One document matched: draft-ietf-sipping-e2m-sec-reqs-01.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-sipping-e2m-sec-reqs-00.txt
SIPPING K. Ono
Internet-Draft S. Tachimoto
Expires: August 16, 2004 NTT Corporation
February 16, 2004
Requirements for End-to-middle Security for the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)
draft-ietf-sipping-e2m-sec-reqs-01
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2004.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
A SIP User Agent (UA) does not always trust all proxy servers in a
request path to decide whether or not to inspect the message bodies
and/or headers contained in a message. The UA might want to protect
the message bodies and/or headers from proxy servers excluding the
particular proxy that provides some services based on their content.
This situation requires a mechanism for securing information passed
between the UA and an intermediary proxy, also called "end-to-middle
security", which does not interfere with end-to-end security. This
document defines a set of requirements for a mechanism to achieve
end-to-middle security.
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Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [1].
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problems with the Existing Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Requirements for a Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1 General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 Requirements for End-to-middle Confidentiality . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Requirements for End-to-middle Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Changes from 00.txt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [2] supports hop-by-hop
security using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [3] and end-to-end
security using Secure MIME (S/MIME) [4]. This assumes that a SIP UA
trusts all proxy servers in a request path to decide whether or not
to inspect the message bodies contained in a message.
However, there is a model where trusted and partially-trusted proxy
servers are mixed along a message path. The partially-trusted proxy
servers are only trusted by users in terms of the SIP routing. The
proxy servers are not trusted by users to inspect data except routing
headers. Hop-by-hop confidentiality services using TLS are not
suitable for this model. End-to-end confidentiality services using S/
MIME are also not suitable when the intermediaries provide services
based on reading the message bodies and/or headers. This problem is
described in Section 23 of [2].
One example of such services is a firewall traversal. A firewall
entity that supports the SIP protocol or a midcom [5] agent
co-located with a proxy server controls a firewall based on certain
Session Description Protocol (SDP) attributes in a SIP transaction.
Another example is transcoding [6]. A transcoder related to a proxy
server transfers coding based on certain SDP attributes in a SIP
transaction or transfers text-to-speech based on a message body in
the MESSAGE [7] method.
A third example is the archiving of instant messaging traffic, where
the archiving function co-located with a proxy server logs the
message bodies in the MESSAGE method. This service might be deployed
for financial or health care applications, where achiving
communications is required by policies, as well as other
applications.
In these cases, a UA might want to protect the message bodies and/or
headers from proxy servers excluding the particular proxy server that
provides these services. Conversely, a proxy server might want to
view the message bodies and/or headers to provide these services.
Such a proxy server is not always the first hop for the UA. These
situations require security between the UA and the intermediary proxy
server for the message bodies and/or message headers. We call this
"end-to-middle security".
End-to-middle security consists of authentication, data integrity and
data confidentiality. Above examples mainly require data
confidentiality for end-to-middle security. For authentication, proxy
servers usually require to authenticate a user that sends a request
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message. The user also requires to authenticate the proxy that has
the user's credential. HTTP digest authentication described in [2]
can be used for mutual authentication for the request message. The
authenticating proxy is not limited to the first hop for the UA.
Thus, HTTP digest authentication can be used for end-to-middle
security. To avoid replay attacks, the HTTP digest authentication
needs to be used with a security mechanism for confidentiality such
as TLS. HTTP digest authentication does not support authentication
for an originator of a response message. Digital signatures obtained
from a Public Key Infrastructure, S/MIME Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) [8] SignedData body, can be used for the authentication. Since
these mechanisms achieve authentication for end-to-middle security,
the requirements are not discussed in this document.
As for data integrity, proxy servers require to validate the content
to be used for providing some services. The CMS SignedData body might
be used in a mechanism for end-to-middle security. The CMS SignedData
body can be created with the original data and the originator's
private key, and anyone can verify the data integrity by using the
originator's public key and the certificate. That is, proxy servers
can verify the data integrity whenever they require. Thus, the CMS
SignedData body could be used to implement end-to-middle security at
the same time as using end-to-end security. Currently, proxy servers
cannot require UAs to send a message with the CMS SignedData body.
Some new mechanisms are needed to achieve data integrity for
end-to-middle security.
This document mainly discusses requirements for data confidentiality
and the integrity of end-to-middle security. Proposed mechanisms are
discussed in [9].
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2. Problems with the Existing Situations
We describe here examples of models in which trusted and partially
trusted proxy servers both exist in a message path. These situations
demonstrate the reasons why end-to-middle security are required in
certain scenarios.
In the following example, User #1 does not know the services provided
by or security policies of Proxy #1. User#1 sends an INVITE request
including S/MIME-encrypted SDP for end-to-end security as shown in
Figure 1. Proxy #1 may reject the request because it cannot offer a
firewall traversal service. Or Proxy #1 may erase the encrypted data
in the request based on a strict security policy that prohibits the
forwarding of unknown data. Thus, the UA will need to discover if
information requirements to receive intermediary's services or
security policies will conflict with end-to-end confidentiality.
Home network
+---------------------+
| +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+
User #1-----| | C |-----| * |-----| * |-----| C |-----User #2
| +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+
| UA #1 Proxy #1 | Proxy #2 UA #2
+---------------------+
C: Content that UA #1 allows the entity to inspect
*: Content that UA #1 prevents the entity from inspecting
Figure 1: Deployment example #1
In the second example, Proxy server #1 (Proxy #1) is the home proxy
server of User #1 using UA #1. User #1 communicates with User #2
through Proxy #1 and Proxy #2 as shown in Figure 2. UA #1 already
knows the public key certificate of Proxy #1, and it allows Proxy #1
to inspect the message bodies in a request for some purpose.
However, User #1 does not know whether Proxy #2 is trustworthy, and
thus wants to protect the message bodies in the request. The UA will
need to be able to grant a trusted intermediary permission to inspect
message bodies while preserving their confidentiality with respect to
other intermediaries.
Even if UA #1's request message authorizes a selected proxy server
(Proxy #1) to see the message body, UA #1 is unable to authorize the
same proxy server to see the message body in the response from UA #2.
The originating UA will need to designate and share a key that can be
reused as a content encryption key (CEK) for bidirectional exchanges
of S/MIME-secured messages in SIP.
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Home network
+---------------------+
| +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+
User #1-----| | C |-----| C |-----| * |-----| C |----- User #2
| +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+
| UA #1 Proxy #1 | Proxy #2 UA #2
+---------------------+
C: Content that UA #1 needs to disclose
*: Content that UA #1 needs to protect
Figure 2: Deployment example #2
In the third example, User #1 connects UA #1 to a proxy server in a
Visited (potentially hostile) network, e.g. a hotspot service or a
roaming service. Since User #1 wants to utilize certain home network
services, UA #1 connects to a home proxy server, Proxy #1. However,
UA #1 must connect to Proxy #1 via the proxy server of the visited
network (Proxy A), because User#1 must follow the policy of that
network. Proxy A may perform access control based on the destination
addresses of calls. User #1 trusts Proxy A to route requests, but not
to inspect the message bodies they contain as shown in Figure 3. User
#1 trusts Proxy #1 both to route requests and to inspect the message
bodies for some purpose.
The same problems as in the second example also exist here.
Visited network
+---------------------+
| +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
User #1 -- | | C |-----| * |-----| C |-----| * |-----| C |
| +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
| UA #1 Proxy A | Proxy #1 Proxy #2 UA #2
+---------------------+
C: Content that UA #1 needs to disclose
*: Content that UA #1 needs to protect
Figure 3: Deployment example #3
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3. Requirements for a Solution
We describe here requirements for a solution. The requirements are
mainly applied during the phase of a dialog creation or sending a
MESSAGE method.
3.1 General Requirements
Following are gerenal requirements for end-to-middle confidentiality
and the integrity.
1. It SHOULD have little impact on the way a UA handles messages
with S/MIME bodies.
2. It SHOULD have no impact on proxy servers that do not provide
services based on S/MIME bodies in terms of handling the existing
SIP headers.
3. It SHOULD have little impact on the standardized mechanism of
proxy servers that provide services based on S/MIME bodies.
When a proxy server receives an S/MIME message, it should be
able to quickly and easily determine the necessity to
investigate the S/MIME body. This can be restated as:
+ It SHOULD allow proxy servers to quickly and easily
determine whether to handle S/MIME bodies and, if so, how
and which ones.
4. It SHOULD allow a proxy server to notify a UA about the proxy
server's security policy for a request/response.
5. It SHOULD allow a proxy server to notify a UA what data in a
request/response is needed in order to provide a service.
3.2 Requirements for End-to-middle Confidentiality
1. The solution MUST be compatible with end-to-end encryption. The
encrypted data can be shared with the end user and selected proxy
server, if needed.
2. It MUST NOT violate end-to-end encryption when the encrypted data
does not need to be shared with any proxy servers.
For example, keying materials for secure RTP (SRTP) in SDP
[11] can be included only in the end-to-end encryption, if the
UA's policy is such.
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3. It SHOULD allow a UA to discover which proxy server needs to view
some data in a request/response message for a certain service,
and discover what data is needed.
This requirement is necessary when the UA does not know which
proxy or domain provides the service in advance.
4. It MUST allow a UA to request selected proxy servers to view
specific message bodies. The request itself SHOULD be secure.
5. It SHOULD allow a UA to request the recipient UA to disclose the
same information that the requesting UA is providing to the proxy
server to the same proxy server. The request itself SHOULD be
secure.
It is not reasonable to expect the recipient UA have knowledge
of the public key certificate of the proxy server on the
originating network. This can be restated as:
+ The solution SHOULD allow a UA to request the opposite-side
UA to reuse a CEK in subsequent messages during a dialog.
+ It SHOULD allow a UA to request a selected proxy server to
keep a CEK in a message during a dialog. The requests
themselves SHOULD be secure.
6. It MAY allow a UA to notify the opposite-side UA which proxy
server needs to view some data in a request/response for the
services.
7. It MAY allow a UA to notify the opposite-side UA what data the
proxy server is permitted to view in a request/response for the
services.
These last two requirements might be needed when there are a
firewall in the network on UAS's side. A UAS need to notify a
UAC to disclose the SDP in an INVITE message to a proxy server
that control the firewall in the UAS side. Such notification
might be applied to a registration phase.
3.3 Requirements for End-to-middle Integrity
1. It SHOULD work even with SIP end-to-end integrity service
enabled.
2. It SHOULD allow a UA to discover what data in a request/response
the proxy needs to verify in order to provide the service.
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This requirement is necessary when the UA does not know what
data is used to provide the service in advance.
3. It MUST allow a UA to request selected proxy servers to verify
specific message bodies. The request itself SHOULD be secure.
4. It SHOULD allow a UA to request the recipient UA to send the
verification data of the same information that the requesting UA
is providing to the proxy server. The request itself SHOULD be
secure.
5. It MAY allow a UA to notify the opposite-side UA what data the
proxy server needs to verify in a request/response for the
services.
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4. Security Considerations
This documents present requirements including security viewpoints in
Section 3.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document requires no additional considerations.
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6. Changes from 00.txt
o Reworked the sub-sections in Section 3 to clarify the objectives,
separating end-to-middle confidentiality and integrity.
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7. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Rohan Mahy and Cullen Jennings for their initial support of
this concept, and to Jon Peterson, Gonzalo Camarillo, and Sean Olson
for their helpful comments.
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References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[2] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M. and E. Schooler, "SIP:
Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[3] Allen, C. and T. Dierks, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
2246, January 1999.
[4] Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification", RFC
2633, June 1992.
[5] Srisuresh, P., Kuthan, J., Rosenberg, J., Brim, S., Molitor, A.
and A. Rayhan, "Middlebox communication architecture and
framework", RFC 3303, August 2002.
[6] Camarillo, G., "Framework for Transcoding with the Session
Initiation Protocol",
draft-ietf-sipping-transc-framework-00.txt (work in progress),
February 2004.
[7] Campbell, Ed., B., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Huitema, C.
and D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for
Instant Messaging", RFC 3428, December 2002.
[8] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630, June
1999.
[9] Ono, K. and S. Tachimoto, "End-to-middle security in the
Session Initiation Protocol(SIP)",
draft-ono-sipping-end2middle-security-01 (work in progress),
Feb. 2004.
[10] Baugher, M., Carrara, E., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., McGrew, D.
and K. Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol",
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-09.txt (work in progress), July 2003.
[11] Andreasen, F., Baugher, M. and D. Wing, "Session Description
Protocol Security Descriptions for Media Streams",
draft-ietf-mmusic-sdescriptions-03.txt (work in progress),
February 2004.
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Authors' Addresses
Kumiko Ono
Network Service Systems Laboratories
NTT Corporation
9-11, Midori-Cho 3-Chome
Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan
EMail: ono.kumiko@lab.ntt.co.jp
Shinya Tachimoto
Network Service Systems Laboratories
NTT Corporation
9-11, Midori-Cho 3-Chome
Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan
EMail: tachimoto.shinya@lab.ntt.co.jp
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