One document matched: draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-02.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-01.txt
SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson, Ed.
Obsoletes: 6485 (if approved) APNIC
Intended status: Standards Track May 15, 2015
Expires: November 16, 2015
The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure
draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-02.txt
Abstract
This document specifies the algorithms, algorithms' parameters,
asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format for
the Resource Public Key Infrastructure subscribers that generate
digital signatures on certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and
signed objects as well as for the Relying Parties that verify these
digital signatures.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
This document specifies:
* the digital signature algorithm and parameters;
* the hash algorithm and parameters;
* the public and private key formats; and,
* the signature format
used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) subscribers when
they apply digital signatures to certificates, Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs), and signed objects (e.g., Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs) and manifests). Relying Parties (RPs) also use this document
when verify RPKI subscribers' digital signatures [RFC6480].
This document is referenced by other RPKI profiles and
specifications, including the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484],
the RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487], the SIDR Architecture
[RFC6480], and the Signed Object Template for the RPKI [RFC2119].
Familiarity with these documents is assumed.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Algorithms
Two cryptographic algorithms are used in the RPKI:
* The signature algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, and signed
objects is RSA Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1
Version 1.5 (sometimes referred to as "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5") from
Section 5 of [RFC4055].
* The hashing algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, and signed
objects is SHA-256 [SHS] (see note below). Hashing algorithms
are not identified individually in certificates and CRLs, as
the identity of the hashing algorithm is combined with the
identity of the digital signature algorithm.
When used in the context of the Cryptographic Message Syntax
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(CMS) SignedData, the hashing algorithm is identified
individually (in this case the hashing algorithm is sometimes
called a message digest algorithm).
NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm use is the
use of SHA-1 [SHS] when CAs generate authority and subject key
identifiers [RFC6487].
For generating and verifying certificates and CRLs the hashing and
digital signature algorithms are referred to together, i.e., "RSA
PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256" or more simply "RSA with SHA-256". The
Object Identifier (OID) sha256WithRSAEncryption from [RFC4055] MUST
be used in this case.
For CMS SignedData, the object identifier and parameters for SHA-256
in [RFC5754] MUST be used for the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
and the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field when generating and
verifying CMS SignedData objects. The object identifier and
parameters for rsaEncryption MUST be used for the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field when generating CMS SignedData objects.
RPKI implementations MUST accept CMS SignedData objects that use the
object identifier and parameters for either rsaEncryption or
sha256WithRSAEncryption for the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field
when verifying CMS SignedData objects.
Locations for this OID are as follows:
In the certificate, the OID appears in the signature and
signatureAlgorithm fields [RFC4055];
In the CRL, the OID appears in the signatureAlgorithm field
[RFC4055];
In CMS SignedData, the OID appears in each SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field,
and in the SignedData digestAlgorithms [RFC5652]; and,
In a certification request, the OID appears in the PKCS #10
signatureAlgorithm field [RFC2986], or in the Certificate Request
Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey signature field [RFC4211].
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats
The RSA key pairs used to compute the signatures MUST have a 2048-bit
modulus and a public exponent (e) of 65,537.
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3.1. Public Key Format
The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:
algorithm (which is an AlgorithmIdentifier type):
The object identifier for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 MUST be
used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 5 of
[RFC4055]. The value for the associated parameters from that
clause MUST also be used for the parameters field.
subjectPublicKey:
RSAPublicKey MUST be used to encode the certificate's
subjectPublicKey field, as specified in [RFC4055].
3.2. Private Key Format
Local Policy determines private key format.
4. Signature Format
The structure for the certificate's signature field is as specified
in Section 1.2 of [RFC4055]. The structure for the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) SignedData's signature field is as specified in
[RFC5652].
5. Additional Requirements
It is anticipated that the RPKI will require the adoption of updated
key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
security to protect the integrity of signed products in the RPKI.
This profile should be relaced to specify such future requirements,
as and when appropriate.
Certification Authorities (CAs) and RPs SHOULD be capable of
supporting a transition to allow for the phased introduction of
additional encryption algorithms and key specifications, and also
accommodate the orderly deprecation of previously specified
algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of
supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key profiles simultaneously
within the scope of such anticipated transitions. The recommended
procedures to implement such a transition of key sizes and algorithms
is not specified in this document.
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6. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC4055], [RFC5280], and [RFC6487]
apply to certificate and CRLs. The Security Considerations of
[RFC5754] apply to signed objects. No new security are introduced as
a result of this specification.
7. IANA Considerations
[Remove before publication. There are no IANA considerations in this
document.]
8. Changes Aplied to RFC6485
This document represents a slight technical change to [RFC6485] that
is considered to be outside the limited scope of an erratum.
Section 2 of [RFC6485] specified a single signature algorithm (SHA-
256) and a single CMS OID, sha256withRSAEncryption, to be used for
the SignerInfo field of the CMS object. A closer reading of
[RFC4055] and [RFC5754] has identified that the CMS SignerInfo field
must support use of the rsaEncryption OID for full conformance with
the CMS specifications, and the normative references in [RFC6485]
inherited this requirement.
This document changes Section 2 of [RFC6485]. By conforming to the
CMS specifications as per [RFC4055] and [RFC5754], RPKI CMS objects
are less likely to be rejected as non-conformant with the CMS
standards. No change is made to the cryptographic status of the CMS
objects produced. This change reflects the behaviour of deployed
interoperating code. No other changes have been made to the
specification as described in [RFC6485].
9. Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the re-use in this draft of material
originally contained in working drafts the RPKI Certificate Policy
and Resource Certificate profile documents. The co-authors of these
two documents, namely Stephen Kent, Derrick Kong, Karen Seo, Ronald
Watro, George Michaelson and Robert Loomans, are acknowledged, with
thanks. The constraint on key size noted in this profile is the
outcome of comments from Stephen Kent and review comments from David
Cooper. Sean Turner has provided additional review input to this
document.
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Andrew Chi and David Mandelberg discovered the issue addressed in
this update to [RFC6485], and the changes in this updated
specification reflect the outcome of a discussion between Rob Austein
and Matt Lepinski on the SIDR Working group mailing list. George
Michaelson edited the update to this document.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, January 2010.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
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February 2012.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard", FIPS
Publication 180-3, October 2008.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, February 2012.
Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston
APNIC
Email: gih@apnic.net
George Michaelson (editor)
APNIC
Email: ggm@apnic.net
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