One document matched: draft-ietf-radius-auth-clientmib-02.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-radius-auth-clientmib-01.txt
RADIUS Working Group Bernard Aboba
INTERNET-DRAFT Microsoft
Category: Standards Track Glen Zorn
<draft-ietf-radius-auth-clientmib-02.txt> Microsoft
11 November 1998
RADIUS Authentication Client MIB
1. Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working docu-
ments of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and
its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute work-
ing documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference mate-
rial or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''
To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net
(Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim).
The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as <draft-
ietf-radius-auth-clientmib-02.txt>, and expires May 1, 1999. Please
send comments to the authors.
2. Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
3. Abstract
This memo defines a set of extensions which instrument RADIUS authen-
tication client functions. These extensions represent a portion of the
Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management pro-
tocols in the Internet community. Using these extensions IP-based
management stations can manage RADIUS authentication clients.
4. Introduction
This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
for use with network management protocols in the Internet community.
In particular, it describes managed objects used for managing RADIUS
authentication clients.
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Today a wide range of network devices, including routers and NASes,
act as RADIUS authentication clients in order to provide authentica-
tion and authorization services. As a result, the effective management
of RADIUS authentication clients is of considerable importance.
5. The SNMP Management Framework
The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major compo-
nents:
o An overall architecture, described in RFC 2271 [1].
o Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for
the purpose of management. The first version of this Structure
of Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv1 and described
in RFC 1155 [2], RFC 1212 [3] and RFC 1215 [4]. The second
version, called SMIv2, is described in RFC 1902 [5], RFC 1903
[6] and RFC 1904 [7].
o Message protocols for transferring management information. The
first version of the SNMP message protocol is called SNMPv1
and described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second version of the SNMP
message protocol, which is not an Internet standards track
protocol, is called SNMPv2c and described in RFC 1901 [9] and
RFC 1906 [10]. The third version of the message protocol is
called SNMPv3 and described in RFC 1906 [10], RFC 2272 [11]
and RFC 2274 [12].
o Protocol operations for accessing management information. The
first set of protocol operations and associated PDU formats is
described in RFC 1157 [8]. A second set of protocol operations
and associated PDU formats is described in RFC 1905 [13].
o A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 2273 [14]
and the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC
2275 [15].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. Objects in the MIB are
defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI.
This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIv2. A MIB
conforming to the SMIv1 can be produced through the appropriate trans-
lations. The resulting translated MIB must be semantically equivalent,
except where objects or events are omitted because no translation is
possible (use of Counter64). Some machine readable information in
SMIv2 will be converted into textual descriptions in SMIv1 during the
translation process. However, this loss of machine readable informa-
tion is not considered to change the semantics of the MIB.
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6. Overview
The RADIUS authentication protocol, described in [16], distinguishes
between the client function and the server function. In RADIUS authen-
tication, clients send Access-Requests, and servers reply with Access-
Accepts, Access-Rejects, and Access-Challenges. Typically NAS devices
implement the client function, and thus would be expected to implement
the RADIUS authentication client MIB, while RADIUS authentication
servers implement the server function, and thus would be expected to
implement the RADIUS authentication server MIB.
However, it is possible for a RADIUS authentication entity to perform
both client and server functions. For example, a RADIUS proxy may act
as a server to one or more RADIUS authentication clients, while simul-
taneously acting as an authentication client to one or more authenti-
cation servers. In such situations, it is expected that RADIUS enti-
ties combining client and server functionality will support both the
client and server MIBs.
6.1. Selected objects
This MIB module contains two scalars as well as a single table:
(1) the RADIUS Authentication Server Table contains one row for each
RADIUS authentication server that the client shares a secret with.
Each entry in the RADIUS Authentication Server Table includes fifteen
columns presenting a view of the activity of the RADIUS authentication
client.
7. Definitions
RADIUS-AUTH-CLIENT-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
OBJECT-IDENTITY, experimental,
Counter32, Integer32, Gauge32,
IpAddress, TimeTicks FROM SNMPv2-SMI
DisplayString FROM SNMPv2-TC
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF;
radius OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The OID assigned to RADIUS MIB work by the IANA."
::= { experimental 79 }
radiusAuthentication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {radius 1}
radiusAuthClientMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "9811161659Z"
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ORGANIZATION "IETF RADIUS Working Group."
CONTACT-INFO
" Bernard Aboba
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
Phone: +1 425 936 6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com"
DESCRIPTION
"The MIB dule for entities implementing the client side of
the Remote Access Dialin User Service (RADIUS) authentication
protocol."
::= { radiusAuthentication 2 }
radiusAuthClientMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIB 1 }
radiusAuthClient OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBObjects 1 }
radiusAuthClientInvalidServerAddresses OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Response packets
received from unknown addresses since client start-up."
::= { radiusAuthClient 1 }
radiusAuthClientIdentifier OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The NAS-Identifier of the RADIUS authentication client.
This is not necessarily the same as sysName in MIB II."
::= { radiusAuthClient 2 }
radiusAuthServerTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF RadiusAuthServerEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The (conceptual) table listing the RADIUS authentication
servers with which the client shares a secret."
::= { radiusAuthClient 3 }
radiusAuthServerEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RadiusAuthServerEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"An entry (conceptual row) representing a RADIUS
authentication server with which the client shares a secret."
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INDEX { radiusAuthServerIndex }
::= { radiusAuthServerTable 1 }
RadiusAuthServerEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
radiusAuthServerIndex Integer32,
radiusAuthServerAddress IpAddress,
radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber Integer32,
radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime TimeTicks,
radiusAuthClientAccessRequests Counter32,
radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions Counter32,
radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts Counter32,
radiusAuthClientAccessRejects Counter32,
radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges Counter32,
radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses Counter32,
radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators Counter32,
radiusAuthClientPendingRequests Gauge32,
radiusAuthClientTimeouts Counter32,
radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes Counter32,
radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped Counter32
}
radiusAuthServerIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32 (0..MAX)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A number uniquely identifying each RADIUS
Authentication server with which this client
communicates."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 1 }
radiusAuthServerAddress OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX IpAddress
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IP address of the RADIUS authentication server
referred to in this table entry."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 2 }
radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The UDP port the client is using to send requests to
this server."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 3 }
radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeTicks
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
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"The time interval between the most recent
Access-Reply/Access-Challenge and the Access-Request that
matched it from this RADIUS authentication server."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 4 }
-- Request/Response statistics
--
-- TotalIncomingPackets = Accepts + Rejects + Challenges + UnknownTypes
--
-- TotalIncomingPackets - MalformedResponses - BadAuthenticators -
-- UnknownTypes - PacketsDropped = Successfully received
--
-- AccessRequests + PendingRequests + ClientTimeouts = Successfully Received
--
--
radiusAuthClientAccessRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Request packets sent
to this server since client start-up. This does not
include retransmissions."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 5 }
radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Request packets
retransmitted to this RADIUS authentication server
since client start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 6 }
radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Accept packets
(valid or invalid) received from this server
since client start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 7 }
radiusAuthClientAccessRejects OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Reject packets
(valid or invalid) received from this server
since client start-up."
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::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 8 }
radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Challenge packets
(valid or invalid) received from this server since
client start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 9 }
-- "Access-Response" includes an Access-Accept, Access-Challenge
-- or Access-Reject
radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of malformed RADIUS Access-Response
packets received from this server since client
start-up. Malformed packets include packets with
an invalid length. Bad authenticators or
Signature attributes or unknown types are not
included as malformed access responses."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 10 }
radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Response packets
containing invalid authenticators or Signature
attributes received from this server since client
start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 11 }
radiusAuthClientPendingRequests OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS Access-Request packets
destined for this server that have not yet timed out
or received a response. This variable is incremented
when an Access-Request is sent and decremented due to
receipt of an Acess-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Challenge,
a timeout or retransmission."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 12 }
radiusAuthClientTimeouts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
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MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of authentication timeouts to this server
since client startup. After a timeout the client may
retry to the same server, send to a different server, or
give up. A retry to the same server is counted as a
retransmit as well as a timeout. A send to a different
server is counted as a Request as well as a timeout."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 13 }
radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS packets of unknown type which
were received from this server on the authentication port
since client start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 14 }
radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of RADIUS packets of which were
received from this server on the authentication port
and dropped for some other reason since client
start-up."
::= { radiusAuthServerEntry 15 }
-- conformance information
radiusAuthClientMIBConformance
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIB 2 }
radiusAuthClientMIBCompliances
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBConformance 1 }
radiusAuthClientMIBGroups
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { radiusAuthClientMIBConformance 2 }
-- compliance statements
radiusAuthClientMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The compliance statement for authentication clients
implementing the RADIUS Authentication Client MIB."
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { radiusAuthClientMIBGroup }
::= { radiusAuthClientMIBCompliances 1 }
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-- units of conformance
radiusAuthClientMIBGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS { radiusAuthClientIdentifier,
radiusAuthClientInvalidServerAddresses,
radiusAuthServerAddress,
radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber,
radiusAuthClientRoundTripTime,
radiusAuthClientAccessRequests,
radiusAuthClientAccessRetransmissions,
radiusAuthClientAccessAccepts,
radiusAuthClientAccessRejects,
radiusAuthClientAccessChallenges,
radiusAuthClientMalformedAccessResponses,
radiusAuthClientBadAuthenticators,
radiusAuthClientPendingRequests,
radiusAuthClientTimeouts,
radiusAuthClientUnknownTypes,
radiusAuthClientPacketsDropped
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The basic collection of objects providing management of
RADIUS Authentication Clients."
::= { radiusAuthClientMIBGroups 1 }
END
8. References
[1] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for
Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", RFC 2271, Cabletron Sys-
tems, Inc., BMC Software, Inc., IBM T. J. Watson Research, Jan-
uary 1998.
[2] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and Identification of
Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets", RFC 1155,
Performance Systems International, Hughes LAN Systems, May 1990.
[3] Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, "Concise MIB Definitions", RFC 1212,
Performance Systems International, Hughes LAN Systems, March
1991.
[4] M. Rose, "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP",
RFC 1215, Performance Systems International, March 1991.
[5] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Structure
of Management Information for Version 2 of the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1902, SNMP Research,Inc.,
Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International
Network Services, January 1996.
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INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 11 November 1998
[6] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Textual
Conventions for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Proto-
col (SNMPv2)", RFC 1903, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems,
Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Ser-
vices, January 1996.
[7] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Confor-
mance Statements for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC 1904, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems,
Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Ser-
vices, January 1996.
[8] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin, "Simple Net-
work Management Protocol", RFC 1157, SNMP Research, Performance
Systems International, Performance Systems International, MIT
Laboratory for Computer Science, May 1990.
[9] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Introduc-
tion to Community-based SNMPv2", RFC 1901, SNMP Research, Inc.,
Cisco Systems, Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International
Network Services, January 1996.
[10] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Transport
Mappings for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMPv2)", RFC 1906, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc.,
Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Services,
January 1996.
[11] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, "Message Pro-
cessing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Proto-
col (SNMP)", RFC 2272, SNMP Research, Inc., Cabletron Systems,
Inc., BMC Software, Inc., IBM T. J. Watson Research, January
1998.
[12] Blumenthal, U., and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM)
for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMPv3)", RFC 2274, IBM T. J. Watson Research, January 1998.
[13] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser, "Protocol
Operations for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Proto-
col (SNMPv2)", RFC 1905, SNMP Research, Inc., Cisco Systems,
Inc., Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., International Network Ser-
vices, January 196.
[14] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "SNMPv3 Applications", RFC
2273, SNMP Research, Inc., Secure Computing Corporation, Cisco
Systems, January 1998
[15] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access
Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", RFC 2275, IBM T. J. Watson Research, BMC Software, Inc.,
Cisco Systems, Inc., January 1998
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INTERNET-DRAFT RADIUS Authentication Client MIB 11 November 1998
[16] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson W., and S. Willens, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2138, April
1997.
[17] "Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection -
Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)", Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization, International Standard
8824, December 1987.
9. Security considerations
There are no management objects defined in this MIB that have a MAX-
ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this MIB is
implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an intruder can
alter or create any management objects of this MIB via direct SNMP SET
operations.
There are a number of managed objects in this MIB that may contain
sensitive information. These are:
radiusAuthServerAddress
This can be used to determine the address of the RADIUS
authentication server with which the client is communicat-
ing. This information could be useful in mounting an attack
on the authentication server.
radiusAuthClientServerPortNumber
This can be used to determine the port number on which the
RADIUS authentication client is sending. This information
could be useful in impersonating the client in order to send
data to the authentication server.
It is thus important to control even GET access to these objects and
possibly to even encrypt the values of these object when sending them
over the network via SNMP. Not all versions of SNMP provide features
for such a secure environment.
SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment. Even if the network
itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), there is no control as
to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET
(read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB.
It is recommended that the implementers consider the security features
as provided by the SNMPv3 framework. Specifically, the use of the
User-based Security Model RFC 2274 [12] and the View-based Access Con-
trol Model RFC 2275 [15] is recommended. Using these security fea-
tures, customer/users can give access to the objects only to those
principals (users) that have legitimate rights to GET or SET
(change/create/delete) them.
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10. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Narendra Gidwani of Microsoft, Allan C. Rubens of MERIT,
Carl Rigney of Livingston and Peter Heitman of American Internet Cor-
poration for useful discussions of this problem space.
11. Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-936-6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
Glen Zorn
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-703-1559
EMail: glennz@microsoft.com
12. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and
distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind,
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this docu-
ment itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the
copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Inter-
net organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing
Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined
in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to
translate it into languages other than English. The limited permis-
sions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the
Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the
information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE
INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WAR-
RANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY
RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
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13. Expiration Date
This memo is filed as <draft-ietf-radius-auth-clientmib-02.txt>, and
expires May 1, 1999.
m o
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