One document matched: draft-ietf-smime-escertid-04.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-smime-escertid-03.txt
Network Working Group J. Schaad
Internet-Draft Soaring Hawk Consulting
Updates: 2634 (if approved) January 4, 2007
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 8, 2007
ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility
draft-ietf-smime-escertid-04.txt
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2007).
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Abstract
In the original Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME document (RFC
2634), a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to
be used in validation with the signature was introduced, this
structure was hardwired to use SHA-1. This document allows for the
structure to have algorithm agility and defines a new attribute for
this purpose.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Updates to RFC 2634 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute
Definitions' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Insert new section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute
Definition Version 2' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Insert new section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification
Version 2' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Insert new section 5.4.2 ' Signing Certificate Attribute
Defintion Version 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Renumber Section 5.4.1 Certificate Identification Version 1 . 11
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
In the original Enhanced Security Services (ESS) for S/MIME document
[ESS], a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to
be used in validation with the signature was defined. This
structure, called ESSCertID was hardwired to use a SHA-1 hash value.
The recent attacks on SHA-1 require that we define a new attribute
which allows for the use of a different algorithms. This document
performs that task.
This document defines the structure ESSCertIDv2 along with a new
attribute SigningCertificateV2 which uses the updated structure.
This document allows for the structure to have algorithm agility and
defines new attributes to deal with the updating.
1.1. Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Updates to RFC 2634
This document updates section 5.4 of RFC 2634. Once the updates are
applied, the revised section will have the following structure:
5.4 Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions
5.4.1 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2
5.4.1.1 Certificate Identification Version 2
5.4.2 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1
5.4.2.1 Certificate Identification Version 1
In addition, the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is replaced.
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2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions'
The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent simple
substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
Two different attributes exist for this due to a flaw in the original
design. The only substantial difference between the two attributes
is that SigningCertificateV2 allows for hash algorithm agility, while
SigningCertificate forces the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm. With
the recent advances in the ability to create hash collisions for
SHA-1 it is wise to move forward sooner rather than later.
When the SHA-1 hash function is used, the SigningCertificate
attribute MUST be used. The SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be
used if any algorithm other than SHA-1 is used and SHOULD NOT be used
for SHA-1. Applications SHOULD recognize both attributes as long as
they consider SHA-1 able to distinguish between two different
certificates. (I.e. the possibility of a collision is sufficently
low.)
Four cases exist which need to be taken into account when using this
attribute for correct processing:
1. Signature Validates and the hashes match: This is the success
case.
2. Signature Validates and the hashes do not match: In this case the
certificate contained the correct public key, but the certificate
containing the public key is not the one that the signer intended
to be used. In this case the application should attempt a search
for a different certificate with the same public key and for
which the hashes match. If no such certificate can be found,
this is a failure case.
3. Signature Fails Validation and the hashes match: In this case it
can be assumed that the signature has been modified in some
fashion. This is a failure case.
4. Signature Fails Validation and the Hashes do not match: In this
case it can be either that the signature has been modified, or
that the wrong certificate has been used. Applications should
attempt a search for a different certificate which matches the
hash value in the attribute and use the new certificate to retry
the signature validation.
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3. Insert new section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definition
Version 2'
5.4.1 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2
The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
SigningCertificateV2 is identified by the OID:
id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
The attribute has the ASN.1 definition:
SigningCertificateV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertIDv2,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}
certs contains the list of certificates that are to be used in
validating the message. The first certificate identified in the
sequence of certificate identifiers MUST be the certificate used
to verify the signature. The encoding of the ESSCertIDv2 for this
certificate SHOULD include the issuerSerial field. If other
constraints ensure that issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in
the SignerInfo, the issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The
certificate identified is used during the signature verification
process. If the hash of the certificate does not match the
certificate used to verify the signature, the signature MUST be
considered invalid.
If more than one certificate is present, subsequent certificates
limit the set of certificates that are used during signature
validation. Certificates can be either attribute certificates or
normal certificates. The issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertIDv2
structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates, unless the
client who is validating the signature is expected to have easy
access to all the certificates required for validation. If only
the signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no
restrictions on the set of certificates used in validating the
signature.
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policies contains a sequence of policy information terms that
identify those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply
to the certificate, and under which the certificate should be
relied upon. This value suggests a policy value to be used in the
relying party's certification path validation. The definition of
PolicyInformation can be found in [PKIXCERT].
If present, the SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be a signed
attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines
SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A SignerInfo MUST NOT
include multiple instances of the SigningCertificate attribute. CMS
defines the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. A SigningCertificate attribute
MUST include only a single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST
NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.
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4. Insert new section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification Version 2'
Insert the following text as a new section
5.4.1.1 Certificate Identification Version 2
The best way to identify certificates is an often-discussed issue.
The ESSCertIDv2 structure supplies two different fields that are used
for this purpose.
The hash of the entire certificate allows for a verifier to check
that the certificate used in the verification process was the same
certificate the signer intended. Hashes are convenient in that they
are frequently used by certificate stores as a method of indexing and
retrieving certificates as well. The use of the hash is required by
this structure since the detection of substituted certificates is
based on the fact they would map to different hash values.
The issuer/serial number pair is the method of identification of
certificates used in [PKIXCERT]. That document imposes a restriction
for certificates that the issuer distinguished name must be present.
The issuer/serial number pair would therefore normally be sufficient
to identify the correct signing certificate. (This assumes the same
issuer name is not re-used from the set of trust anchors.) The
issuer/serial number pair can be stored in the sid field of the
SignerInfo object. However the sid field is not covered by the
signature. In the cases where the issuer/serial number pair is not
used in the sid or the issuer/serial number pair needs to be signed,
it SHOULD be placed in the issuerSerial field of the ESSCertIDv2
structure.
Attribute certificates and additional public key certificates
containing information do not have an issuer/serial number pair
represented anywhere in a SignerInfo object. When an attribute
certificate or an additional public key certificate is not included
in the SignedData object, it becomes much more difficult to get the
correct set of certificates based only on a hash of the certificate.
For this reason, these certificates SHOULD be identified by the
IssuerSerial object.
This document defines a certificate identifier as:
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ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256 parameters NULL},
certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}
Hash ::= OCTET STRING
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer GeneralNames,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
}
The fields of ESSCertIDv2 are defined as follows:
hashAlg contains the identifier of the algorithm used in computing
certHash.
certHash is computed over the entire DER encoded certificate
including the signature.
issuerSerial holds the identification of the certificate. The
issuerSerial would normally be present unless the value can be
inferred from other information (e.g. the sid field of the
SignerInfo object).
The fields of IssuerSerial are defined as follows:
issuer contains the issuer name of the certificate. For non-
attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain only the issuer
name from the certificate encoded in the directoryName choice of
GeneralNames. For attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain
the issuer name field from the attribute certificate.
serialNumber holds the serial number that uniquely identifies the
certificate for the issuer.
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5. Insert new section 5.4.2 ' Signing Certificate Attribute Defintion
Version 1
5.4.2 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1
The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
The definition of SigningCertificate is
SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}
id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 }
The first certificate identified in the sequence of certificate
identifiers MUST be the certificate used to verify the signature.
The encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate SHOULD include the
issuerSerial field. If other constraints ensure that
issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in the SignerInfo, the
issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The certificate identified is
used during the signature verification process. If the hash of the
certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the
signature, the signature MUST be considered invalid.
If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of
ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of
certificates that are used during signature validation. Certificates
can be either attribute certificates or public key certificates. The
issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertID structure) SHOULD be present for
these certificates, unless the client who is validating the signature
is expected to have easy access to all the certificates required for
validation. If only the signing certificate is present in the
sequence, there are no restrictions on the set of certificates used
in validating the signature.
The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate
policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under
which the certificate should be relied upon. This value suggests a
policy value to be used in the relying party's certification path
validation.
If present, the SigningCertificate attribute MUST be a signed
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attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines
SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A SignerInfo MUST NOT
include multiple instances of the SigningCertificate attribute. CMS
defines the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. A SigningCertificate attribute
MUST include only a single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST
NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.
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6. Renumber Section 5.4.1 Certificate Identification Version 1
Change the number on this section from 5.4.1 to 5.4.2.1.
Change the title on this section to "Certificate Identification
Version 1".
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7. Normative References
[ESS] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
RFC 2634, June 1999.
[PKIXCERT]
Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3852, July 2004.
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Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
Replace the ASN.1 module in RFC 2634 with this one.
ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC 3852]
ContentType, IssuerAndSerialNumber, SubjectKeyIdentifier
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
cms-2004(24)}
-- PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Section A.1 Explicity Tagged Module
-- 1988 Syntax [RFC 3280]
AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateSerialNumber
FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) pkix1-explicit(18) }
;
-- PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Sec A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module,
-- 1988 Syntax [RFC 3280]
PolicyInformation, CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralNames
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19)};
-- Extended Security Services
-- The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1
-- constructs in this module. A valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE can have zero or
-- more entries. The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the SEQUENCE to
-- have at least one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified.
-- Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their
-- environment.
-- UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
-- The contents are formatted as described in [UTF8]
-- Section 2.7
ReceiptRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
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receiptsFrom ReceiptsFrom,
receiptsTo SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-receiptsTo) OF GeneralNames }
ub-receiptsTo INTEGER ::= 16
id-aa-receiptRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 1}
ContentIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
id-aa-contentIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 7}
ReceiptsFrom ::= CHOICE {
allOrFirstTier [0] AllOrFirstTier,
-- formerly "allOrNone [0]AllOrNone"
receiptList [1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralNames }
AllOrFirstTier ::= INTEGER { -- Formerly AllOrNone
allReceipts (0),
firstTierRecipients (1) }
-- Section 2.8
Receipt ::= SEQUENCE {
version ESSVersion,
contentType ContentType,
signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }
id-ct-receipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-ct(1) 1}
ESSVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1) }
-- Section 2.9
ContentHints ::= SEQUENCE {
contentDescription UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) OPTIONAL,
contentType ContentType }
id-aa-contentHint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 4}
-- Section 2.10
MsgSigDigest ::= OCTET STRING
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id-aa-msgSigDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 5}
-- Section 2.11
ContentReference ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }
id-aa-contentReference OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 10 }
-- Section 3.2
ESSSecurityLabel ::= SET {
security-policy-identifier SecurityPolicyIdentifier,
security-classification SecurityClassification OPTIONAL,
privacy-mark ESSPrivacyMark OPTIONAL,
security-categories SecurityCategories OPTIONAL }
id-aa-securityLabel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 2}
SecurityPolicyIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
SecurityClassification ::= INTEGER {
unmarked (0),
unclassified (1),
restricted (2),
confidential (3),
secret (4),
top-secret (5) } (0..ub-integer-options)
ub-integer-options INTEGER ::= 256
ESSPrivacyMark ::= CHOICE {
pString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-privacy-mark-length)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))
}
ub-privacy-mark-length INTEGER ::= 128
SecurityCategories ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-security-categories) OF
SecurityCategory
ub-security-categories INTEGER ::= 64
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SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
type [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type
}
--Note: The aforementioned SecurityCategory syntax produces identical
--hex encodings as the following SecurityCategory syntax that is
--documented in the X.411 specification:
--
--SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
-- type [0] SECURITY-CATEGORY,
-- value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type }
--
--SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::=
--BEGIN
--TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty
--VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER)
--END
-- Section 3.4
EquivalentLabels ::= SEQUENCE OF ESSSecurityLabel
id-aa-equivalentLabels OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 9}
-- Section 4.4
MLExpansionHistory ::= SEQUENCE
SIZE (1..ub-ml-expansion-history) OF MLData
id-aa-mlExpandHistory OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 3}
ub-ml-expansion-history INTEGER ::= 64
MLData ::= SEQUENCE {
mailListIdentifier EntityIdentifier,
expansionTime GeneralizedTime,
mlReceiptPolicy MLReceiptPolicy OPTIONAL }
EntityIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier }
MLReceiptPolicy ::= CHOICE {
none [0] NULL,
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insteadOf [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames,
inAdditionTo [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames }
-- Section 5.4
SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}
id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 }
SigningCertificateV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertIDv2,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}
id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256 parameters NULL},
certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}
ESSCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}
Hash ::= OCTET STRING
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer GeneralNames,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
}
END -- of ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
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Author's Address
Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
PO Box 675
Gold Bar, WA 98251
Phone: (425) 785-1031
Email: jimsch@exmsft.com
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Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
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