One document matched: draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-00.txt
S/MIME WG Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational June 3, 2008
Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: December 3, 2008
Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-00.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The
ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the
exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content. The definition
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of the algorithm processing is based on the ANSI X9.62 standard,
developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group, the IEEE 1363 standard, and
the SEC 1 standard.
Discussion
This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3
1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3
2. SignedData using ECC...........................................4
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................4
2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData.............................5
2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent.........................5
2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent.......................6
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................6
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6
3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo......................6
3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent.........................7
3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent.......................7
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................7
3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo......................8
3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent.........................8
3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent.......................9
4. AuthenticatedData using ECC....................................9
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV......................9
4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.................10
4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent........................10
4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent......................10
5. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................10
6. Certificates using ECC........................................11
7. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................12
8. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................14
8.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................14
8.2. Other Sytnax.............................................17
9. Security Considerations.......................................18
10. IANA Considerations..........................................22
11. References...................................................22
11.1. Normative...............................................22
11.2. Informative.............................................23
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Annex A ASN.1 Modules............................................25
Annex A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module...................................25
Annex A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module...................................25
1. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
independent. This specification defines a profile for the use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS.
The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content
types:
- 'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
(ECDSA) to sign content
- 'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
encryption
- 'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication and integrity.
Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public-
key distribution in support of the specified techniques.
1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].
1.2. Changes since RFC 3278
The following summarizes the changes:
- Paragraph 2.1 added sentence indicating SHA is used with EDSA.
- Paragraph 2.1.1 limited the digest algorithm to SHA-1. This
document expands the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512.
- Paragraph 3.1.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECDH std and cofactor
methods. This document expands the set of allowed algorithms by
adding SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
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- Paragraph 3.2.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECMQV. This document
expands the set of allowed algorithms by adding SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512.
- Paragraph 5 is updated to include requirements for hash algorithms
and recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. It
also was expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants are
required.
- Paragraph 7 is updated to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA
with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. It was also updated
to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2
algorithms as the KDF.
- Paragraph 8.1 listed the algorithm identifiers for SHA-1 and SHA-1
with ECDSA. This document adds algorithm identifiers for SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. This document also updates the list
of algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV
with SHA2 algorithms as the KDF.
- Deleted summary paragraph.
- Updated references.
- Updated security considerations. Security considerations paragraph
referring to definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-
512 is deleted.
- Added ASN.1 modules.
- Updated acknowledgements section.
2. SignedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
SignedData format to sign data.
2.1. SignedData using ECDSA
This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData. ECDSA is specified in
[X9.62]. The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [DSS]. ECDSA is used with the Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA) [SHS].
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In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
following techniques and formats MUST be used.
2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in
[CMS], but with the following restrictions:
digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
algorithm (see Section 8.1) which MUST be one of the following:
id-sha1 identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm, id-sha224 identifies
the SHA-224 hash algorithm, id-sha256 identifies the SHA-256 hash
algorithm, id-sha384 identifies the SHA-384 algorithm, and id-
sha512 identifies the SHA-512 algorithm.
signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
(see Section 8.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.
signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 8.2).
When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the
ECDSA signatures in SignedData. ECC certificates are discussed in
Section 6.
2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message
digest calculation process and signature generation process for
SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To sign data, the sending
agent uses the signature method specified in [X9.62, Section 5.3]
with the following exceptions:
- In [X9.62, Section 5.3.1], the integer "e" is instead determined
by converting the message digest generated according to [CMS,
Section 5.4] to an integer using the data conversion method in
[X9.62, Section 4.3.2].
The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the ECDSA-
Sig-Value syntax (see Section 8.2) and places it in the
SignerInfosignature field.
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2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
message digest calculation process and signature verification process
for SignedData that are specified in [CMS]. To verify SignedData,
the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified
in [X9.62, Section 5.4] with the following exceptions:
- In [X9.62, Section 5.4.1] the integer "e'" is instead determined
by converting the message digest generated according to [CMS,
Section 5.4] to an integer using the data conversion method in
[X9.62, Section 4.3.2].
In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received
message.
3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
EnvelopedData format.
3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH
This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData.
Ephemeral-static ECDH is specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363].
Ephemeral-static ECDH is the the elliptic curve analog of the
ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified
jointly in the documents [CMS, Section 12.3.1.1] and [CMS-DH].
In an implementation that uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData with key
agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be used.
3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following
restrictions:
originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey. The
originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
object identifier (see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters. The
originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding of a
value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), which
represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key.
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keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm
object identifier (see Section 8.1). The parameters field
contains KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm
identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used
to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the
key-encryption key (KEK). Algorithm requirements are found in
paragraph 5.
3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate). The sending
agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
"SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
Section 8.2). The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1]. As a result the sending
agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the
type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string and
placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field, and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer
"keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The
receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit
string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type
ECPoint (see Section 8.2) encapsulated as a bit string. The
receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1]. As a
result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K",
which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData. ECMQV is
specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363]. Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-
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KEA], 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a
static key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the
receiving agent. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it can
be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
In an implementation that uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData
with key agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be
used.
3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:
originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender. It
SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or
subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's
certificates.
ukm MUST be present. The ukm field MUST contain an octet string
which is the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
Section 8.2). The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object identifier
(see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters field. The
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST
contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
8.2) representing sending agent's ephemeral EC public key. The
MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, SHOULD contain
an octet string of additional user keying material of the sending
agent.
keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm
identifier (see Section 8.1), with the parameters field
KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm. Algorithm
requirements are found in paragraph 5.
3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters, (e.g.
from the recipient's certificate) and checks that the domain
parameters are the same. The sending agent then determines an
integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-
size in bits, and also a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
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encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2). The sending agent
then performs the key deployment and key agreement operations of the
Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.2]. As a
result, the sending agent obtains:
- an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type
ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed
in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field
(see Section 8.2), and
- a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData for
greater efficiency.
3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent
When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer "keydatalen"
from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The receiving
agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the
originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in field
and checks that the domain parameters are the same. The receiving
agent then performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve
MQV Scheme [SEC1, Section 6.2]. As a result, the receiving agent
obtains a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the pairwise
key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.
4. AuthenticatedData using ECC
This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
AuthenticatedData format. AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData. (For example,
the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when
forwarded.)
4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV
This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
(ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData. ECMQV is
specified in [SEC1]. An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it
can be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.
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4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.
4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent
The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1-
Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.
The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
greater efficiency.
Note: if there are multiple recipients, an attack is possible where
one recipient modifies the content without other recipients noticing
[BON]. A sending agent who is concerned with such an attack SHOULD
use a separate AuthenticatedData for each recipient.
4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent
The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.
Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2.
5. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves
Implementations of this specification MUST implement either
SignedData with ECDSA or EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
Implementations of this specification SHOULD implement both
SignedData with ECDSA and EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
Implementations MAY implement the other techniques specified, such as
AuthenticatedData and 1-Pass ECMQV.
Furthermore, in order to encourage interoperability, implementations
SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by ANSI
[X9.62], NIST [DSS] and SECG [SEC2]. It is RECOMMENDED that the P-
256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with SHA-384,
and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.
Implementations of this specification MUST implement the SHA-256 hash
algorithm. The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms MAY
be supported.
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When ECDSA, ECDH, or ECMQV is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the
P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with SHA-
384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.
Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive MUST support the
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support
the id-aes128-wrap algorithm. The dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-
scheme, and dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY be
supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-
aes256wrap MAY be supported.
Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
ephemeral-static ECDH cofactor primitive MUST support the
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also
support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm. The dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme,
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-
cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise,
the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256wrap MAY be
supported.
Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
ECMQV MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They
MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap algorithm. The mqvSinglePass-
sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
sha384kdf-scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY
be supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and
id-aes256wrap MAY be supported.
Implementations of this specification that support AuthenticatedData
with ECMQV MUST support the
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the
id-aes128-wrap algorithm. The mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme,
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise,
the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256wrap MAY be
supported.
6. Certificates using ECC
Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
this specification to distribute agents' public keys. The use of ECC
algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
[PKI-ALG].
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7. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC
A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one
or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by using the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG, Section 2.5.2].
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA signature
algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the
object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA* object identifiers (where * is 1,
224, 256, 384, or 512) all with NULL parameters. The DER encodings
are:
ecdsa-with-SHA1: 30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00
ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00
The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for
a) the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm,
b) the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or
c) the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm
is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object
identifier
a) dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme,
b) dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or
c) mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme
respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the
parameters present. The parameters indicate the supported key-
encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.
Example DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows
(KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key
wrap algorithm):
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES
30 1c
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02
30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
05 00
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KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128
30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
05 00
KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256
30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES
30 1c
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03
30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128
30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
05 00
KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256
30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES
30 1c
06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10
30 0f
06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
05 00
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KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128
30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
05 00
KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256
30 17
06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02
30 0d
06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
05 00
8. ASN.1 Syntax
The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section
for reference purposes.
8.1. Algorithm Identifiers
The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used in
this document [SMIME-SHA2]:
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
algorithm(2) 26 }
id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
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The following object identifier is used in this document to indicate
an elliptic curve public key:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
where
ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
10045 }
When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
algorithm identifier, the associated parameters contain NULL.
The following object identifier indicates the digital signature
algorithm used in this document:
ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
When the object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224,
ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512 are used
within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field
contains NULL.
The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement
algorithms used in this document:
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 }
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dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 2 }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 3 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 3 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 0 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 1 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 2 }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 3 }
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 16 }
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 0 }
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 1 }
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 2 }
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 3 }
where
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16)
x9(840) x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
and
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
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When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS
KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.
8.2. Other Sytnax
The following additional syntax is used here.
When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using
the type:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER,
s INTEGER }
ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [X9.62]. Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig-Value
is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of SignedData.
When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData,
ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using the type ECPoint.
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData, the
sending agent's ephemeral public key and additional keying material
are encoded using the type:
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL }
The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key and
placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field. The additional user keying
material is placed in the addedukm field. Then the
MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within a ukm
field of EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData.
When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData, the
key-encryption keys are derived by using the type:
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING }
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The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows:
keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and NULL parameters.
entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
supplied by the sending agent. When used with ECDH and CMS, the
entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm. When used with
ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm
(encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).
suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH]. (E.g. for 3DES
it would be 00 00 00 c0.)
Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
the key derivation function, as specified in [SEC1, Section 3.6.1].
Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
[CMS-DH]. Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field
because the key derivation function specified in [SEC1, Section
3.6.1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided.
9. Security Considerations
This specification is based on [CMS], [X9.62] and [SEC1] and the
appropriate security considerations of those documents apply.
In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of the
concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to send
messages to more than one recipient. Also, users of MQV should be
aware of the vulnerability in [K].
When implementing EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData, there are five
algorithm related choices that need to be made:
1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the KDF?
3) What is the key wrap algorithm?
4) What is the content encryption algorithm?
5) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to strength of the security provided by
each of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable
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minimum bits of security [NISTSP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes,
KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It
also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes.
Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curves
Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption |
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | sect163k1
| | SHA224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2
| | SHA256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1
| | SHA384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC |
| | SHA512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
112 | 224-255 | SHA1 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1
| | SHA224 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1
| | SHA256 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect233r1
| | SHA384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC |
| | SHA512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
128 | 256-383 | SHA1 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
| | SHA224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | sect283k1
| | SHA256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect283r1
| | SHA384 | | |
| | SHA512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
192 | 384-511 | SHA224 | AES-192 | AES-192 CBC | secp384r1
| | SHA256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | sect409k1
| | SHA384 | | | sect409r1
| | SHA512 | | |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
256 | 512+ | SHA256 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
| | SHA384 | | | sect571k1
| | SHA512 | | | sect571r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
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To promote interoperability, the following choices are REOMMENDED:
Minimum | ECDH or | Key | Key | Content | Curve
Bits of | ECQMV | Derivation | Wrap | Encryption |
Security | Key Size | Function | Alg. | Alg. |
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
80 | 192 | SHA256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp192r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
112 | 224 | SHA256 | 3DES | 3DES CBC | secp224r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
128 | 256 | SHA256 | AES-128 | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
192 | 384 | SHA384 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
256 | 512 | SHA512 | AES-256 | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related
choices that need to be made:
1) What is the public key size?
2) What is the hash algorithm?
3) What is the curve?
Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each
of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
each choice are roughly equivalent. The following table provides
comparable minimum bits of security [NISTSP800-57] for the ECDSA key
sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG]
for the key sizes.
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Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve
Bits of | Key Size | Digest |
Security | | Algorithm |
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
80 | 160-223 | SHA1 | sect163k1
| | SHA224 | secp163r2
| | SHA256 | secp192r1
| | SHA384 |
| | SHA512 |
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
112 | 224-255 | SHA224 | secp224r1
| | SHA256 | sect233k1
| | SHA384 | sect233r1
| | SHA512 |
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
128 | 256-383 | SHA256 | secp256r1
| | SHA384 | sect283k1
| | SHA512 | sect283r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
192 | 384-511 | SHA384 | secp384r1
| | SHA512 | sect409k1
| | | sect409r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
256 | 512+ | SHA512 | secp521r1
| | | sect571k1
| | | sect571r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:
Minimum | ECDSA | Message | Curve
Bits of | Key Size | Digest |
Security | | Algorithm |
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
80 | 192 | SHA256 | sect192r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
112 | 224 | SHA256 | secp224r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
128 | 256 | SHA256 | secp256r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
192 | 384 | SHA384 | secp384r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
256 | 512+ | SHA512 | secp521r1
---------+----------+-----------+-----------
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10. IANA Considerations
None.
11. References
11.1. Normative
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3852,
July.
[CMS-AES] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.
[CMS-AESCG] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 5084, November 2007.
[CMS-ALG] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[CMS-DH] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999.
[IEEE1363] IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 2000.
[DSS] FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National
Institute of Standards and Technology, January 2000.
[MUST] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[MSG] Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2
Message Specification", work-in-progress.
[PKI] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[PKI-ALG] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W.
Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", work-in-progress.
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[SEC1] SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from
www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf.
[SEC2] SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
Available from www.secg.org/collateral/sec2.pdf.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
FIPS Publication 180-2: Secure Hash Standard, August
2002.
[SMIME-SHA2] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", work-in-progress.
[X9.62] ANSI X9.62-2005, "Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", American National
Standards Institute, 2005.
[X.208] CCITT Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), 1988.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology -
Abstract Syntax Notation One, 1997.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology -
Abstract Syntax Notation One: Information Object
Specification, 1997.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682: Information Technology -
Abstract Syntax Notation One: Constraint Specification,
2002.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683: Information Technology -
Abstract Syntax Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
Specifications, 2002.
11.2. Informative
[BON] D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC", Presentation
at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000, Center for
Applied Cryptographic Research, University of Waterloo,
2000. Paper version available from
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps
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[CMS-KEA] Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
2876, July 2000.
[K] B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1
and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.
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Annex A ASN.1 Modules
Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.208].
Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680], [X.681], [X.682], [X.683]. This appendix contains the same
information as Appendix A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1
notation, however Appendix A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.
Annex A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module
Annex A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module
SMIMEECCAlgs-2008
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) TBD }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS
-- From [PKI-ALG]
ALGORITHM, algorithmIdentifier, MessageDigestAlgorithms,
SignatureAlgorithms
ow-sha1, ow-sha224, ow-sha256, ow-sha384, ow-sha512,
sa-ecdsaWithSHA1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }
-- From [CMS-AES]
id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV
id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes1256-wrap
FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }
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-- From [CMS-AESCG]
id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters
id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }
-- From [CMS]
OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- From [CMS-ALG]
hMAC-SHA1, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }
;
-- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field
MessageDigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
ow-sha1 |
ow-sha224 |
ow-sha256 |
ow-sha384 |
ow-sha512,
... -- Extensible
}
-- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 ,
... -- Extensible
}
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sa-ecdsa-with-SHA224 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA224 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
sa-ecdsa-with-SHA256 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA256 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
sa-ecdsa-with-SHA384 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA384 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
sa-ecdsa-with-SHA512 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID ecdsa-with-SHA512 PARMS NULL }
ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
-- ECDSA Signature Value
-- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER,
s INTEGER
}
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-- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
-- keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
-- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
-- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
-- AuthEnvelopedData
KeyAgreementAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf |
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
... -- Extensible
}
x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
x9-63(63) schemes(0) }
secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 0 }
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kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 1 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 2 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 11 3 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 3 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 0 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 1 }
kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 2 }
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kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 14 3 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
x9-63-scheme 16 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 0 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 1 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 2 }
kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
OID mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }
mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
secg-scheme 15 3 }
KeyWrapAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
kwa-3des |
kwa-aes128 |
kwa-aes192 |
kwa-aes256,
... -- Extensible
}
kwa-3des ALGORITHM :: = {
OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NULL }
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kwa-aes128 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-wrap PARMS ABSENT }
kwa-aes192 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-wrap PARMS ABSENT }
kwa-aes256 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-wrap PARMS ABSENT }
-- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
-- field
ContentEncryptionAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
cea-des-ede3-cbc |
cea-aes128-cbc |
cea-aes192-cbc |
cea-aes256-cbc |
cea-aes128-ccm |
cea-aes192-ccm |
cea-aes256-ccm |
cea-aes128-gcm |
cea-aes192-gcm |
cea-aes256-gcm,
... -- Extensible
}
cea-des-ede3-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID des-ede3-cbc PARMS CBCParameter }
cea-aes128-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-CBC PARMS AES-IV }
cea-aes192-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-CBC PARMS AES-IV }
cea-aes256-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-CBC PARMS AES-IV }
cea-aes128-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }
cea-aes192-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }
cea-aes256-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }
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cea-aes128-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes128-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }
cea-aes192-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes192-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }
cea-aes256-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-aes256-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }
-- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
-- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
maca-sha1 |
maca-sha224 |
maca-sha256 |
maca-sha384 |
maca-sha512,
... -- Extensible
}
maca-sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID hMAC-SHA1 PARMS NULL }
maca-sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-hmacWithSHA224 PARMS NULL }
-- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a
-- module (that I could find)
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }
maca-sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-hmacWithSHA256 PARMS NULL }
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }
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maca-sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-hmacWithSHA384 PARMS NULL }
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }
maca-sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {
OID id-hmacWithSHA512 PARMS NULL }
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }
-- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
-- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field
-- PARMS are NULL
OriginatorPKAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
opka-ec,
... -- Extensible
}
opka-ec AGLORITHM ::={
OID id-ecPublicKey PARMS NULL }
-- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys
ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
-- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
-- ECMQV
MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
}
-- Format for ECDH and ECMQV key-encryption keys when using
-- EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData
ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithms },
entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
}
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SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
&Type OPTIONAL,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE
}
WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &Type IDENTIFIED BY &id }
SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
capabilityID SMIME-CAPS.&id({SMimeCapsSet}),
parameters SMIME-CAPS.
&Type({SMimeCapsSet}{@capabilityID}) OPTIONAL
}
SMimeCapsSet SMIME-CAPS ::= {
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 |
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf |
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
... -- Extensible
}
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA1 }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA224 }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA256 }
cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA384 }
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cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA512 }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf }
cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf }
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cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf }
cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf }
END
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Acknowledgements
The methods described in this document are based on work done by the
ANSI X9F1 working group. The authors wish to extend their thanks to
ANSI X9F1 for their assistance. The authors also wish to thank Peter
de Rooij for his patient assistance. The technical comments of
Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.
Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake-
Wilson, Paul Lambert, and Dan Brown. Without the initial version of
RFC3278 this version wouldn't exist.
The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hines, Jim Schaad, and Russ
Housley for their valuable input.
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Author's Addresses
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA
Email: turners@ieca.com
Daniel R. L. Brown
Certicom Corp
5520 Explorer Drive #400
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
CANADA
Email: dbrown@certicom.com
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Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
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OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
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Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
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Turner & Brown Expires December 3, 2008 [Page 39]
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