain multiple concurrent master keys,
where the KeyID field is used to identify the master key that
corresponds to the traffic key used for a segment, to avoid the need
for expensive trial-and-error testing of master keys in sequence.
TCP-AO provides an explicit key coordination mechanism, described in
Section 8.1. Such a mechanism is useful when new keys are installed,
or when keys are changed, to determine when to commence using
installed keys.
The KeyID field is also useful in coordinating master keys used for
new connections. A TAPD entry may be configured that matches the
unbound source port, which would return a set of possible master
keys. The KeyID would then indicate the specific master key, allowing
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more efficient connection establishment; otherwise, the master keys
could have been tried in sequence.
Users are advised to manage master keys following the spirit of the
advice for key management when using TCP MD5 [RFC3562], notably to
use appropriate key lengths (12-24 bytes) and to avoid sharing master
keys among multiple BGP peering arrangements. This requires that the
TAPD support monitoring and modification.
7.3.1. Master Key Reuse Across Socket Pairs
Master keys can be reused across different socket pairs within a
host, or across different instances of a socket pair within a host.
In either case, replay protection is maintained.
Master keys reused across different socket pairs cannot enable replay
attacks because the TCP socket pair is included in the MAC, as well
as in the generation of the traffic key. Master keys reused across
repeated instances of a given socket pair cannot enable replay
attacks because the connection ISNs are included in the traffic key
generation algorithm, and ISN pairs are unlikely to repeat over
useful periods.
7.3.2. Master Key Use Within a Long-lived Connection
TCP-AO uses extended sequence numbers (ESNs) to prevent replay
attacks within long-lived connections. Explicit master key rollover,
accomplished by external means and indexed using the KeyID field, can
be used to change keying material for various reasons (e.g.,
personnel turnover), but is not required to support long-lived
connections.
8. Additional Security Mechanisms
TCP-AO adds mechanisms to support efficient use, especially in
environments where only manual keying is available. These include the
previously described mechanisms for supporting multiple concurrent
keys (via the KeyID field) and for generating unique per-connection
traffic keys (via the KDF). This section describes additional
mechanisms to coordinate KeyID changes and to prevent replay attacks
when a traffic key is not changed for long periods of time.
8.1. Coordinating KeyID Changes
At any given time, a single TCP connection may have multiple KeyIDs
specified for each segment direction (incoming, outgoing). TCP-AO
provides a mechanism to indicate when a new KeyID is ready, to allow
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the sender to commence use of that new KeyID. This supported by using
two key ID fields in the header:
o KeyID
o NextKeyID
KeyID represents the outgoing keying information used by the segment
sender to create the segment's MAC (outgoing), and the corresponding
incoming keying information used by the segment receiver to validate
that MAC. It indicates the KeyID in active use in that direction.
NextKeyID represents the preferred keying information to be used for
subsequent segments. I.e., it is a way for the segment sender to
indicate ready incoming keying information for future segments it
receives, so that the segment receiver can know when to switch
traffic keys (and thus their KeyIDs).
There are two pointers kept by each side of a connection, as noted in
the per-connection information (see Section 6):
o Currently active outgoing KeyID (Current_key)
o Current preference for KeyIDs (Next_key)
Current_key points to a KeyID (and associated master key tuple) that
is used to authenticate outgoing segments. Upon connection
establishment, it points to the first key selected for use.
Next_key points to an incoming KeyID (and associated master key
tuple) that is ready and preferred for use. Upon connection
establishment, this points to the currently active incoming key. It
can be changed when new keys are installed (e.g., either by automatic
key management protocol operation or by user manual selection).
Next_key is changed only by manual user intervention or key
management protocol operation. It is not manipulated by TCP-AO.
Current_key is updated by TCP-AO when processing received TCP
segments as discussed in the segment processing description in
Section 9.5.
8.2. Preventing replay attacks within long-lived connections
TCP uses a 32-bit sequence number which may, for long-lived
connections, roll over and repeat. This could result in TCP segments
being intentionally and legitimately replayed within a connection.
TCP-AO prevents replay attacks, and thus requires a way to
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differentiate these legitimate replays from each other, and so it
adds a 32-bit extended sequence number (ESN) for transmitted and
received segments.
The ESN extends TCP's sequence number so that segments within a
single connection are always unique. When TCP's sequence number rolls
over, there is a chance that a segment could be repeated in total;
using an ESN differentiates even identical segments sent with
identical sequence numbers at different times in a connection. TCP-AO
emulates a 64-bit sequence number space by inferring when to
increment the high-order 32-bit portion (the ESN) based on
transitions in the low-order portion (the TCP sequence number).
TCP-AO thus maintains SND.ESN for transmitted segments, and RCV.ESN
for received segments, both initialized as zero when a connection
begins. The intent of these ESNs is, together with TCP's 32-bit
sequence numbers, to provide a 64-bit overall sequence number space.
For transmitted segments SND.ESN can be implemented by extending
TCP's sequence number to 64-bits; SND.ESN would be the top (high-
order) 32 bits of that number. For received segments, TCP-AO needs to
emulate the use of a 64-bit number space, and correctly infer the
appropriate high-order 32-bits of that number as RCV.ESN from the
received 32-bit sequence number and the current connection context.
The implementation of ESNs is not specified in this document, but one
possible way is described here that can be used for either RCV.ESN,
SND.ESN, or both.
Consider an implementation with two ESNs as required (SND.ESN,
RCV.ESN), and additional variables as listed below, all initialized
to zero, as well as a current TCP segment field (SEG.SEQ):
o SND.PREV_SEQ, needed to detect rollover of SND.SEQ
o RCV.PREV_SEQ, needed to detect rollover of RCV.SEQ
o SND.ESN_FLAG, which indicates when to increment the SND.ESN
o RCV.ESN_FLAG, which indicates when to increment the RCV.ESN
When a segment is received, the following algorithm (written in C)
computes the ESN used in the MAC; an equivalent algorithm can be
applied to the "SND" side:
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/* */
/* set the flag when the SEG.SEQ first rolls over */
if ((RCV.ESN_FLAG == 0)
&& (RCV.PREV_SEQ > 0x7fff) && (SEG.SEQ < 0x7fff)) {
RCV.ESN = RCV.ESN + 1;
RCV.ESN_FLAG = 1;
}
/* */
/* decide which ESN to use after incremented */
if ((RCV.ESN_FLAG == 1) && (SEG.SEQ > 0x7fff)) {
ESN = RCV.ESN - 1; # use the pre-increment value
} else {
ESN = RCV.ESN; # use the current value
}
/* */
/* reset the flag in the *middle* of the window */
if ((RCV.PREV_SEQ < 0x7fff) && (SEG.SEQ > 0x7fff)) {
RCV.ESN_FLAG = 0;
}
/* */
/* save the current SEQ for the next time through the code */
RCV.PREV_SEQ = SEG.SEQ;
In the above code, the first line when the sequence number first
rolls over, i.e., when the new number is low (in the bottom half of
the number space) and the old number is high (in the top half of the
number space). The first time this happens, the ESN is incremented
and a flag is set.
If the flag is set and a high number is seen, it must be a reordered
packet, so use the pre-increment ESN, otherwise use the current ESN.
The flag will be cleared by the time the number rolls all the way
around.
The flag prevents the ESN from being incremented again until the flag
is reset, which happens in the middle of the window (when the old
number is in the bottom half and the new is in the top half). Because
the receive window is never larger than half of the number space, it
is impossible to both set and reset the flag at the same time -
outstanding packets, regardless of reordering, cannot straddle both
regions simultaneously.
9. TCP-AO Interaction with TCP
The following is a description of how TCP-AO affects various TCP
states, segments, events, and interfaces. This description is
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intended to augment the description of TCP as provided in RFC-793,
and its presentation mirrors that of RFC-793 as a result [RFC793].
9.1. TCP User Interface
The TCP user interface supports active and passive OPEN, SEND,
RECEIVE, CLOSE, STATUS and ABORT commands. TCP-AO does not alter this
interface as it applies to TCP, but some commands or command
sequences of the interface need to be modified to support TCP-AO.
TCP-AO does not specify the details of how this is achieved.
TCP-AO requires the TCP user interface be extended to allow the TAPD
to be configured, as well as to allow an ongoing connection to manage
which KeyID tuples are active. The TAPD needs to be configured prior
to connection establishment, and possibly changed during a
connection:
>> TCP OPEN, or the sequence of commands that configure a connection
to be in the active or passive OPEN state, MUST be augmented so that
a TAPD entry can be configured.
>> A TCP-AO implmentation MUST allow TAPD entries for ongoing TCP
connections (i.e., not in the CLOSED state) to be modified.
Parameters not used to index a connection MAY be modified; parameters
used to index a connection MUST NOT be modified.
The TAPD information of a connection needs to be available for
confirmation; this includes the ability to read the connection key:
>> TCP STATUS SHOULD be augmented to allow the TAPD entry of a
current or pending connection to be read (for confirmation).
Senders may need to be able to determine when the outgoing KeyID
changes or when a new preferred KeyID (NextKeyID) is indicated; these
changes immediately affect all subsequent outgoing segments:
>> TCP SEND, or a sequence of commands resulting in a SEND, MUST be
augmented so that the preferred KeyID (Current_key) and/or the
Next_key of a connection can be indicated.
It may be useful to change the outgoing active KeyID (Current_key)
even when no data is being sent, which can be achieved by sending a
zero-length buffer or by using a non-send interface (e.g., socket
options in Unix), depending on the implementation.
It is also useful to indicate recent KeyID and NextKeyID values
received; although there could be a number of such values, they are
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not expected to change quickly so any recent sample should be
sufficient:
>> TCP RECEIVE, or the sequence of commands resulting in a RECEIVE,
MUST be augmented so that the KeyID and NextKeyID of a recently
received segment is available to the user out-of-band (e.g., as an
additional parameter to RECEIVE, or via a STATUS call).
9.2. TCP States and Transitions
TCP includes the states LISTEN, SYN-SENT, SYN-RECEIVED, ESTABLISHED,
FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT, and
CLOSED.
>> A TAPD entry MAY be associated with any TCP state.
>> A TAPD entry MAY underspecify the TCP connection for the LISTEN
state. Such an entry MUST NOT be used for more than one connection
progressing out of the LISTEN state.
9.3. TCP Segments
TCP includes control (at least one of SYN, FIN, RST flags set) and
data (none of SYN, FIN, or RST flags set) segments. Note that some
control segments can include data (e.g., SYN).
>> All TCP segments MUST be checked against the TAPD for matching TCP
connection IDs.
>> TCP segments matching TAPD entries without TCP-AO, or with TCP-AO
and whose MACs and KeyIDs do not validate MUST be silently discarded.
>> TCP segments with TCP-AO but not matching TAPD entries MUST be
silently accepted; this is required for equivalent function with TCPs
not implementing TCP-AO.
>> Silent discard events SHOULD be signaled to the user as a warning,
and silent accept events MAY be signaled to the user as a warning.
Both warnings, if available, MUST be accessible via the STATUS
interface. Either signal MAY be asynchronous, but if so they MUST be
rate-limited. Either signal MAY be logged; logging SHOULD allow rate-
limiting as well.
All TCP-AO processing occurs between the interface of TCP and IP; for
incoming segments, this occurs after validation of the TCP checksum.
For outgoing segments, this occurs before computation of the TCP
checksum.
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Note that the TCP-AO option is not negotiated. It is the
responsibility of the receiver to determine when TCP-AO is required
and to enforce that requirement.
9.4. Sending TCP Segments
The following procedure describes the modifications to TCP to support
TCP-AO when a segment departs.
>> Note that TCP-AO MUST be the last TCP option processed on outgoing
segments, because its MAC calculation may include the values of other
TCP options.
1. Find the per-connection parameters for the segment:
a. If the segment is a SYN, then this is the first segment of a
new connection. Consult the TAPD to find the appropriate
master key tuple.
i. If there is no matching TAPD entry, omit the TCP-AO
option. Proceed with transmitting the segment.
ii. If there is a TAPD entry with zero master key tuples,
silently discard the segment and cease further
processing.
iii. If there is a TAPD entry and at least one master key
tuple, then set the per-connection parameters as needed
(see Section 6). Proceed with the step 2.
b. If the segment is not a SYN, then determine whether TCP-AO is
being used and the current_key value from the per-connection
parameters (see Section 6) and proceed with the step 2.
2. Using the per-connection parameters:
a. Augment the TCP header with the TCP-AO, inserting the
appropriate Length and KeyID based on the master key tuple
indicated by current_key. Update the TCP header length
accordingly.
b. Determine SND.ESN as described in Section 8.2.
c. Determine the appropriate traffic key, i.e., as pointed to by
current_key (as noted in Section 8.1, and as probably cached
in the TCB). I.e., use the Send_SYN_traffic_key for SYN
segments, and the send_other_traffic_key for other segments.
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d. Determine the NextKeyID as indicated by the Next_key pointer
(as noted in Section 8.1).
e. Compute the MAC using the master key tuple (and cached traffic
key) and data from the segment as specified in Section 7.1.
f. Insert the MAC in the TCP-AO field.
g. Proceed with transmitting the segment.
9.5. Receiving TCP Segments
The following procedure describes the modifications to TCP to support
TCP-AO when a segment arrives.
>> Note that TCP-AO MUST be the first TCP option processed on
incoming segments, because its MAC calculation may include the values
of other TCP options which could change during TCP option processing.
This also protects the behavior of all other TCP options from the
impact of spoofed segments or modified header information.
>> Note that TCP-AO checks MUST be performed for all incoming SYNs to
avoid accepting SYNs lacking the TCP-AO option where required. Other
segments can cache whether TCP-AO is needed in the TCB.
1. Find the per-connection parameters for the segment:
a. If the segment is a SYN, then this is the first segment of a
new connection. Consult the TAPD to find the appropriate
master key tuple.
i. If there is no matching TAPD entry, omit the TCP-AO
option. Proceed with further TCP handling of the segment.
ii. If there is a TAPD entry with zero master key tuples,
silently discard the segment and cease further TCP
processing.
iii. If there is a TAPD entry and at least one master key
tuple, then set the per-connection parameters as needed
(see Section 6). Proceed with the step 2.
2. Using the per-connection parameters:
a. Check that the segment's TCP-AO Length matches the length
indicated by the master key indicated by the segment's TCP-AO
KeyID field.
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i. If lengths differ, silently discard the segment. Log
and/or signal the event as indicated in Section 9.3.
b. Use the segment's KeyID value to index the appropriate
connection key for this connection.
c. Determine the segment's RCV.ESN as described in Section 8.2.
d. Determine the segment's traffic key from the master key tuple
as described in Section 7.1 (and as likely cached in the TCB).
I.e., use the receive_SYN_traffic_key for SYN segments, and
the receive_other_traffic_key for other segments.
e. Compute the segment's MAC using the master key tuple (and its
derived traffic key) and portions of the segment as indicated
in Section 7.1.
i. If the computed MAC differs from the TCP-AO MAC field
value, silently discard the segment. Log and/or signal
the event as indicated in Section 9.3.
f. Compare the received NextKeyID value to the currently active
outgoing KeyID value (Current_key).
i. If they match, no further action is required.
ii. If they differ, determine whether the NextKeyID keying
information is ready.
1. If the NextKeyID keying information is not
available, no action is required.
2. If the NextKeyID keying information is available:
NOTE: there is an open question as to whether to
refuse to change to the suggested NextKeyID if it
already has a 2*MSL timer set on it, i.e., to refuse
to 'backup' and use a key once it has been
previously used.
a. Set a timer on the previous value of current_key
to ensure that the corresponding master key
cannot be removed from the TAPD for 2*MSL.
b. Set Current_key to the NextKeyID value.
g. Proceed with TCP processing of the segment.
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It is suggested that TCP-AO implementations validate a segment's
Length field before computing a MAC, to reduce the overhead incurred
by spoofed segments with invalid TCP-AO fields.
Additional reductions in MAC validation overhead can be supported in
the MAC algorithms, e.g., by using a computation algorithm that
prepends a fixed value to the computed portion and a corresponding
validation algorithm that verifies the fixed value before investing
in the computed portion. Such optimizations would be contained in the
MAC algorithm specification, and thus are not specified in TCP-AO
explicitly. Note that the KeyID cannot be used for connection
validation per se, because it is not assumed random.
9.6. Impact on TCP Header Size
The TCP-AO option typically uses a total of 17-19 bytes of TCP header
space. TCP-AO is no larger than and typically 3 bytes smaller than
the TCP MD5 option (assuming a 96-bit MAC).
Note that TCP option space is most critical in SYN segments, because
flags in those segments could potentially increase the option space
area in other segments. Because TCP ignores unknown segments,
however, it is not possible to extend the option space of SYNs
without breaking backward-compatibility.
TCP's 4-bit data offset requires that the options end 60 bytes (15
32-bit words) after the header begins, including the 20-byte header.
This leaves 40 bytes for options, of which 15 are expected in current
implementations (listed below), leaving at most 25 for other uses.
Assuming a 96-bit MAC, TCP-AO consumes 16 bytes, leaving up to 9
bytes for additional SYN options (depending on implementation
dependant alignment padding, which could consume another 2 bytes at
most).
o SACK permitted (2 bytes) [RFC2018][RFC3517]
o Timestamps (10 bytes) [RFC1323]
o Window scale (3 bytes) [RFC1323]
After a SYN, the following options are expected in current
implementations of TCP:
o SACK (10bytes) [RFC2018][RFC3517] (18 bytes if D-SACK [RFC2883]
o Timestamps (10 bytes) [RFC1323]
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TCP-AO continues to consume 16 bytes in non-SYN segments, leaving a
total of 24 bytes for other options, of which the timestamp consumes
10. This leaves 14 bytes, of which 10 are used for a single SACK
block. When two SACK blocks are used, such as to handle D-SACK, a
smaller TCP-AO MAC would be required to make room for the additional
SACK block (i.e., to leave 18 bytes for the D-SACK variant of the
SACK option) [RFC2883]. Note that D-SACK is not supportable in TCP-
MD5 in the presence of timestamps, because TCP MD5's MAC length is
fixed and too large to leave sufficient option space.
Although TCP option space is limited, we believe TCP-AO is consistent
with the desire to authenticate TCP at the connection level for
similar uses as were intended by TCP MD5.
10. Obsoleting TCP MD5 and Legacy Interactions
TCP-AO obsoletes TCP MD5. As we have noted earlier:
>> TCP implementations MUST support TCP-AO.
Systems implementing TCP MD5 only are considered legacy, and ought to
be upgraded when possible. In order to support interoperation with
such legacy systems until upgrades are available:
>> TCP MD5 SHOULD be supported where interactions with legacy systems
is needed.
>> A system that supports both TCP-AO and TCP MD5 MUST use TCP-AO for
connections unless not supported by its peer, at which point it MAY
use TCP MD5 instead.
>> A TCP implementation MUST NOT use both TCP-AO and TCP MD5 for a
particular TCP connection, but MAY support TCP-AO and TCP MD5
simultaneously for different connections (notably to support legacy
use of TCP MD5).
The Kind value explicitly indicates whether TCP-AO or TCP MD5 is used
for a particular connection in TCP segments.
It is possible that the TAPD could be augmented to support TCP MD5,
although use of a TAPD-like system is not described in RFC2385.
It is possible to require TCP-AO for a connection or TCP MD5, but it
is not possible to require 'either'. When an endpoint is configured
to require TCP MD5 for a connection, it must be added to all outgoing
segments and validated on all incoming segments [RFC2385]. TCP MD5's
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requirements prohibit the speculative use of both options for a given
connection, e.g., to be decided by the other end of the connection.
11. Interactions with Middleboxes
TCP-AO may interact with middleboxes, depending on their behavior
[RFC3234]. Some middleboxes either alter TCP options (such as TCP-AO)
directly or alter the information TCP-AO includes in its MAC
calculation. TCP-AO may interfere with these devices, exactly where
the device modifies information TCP-AO is designed to protect.
11.1. Interactions with non-NAT/NAPT Middleboxes
TCP-AO supports middleboxes that do not change the IP addresses or
ports of segments. Such middleboxes may modify some TCP options, in
which case TCP-AO would need to be configured to ignore all options
in the MAC calculation on connections traversing that element.
Note that ignoring TCP options may provide less protection, i.e., TCP
options could be modified in transit, and such modifications could be
used by an attacker. Depending on the modifications, TCP could have
compromised efficiency (e.g., timestamp changes), or could cease
correct operation (e.g., window scale changes). These vulnerabilities
affect only the TCP connections for which TCP-AO is configured to
ignore TCP options.
11.2. Interactions with NAT/NAPT Devices
TCP-AO cannot interoperate natively across NAT/NAPT devices, which
modify the IP addresses and/or port numbers. We anticipate that
traversing such devices will require variants of existing NAT/NAPT
traversal mechanisms, e.g., encapsulation of the TCP-AO-protected
segment in another transport segment (e.g., UDP), as is done in IPsec
[RFC2766][RFC3947]. Such variants can be adapted for use with TCP-AO,
or IPsec NAT traversal can be used instead in such cases [RFC3947].
12. Evaluation of Requirements Satisfaction
TCP-AO satisfies all the current requirements for a revision to TCP
MD5, as summarized below [Be07].
1. Protected Elements
A solution to revising TCP MD5 should protect (authenticate) the
following elements.
This is supported - see Section 7.1.
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a. TCP pseudoheader, including IPv4 and IPv6 versions.
Note that we do not allow optional coverage because IP
addresses define a connection. If they can be coordinated
across a NAT/NAPT, the sender can compute the MAC based on the
received values; if not, a tunnel is required, as noted in
Section 11.2.
b. TCP header.
Note that we do not allow optional port coverage because ports
define a connection. If they can be coordinated across a
NAT/NAPT, the sender can compute the MAC based on the received
values; if not, a tunnel is required, as noted in Section
11.2.
c. TCP options.
Note that TCP-AO allows exclusion of TCP options from
coverage, to enable use with middleboxes that modify options
(except when they modify TCP-AO itself). See Section 11.
d. TCP payload data.
2. Option Structure Requirements
A solution to revising TCP MD5 should use an option with the
following structural requirements.
This is supported - see Section 7.1.
a. Privacy.
The option should not unnecessarily expose information about
the TCP-AO mechanism. The additional protection afforded by
keeping this information private may be of little value, but
also helps keep the option size small.
TCP-AO exposes only the master key index, MAC, and overall
option length on the wire. Note that short MACs could be
obscured by using longer option lengths but specifying a short
MAC length (this is equivalent to a different MAC algorithm,
and is specified in the TAPD entry). See Section 4.2.
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b. Allow optional per connection.
The option should not be required on every connection; it
should be optional on a per connection basis.
This is supported - see Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.
c. Require non-optional.
The option should be able to be specified as required for a
given connection.
This is supported - see Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.
d. Standard parsing.
The option should be easily parseable, i.e., without
conditional parsing, and follow the standard RFC 793 option
format.
This is supported - see Section 4.2.
e. Compatible with Large Windows and SACK.
The option should be compatible with the use of the Large
Windows and SACK options.
This is supported - see Section 9.6. The size of the option is
intended to allow use with Large Windows and SACK. See also
Section 2.1, which indicates that TCP-AO is 3 bytes shorter
than TCP MD5 in the default case, assuming a 96-bit MAC.
3. Cryptography requirements
A solution to revising TCP MD5 should support modern cryptography
capabilities.
a. Baseline defaults.
The option should have a default that is required in all
implementations.
TCP-AO uses a default required algorithm as specified in [ao-
crypto], as noted in Section 7.1.
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b. Good algorithms.
The option should use algorithms considered accepted by the
security community, which are considered appropriately safe.
The use of non-standard or unpublished algorithms should be
avoided.
TCP-AO uses MACs as indicated in [ao-crypto]. The PRF is also
specified in [ao-crypto]. The PRF input string follows the
typical design (see [ao-crypto]).
c. Algorithm agility.
The option should support algorithms other than the default,
to allow agility over time.
TCP-AO allows any desired algorithm, subject to TCP option
space limitations, as noted in Section 4.2. The TAPD allows
separate connections to use different algorithms, both for the
MAC and the PRF.
d. Order-independent processing.
The option should be processed independently of the proper
order, i.e., they should allow processing of TCP segments in
the order received, without requiring reordering. This avoids
the need for reordering prior to processing, and avoids the
impact of misordered segments on the option.
This is supported - see Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. Note that
pre-TCP processing is further required, because TCP segments
cannot be discarded solely based on a combination of
connection state and out-of-window checks; many such segments,
although discarded, cause a host to respond with a replay of
the last valid ACK, e.g. [RFC793]. See also the derivation of
the ESN, which is reconstituted at the receiver using a
demonstration algorithm that avoids the need for reordering
(in Section 8.2).
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e. Security parameter changes require key changes.
The option should require that the key change whenever the
security parameters change. This avoids the need for
coordinating option state during a connection, which is
typical for TCP options. This also helps allow "bump in the
stack" implementations that are not integrated with endpoint
TCP implementations.
TAPD parameters that should not change during a connection (by
defininition, e.g., TCP connection ID, receiver TCP connection
ID, TCP option exclusion list) cannot change. Other parameters
change only when a master key is changed, using the master key
tuple mechanism in the TAPD. See Section 5.
4. Keying requirements.
A solution to revising TCP MD5 should support manual keying, and
should support the use of an external automated key management
system (e.g., a protocol or other mechanism).
Note that TCP-AO does not specify a master key management system,
but does indicate a proposed interface to the TAPD, allowing a
completely separate master key system, as noted in Section 5.
a. Intraconnection rekeying.
The option should support rekeying during a connection, to
avoid the impact of long-duration connections.
This is supported by the KeyID and multiple master key tuples
in a TAPD entry; see Section 5.
b. Efficient rekeying.
The option should support rekeying during a connection without
the need to expend undue computational resources. In
particular, the options should avoid the need to try multiple
keys on a given segment.
This is supported by the use of the KeyID. See Section 8.1.
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c. Automated and manual keying.
The option should support both automated and manual keying.
The use of a separate TAPD allows external automated and
manual keying. See Section 5. This capability is enhanced by
the generation of unique per-connection keys, which enables
use of manual master keys with automatically generated
connection keys as noted in Section 7.2.
d. Key management agnostic.
The option should not assume or require a particular key
management solution.
This is supported by use of a separate TAPD. See Section 5.
5. Expected Constraints
A solution to revising TCP MD5 should also abide by typical safe
security practices.
a. Silent failure.
Receipt of segments failing authentication must result in no
visible external action and must not modify internal state,
and those events should be logged.
This is supported - see Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.
b. At most one such option per segment.
Only one authentication option can be permitted per segment.
This is supported by the protocol requirements - see Section
4.2.
c. Outgoing all or none.
Segments out of a TCP connection are either all authenticated
or all not authenticated.
This is supported - see Section 9.4.
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d. Incoming all checked.
Segments into a TCP connection are always checked to determine
whether their authentication should be present and valid.
This is supported - see Section 9.5.
e. Non-interaction with TCP MD5.
The use of this option for a given connection should not
preclude the use of TCP MD5, e.g., for legacy use, for other
connections.
This is supported - see Section 10.
f. Optional ICMP discard.
The option should allow certain ICMPs to be discarded, notably
Type 3 (destination unreachable), Codes 2-4 (transport
protocol unreachable, port unreachable, or fragmentation
needed and IP DF field set), i.e., the ones indicating the
failure of the endpoint to communicate.
This is supported - see Section 13.
g. Maintain TCP connection semantics, in which the socket pair
alone defines a TCP association and all its security
parameters.
This is supported - see Sections 5 and 11.
13. Security Considerations
Use of TCP-AO, like use of TCP MD5 or IPsec, will impact host
performance. Connections that are known to use TCP-AO can be attacked
by transmitting segments with invalid MACs. Attackers would need to
know only the TCP connection ID and TCP-AO Length value to
substantially impact the host's processing capacity. This is similar
to the susceptibility of IPsec to on-path attacks, where the IP
addresses and SPI would be visible. For IPsec, the entire SPI space
(32 bits) is arbitrary, whereas for routing protocols typically only
the source port (16 bits) is arbitrary. As a result, it would be
easier for an off-path attacker to spoof a TCP-AO segment that could
cause receiver validation effort. However, we note that between
Internet routers both ports could be arbitrary (i.e., determined a-
priori out of band), which would constitute roughly the same off-path
antispoofing protection of an arbitrary SPI.
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TCP-AO, like TCP MD5, may inhibit connectionless resets. Such resets
typically occur after peer crashes, either in response to new
connection attempts or when data is sent on stale connections; in
either case, the recovering endpoint may lack the connection key
required (e.g., if lost during the crash). This may result in time-
outs, rather than more responsive recovery after such a crash. As
noted in Section 7.2, such cases may also result in persistent TCP
state for old connections that cannot be cleared, and so
implementations should be capable of detecting an excess of such
connections and clearing their state if needed to protect memory
utilization [Je07].
TCP-AO does not include a fast decline capability, e.g., where a SYN-
ACK is received without an expected TCP-AO option and the connection
is quickly reset or aborted. Normal TCP operation will retry and
timeout, which is what should be expected when the intended receiver
is not capable of the TCP variant required anyway. Backoff is not
optimized because it would present an opportunity for attackers on
the wire to abort authenticated connection attempts by sending
spoofed SYN-ACKs without the TCP-AO option.
TCP-AO is intended to provide similar protections to IPsec, but is
not intended to replace the use of IPsec or IKE either for more
robust security or more sophisticated security management.
TCP-AO does not address the issue of ICMP attacks on TCP. IPsec makes
recommendations regarding dropping ICMPs in certain contexts, or
requiring that they are endpoint authenticated in others [RFC4301].
There are other mechanisms proposed to reduce the impact of ICMP
attacks by further validating ICMP contents and changing the effect
of some messages based on TCP state, but these do not provide the
level of authentication for ICMP that TCP-AO provides for TCP [Go07].
>> A TCP-AO implementation MUST allow the system administrator to
configure whether TCP will ignore incoming ICMP messages of Type 3
(destination unreachable) Codes 2-4 (protocol unreachable, port
unreachable, and fragmentation needed - 'hard errors') intended for
connections that match TAPD entries with non-NONE inbound MACs. An
implementation SHOULD allow ignored ICMPs to be logged.
This control affects only ICMPs that currently require 'hard errors',
which would abort the TCP connection [RFC1122]. This recommendation
is intended to be similar to how IPsec would handle those messages
[RFC4301].
TCP-AO includes the TCP connection ID (the socket pair) in the MAC
calculation. This prevents different concurrent connections using the
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same connection key (for whatever reason) from potentially enabling a
traffic-crossing attack, in which segments to one socket pair are
diverted to attack a different socket pair. When multiple connections
use the same master key, it would be useful to know that packets
intended for one ID could not be (maliciously or otherwise) modified
in transit and end up being authenticated for the other ID. The ID
cannot be zeroed, because to do so would require that the TAPD index
was unique in both directions (ID->key and key->ID). That requirement
would place an additional burden of uniqueness on master keys within
endsystems, and potentially across endsystems. Although the resulting
attack is low probability, the protection afforded by including the
received ID warrants its inclusion in the MAC, and does not unduly
increase the MAC calculation or master key management system.
The use of any security algorithm can present an opportunity for a
CPU DOS attack, where the attacker sends false, random segments that
the receiver under attack expends substantial CPU effort to reject.
In IPsec, such attacks are reduced by the use of a large Security
Parameter Index (SPI) and Sequence Number fields to partly validate
segments before CPU cycles are invested validated the Integrity Check
Value (ICV). In TCP-AO, the socket pair performs most of the function
of IPsec's SPI, and IPsec's Sequence Number, used to avoid replay
attacks, isn't needed due to TCP's Sequence Number, which is used to
reorder received segments (provided the sequence number doesn't wrap
around, which is why TCP-AO adds the ESN in Section 8.2). TCP already
protects itself from replays of authentic segment data as well as
authentic explicit TCP control (e.g., SYN, FIN, ACK bits, but even
authentic replays could affect TCP congestion control [Sa99]. TCP-AO
does not protect TCP congestion control from this last form of attack
due to the cumbersome nature of layering a windowed security sequence
number within TCP in addition to TCP's own sequence number; when such
protection is desired, users are encouraged to apply IPsec instead.
Further, it is not useful to validate TCP's Sequence Number before
performing a TCP-AO authentication calculation, because out-of-window
segments can still cause valid TCP protocol actions (e.g., ACK
retransmission) [RFC793]. It is similarly not useful to add a
separate Sequence Number field to the TCP-AO option, because doing so
could cause a change in TCP's behavior even when segments are valid.
14. IANA Considerations
[NOTE: This section be removed prior to publication as an RFC]
The TCP-AO option defines no new namespaces.
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The TCP-AO option requires that IANA allocate a value from the TCP
option Kind namespace, to be replaced for TCP-IANA-KIND throughout
this document.
To specify MAC and PRF algorithms, TCP-AO refers to a separate
document that may involve IANA actions [ao-crypto].
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol," STD-7,
RFC-793, Standard, Sept. 1981.
[RFC1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts --
Communication Layers," RFC-1122, Oct. 1989.
[RFC2018] Mathis, M., J. Mahdavi, S. Floyd, A. Romanow, "TCP
Selective Acknowledgement Options", RFC-2018, Proposed
Standard, April 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP-14, RFC-2119, Best Current
Practice, March 1997.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option," RFC-2385, Proposed Standard, Aug. 1998.
[RFC2403] Madson, C., R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP
and AH," RFC-2403, Proposed Standard, Nov. 1998.
[RFC2460] Deering, S., R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification," RFC-2460, Proposed Standard, Dec.
1998.
[RFC2883] Floyd, S., J. Mahdavi, M. Mathis, M. Podolsky, "An
Extension to the Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) Option
for TCP", RFC-2883, Proposed Standard, July 2000.
[RFC3517] Blanton, E., M. Allman, K. Fall, L. Wang, "A Conservative
Selective Acknowledgment (SACK)-based Loss Recovery
Algorithm for TCP", RFC-3517, Proposed Standard, April
2003.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol,"
RFC-4306, Proposed Standard, Dec. 2005.
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[ao-crypto] Lebovitz, G., "Cryptographic Algorithms, Use, &
Implementation Requirments for TCP Authentication Option",
draft-lebovitz-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto, Mar. 2009.
15.2. Informative References
[Be07] Eddy, W., (ed), S. Bellovin, J. Touch, R. Bonica, "Problem
Statement and Requirements for a TCP Authentication
Option," draft-bellovin-tcpsec-01, (work in progress), Jul.
2007.
[Bo07] Bonica, R., B. Weis, S. Viswanathan, A. Lange, O. Wheeler,
"Authentication for TCP-based Routing and Management
Protocols," draft-bonica-tcp-auth-06, (work in progress),
Feb. 2007.
[Go07] Gont, F., "ICMP attacks against TCP," draft-ietf-tcpm-icmp-
attacks-04, (work in progress), Oct. 2008.
[Je07] Jethanandani, M., M. Bashyam, "TCP Robustness in Persist
Condition," draft-mahesh-persist-timeout-02, (work in
progress), Oct. 2007.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm," RFC-1321,
Informational, April 1992.
[RFC1323] Jacobson, V., R. Braden, D. Borman, "TCP Extensions for
High Performance," RFC-1323, May 1992.
[RFC1948] Bellovin, S., "Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks,"
RFC-1948, Informational, May 1996.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication," RFC-2104, Informational, Feb.
1997.
[RFC2766] Tsirtsis, G., P. Srisuresh, "Network Address Translation -
Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)," RFC-2766, Proposed
Standard, Feb. 2000.
[RFC3234] Carpenter, B., S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues,"
RFC-3234, Informational, Feb. 2002.
[RFC3562] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
Signature Option," RFC-3562, Informational, July 2003.
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[RFC3947] Kivinen, T., B. Swander, A. Huttunen, V. Volpe,
"Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE," RFC-3947,
Proposed Standard, Jan. 2005.
[RFC4301] Kent, S., K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol," RFC-4301, Proposed Standard, Dec. 2005.
[RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5,"
RFC-4808, Informational, Mar. 2007.
[RFC4953] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks,"
RFC-4953, Informational, Jul. 2007.
[Sa99] Savage, S., N. Cardwell, D. Wetherall, T. Anderson, "TCP
Congestion Control with a Misbehaving Receiver," ACM
Computer Communications Review, V29, N5, pp71-78, October
1999.
[SDNS88] Secure Data Network Systems, "Security Protocol 4 (SP4),"
Specification SDN.401, Revision 1.2, July 12, 1988.
[To06] Touch, J., A. Mankin, "The TCP Simple Authentication
Option," draft-touch-tcpm-tcp-simple-auth-03, (expired work
in progress), Oct. 2006.
[Wa05] Wang, X., H. Yu, "How to break MD5 and other hash
functions," Proc. IACR Eurocrypt 2005, Denmark, pp.19-35.
[We05] Weis, B., "TCP Message Authentication Code Option," draft-
weis-tcp-mac-option-00, (expired work in progress), Dec.
2005.
16. Acknowledgments
Alfred Hoenes, Charlie Kaufman, and Adam Langley provided substantial
feedback on this document.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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Authors' Addresses
Joe Touch
USC/ISI
4676 Admiralty Way
Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 (310) 448-9151
Email: touch@isi.edu
URL: http://www.isi.edu/touch
Allison Mankin
Johns Hopkins Univ.
Washington, DC
U.S.A.
Phone: 1 301 728 7199
Email: mankin@psg.com
URL: http://www.psg.com/~mankin/
Ronald P. Bonica
Juniper Networks
2251 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon, VA 20171
U.S.A.
Email: rbonica@juniper.net
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