One document matched: draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-03.txt
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D.
Internet Draft Seo, K.
Expires: October 2010 Kent, S.
Intended Status: BCP BBN Technologies
March 8, 2010
Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice
Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with
the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2010.
Abstract
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI).
Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
Table of Contents
Preface...........................................................7
1. Introduction...................................................8
1.1. Overview..................................................8
1.2. Document name and identification..........................9
1.3. PKI participants..........................................9
1.3.1. Certification authorities............................9
1.3.2. Registration authorities.............................9
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................10
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................10
1.3.5. Other participants..................................10
1.4. Certificate usage........................................10
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10
1.5. Policy administration....................................11
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............11
1.5.2. Contact person......................................11
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...11
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................11
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................11
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................13
2.1. Repositories.............................................13
2.2. Publication of certification information.................13
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................13
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................13
3. Identification And Authentication.............................15
3.1. Naming...................................................15
3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.16
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key17
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................18
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions19
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate................................................20
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities...................................................20
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................20
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................21
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber22
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
...........................................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities...................................................22
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber23
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................23
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities...................................................24
4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........24
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................25
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
...........................................................25
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities...................................................25
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
...........................................................26
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
4.10. Certificate status services.............................26
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................27
5.1. Physical controls........................................27
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................27
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................27
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................27
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................27
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................27
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................27
5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................27
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................27
5.2. Procedural controls......................................27
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................27
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................27
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....27
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................27
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................27
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements28
5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................28
5.3.3. Training requirements...............................28
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............28
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................28
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................28
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................28
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................28
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................28
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................28
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................28
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................29
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................29
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................29
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....29
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................29
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................29
5.6. Key changeover...........................................29
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............29
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................29
6. Technical Security Controls...................................30
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................30
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................30
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................30
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........30
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........30
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................31
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking31
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)31
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........31
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......31
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................31
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................32
6.2.5. Private key archival................................32
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
...........................................................32
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........32
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................32
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................32
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................33
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................33
6.4. Activation data..........................................33
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........33
6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................33
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................33
6.5. Computer security controls...............................33
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....33
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................34
6.6.1. System development controls.........................34
6.6.2. Security management controls........................34
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34
6.7. Network security controls................................34
6.8. Time-stamping............................................34
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................35
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................36
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................36
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................36
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............36
8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................36
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................36
8.6. Communication of results.................................36
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................37
9.1. Fees.....................................................38
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................38
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............38
9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................38
9.2. Financial responsibility.................................38
9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................38
9.2.2. Other assets........................................38
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....38
9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................38
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................38
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information................................................38
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..38
9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................38
9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................38
9.4.2. Information treated as private......................38
9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................38
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......38
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......38
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process....................................................38
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........38
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............38
9.6. Representations and warranties...........................38
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................38
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........39
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........39
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................39
9.8. Limitations of liability.................................39
9.9. Indemnities..............................................39
9.10. Term and termination....................................39
9.10.1. Term...............................................39
9.10.2. Termination........................................39
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................39
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.39
9.12. Amendments..............................................39
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................39
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................39
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................39
9.14. Governing law...........................................39
9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................39
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................39
9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................39
9.16.2. Assignment.........................................39
9.16.3. Severability.......................................39
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).39
9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................39
10. Security Considerations......................................39
11. IANA Considerations..........................................40
12. Acknowledgments..............................................40
13. References...................................................41
13.1. Normative References....................................41
13.2. Informative References..................................41
Author's Addresses...............................................42
Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................42
Copyright Statement..............................................43
Preface
This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Service
Provider that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI). The user of this document should
1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of ISP>
Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.
2. leave the table of contents
3. delete this Preface
4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
brackets>
5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2
6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by
steps 4 and 5 above .
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to facilitate
comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC.
[There are 4 sub-sections that I haven't removed yet due to Word
problems.)
1. Introduction
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
of ISP>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of ISP>
Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance
with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
this PKI.
The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in 1.7) in
accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in
this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring
the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources
This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions, National
Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the
RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs and
network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
1.1. Overview
This CPS describes:
. Participants
. Publication of the certificates and CRLs
. How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked
. Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
. Key management
. Audit procedures
. Business and legal issues
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF document
draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):
. CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
each subscriber
. End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate
digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).
. In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system as described in
2.4.
1.2. Document name and identification
The name of this document is ''<Name of ISP>'s Certification Practice
Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)''.
1.3. PKI participants
Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. In such cases the term ''network subscriber'' will
be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though some of
them are individuals.
1.3.1. Certification authorities
<Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI. One approach
is to operate two CAs: one designated ''offline'' and the other
designated ''production.'' The offline CA is the top level CA for the
<Name of ISP> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation
and recovery capability in case the production CA is compromised or
becomes unavailable. Thus the offline CA issues certificates only to
instances of the production CA; and the CRLs it issues are used to
revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production
CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <Name of ISP> members, to
whom INRs have been distributed.>
1.3.2. Registration authorities
<Describe how the registration authority function is handled for the
CA(s) that you operate. The RPKI does not require establishment or
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with the
CA function. The RA function will be provided by the same entity
operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity
acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with
each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
already perform the RA function implicitly since they already assume
responsibility for distributing INRs.>
1.3.3. Subscribers
The primary types of organizations that receive distributions of INRs
from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are network
subscribers.
1.3.4. Relying parties
Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-
signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying
parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See section
1.7 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
1.3.5. Other participants
<If <Name of ISP> operates a repository that holds certificates,
CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects, then indicate this here.>
1.4. Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
cited above, are also permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses also
are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
1.5. Policy administration
1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This CPS is administered by <Name of ISP>
1.5.2. Contact person
<Insert ISP contact info here>
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the
accuracy of this binding.
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the
accuracy of this binding.
1.6. Definitions and acronyms
BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used to
identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued.
CP- Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates
the applicability of a certificate to a particular community
and/or class of applications with common security requirements.
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates.
Distribution of INRs - - A process of distribution of the INRs along the
respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
their customers.
IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems
and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet
traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs).
INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
protocol parameter sets, namely:
. IP Version 4 addresses,
. IP version 6 addresses, and
. Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.
ISP - - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.
NIR - - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an
optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INR
distribution.
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
RPKI-signed object - - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such by
a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
these data constructs depend on the context in which validation
of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of
these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories
As per the CP, certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them
to validate this data.
<If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic
set up. For example, ''The <Name of ISP> RPKI CA will publish
certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is
accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of ISP>.net.''>
2.2. Publication of certification information
<Name of ISP> MUST publish certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a world-wide
distributed system of repositories. <Name of ISP> will also publish
to this repository system any RPKI-signed objects that it creates.
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
<Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
repository system) of the certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
that you issue. If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data,
you still need to provide this information for relying parties. This
should include the period of time within which a certificate will be
published after the CA issues the certificate and the period of time
within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
certificate after it revokes that certificate.>
As per the CP, the following standard exists for publication times
and frequency:
The <Name of ISP> CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
the CA.
2.4. Access controls on repositories
Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must be
controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects) published to a
repository are digitally signed RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
issues MUST be published to the repository that it runs by means not
accessible to the outside world. <If <Name of Registry> offers
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
repository services to its subscribers, then <describe here the
protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed objects.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
3. Identification And Authentication
3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names
The Subject of each certificate issued by this ISP is identified by
an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished name will
consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value
generated by <Name of ISP>. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute
may be included along with the common name (to form a terminal
relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive
instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
relative to all certificates issued by <Name of ISP>. However, there
is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this
PKI. Also, the name of the subscriber need not to be ''meaningful'' in
the conventional, human-readable sense. The certificates issued
under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications
that make use of attestations of Internet resource holding, not for
identification
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this ISP need not be
meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a function of
this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
<Name of ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced
through technical means.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is
no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc.
3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to <Name of
ISP's> issuing the certificate. One possible approach makes use of
the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format
requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.>
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of subscribers, with the exception of
registries. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a
fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions of INRs in this
<Name of ISP's> records.
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each
certificate that is issued, accurately reflects your records with
regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or sub-
distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate. For example, a
BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request
that serves as a link to the <Name of ISP's> subscriber database that
maintains the resource distribution records. The certificate request
could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in
question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the
resources requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber.
The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be
commensurate with those you already employ as an ISP in the
maintenance of INR distribution.>
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a subscriber. However, <Name of ISP> maintains contact
information for each subscriber in support of certificate renewal,
rekey, or revocation.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
<Describe the procedures that MUST be used to identify at least one
individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in
support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
ISP> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used
to identify individuals who represent <Name of ISP> subscribers.'' The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders. Note
that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the
organizations to which you distribute (or sub-distribute) INRs, and
thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber
relationship.>
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.
3.2.5. Validation of authority
<Describe the procedures that MUST be used to verify that an
individual claiming to represent subscriber, is authorized to
represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could
say, ''Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section
3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate.
Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.'' The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ as an
ISP in authenticating individuals as representatives of subscribers.>
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used to
authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their resource
distributions.>
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
<Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that
MUST be used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is
the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State the
approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used
to authenticate routine re-key requests.>
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation
<Describe the procedures that MUST be used to ensure that an
organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This should
also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key
corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe
how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key requests. With respect
to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be
commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR
distribution records.>
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
<Describe the procedures that MUST be used by an RPKI subscriber to
make a revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is
ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of
the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be
revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case
where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key
as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.
These procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ
in the maintenance of subscriber records.>
Note that if a subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
existing RPKI certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so
long as the set of INRs distributed to the subscriber did not
''shrink,'' i.e., the new INRs are a superset of the old INR set.
However, if a new INR distribution results in ''shrinkage'' of the set
of INRs distributed to a subscriber, this triggers an implicit
revocation of the old RPKI certificate(s) associated with that
subscriber.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this ISP may submit a
certificate application to this CA.
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your
normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices
are documented.>
4.2. Certificate application processing
<Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will
employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to
identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for
issuance of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made
to documentation of such existing practices.>
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate
applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of
subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedures
specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key
corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
the CA issues to the requester.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
<Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
applications.>
4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
<Describe in this section your procedures for issuance and
publication of a certificate.>
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate
<Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
published. <Describe in this section your procedures for notification
of a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
<Describe here any other entities that MUST be notified when a new
certificate is published.>
4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
When a certificate is issued, the CA MUST publish it to the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
system once issued following the conduct described in 4.4.1. This
will be done within <specify the timeframe within which the
certificate will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will
be notified>.<Describe your procedures for publication of the
certificate.>
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
The certificates issued by <Name of ISP> to subscribers are CA
certificates. The private key associated with each of these
certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
CRLs. Subscribers who are ISPs will issue CA certificates to any
organizations to which they in turn distribute INRs, one or more end
entity (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on RPKI-
signed objects signed by the suscriber, and end entity certificates
to operators in support of repository access control. Non-ISP INR
holders will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since
they will not be distributing INRs to other organizations.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations who will
use EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Repositories will
use operator certificates to verify the authorization of entities to
engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories
represent a secondary type of relying party.
4.6. Certificate renewal
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. If <Name of ISP> initiates the renewal process based on the
certificate expiration date, then <Name of ISP> will notify the
subscriber <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 weeks in
advance of the expiration date'', or the general policy, e.g., ''in
conjunction with notification of service expiration''.> The validity
interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply.
4.6.2. Who may request renewal
The subscriber or <Name of ISP> may initiate the renewal process.
<For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures that will be
used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate holder of the
INRs in the certificate being renewed. This should also include the
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to
the public key in the certificate being renewed or the new public key
if the public key is being changed. With respect to authentication
of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those
you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records. If
you operate a BPKI for this, describe how that business-based PKI is
used to authenticate re-newal requests and refer to 3.2.6.>
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
<Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
This must include verification that the requester is the subscriber
or is authorized by the subscriber and that the certificate in
question has not been revoked.>
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
<Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
published <Describe your procedure for notification of new
certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent
with 4.3.2.>
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
When a renewal certificate is issued, the <name of ISP> CA MUST
publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be
done without subscriber review and acceptance.
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
<Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewal
certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
<List here any other entities (besides the subscriber) who will be
notified when a renewed certificate is issued.>
4.7. Certificate re-key
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
required, based on:
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
pair
If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked.
Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places
additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
Only the subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of ISP>
may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. <If the
subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the rekey, describe how
authentication is effected, e.g., using the <Name of Registry> BPKI.
Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
subscriber is verified.>
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
<Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the
CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
4.3. So reference can be made to that section.>
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
<Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
availability of the new re-keyed certificate. This should be
consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
issuance (see section 4.3.2).>
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
<Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
<List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
notified when a re-keyed certificate is issued.>
4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A
subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result
of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber.
If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a
current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a
new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then
this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a
certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued.
The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same
expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental
information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded. When
previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate,
then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate
(reflecting the new distribution) issued.
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
The subscriber or <Name of ISP> may initiate the certificate
modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here
what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
the entity requesting the modification.>
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
<Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These
should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and
4.3.1.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber
<Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
issuance of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with
the notification process for any new certificate (see section
4.3.2).>
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will publish it to the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
<List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
notified when a modified certificate is issued.
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the
public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a
certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
private key associated with that certificate.
4.9.2. Who can request revocation
The subscriber or <Name of ISP> may request a revocation. <For the
case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to verify
the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
revocation.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
This should include:
o Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation
o Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
is initiated by <Name of ISP>.>
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
process a revocation request.>
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
<State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.> <
Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be
published at or before that time. <Name of ISP> will set the
nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
next scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the
maximum latency> after generation.
4.10. Certificate status services
<Name of ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP. <Name of ISP> issues
CRLs.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls
<As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in
the management of INR distribution.>
5.1.1. Site location and construction
5.1.2. Physical access
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
5.1.4. Water exposures
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
5.1.6. Media storage
5.1.7. Waste disposal
5.1.8. Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls
<As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to
those used in the management of INR distribution.>
5.2.1. Trusted roles
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
5.3. Personnel controls
<As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate to those used in the management of INR
distribution.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
5.3.2. Background check procedures
5.3.3. Training requirements
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
5.4. Audit logging procedures
<As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how
you implement audit logging.>
5.4.1. Types of events recorded
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
. Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
. Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications)
. Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
. Posting of any material to a repository
. Any attempts to change or delete audit data
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
<Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
5.4.4. Protection of audit log
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether
such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]
5.6. Key changeover
The <Name of ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period that
is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued under
that certificate. When <Name of ISP> CA wishes to change keys, <Name
of ISP> will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish
a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, <specify
here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g., ''a minimum of 6 months''>
in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]
5.8. CA or RA termination
<Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions
in case of its own termination.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
6. Technical Security Controls
This section describes the security controls used by <Name of ISP>.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation
<Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for subscribers. In most
instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However,
your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf of
your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done for
subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
inherently undermine the security of the PKI.>
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
is not applicable.>
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
<Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
public keys to the <Name of ISP> RPKI CA. These procedures should
ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit and
that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the
transferred public key. >
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs and MUST be published
to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties MUST download these
certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
for (putative) trust anchors MUST be distributed out of band and
accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined criteria,
e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
available to the Internet community.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
6.1.5. Key sizes
The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
[RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as
specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
statement.>
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible
for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
<Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for
subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 5280.
For <Name of ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits
will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be
set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. <Specify
whether end entity certificates (e.g., issued by the CA for its
operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit
values as per RFC 5280.>
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The <Name of ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under
FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2 or 3 [FIPS].
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.''>
6.2.3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
6.2.4. Private key backup
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
6.2.5. Private key archival
See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
The private key for <Name of ISP>'s production CA <if appropriate,
change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The
private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for
backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
The private key for <Name of ISP>'s production CA <if appropriate,
change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from
unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2/3 requirements
applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])
6.2.8. Method of activating private key
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
key.>
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will
be stored securely when not in use.
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2
or 3 [FIPS].
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods
The <Name of ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of
<insert number of years - - ISP key pairs and certificates should have
reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
disruption caused by key changeover.>
6.4. Activation data
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
6.4.2. Activation data protection
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe
your procedures here>.
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
activation data for your CA. If there are none, say ''None.''>
6.5. Computer security controls
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with
those used for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls
<Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
(TSDM) Level 2.>
6.6.2. Security management controls
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security
measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI
functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This
should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled. >
6.7. Network security controls
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
operation. These should be commensurate with the network security
controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution of
INRs.>
6.8. Time-stamping
The RPKI does not make use of time stamping.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
security of the administration of INRs. These are sufficient for the
RPKI systems.>
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
8.4. Topics covered by assessment
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
8.6. Communication of results
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
9. Other Business And Legal Matters
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover 9.1 to 9.11 and
9.13 to 9.17 although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that
the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for
this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage
business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
9.1. Fees
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)
9.1.3. Refund policy
9.2. Financial responsibility
9.2.1. Insurance coverage
9.2.2. Other assets
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
9.3. Confidentiality of business information
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information
9.4. Privacy of personal information
9.4.1. Privacy plan
9.4.2. Information treated as private
9.4.3. Information not deemed private
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)
9.6. Representations and warranties
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties
9.8. Limitations of liability
9.9. Indemnities
9.10. Term and termination
9.10.1. Term
9.10.2. Termination
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
9.14. Governing law
9.15. Compliance with applicable law
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
9.16.1. Entire agreement
9.16.2. Assignment
9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
9.16.5. Force Majeure
10. Security Considerations
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
and technical security controls, including the scope of the
subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private
key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and
conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems.
11. IANA Considerations
None.
12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the
formatting and Ron Watro for assistance with the editing of this
document.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March
1997.
[RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress.
[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress.
[RFCzzzz] Huston, G., ''A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,'' work in
progress.
13.2. Informative References
[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
(FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, work in progress.
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method
for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
Author's Addresses
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
Email: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
Email: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com
Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft Template CPS for ISPs March 2010
Copyright Statement
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Kong, Seo & Kent Expires October 2010 [Page 43]
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 05:34:19 |