One document matched: draft-ietf-pppext-l2tp-sec-02.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-pppext-l2tp-sec-01.txt
PPP Working Group Pat R. Calhoun
INTERNET DRAFT 3Com Corporation
Category: Internet Draft W. Mark Townsley
Title: draft-ietf-pppext-l2tp-sec-02.txt IBM Corporation
Date: October 1997
Layer Two Tunneling Protocol "L2TP"
Security Extensions for Non-IP networks
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months.
Internet-Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet-Drafts
as reference material or to cite them other than as a ``working
draft'' or ``work in progress.''
To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
1id-abstracts.txt listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
Directories on ds.internic.net, nic.nordu.net, ftp.nisc.sri.com, or
munnari.oz.au.
Abstract
The L2TP document [1] defines the base protocol which describes the
method of tunneling PPP [2] data. The L2TP document states that the
security mechanism used over an IP network is to use the IETF's IPSEC
protocols.
L2TP was designed in such a way as to be able to run over any
underlying layer (i.e. Frame Relay, ATM, etc.). This document
specifies extensions to the L2TP protocol in order to provide
authentication and integrity of individual packets in a tunneled
session over a network where IPSEC or another suitable security
protocol is not available.
Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Conventions
2.0 L2TP Security Header Format
3.0 Protection Against Attacks
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3.1 Denial of Service Attacks
3.2 Replay Attacks
3.3 Compromise of the Master Key
4.0 AVP Hiding
5.0 Security Association Negotiation
5.1 Renegotiate-Security-Association Message
5.2 Encoded Message Key
5.3 Message Security Parameter Index
6.0 Acknowledgments
7.0 Contacts
8.0 References
Appendix A: Additional Recommendations for secure L2TP
implementations
1.0 Introduction
The L2TP protocol specification states that the IPSEC protocols MUST
be used over an IP network for L2TP to operate in a secure manner.
However, L2TP may be run on a link layer that does not have a security
mechanism such as IPSEC available. In this case it becomes necessary
for L2TP to provide its own mechanism for packet level security.
This document will describe how authentication and integrity of L2TP
packets will be handled over networks where IPSEC or another suitable
security protocol does not exist. It does not intend to provide a
mechanism for encryption of packets. If data encryption is necessary,
then the user may utilize ECP or another form of end to end
encryption.
The security extensions defined here also provide the added
flexibility to negotiate security separately over the control and data
channels. This may be desirable in some situations, particularly where
processing power may be at a minimum, but some level of security is
still desired.
By design, several of the constructs used here draw upon those being
developed in the IPSEC working group.
1.1 Conventions
The following language conventions are used in the items of specifi-
cation in this document:
o MUST, SHALL, or MANDATORY -- This item is an absolute
requirement of the specification.
o SHOULD or RECOMMEND -- This item should generally be followed
for all but exceptional circumstances.
o MAY or OPTIONAL -- This item is truly optional and may be
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followed or ignored according to the needs of the
implementor.
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2.0 L2TP Security Header Format
The L2TP Header has been modified as follows in order to accommodate
the new security extension.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|T|1|1|1|1|K|0|0| | Ver | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Tunnel ID | Call ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Ns | Nr |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Initialization Vector |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Initialization Vector |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Initialization Vector |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Initialization Vector |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Security Parameters Index |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Integrity Check |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Integrity Check |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Integrity Check |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Type AVP... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... (8 bytes) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
K Bit
The 'K' bit MUST be set to one (1) when the security extension is
present. The behavior of the 'K' bit is identical on both the control
and data channel.
Initialization Vector (IV)
This field MUST contain a cryptographically random 128 bit value [5].
Security Parameters Index (SPI)
The SPI is an arbitrary four octet value. It is an unstructured opaque
index which is used in conjunction with the Tunnel ID to identify a
particular Security Association. The behavior of the SPI is identical
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on the control and data channel.
The value inserted in this field is the locally generated SPI value
which references the key used in generating the Message Integrity
Check.
Message Integrity Check (MIC)
The MIC contains the result of the HMAC-MD5-96 algorithm [3][4] as
applied over the entire L2TP packet. The behavior of the MIC is
identical on the control and data channel.
3.0 Protection Against Attacks
This section will define certain methods of protecting against
specific known types of attacks.
3.1 Denial of Service Attacks
There currently exists a Denial of Service Attack whereby a malicious
host can issue a stream of Start-Control-Connection- Request messages
to an L2TP host on a network.
Although an implementation MUST time-out when a Start-Control-
Connection-Connected has not been received within a given window,
there is still a possibility that if the messages were received fast
enough the L2TP host would deplete its Control Connection Control
Blocks. This form of attack is aggravated when the malicious host
sends the packets with a random source IP address.
One form of protection against this attack is to have a local list of
trusted hosts, however this does not scale very well when providing a
roaming service from anywhere on the Internet. Furthermore, enforcing
a security policy based on a source address is a very weak form of
protection.
Another method of protecting against this form of attack is to have
the 'K' bit set in the initial Start-Control-Connection-Request
message. The message would be signed with the common secret (or key,
see below for more details). This scheme will ensure that only
authenticated Start-Control-Connection-Requests will be accepted,
making this type of attack very inconvenient for a malicious user to
create.
In order for this scheme to be successful, it is imperative that the
base specification require that a base implementation which does not
support any extensions MUST reject a Start-Control-Connection-Request
message with a 'K' bit set.
3.2 Replay Attacks
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One common attack is the replay attack. This requires that a malicious
user gain access to the network where packets are routed.
There are two different types of replay attacks in the current L2TP
protocol. The first takes advantage of the fact that since a secret is
a long lived key (known as the master key), a malicious user can
retrieve the Stop-Control-Connection-Request message from two L2TP
peers and replay it at a later date when an L2TP tunnel is active
between both peers.
This form of attack is further complicated by the fact that the
malicious user must inject the packet when the sequence number in the
replayed packet is within the window of the receiver. This can be
achieved using a brute force type attack by constantly sending the
packet until the L2TP host accepts it. One more complication for the
malicious user is the fact that the Tunnel and Call identifiers MUST
be the same in the new session being attacked. This is possible, but
improbable if the Tunnel and Call IDs are selected in a sufficiently
random manner (while L2TP does not specify a method for selecting
Tunnel and Call IDs, we reccommend choosing a method that is as
unpredictable as possible to help guard against replay attacks,
regardless if a security protocol is being utilized over the link).
The second type of attack occurs when a user attempts to replay data
packets being tunneled. An example of a malicious packet to replay
would be a LCP Terminate Request message from a previous session. In
this case, again, the Tunnel and the Call IDs MUST be identical for
the L2TP peer to accept the packet.
However, if a malicious user was to simply snoop the network and
replay valid data packets from the current session it could
potentially create some form of denial of service for the user. A good
example of such a packet would be a TCP FIN packet (which are very
common when using the WEB which have many short-lived connections).
Since most TCP implementations do not have random initial sequence
numbers, this is a very simple attack.
In order to protect against such an attack it is recommended that the
L2TP flow control mechanism be enabled on the data path. This will
offer protection since a replay packet would only be accepted once the
window "rolled" over.
3.3 Compromise of the Master Key
Since tunnels may be long-lived and frequent, it is possible for the
master key to be compromised. A malicious user could gain many valid
samples and given enough resources could guess the master key. This is
a very serious problem which must be addressed.
One simple and effective method to protect against this is to have
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both L2TP peers generate a session key when a tunnel is created. This
key would be transmitted in the Start-Control-Connection-Request and
the appropriate -Reply message. Furthermore, an L2TP peer could
generate a new key whenever its sequence number "rolls" over. This
would create a new security association between both peers, and
protect against compromise of the master key.
This scheme would also protect against the replay of the data packet
described above since the key would be changed once the Sequence
number reached zero, making the replayed packet non- authenticated.
4.0 AVP Hiding
Document [1] states that a shared secret that exists between the
tunnel peers is used for the AVP Hiding algorithm. However when using
this extension on the control channel, the shared secret is only used
to "hide" the initial control and payload channel key.
All subsequent AVP hiding uses the key instead of the shared (or
master) key (including any other AVPs in the SCCRQ and SCCRP
messages). This means that the key renegotiation procedure uses the
old key to hide the new key.
5.0 Security Association Negotiation
This section will define the new message type and AVPs which are
required for the security extensions of the L2TP protocol. The AVPs
allow designation of a Key for control messages, payload messages, or
both. The Keys may or may not be the same for each.
5.1 Renegotiate-Security-Association (RSA)
The Renegotiate-Security-Association message type is a new L2TP
control message used to renegotiate a new security association. It
MAY be sent periodically while the control connection is established.
To avoid certain replay attacks It SHOULD be sent before the sequence
number of a control or call queue "rolls" back to 0.
If the CallId field in the L2TP header was set to a zero value, the
key is being renegotiated for the control channel. If a non-zero value
was found the key is being renegotiated for the payload channel.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| L2TP Control Message Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Renegotiate-Security-Association |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Encoded Control Message Key |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Control Message SPI |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Encoded Payload Packet Key |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload Packet SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Renegotiate-Security-Association
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|0|0|0| 8 | 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 | 17 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Message Type AVP contains a Value of 17, mandatory, indicating
Renegotiate-Security-Association. This AVP MUST be present. This
message type indicates that the peer wishes to negotiate a new key
for the payload stream or control stream. If the message contains a
new key for the control channel the message digest function is
calculated using the decrypted form of the key found within the
Encoded Message Key AVP found in this message.
5.2 Encoded Message Key
The Encoded Message Key AVP may be present in SCCRQ, SCCRP, OCRQ,
OCRP, ICRQ and ICRP. This message is used to inform the tunnel peer of
a key to be used for the generation of the MIC (shown above) as well
as the hiding of all attributes [1].
The presence of this attribute in the SCCRQ and SCCRP indicates that
the key is being setup for the control channel. When found in the
OCRQ, OCRP, ICRQ or the ICRP, the key is to be used for the payload
channel which is referenced by the Assigned CallId AVP.
Note that there is a direct relationship between this key and the SPI
value passed in the same message.
When a key is being negotiated on the control channel, any AVP hiding
MUST use the decrypted form of this key as the shared secret [1].
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|1|0|0| Length | 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 38 | Encoded Message Key... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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This AVP MAY be present in the messages shown above. It is encoded
as the attribute 38, mandatory, with the indicated number of bytes
representing the encoded message key. This AVP MUST be hidden and
is optional. When present, the L2TP peer is indicating that
authentication is required on all control or payload packets.
5.3 Message Security Parameter Index
The SPI is used as a reference to a session key. The locally
generated SPI value MUST be inserted in the SPI field of the L2TP
header to reference the appropriate KEY (found in the Encoded
Message Key AVP).
When renegotiating a new key, a new SPI MUST be generated to
correctly identify the key. The old key MUST become invalidated. On
the payload channel, the peer MAY retain the old SPI for a short
time in order to authenticate packets which are received out of
order.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|0|0|0| 10 | 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 39 | Control Message SPI... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| .... (4 bytes) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This AVP MUST be present if the Encoded Message Key AVP is present.
It is encoded as the attribute 29, mandatory, with length 10. This
AVP is optional and contains the security parameters index for the
control or the payload channel.
6.0 Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Baiju Patel from Intel Coproration and Sumit
Vakil from 3COM Corporation for their assistance.
7.0 Contacts
Pat R. Calhoun
3Com Corporation
1800 Central Ave.
Mount Prospect, Il, 60056
pcalhoun@usr.com
(847) 342-6898
W. Mark Townsley
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IBM Corporation
700 Park Office Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
wmt@raleigh.ibm.com
(919) 543-7522
8.0 References
[1] K. Hamzeh, T. Kolar, M. Littlewood, G. Singh Pall, J. Taarud,
A. J. Valencia, W. Verthein, W.M. Townsley, B. Palter,
A. Rubens "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)",
Internet draft, October 1997
[2] W. Simpson, "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", RFC 1661,
07/21/1994
[3] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997
[4] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
04/16/1992
[5] D. Eastlake III, S. Crocker, J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994
Appendix A: Additional Recommendations for secure L2TP implementations
This appendix identifies some potential security problems with the
L2TP and includes reccommendations for ways to avoid the associated
risks. We do not identify any new protocol entities here, rather
provide implementation advice for greater security when using L2TP.
A.1 Proxy CHAP
While proxy CHAP provides a useful method of forwarding the challenge
issued by the LAC and the response from the client to the LNS for
final processing, there is a potential security risk if the operator
of the LNS does not FULLY trust the operator of the LAC. Granted,
there must be some level of trust between these two entities to setup
billing practices, etc. However, allowing the LAC to control the
challenge gives the operator of the LAC a very simple (and perhaps
tempting) way to impersonate any user which has been tunneled through
her system in the past (given that the user's password has not changed
in the home network). By simply replaying the challenge/response pair
to the LNS in the proxy CHAP AVP, a malicious user can gain access as
that user on the home network via the LNS at any time. This
impersonated call can continue to exist undetected until a CHAP
rechallenge is sent from the LNS to the client at which time the fake
client will presumably fail to answer the challege correctly and be
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disconnected.
Neither the protocol specified in this document nor IPSEC can counter
against this kind of attack by a malicious, yet "trusted" LAC.
However, the LNS can remedy this problem by simply issuing a CHAP
rechallenge so that the challenge is issued by the LNS rather than the
LAC. This makes it much more difficult for the LAC operator to spoof
the CHAP authentication phase at your LNS, reducing vulnerabilty
considerably.
To implement this security feature, a CHAP rechallenge MUST be issued
from the LNS in lieu of sending a CHAP SUCCESS based upon the proxy
CHAP values sent from the LAC. If the proxy CHAP values sent from the
LAC result in a CHAP FAILURE, there is no compelling reason to send
the rechallenge unless you wish to give the client another "chance" at
answering the challenge correctly.
A.2 Tunnel ID and Call ID selection
As suggested in section 2.2, Tunnel IDs and Call IDs SHOULD be
selected in a sufficiently random manner rather than sequentially or
any other predictable order. Doing so helps prevent a malicious user
who otherwise does not have access to packet traces to and from a LAC
or LNS to guess the ID of an active session and attempt to hijack it.
However, when using the L2TP Security extensions this requirement is
no longer required since the level of authentication this extension
provides does not allow a malicious user to simply guess a Tunnel and
Call Id.
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