One document matched: draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-new-rfc2527-01.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-new-rfc2527-00.txt
PKIX Working Group S. Chokhani (CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.)
Internet Draft W. Ford (VeriSign, Inc.)
R. Sabett (Cooley Godward LLP)
C. Merrill (McCarter & English, LLP)
S. Wu (Infoliance, Inc.)
Expires in six months from January 3, 2002
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework
< draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-new-rfc2527-01.txt >
Status of this Memo
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2001. All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document presents a framework to assist the writers of
certificate policies or certification practice statements for
participants within public key infrastructures, such as
certification authorities, policy authorities, and communities of
interest that wish to rely on certificates. In particular, the
framework provides a comprehensive list of topics that potentially
(at the writer's discretion) need to be covered in a certificate
policy or a certification practice statement. This document is
being submitted to the RFC Editor with a request for publication as
an Informational RFC that will supercede RFC 2527 [CPF].
Chokhani, Ford, Sabett, Merrill, & Wu INTERNET DRAFT [Page 1]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 3
1.1 BACKGROUND 3
1.2 PURPOSE 5
1.3 SCOPE 5
2. DEFINITIONS 6
3. CONCEPTS 8
3.1 CERTIFICATE POLICY 8
3.2 CERTIFICATE POLICY EXAMPLES 10
3.3 X.509 CERTIFICATE FIELDS 10
3.3.1 Certificate Policies Extension 10
3.3.2 Policy Mappings Extension 11
3.3.3 Policy Constraints Extension 12
3.3.4 Policy Qualifiers 12
3.4 CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT 13
3.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CP AND CPS 14
3.6 RELATIONSHIP AMONG CPs, CPSs, AGREEMENTS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 15
3.7 SET OF PROVISIONS 17
4. CONTENTS OF A SET OF PROVISIONS 19
4.1 INTRODUCTION 19
4.1.1 Overview 19
4.1.2 Document Name and Identification 20
4.1.3 PKI Participants 20
4.1.4 Certificate usage 21
4.1.5 Policy Administration 21
4.1.6 Definitions and acronyms 21
4.2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES 21
4.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A) 22
4.3.1 Naming 22
4.3.2 Initial Identity Validation 22
4.3.3 I&A for Re-key Requests 23
4.3.4 I&A for Revocation Requests 23
4.4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 24
4.4.1 Certificate Application 24
4.4.2 Certificate Application Processing 24
4.4.3 Certificate Issuance 24
4.4.4 Certificate Acceptance 25
4.4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage 25
4.4.6 Certificate Renewal 26
4.4.7 Certificate Re-key 26
4.4.8 Certificate Modification 27
4.4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension 27
4.4.10 Certificate Status Services 28
4.4.11 End of Subscription 28
4.4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery 29
4.5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS 29
4.5.1 Physical Security Controls 29
4.5.2 Procedural Controls 30
4.5.3 Personnel Controls 30
4.5.4 Audit Logging Procedures 31
4.5.5 Records Archival 31
4.5.6 Key Changeover 32
4.5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery 32
4.5.8 CA or RA Termination 33
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4.6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS 33
4.6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation 33
4.6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic
Module Engineering Controls 34
4.6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 36
4.6.4 Activation Data 36
4.6.5 Computer Security Controls 36
4.6.6 Life Cycle Security Controls 37
4.6.7 Network Security Controls 37
4.6.8 Timestamping 37
4.7 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES 37
4.7.1 Certificate Profile 37
4.7.2 CRL Profile 38
4.7.3 OCSP Profile 38
4.8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENT 38
4.9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS 39
4.9.1 Fees 40
4.9.2 Financial Responsibility 40
4.9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information 40
4.9.4 Privacy of Personal Information 41
4.9.5 Intellectual Property Rights 41
4.9.6 Representations and Warranties 41
4.9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties 42
4.9.8 Limitations of Liability 42
4.9.9 Indemnities 42
4.9.10 Term and Termination 42
4.9.11 Individual notices and communications
with participants 43
4.9.12 Amendments 43
4.9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures 44
4.9.14 Governing Law 44
4.9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law 44
4.9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions 44
4.9.17 Other Provisions 45
5. OUTLINE OF A SET OF PROVISIONS 45
6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 51
7. REFERENCES 52
8. AUTHORS' ADDRESSES 53
NOTES 53
LIST OF ACRONYMS 54
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
In general, a public-key certificate (hereinafter "certificate")
binds a public key held by an entity (such as person, organization,
account, device, or site) to a set of information that identifies
the entity associated with use of the corresponding private key. In
most cases involving identity certificates, this entity is known as
the "subject" or "subscriber" of the certificate. Two exceptions,
however, include devices (in which the subscriber is usually the
individual or organization controlling the device) and anonymous
Chokhani, Ford, Sabett, Merrill, & Wu INTERNET DRAFT [Page 3]
certificates (in which the identity of the individual or
organization is not available from the certificate itself).
Other types of certificates bind public keys to attributes of an
entity other than the entity's identity, such as a role, a title, or
creditworthiness information.
A certificate is used by a "certificate user" or "relying party"
that needs to use, and rely upon the accuracy of, the binding
between the subject public key distributed via that certificate and
the identity and/or other attributes of the subject contained in
that certificate. A relying party is frequently an entity that
verifies a digital signature from the certificate's subject where
the digital signature is associated with an email, web form,
electronic document, or other data. Other examples of relying
parties can include a sender of encrypted email to the subscriber, a
user of a web browser relying on a server certificate during a
secure sockets layer (SSL) session, and an entity operating a server
that controls access to online information using client certificates
as an access control mechanism. In summary, a relying party is an
entity that uses a public key in a certificate (for signature
verification and/or encryption). The degree to which a relying
party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on
several factors. These factors can include the practices followed
by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject;
the CA's operating policy, procedures, and security controls; the
scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in
protecting the private key); and the stated responsibilities and
liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties,
disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability).
A Version 3 X.509 certificate may contain a field declaring that one
or more specific certificate policies apply to that certificate
[ISO1]. According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named
set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
particular community and/or class of applications with common
security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
application. The CP concept is an outgrowth of the policy statement
concept developed for Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail [PEM1] and
expanded upon in [BAU1].
A more detailed description of the practices followed by a CA in
issuing and otherwise managing certificates may be contained in a
certification practice statement (CPS) published by or referenced by
the CA. According to the American Bar Association Information
Security Committee's Digital Signature Guidelines (hereinafter
"DSG")(1) and the Information Security Committee's PKI Assessment
Guidelines (hereinafter "PAG")(2), "a CPS is a statement of the
practices which a certification authority employs in issuing
certificates." [ABA1, ABA2] In general, CPSs also describe practices
relating to all certificate lifecycle services (e.g., issuance,
management, revocation, and renewal or re-keying), and CPSs provide
details concerning other business, legal, and technical matters.
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The terms contained in a CP or CPS may or may not be binding upon a
PKI's participants as a contract. A CP or CPS may itself purport to
be a contract. More commonly, however, an agreement may incorporate
a CP or CPS by reference and therefore attempt to bind the parties of
the agreement to some or all of its terms. For example, some PKIs
may utilize a CP or (more commonly) a CPS that is incorporated by
reference in the agreement between a subscriber and a CA or RA
(called a "subscriber agreement") or the agreement between a relying
party and a CA (called a "relying party agreement" or "RPA"). In
other cases, however, a CP or CPS has no contractual significance at
all. A PKI may intend these CPs and CPSs to be strictly
informational or disclosure documents.
1.2 PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is twofold. First, the document aims
to explain the concepts of a CP and a CPS, describe the differences
between these two concepts, and describe their relationship to
subscriber and relying party agreements. Second, this document aims
to present a framework to assist the writers and users of
certificate policies or CPSs in drafting and understanding these
documents. In particular, the framework identifies the elements
that may need to be considered in formulating a CP or a CPS. The
purpose is not to define particular certificate policies or CPSs,
per se. Moreover, this document does not aim to provide legal advice
or recommendations as to particular requirements or practices that
should be contained within CPs or CPSs. (Such recommendations,
however, appear in [ABA2].)
1.3 SCOPE
The scope of this document is limited to discussion of the topics
that can be covered in a CP (as defined in X.509) or CPS (as defined
in the DSG and PAG). In particular, this document describes the
types of information that should be considered for inclusion in a CP
or a CPS. While the framework as presented generally assumes use of
the X.509 version 3 certificate format for the purpose of providing
assurances of identity, it is not intended that the material be
restricted to use of that certificate format or identity
certificates. Rather, it is intended that this framework be
adaptable to other certificate formats and to certificates providing
assurances other than identity that may come into use.
The scope does not extend to defining security policies generally
(such as organization security policy, system security policy, or
data labeling policy). Further, this document does not define a
specific CP or CPS. Moreover, in presenting a framework, this
document should be viewed and used as a flexible tool presenting
topics that should be considered of particular relevance to CPs or
CPSs, and not as a rigid formula for producing CPs or CPSs.
This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the general
concepts of digital signatures, certificates, and public-key
infrastructure (PKI), as used in X.509, the DSG, and the PAG.
Chokhani, Ford, Sabett, Merrill, & Wu INTERNET DRAFT [Page 5]
2. DEFINITIONS
This document makes use of the following defined terms:
Activation data - Data values, other than keys, that are required to
operate cryptographic modules and that need to be protected (e.g., a
PIN, a passphrase, or a manually-held key share).
Authentication - The process of establishing that individuals,
organizations, or things are who or what they claim to be. In the
context of a PKI, authentication can be the process of establishing
that that an individual or organization applying for or seeking
access to something under a certain name is, in fact, the proper
individual or organization. This process corresponds to the second
process involved with identification, as shown in the definition of
"identification" below. Authentication can also refer to a security
service that provides assurances that individuals, organizations, or
things are who or what they claim to be or that a message or other
data originated from a specific individual, organization, or device.
Thus, it is said that a digital signature of a message authenticates
the message's sender.
CA-certificate - A certificate for one CA's public key issued by
another CA.
Certificate policy (CP) - A named set of rules that indicates the
applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or
class of application with common security requirements. For
example, a particular CP might indicate applicability of a type of
certificate to the authentication of parties engaging in business-
to-business transactions for the trading of goods or services within
a given price range.
Certification path - An ordered sequence of certificates that,
together with the public key of the initial object in the path, can
be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path.
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) - A statement of the
practices that a certification authority employs in issuing,
managing, revoking, and renewing or re-keying certificates.
CPS Summary (or CPS Abstract) - A subset of the provisions of a
complete CPS that is made public by a CA.
Identification - The process of establishing the identity of an
individual or organization, i.e., to show that an individual or
organization is a specific individual or organization. In the
context of a PKI, identification refers to two processes: (1)
establishing that a given name of an individual or organization
corresponds to a real-world identity of an individual or
organization, and (2) establishing that an individual or
organization applying for or seeking access to something under that
name is, in fact, the named individual or organization. A person
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seeking identification may be a certificate applicant, an applicant
for employment in a trusted position within a PKI participant, or
a person seeking access to a network or software application, such
as a CA administrator seeking access to CA systems.
Issuing certification authority (issuing CA) - In the context of a
particular certificate, the issuing CA is the CA that issued the
certificate (see also Subject certification authority).
Participant - An individual or organization that plays a role within
a given PKI as a subscriber, relying party, CA, RA, certificate
manufacturing authority, repository service provider, or similar
entity.
PKI Disclosure Statement (PDS) - An instrument that supplements a CP
or CPS by disclosing critical information about the policies and
practices of a CA/PKI. A PDS is a vehicle for disclosing and
emphasizing information normally covered in detail by associated CP
and/or CPS documents. Consequently, a PDS is not intended to
replace a CP or CPS.
Policy qualifier - Policy-dependent information that may accompany a
CP identifier in an X.509 certificate. Such information can include
a pointer to the URL of the applicable CPS or relying party
agreement. It may also include text (or number causing the
appearance of text) that contains terms of the use of the
certificate or other legal information.
Registration authority (RA) - An entity that is responsible for one
or more of the following functions: the identification and
authentication of certificate applicants, the approval or rejection
of certificate applications, initiating certificate revocations or
suspensions under certain circumstances, processing subscriber
requests to revoke or suspend their certificates, and approving or
rejecting requests by subscribers to renew or re-key their
certificates. RAs, however, do not sign or issue certificates
(i.e., an RA is delegated certain tasks on behalf of a CA). [Note:
The term Local Registration Authority (LRA) is sometimes used in
other documents for the same concept.]
Relying party - A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on
that certificate and/or any digital signatures verified using that
certificate. In this document, the terms "certificate user" and
"relying party" are used interchangeably.
Relying party agreement (RPA) - An agreement between a certification
authority and relying party that typically establishes the rights
and responsibilities between those parties regarding the
verification of digital signatures or other uses of certificates.
Set of provisions - A collection of practice and/or policy
statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in
expressing a CP or CPS employing the approach described in this
framework.
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Subject certification authority (subject CA) - In the context of
a particular CA-certificate, the subject CA is the CA whose public
key is certified in the certificate (see also Issuing certification
authority).
Subscriber - A subject of a certificate who is issued a certificate.
Subscriber Agreement - An agreement between a CA and a subscriber
that establishes the right and responsibilities of the parties
regarding the issuance and management of certificates.
Validation - The process of identification of certificate
applicants. "Validation" is a subset of "identification" and refers
to identification in the context of establishing the identity of
certificate applicants.
3. CONCEPTS
This section explains the concepts of CP and CPS, and describes
their relationship with other PKI documents, such as subscriber
agreements and relying party agreements. Other related concepts are
also described. Some of the material covered in this section and in
some other sections is specific to certificate policies extensions
as defined X.509 version 3. Except for those sections, this
framework is intended to be adaptable to other certificate formats
that may come into use.
3.1 CERTIFICATE POLICY
When a certification authority issues a certificate, it is providing
a statement to a certificate user (i.e., a relying party) that a
particular public key is bound to the identity and/or other
attributes of a particular entity (the certificate subject, which is
usually also the subscriber). The extent to which the relying party
should rely on that statement by the CA, however, needs to be
assessed by the relying party or entity controlling or coordinating
the way relying parties or relying party applications use
certificates. Different certificates are issued following different
practices and procedures, and may be suitable for different
applications and/or purposes.
The X.509 standard defines a CP as "a named set of rules that
indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community and/or class of application with common security
requirements" [ISO1]. An X.509 Version 3 certificate may identify a
specific applicable CP, which may be used by a relying party to
decide whether or not to trust a certificate, associated public key,
or any digital signatures verified using the public key for a
particular purpose.
CPs typically fall into two major categories. First, some CPs
"indicate the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community" [ISO1]. These CPs set forth requirements for
certificate usage and requirements on members of a community.
For instance, a CP may focus on the needs of a geographical community,
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such as the ETSI policy requirements for CAs issuing qualified
certificates [ETS]. Also, a CP of this kind may focus on the
needs of a specific vertical-market community, such as
financial services [IDT].
The second category of typical CPs "indicate the applicability of a
certificate to a . . . class of application with common security
requirements." These CPs identify a set of applications or uses for
certificates and say that these applications or uses require a
certain level of security. They then set forth PKI requirements
that are appropriate for these applications or uses. A CP within
this category often makes sets requirements appropriate for a
certain "level of assurance" provided by certificates, relative to
certificates issued pursuant to related CPs. These levels of
assurance may correspond to "classes" or "types" of certificates.
For instance, the Government of Canada PKI Policy Management
Authority (GOC PMA) has established eight certificate policies in a
single document [GOC], four policies for certificates used for
digital signatures and four policies for certificates used for
confidentiality encryption. For each of these applications, the
document establishes four levels of assurances: rudimentary, basic,
medium, and high. The GOC PMA described certain types of digital
signature and confidentiality uses in the document, each with a
certain set of security requirements, and grouped them into eight
categories. The GOC PMA then established PKI requirements for each
of these categories, thereby creating eight types of certificates,
each providing rudimentary, basic, medium, or high levels of
assurance. The progression from rudimentary to high levels
corresponds to increasing security requirements and corresponding
increasing levels of assurance.
A CP is represented in a certificate by a unique number called
an "Object Identifier" (OID). That OID, or at least an "arc", can be
registered. An "arc" is the beginning of the numerical sequence of
an OID and is assigned to a particular organization. The
registration process follows the procedures specified in ISO/IEC and
ITU standards. The party that registers the OID or arc also can
publish the text of the CP, for examination by relying parties. Any
one certificate will typically declare a single CP or, possibly, be
issued consistent with a small number of different policies. Such
declaration appears in the Certificate Policies extension of a X.509
Version 3 certificate. When a CA places multiple CPs within a
certificate's Certificate Policies extension, the CA is asserting
that the certificate is appropriate for use in accordance with any
of the listed CPs.
CPs also constitute a basis for an audit, accreditation, or another
assessment of a CA. Each CA can be assessed against one or more
certificate policies or CPSs that it is recognized as implementing.
When one CA issues a CA-certificate for another CA, the issuing CA
must assess the set of certificate policies for which it trusts the
subject CA (such assessment may be based upon an assessment with
respect to the certificate policies involved). The assessed set of
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certificate policies is then indicated by the issuing CA in the
CA-certificate. The X.509 certification path processing logic
employs these CP indications in its well-defined trust model.
3.2 CERTIFICATE POLICY EXAMPLES
For example purposes, suppose that the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) undertakes to define some certificate policies
for use throughout the airline industry, in a PKI operated by IATA
in combination with PKIs operated by individual airlines. Two CPs
might be defined - the IATA General-Purpose CP, and the IATA
Commercial-Grade CP.
The IATA General-Purpose CP could be used by industry personnel for
protecting routine information (e.g., casual electronic mail) and
for authenticating connections from World Wide Web browsers to
servers for general information retrieval purposes. The key pairs
may be generated, stored, and managed using low-cost, software-based
systems, such as commercial browsers. Under this policy, a
certificate may be automatically issued to anybody listed as an
employee in the corporate directory of IATA or any member airline
who submits a signed certificate request form to a network
administrator in his or her organization.
The IATA Commercial-Grade CP could be used to protect financial
transactions or binding contractual exchanges between airlines.
Under this policy, IATA could require that certified key pairs be
generated and stored in approved cryptographic hardware tokens.
Certificates and tokens could be provided to airline employees with
disbursement authority. These authorized individuals might then be
required to present themselves to the corporate security office,
show a valid identification badge, and sign a subscriber agreement
requiring them to protect the token and use it only for authorized
purposes, as a condition of being issued a token and a certificate.
3.3 X.509 CERTIFICATE FIELDS
The following extension fields in an X.509 certificate are used to
support CPs:
* Certificate Policies extension;
* Policy Mappings extension; and
* Policy Constraints extension.
3.3.1 Certificate Policies Extension
A Certificate Policies field lists CPs that the certification
authority declares are applicable. Using the example of the IATA
General-Purpose and Commercial-Grade policies defined in Section
3.2, the certificates issued to regular airline employees would
contain the object identifier for General-Purpose policy. The
certificates issued to the employees with disbursement authority
would contain the object identifiers for both the General-Purpose
policy and the Commercial-Grade policy. The inclusion of both
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object identifiers in the certificates means that they would be
appropriate for either the General-Purpose or Commercial-Grade
policies. The Certificate Policies field may also optionally convey
qualifier values for each identified policy; the use of qualifiers
is discussed in Section 3.4.
When processing a certification path, a CP that is acceptable to the
relying party application must be present in every certificate in
the path, i.e., in CA-certificates as well as end entity
certificates.
If the Certificate Policies field is flagged critical, it serves the
same purpose as described above but also has an additional role.
Specifically, it indicates that the use of the certificate is
restricted to one of the identified policies, i.e., the
certification authority is declaring that the certificate must only
be used in accordance with the provisions of at least one of the
listed CPs. This field is intended to protect the certification
authority against claims for damages asserted by a relying party who
has used the certificate for an inappropriate purpose or in an
inappropriate manner, as stipulated in the applicable CP.
For example, the Internal Revenue Service might issue certificates
to taxpayers for the purpose of protecting tax filings. The
Internal Revenue Service understands and can accommodate the risks
of erroneously issuing a bad certificate, e.g., to an imposter.
Suppose, however, that someone used an Internal Revenue Service tax-
filing certificate as the basis for encrypting multi-million-dollar-
value proprietary trade secrets, which subsequently fell into the
wrong hands because of a cryptanalytic attack by an attacker who is
able to decrypt the message. The Internal Revenue Service may want
to defend itself against claims for damages in such circumstances by
pointing to the criticality of the Certificate Policies extension to
show that the subscriber and relying party misused the certificate.
The critical-flagged Certificate Policies extension is intended to
mitigate the risk to the CA in such situations.
3.3.2 Policy Mappings Extension
The Policy Mappings extension may only be used in CA-certificates.
This field allows a certification authority to indicate that certain
policies in its own domain can be considered equivalent to certain
other policies in the subject certification authority's domain.
For example, suppose that for purposes of facilitating
interoperability, the ACE Corporation establishes an agreement with
the ABC Corporation to cross-certify the public keys of each others'
certification authorities for the purposes of mutually securing
their respective business-to-business exchanges. Further, suppose
that both companies have pre-existing financial transaction
protection policies called ace-e-commerce and abc-e-commerce,
respectively. One can see that simply generating cross-certificates
between the two domains will not provide the necessary
interoperability, as the two companies' applications are configured
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with, and employee certificates are populated with, their
respective certificate policies. One possible solution is to
reconfigure all of the financial applications to require either
policy and to reissue all the certificates with both policies
appearing in their Certificate Policies extensions. Another
solution, which may be easier to administer, uses the Policy Mapping
field. If this field is included in a cross-certificate for the ABC
Corporation certification authority issued by the ACE Corporation
certification authority, it can provide a statement that the ABC's
financial transaction protection policy (i.e., abc-e-commerce) can
be considered equivalent to that of the ACE Corporation (i.e., ace-
e-commerce). With such a statement included in the cross-
certificate issued to ABC, relying party applications in the ACE
domain requiring the presence of the object identifier for the ace-
e-commerce CP can also accept, process, and rely upon certificates
issued within the ABC domain containing the object identifier for
the abc-e-commerce CP.
3.3.3 Policy Constraints Extension
The Policy Constraints extension supports two optional features.
The first is the ability for a certification authority to require
that explicit CP indications be present in all subsequent
certificates in a certification path. Certificates at the start of
a certification path may be considered by a relying party to be part
of a trusted domain, i.e., certification authorities are trusted for
all purposes so no particular CP is needed in the Certificate
Policies extension. Such certificates need not contain explicit
indications of CP. When a certification authority in the trusted
domain, however, certifies outside the domain, it can activate the
requirement that a specific CP's object identifier appear in
subsequent certificates in the certification path.
The other optional feature in the Policy Constraints field is the
ability for a certification authority to disable policy mapping by
subsequent certification authorities in a certification path. It
may be prudent to disable policy mapping when certifying outside the
domain. This can assist in controlling risks due to transitive
trust, e.g., a domain A trusts domain B, domain B trusts domain C,
but domain A does not want to be forced to trust domain C.
3.3.4 Policy Qualifiers
The Certificate Policies extension field has a provision for
conveying, along with each CP identifier, additional policy-
dependent information in a qualifier field. The X.509 standard does
not mandate the purpose for which this field is to be used, nor does
it prescribe the syntax for this field. Policy qualifier types can
be registered by any organization.
The following policy qualifier types are defined in PKIX RFC 2459
[PKI1]:
(a) The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a CPS, CPS
Summary, RPA, or PDS published by the CA. The pointer is in the
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form of a uniform resource identifier (URI).
(b) The User Notice qualifier contains a text string that is to be
displayed to subscribers and relying parties prior to the use of the
certificate. The text string may be an IA5String or a BMPString - a
subset of the ISO 100646-1 multiple octet coded character set. A CA
may invoke a procedure that requires that the relying party
acknowledge that the applicable terms and conditions have been
disclosed and/or accepted.
Policy qualifiers can be used to support the definition of generic,
or parameterized, CPs. Provided the base CP so provides, policy
qualifier types can be defined to convey, on a per-certificate
basis, additional specific policy details that fill in the generic
definition.
3.4 CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT
The term certification practice statement (CPS) is defined by the
DSG and PAG as: "A statement of the practices which a certification
authority employs in issuing certificates." [ABA1, ABA2] As stated
above, a CPS establishes practices concerning lifecycle services in
addition to issuance, such as certificate management (including
publication and archiving), revocation, and renewal or re-keying. In
the DSG, the ABA expands this definition with the following comments:
"A certification practice statement may take the form of a
declaration by the certification authority of the details of its
trustworthy system and the practices it employs in its operations
and in support of issuance of a certificate . . . ." This form of
CPS is the most common type, and can vary in length and level of
detail.
Some PKIs may not have the need to create a thorough and detailed
statement of practices. For example, the CA may itself be the
relying party and would already be aware of the nature and
trustworthiness of its services. In other cases, a PKI may provide
certificates providing only a very low level of assurances where the
applications being secured may pose only marginal risks if
compromised. In these cases, an organization establishing a PKI
may only want to write or have CAs use a subscriber agreement,
relying party agreement, or agreement combining subscriber and
relying party terms, depending on the role of the different PKI
participants. In such a PKI, that agreement may serve as the only
"statement of practices" used by one or more CAs within that PKI.
Consequently, that agreement may also be considered a CPS and can
be entitled or subtitled as such.
Likewise, since a detailed CPS may contain sensitive details of its
system, a CA may elect not to publish its entire CPS. It may
instead opt to publish a CPS Summary (or CPS Abstract). The CPS
Summary would contain only those provisions from the CPS that the CA
considers to be relevant to the participants in the PKI (such as the
responsibilities of the parties or the stages of the certificate
lifecycle). A CPS Summary, however, would not contain those
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sensitive provisions of the full CPS that might provide an
attacker with useful information about the CA's operations.
Throughout this document, the use of "CPS" includes both a detailed
CPS and a CPS Summary (unless otherwise specified).
CPSs do not automatically constitute contracts and do not
automatically bind PKI participants as a contract would. Where a
document serves the dual purpose of being a subscriber or relying
party agreement and CPS, the document is intended to be a contract
and constitutes a binding contract to the extent that a subscriber
or relying party agreement would ordinarily be considered as such.
Most CPSs, however, do not serve such a dual purpose. Therefore, in
most cases, a CPS's terms have a binding effect as contract terms
only if a separate document creates a contractual relationship
between the parties and that document incorporates part or all of
the CPS by reference. Further, if a particular PKI employs a CPS
Summary (as opposed to the entire CPS), the CPS Summary could be
incorporated into any applicable subscriber or relying party
agreement.
In the future, a court or applicable statutory or regulatory law may
declare that a certificate itself is a document that is capable of
creating a contractual relationship, to the extent its mechanisms
designed for incorporation by reference (such as the Certificate
Policies extension and its qualifiers) indicate that terms of its
use appear in certain documents. In the meantime, however, some
subscriber agreements and relying party agreements may incorporate a
CPS by reference and therefore make its terms binding on the parties
to such agreements.
3.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION
PRACTICE STATEMENT
The CP and CPS address the same set of topics that are of interest
to the relying party in terms of the degree to and purpose for which
a public key certificate should be trusted. Their primary
difference is in the focus of their provisions. A CP sets forth the
requirements and standards imposed by the PKI with respect to the
various topics. In other words, the purpose of the CP is to
establish what participants must do. A CPS, by contrast, states how
a CA and other participants in a given domain implement procedures
and controls to meet the requirements stated in the CP. In other
words, the purpose of the CPS is to disclose how the participants
perform their functions and implement controls.
An additional difference between a CP and CPS relates the scope of
coverage of the two kinds of documents. Since a CP is a statement
of requirements, it best serves as the vehicle for communicating
minimum operating guidelines that must be met by interoperating PKIs.
Thus, a CP generally applies to multiple CAs, multiple organizations,
or multiple domains. By contrast, a CPS applies only to a single CA
or single organization and is not generally a vehicle to facilitate
interoperation.
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A CA with a single CPS may support multiple CPs (used for
different application purposes and/or by different relying party
communities). Also, multiple CAs, with non-identical CPSs, may
support the same CP.
For example, the Federal Government might define a government-wide
CP for handling confidential human resources information. The CP
will be a broad statement of the general requirements for
participants within the Government's PKI, and an indication of the
types of applications for which it is suitable for use. Each
department or agency wishing to operate a certification authority in
this PKI may be required to write its own certification practice
statement to support this CP by explaining how it meets the
requirements of the CP. At the same time, a department's or
agency's CPS may support other certificate policies.
An additional difference between a CP and CPS concerns the level of
detail of the provisions in each. Although the level of detail may
vary among CPSs, a CPS will generally be more detailed than a CP. A
CPS provides a detailed description of procedures and controls in
place to meet the CP requirements, while a CP is more general.
The main differences between CPs and CPSs can therefore be
summarized as follows:
(a) A PKI uses a CP to establish requirements that state what
participants within it must do. A single CA or organization can use
a CPS to disclose how it meets the requirements of a CP or how it
implements its practices and controls.
(b) A CP facilitates interoperation through cross-certification,
unilateral certification, or other means. Therefore, it is intended
to cover multiple CAs. By contrast, a CPS is a statement of a
single CA or organization. Its purpose is not to facilitate
interoperation (since doing so is the function of a CP).
(c) A CPS is generally more detailed than a CP and specifies how
the CA meets the requirements specified in the one or more CPs under
which it issues certificates.
In addition to populating the certificate policies extension with
the applicable CP object identifier, a certification authority may
include, in certificates it issues, a reference to its certification
practice statement. A standard way to do this, using a CP
qualifier, is described in Section 3.4.
3.6 RELATIONSHIP AMONG CPs, CPSs, AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
CPs and CPSs play a central role in documenting the requirements and
practices of a PKI. Nonetheless, they are not the only documents
relevant to a PKI. For instance, subscriber agreements and relying
party agreements play a critical role in allocating responsibilities
to subscribers and relying parties relating to the use of
certificates and key pairs, and establish the terms and conditions
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under which certificates are issued, managed, and used. The term
subscriber agreement is defined by the PAG as: "An agreement
between a CA and a subscriber that establishes the right and
obligations of the parties regarding the issuance and management of
certificates." [ABA2] The PAG defines a relying party agreement as:
"An agreement between a certification authority and relying party
that typically establishes the rights and obligations between those
parties regarding the verification of digital signatures or other
uses of certificates." [ABA2]
As mentioned in Section 3.5, a subscriber agreement, relying party
agreement, or an agreement that combines subscriber and relying
party terms may also serve as a CPS. In other PKIs, however, a
subscriber or relying party agreement may incorporate some or all of
the terms of a CP or CPS by reference. Yet other PKIs may distill
from a CP and/or CPS the terms that are applicable to a subscriber
and place such terms in a self-contained subscriber agreement,
without incorporating a CP or CPS by reference. They may use the
same method to distill relying party terms from a CP and/or CPS and
place such terms in a self-contained relying party agreement.
Creating such self-contained agreements has the advantage of
creating documents that are easier for consumers to review. In some
cases, subscribers or relying parties may be deemed to be
"consumers" under applicable law, who are subject to certain
statutory or regulatory protections. Under the legal systems of
civil law countries, incorporating a CP or CPS by reference may not
be effective to bind consumers to the terms of an incorporated CP or
CPS.
CPs and CPSs may be incorporated by reference in other documents,
including:
* Interoperability agreements (including agreements between CAs for
cross-certification, unilateral certification, or other forms of
interoperation),
* Vendor agreements (under which a PKI vendor agrees to meet
standards set forth in a CP or CPS), or
* A PDS.
See [ABA2]
A PDS serves a similar function to a CPS Summary. It is a
relatively short document containing only a subset of critical
details about a PKI or CA. It may differ from a CPS Summary,
however, in that its purpose is to act as a summary of information
about the overall nature of the PKI, as opposed to simply a
condensed form of the CPS. Moreover, its purpose is to distill
information about the PKI, as opposed to protecting security
sensitive information contained in an unpublished CPS, although a
PDS could also serve that function.
Just as writers may wish to refer to a CP or CPS or incorporate it
by reference in an agreement or PDS, a CP or CPS may refer to other
documents when establishing requirements or making disclosures. For
instance, a CP may set requirements for certificate content by
referring to an external document setting forth a standard
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certificate profile. Referencing external documents permits a CP
or CPS to impose detailed requirements or make detailed disclosures
without having to reprint lengthy provisions from other documents
within the CP or CPS. Moreover, referencing a document in a CP or
CPS is another useful way of dividing disclosures between public
information and security sensitive confidential information (in
addition to or as an alternative to publishing a CPS Summary). For
example, a PKI may want to publish a CP or CPS, but maintain site
construction parameters for CA high security zones as confidential
information. In that case, the CP or CPS could reference an
external manual or document containing the detailed site
construction parameters.
Documents that a PKI may wish to refer to in a CP or CPS include:
* A security policy,
* Training, operational, installation, and user manuals (which may
contain operational requirements),
* Standards documents that apply to particular aspects of the PKI
(such as standards specifying the level of protection offered by any
hardware tokens used in the PKI or standards applicable to the site
construction),
* Key management plans,
* Human resource guides and employment manuals (which may describe
some aspects of personnel security practices), and
* E-mail policies (which may discuss subscriber and relying party
responsibilities, as well as the implications of key management, if
applicable).
See [ABA2]
3.7 SET OF PROVISIONS
A set of provisions is a collection of practice and/or policy
statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in
expressing a CP or CPS employing the approach described in this
framework by covering the topic appearing in Section 5 below, which
are described in detail in Section 4 below.
A CP can be expressed as a single set of provisions.
A CPS can be expressed as a single set of provisions with each
component addressing the requirements of one or more certificate
policies, or, alternatively, as an organized collection of sets of
provisions. For example, a CPS could be expressed as a combination
of the following:
(a) a list of certificate policies supported by the CPS;
(b) for each CP in (a), a set of provisions that contains
statements responding to that CP by filling in details not
stipulated in that policy or expressly left to the discretion of the
CA (in its CPS) ; such statements serve to state how this particular
CPS implements the requirements of the particular CP; or
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(c) a set of provisions that contains statements regarding the
certification practices on the CA, regardless of CP.
The statements provided in (b) and (c) may augment or refine the
stipulations of the applicable CP, but generally must not conflict
with any of the stipulations of such CP. In certain cases, however,
a policy authority may permit exceptions to the requirements in a
CP, because certain compensating controls of the CA are disclosed in
its CPS that allow the CA to provide assurances that are equivalent
to the assurances provided by CAs that are in full compliance with
the CP.
This framework outlines the contents of a set of provisions, in
terms of nine primary components, as follows:
1. Introduction
2. Publication and Repository
3. Identification and Authentication
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
5. Facilities, Management, and Operational Controls
6. Technical Security Controls
7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profile
8. Compliance audit
9. Other Business and Legal Matters
PKIs can use this simple framework of nine primary components to
write a simple CP or CPS. Moreover, a CA can use this same
framework to write a subscriber agreement, relying party agreement,
or agreement containing subscriber and relying party terms. If a CA
uses this simple framework to construct an agreement, it can use
paragraph 1 as an introduction or recitals, it can set forth the
responsibilities of the parties in paragraphs 2-8, and it can use
paragraph 9 to cover the business and legal issues described in more
detail in, and using the ordering of, Section 4.9 below (such as
representations and warranties, disclaimers, and liability
limitations). The ordering of topics in this simple framework and
the business and legal matters Section 4.9 is the same as (or
similar to) the ordering of topics in a typical software or other
technology agreement. Therefore, a PKI can establish a set of core
documents (with a CP, CPS, subscriber agreement, and relying party
agreement) all having the same structure and ordering of topics,
thereby facilitating comparisons and mappings among these documents
and among the corresponding documents of other PKIs.
This simple framework may also be useful for agreements other than
subscriber agreements and relying party agreements. For instance, a
CA wishing to outsource certain services to an RA or certificate
manufacturing authority (CMA) may find it useful to use this
framework as a checklist to write a registration authority agreement
or outsourcing agreement. Similarly, two CAs may wish to use this
simple framework for the purpose of drafting a cross-certification,
unilateral certification, or other interoperability agreement.
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In short, the primary components of the simple framework
(specified above) may meet the needs of drafters of short CPs, CPSs,
subscriber agreements, and relying party agreements. Nonetheless,
this framework is extensible, and its coverage of the nine
components is flexible enough to meet the needs of drafters of
comprehensive CPs and CPSs. Specifically, components appearing above
can be further divided into subcomponents, and a subcomponent may
comprise multiple elements. Section 4 provides a more detailed
description of the contents of the above components, and their
subcomponents. Drafters of CPs and CPSs are permitted to add
additional levels of subcomponents below the subcomponents described
in Section 4 for the purpose of meeting the needs of the drafter's
particular PKI.
4. CONTENTS OF A SET OF PROVISIONS
This section expands upon the contents of the simple framework of
provisions, as introduced in Section 3.7. The topics identified in
this section are, consequently, candidate topics for inclusion in a
detailed CP or CPS.
While many topics are identified, it is not necessary for a CP or a
CPS to include a concrete statement for every such topic. Rather, a
particular CP or CPS may state "no stipulation" for a component,
subcomponent, or element on which the particular CP or CPS imposes
no requirements or makes no disclosure. In this sense, the list of
topics can be considered a checklist of topics for consideration by
the CP or CPS writer.
It is recommended that each and every component and subcomponent be
included in a CP or CPS, even if there is "no stipulation"; this
will indicate to the reader that a conscious decision was made to
include or exclude a provision concerning that topic. This drafting
style protects against inadvertent omission of a topic, while
facilitating comparison of different certificate policies or CPSs,
e.g., when making policy mapping decisions.
In a CP, it is possible to leave certain components, subcomponents,
and/or elements unspecified, and to stipulate that the required
information will be indicated in a policy qualifier, or the document
to which a policy qualifier points. Such CPs can be considered
parameterized definitions. The set of provisions should reference
or define the required policy qualifier types and should specify any
applicable default values.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This component identifies and introduces the set of provisions, and
indicates the types of entities and applications for which the
document (either the CP or the CPS being written) is targeted.
4.1.1 Overview
This subcomponent provides a general introduction to the document
being written. This subcomponent can also be used to provide a
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synopsis of the PKI to which the CP or CPS applies. For example,
it may set out different levels of assurance provided by
certificates within the PKI. Depending on the complexity and scope
of the particular PKI, a diagrammatic representation of the PKI
might be useful here.
4.1.2 Document Name and Identification
This subcomponent provides any applicable names or other
identifiers, including ASN.1 object identifiers, for the document.
An example of such a document name would be the US Federal
Government Policy for Secure E-mail.
4.1.3 PKI Participants
This subcomponent describes the identity or types of entities that
fill the roles of participants within a PKI, namely:
* Certification authorities, i.e., the entities that issue
certificates. A CA is the issuing CA with respect to the
certificates it issues and is the subject CA with respect to the CA
certificate issued to it. CAs may be organized in a hierarchy in
which an organization's CA issues certificates to CAs operated by
subordinate organizations, such as a branch, division, or department
within a larger organization.
* Registration authorities, i.e., the entities that establishment
enrollment procedures for end-user certificate applicants, perform
identification and authentication of certificate applicants,
initiate or pass along revocation requests for certificates, and
approve applications for renewal or re-keying certificates on behalf
of a CA. Subordinate organizations within a larger organization can
act as RAs for the CA serving the entire organization, but RAs may
also be external to the CA.
* Subscribers. Examples of subscribers who receive certificates
from a CA include employees of an organization with its own CA,
banking or brokerage customers, organizations hosting e-commerce
sites, organizations participating in a business-to-business
exchange, and members of the public receiving certificates from a CA
issuing certificates to the public at large.
* Relying parties. Examples of relying parties include employees of
an organization having its own CA who receive digitally signed e-
mails from other employees, persons buying goods and services from
e-commerce sites, organizations participating in a business-to-
business exchange who receive bids or orders from other
participating organizations, and individuals and organizations doing
business with subscribers who have received their certificates from
a CA issuing certificates to the public. Relying parties may or may
not also be subscribers within a given PKI.
* Other participants, such as certificate manufacturing
authorities, providers of repository services, and other entities
providing PKI-related services.
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4.1.4 Certificate usage
This subcomponent contains:
* A list or the types of applications for which the issued
certificates are suitable, such as electronic mail, retail
transactions, contracts, and a travel order, and/or
* A list or the types of applications for which use of the issued
certificates is prohibited.
In the case of a CP or CPS describing different levels of assurance,
this subcomponent can describe applications or types of applications
that are appropriate or inappropriate for the different levels of
assurance.
4.1.5 Policy Administration
This subcomponent includes the name and mailing address of the
organization that is responsible for the drafting, registering,
maintaining, and updating of this CP or CPS. It also includes the
name, electronic mail address, telephone number, and fax number of a
contact person. As an alternative to naming an actual person, the
document may name a title or role, an e-mail alias, and other
generalized contact information. In some cases, the organization may
state that its contact person, alone or in combination with others,
is available to answer questions about the document.
Moreover, when a formal or informal policy authority is responsible
for determining whether a CA should be allowed to operate within or
interoperate with a PKI, it may wish to approve the CPS of the CA as
being suitable for the policy authority's CP. If so, this
subcomponent can include the name or title, electronic mail address
(or alias), telephone number, fax number, and other generalized
information of the entity in charge of making such a determination.
Finally, in this case, this subcomponent also includes the
procedures by which this determination is made.
4.1.6 Definitions and acronyms
This subcomponent contains a list of definitions for defined terms
used within the document, as well as a list of acronyms in the
document and their meanings.
4.2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
This component contains any applicable provisions regarding:
* An identification of the entity or entities that operate
repositories within the PKI, such as a CA, certificate manufacturing
authority, or independent repository service provider;
*The responsibility of a PKI participant to publish information
regarding its practices, certificates, and the current status of
such certificates, which may include the responsibilities of making
the CP or CPS publicly available using various mechanisms and of
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identifying components, subcomponents, and elements of such
documents that exist but are not made publicly available, for
instance, security controls, clearance procedures, or trade secret
information due to their sensitivity;
* When information must be published and the frequency of
publication; and
* Access control on published information objects including CPs,
CPS, certificates, certificate status, and CRLs.
4.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
This component describes the procedures used to authenticate the
identity and/or other attributes of an end-user certificate
applicant to a CA or RA prior to certificate issuance. In addition,
the component sets forth the procedures for authenticating the
identity and the criteria for accepting applicants of entities
seeking to become CAs, RAs, or other entities operating in or
interoperating with a PKI. It also describes how parties requesting
re-key or revocation are authenticated. This component also
addresses naming practices, including the recognition of trademark
rights in certain names.
4.3.1 Naming
This subcomponent includes the following elements regarding naming
and identification of the subscribers:
* Types of names assigned to the subject, such as X.500
distinguished names; RFC-822 names; and X.400 names;
* Whether names have to be meaningful or not;(3)
* Whether or not subscribers can be anonymous or pseudonymous, and,
if they can, what names are assigned to or can be used by anonymous
subscribers;
* Rules for interpreting various name forms, such as the X.500
standard and RFC-822;
* Whether names have to be unique; and
* Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.
4.3.2 Initial Identity Validation
This subcomponent contains the following elements for the
identification and authentication procedures for the initial
registration for each subject type (CA, RA, subscriber, or other
participant):
* If and how the subject must prove possession of the companion
private key for the public key being registered, for example, a
digital signature in the certificate request message;(4)
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* Identification and authentication requirements for
organizational identity of subscriber or participant (CA; RA;
subscriber (in the case of certificates issued to organizations or
devices controlled by an organization), or other participant), for
example, consulting the database of a service that identifies
organizations or inspecting an organization's articles of
incorporation;
* Identification and authentication requirements for an individual
subscriber or a person acting on behalf of an organizational
subscriber or participant (CA, RA, in the case of certificates
issued to organizations or devices controlled by an organization,
the subscriber, or other participant),(5) including:
* Type of documentation and/or number of identification credentials
required;
* How a CA or RA authenticates the identity of the organization or
individual based on the documentation or credentials provided;
* If the individual must present personally to the authenticating CA
or RA;
* How an individual as an organizational person is authenticated,
such as by reference to duly signed authorization documents or a
corporate identification badge.
* List of subscriber information that is not verified (called "non-
verified subscriber information") during the initial registration;
* Validation of authority involves a determination of whether a
person has specific rights, entitlements, or permissions, including
the permission to act on behalf of an organization to obtain a
certificate; and
* In the case of applications by a CA wishing to operate within, or
interoperate with, a PKI, this subcomponent contains the criteria by
which a PKI, CA, or policy authority determines whether or not the
CA is suitable for such operations or interoperation. Such
interoperation may include cross-certification, unilateral
certification, or other forms of interoperation.
4.3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests
This subcomponent addresses the following elements for the
identification and authentication procedures for re-key for each
subject type (CA, RA, subscriber, and other participants):
* Identification and authentication requirements for routine re-key,
such as a re-key request that contains the new key and is signed
using the current valid key; and
* Identification and authentication requirements for re-key after
certificate revocation. One example is the use of the same process
as the initial identity validation.
4.3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests
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This subcomponent describes the identification and authentication
procedures for a revocation request by each subject type (CA, RA,
subscriber, and other participant). Examples include a revocation
request digitally signed with the private key whose companion public
key needs to be revoked and a digitally signed request by the RA.
4.4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This component is used to specify requirements imposed upon issuing
CA, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, or other participants with
respect to the life-cycle of certificate.
Within each subcomponent, separate consideration may need to be
given to subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other participants.
4.4.1 Certificate Application
This subcomponent is used to address the following requirements
regarding subject certificate application:
* Who can submit a certificate application, such as a certificate
subject or the RA; and
* Enrollment process used by subjects to submit certificate
applications and responsibilities in connection with this process.
An example of this process is where the subject generates the key
pair and sends a certificate request to the RA. The RA validates
and signs the request and sends it to the CA. A CA or RA may have
the responsibility to establish an enrollment process in order to
receive certificate applications. Likewise, certificate applicants
may have the responsibility to provide accurate information on their
certificate applications.
4.4.2 Certificate Application Processing
This subcomponent is used to describe the procedure for processing
certificate applications. For example, the issuing CA and RA may
perform identification and authentication procedures to validate the
certificate application. Following such steps, the CA or RA will
either approve or reject the certificate application, perhaps upon
the application of certain criteria. Finally, this subcomponent
sets for the time in which a CA and/or RA must act on and process a
certificate application.
4.4.3 Certificate Issuance
This subcomponent is used to describe the following certificate
issuance related elements:
* Actions performed by the CA during the issuance of the
certificate, for example a procedure whereby the CA validates the RA
signature and RA authority and generates a certificate; and
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* Notification mechanisms, if any, used by the CA to notify the
subscriber of the issuance of the certificate; an example is a
procedure under which the CA e-mails the certificate to the
subscriber or the RA or e-mails information permitting the
subscriber to download the certificate from a web site.
4.4.4 Certificate Acceptance
This subcomponent addresses the following:
* The conduct of an applicant that will be deemed to constitute
acceptance of the certificate. Such conduct may include affirmative
steps to indicate acceptance, actions implying acceptance, or a
failure to object to the certificate or its content. For instance,
acceptance may be deemed to occur if the CA does not receive any
notice from the subscriber within a certain time period; a
subscriber may send a signed message accepting the certificate; or a
subscriber may send a signed message rejecting the certificate where
the message includes the reason for rejection and identifies the
fields in the certificate that are incorrect or incomplete.
* Publication of the certificate by the CA. For example, the CA may
post the certificate to an X.500 or LDAP repository.
* Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.
As an example, the CA may send the certificate to the RA.
4.4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage
This subcomponent is used to describe the responsibilities relating
to the use of keys and certificates, including:
* Subscriber responsibilities relating to use of the subscriber's
private key and certificate. For example, the subscriber may be
required to use a private key and certificate only for appropriate
applications as set forth in the CP and consistent with applicable
certificate content (e.g., key usage field), use of a private key
and certificate are subject to the terms of the subscriber
agreement, the use of a private key is permitted only after the
subscriber has accepted the corresponding certificate, or subscriber
must discontinue use of the private key following expiration or
revocation of the certificate.
* Relying party responsibilities relating to the use of a
subscriber's public key and certificate. For instance, a relying
party may be obligated to rely on certificates only for appropriate
applications as set forth in the CP and consistent with applicable
certificate content (e.g., key usage field), successfully perform
public key operations as a condition of relying on a certificate,
responsibility to check the status of certificate using one of the
required or permitted mechanisms set forth in the CP/CPS (see
Section 4.4.9 below), and assent to the terms of the applicable
relying party agreement as a condition of relying on the
certificate.
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4.4.6 Certificate Renewal
This subcomponent is used to describe the following elements related
to certificate renewal. Certificate renewal means issuance of a new
certificate to the subscriber without changing the subscriber or
other participant's public key or any other information in the
certificate:
* Circumstances under which certificate renewal takes place, such as
where the certificate life has expired, but the policy permits the
same key pair to be reused;
* Who may request certificate renewal, for instance, the subscriber,
RA, or the CA may automatically renew an end-user subscriber
certificate;
* A CA or RA's procedures to process renewal requests to issue the
new certificate, for example, the use of a token, such as a
password, to re-authenticate the subscriber, or procedures that are
the same as the initial certificate issuance;
* Notification of the new certificate to the subscriber;
* Conduct constituting acceptance of the certificate;
* Publication of the certificate by the CA; and
* Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.
4.4.7 Certificate Re-key
This subcomponent is used to describe the following elements related
to a subscriber or other participant generating a new key pair and
applying for the issuance of new certificate that certifies the new
public key:
* Circumstances under which certificate re-key can or must take
place, such as after a certificate is revoked for the reasons of key
compromise or after a certificate has expired and the usage period
of the key pair has also expired;
* Who may request certificate re-key, for example, the subscriber;
* A CA or RA's procedures to process re-keying requests to issue the
new certificate, such as procedures that are the same as the initial
certificate issuance;
* Notification of the new certificate to the subscriber;
* Conduct constituting acceptance of the certificate;
* Publication of the certificate by the CA; and
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* Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities.
4.4.8 Certificate Modification
This subcomponent is used to describe the following elements related
to issuance of a new certificate (6) due to changes in the
information in the certificate other than the subscriber public key:
* Circumstances under which certificate modification can take
place, such as name change, role change, reorganization resulting a
change in the DN;
* Who may request certificate modification, for instance,
subscribers, human resources personnel, or the RA;
* A CA or RA's procedures to process modification requests to issue
the new certificate, such as procedures that are the same as the
initial certificate issuance;
* Notification of the new certificate to the subscriber;
* Conduct constituting acceptance of the certificate;
* Publication of the certificate by the CA; and
* Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.
4.4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension
This subcomponent addresses the following:
* Circumstances under which a certificate may be and circumstances
under which it must be revoked, for instance, in cases of subscriber
employment termination, loss of cryptographic token, or suspected
compromise of the private key;
* Who can request the revocation of the participant's certificate,
for example, the subscriber, RA, or CA in the case of an end-user
subscriber certificate.
* Procedures used for certificate revocation request, such as a
digitally signed message from the RA, a digitally signed message
from the subscriber, or a phone call from the RA;
* The grace period available to the subscriber, within which the
subscriber must make a revocation request;
* The time within which CA must process the revocation request;
* The mechanisms, if any, that a relying party may use or must use
in order to check the status of certificates on which they wish to
rely;
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* If a CRL mechanism is used, the issuance frequency;
* If a CRL mechanism is used, maximum latency between the generation
of CRLs and posting of the CRLs to the repository (in other words,
the maximum amount of processing- and communication-related delays
in posting CRLs to the repository after the CRLs are generated);
* On-line revocation/status checking availability, for instance,
OCSP and a web site to which status inquiries can be submitted;
* Requirements on relying parties to perform on-line
revocation/status checks;
* Other forms of revocation advertisements available;
* Any variations on the above stipulations when the suspension or
revocation is the result of private key compromise (as opposed to
other reasons for suspension or revocation).
* Circumstances under which a certificate may be suspended;
* Who can request the suspension of a certificate, for example, the
subscriber, human resources personnel, a supervisor of the
subscriber, or the RA in the case of an end-user subscriber
certificate;
* Procedures to request certificate suspension, such as a digitally
signed message from subscriber or RA, or a phone call from RA; and
* How long the suspension may last.
4.4.10 Certificate Status Services
This subcomponent addresses the certificate status checking services
available to the relying parties, including:
* The operational characteristics of certificate status checking
services;
* The availability of such services, and any applicable policies on
unavailability; and
* Any optional features of such services.
4.4.11 End of Subscription
This subcomponent addresses procedures used by the subscriber to end
subscription to the CA services, including:
* The revocation of certificates at the end of subscription (which
may differ, depending on whether the end of subscription was due to
expiration of the certificate or termination of the service).
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4.4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery
This subcomponent contains the following elements to identify the
policies and practices relating to the escrowing, and/or recovery of
private keys where private key escrow services are available
(through the CA or other trusted third parties):
* Identification of the document containing private key escrow and
recovery policies and practices or a listing of the such policies
and practices; and
* Identification of the document containing session key
encapsulation and recovery policies and practices or a listing of
such policies and practices.
4.5 MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONAL, AND PHYSICAL CONTROLS
This component describes non-technical security controls (that is,
physical, procedural, and personnel controls) used by the issuing CA
to perform securely the functions of key generation, subject
authentication, certificate issuance, certificate revocation, audit,
and archival.
This component can also be used to define non-technical security
controls on repository, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other
participants. The non-technical security controls for the subject
CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other participants could be the same,
similar, or very different.
These non-technical security controls are critical to trusting the
certificates since lack of security may compromise CA operations
resulting, for example, in the creation of certificates or CRLs with
erroneous information or in the compromise of the CA private key.
Within each subcomponent, separate consideration will, in general,
need to be given to each entity type, that is, issuing CA,
repository, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other participants.
4.5.1 Physical Security Controls
In this subcomponent, the physical controls on the facility housing
the entity systems are described. Topics addressed may include:
* Site location and construction, such as the construction
requirements for high-security zones and the use of locked rooms,
cages, safes, and cabinets;
* Physical access, i.e., mechanisms to control access from one area
of the facility to another or access into high-security zones, such
as locating CA operations in a secure computer room monitored by
guards or security alarms and requiring movement from zone to zone
to be accomplished using a token, biometric readers, and/or access
control lists;
* Power and air conditioning;
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* Water exposures;
* Fire prevention and protection;
* Media storage, for example, requiring the storage of backup media
in a separate location that is physically secure and protected from
fire and water damages;
* Waste disposal; and
* Off-site backup.
4.5.2 Procedural Controls
In this subcomponent, requirements for recognizing trusted roles are
described, together with the responsibilities for each role.
Examples of trusted roles include system administrators, security
officers, and system auditors.
For each task identified for each role, it should also be stated how
many individuals are required to perform the task (n out m rule).
Identification and authentication requirements for each role may
also be defined.
This components also includes the separation of duties in terms of
the roles that cannot be performed by the same individuals.
4.5.3 Personnel Security Controls
This subcomponent addresses the following:
* Qualifications, experience, and clearances that personnel must
have as a condition of filling trusted roles or other important
roles. Examples include credentials, job experiences, and official
government clearances that candidates for these positions must have
before being hired;
* Background checks and clearance procedures that are required in
connection with the hiring of personnel filling trusted roles or
perhaps other important roles, such as requirements that trusted
personnel undergo checks of their criminal records, references, and
additional clearances that a participant undertakes after a decision
has been made to hire a particular person;
* Training requirements and training procedures for each role
following the hiring of personnel;
* Any retraining period and retraining procedures for each role
after completion of initial training;
* Frequency and sequence for job rotation among various roles;
* Sanctions against personnel for unauthorized actions,
unauthorized use of authority, and unauthorized use of entity
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systems for the purpose of imposing accountability on a
participant's personnel;
* Controls on personnel that are independent contractors rather than
employees of the entity; examples include:
- Bonding requirements on contract personnel;
- Contractual requirements including indemnification for damages due
to the actions of the contractor personnel;
- Audit and monitoring of contractor personnel; and
- Other controls on contracting personnel.
* Documentation to be supplied to personnel, during initial
training, retraining, or otherwise.
4.5.4 Audit Logging Procedures
This subcomponent is used to describe event logging and audit
systems, implemented for the purpose of maintaining a secure
environment. Elements include the following:
* Types of events recorded, such as certificate lifecycle
operations, attempts to access the system, and requests made to the
system;
* Frequency with which audit logs are processed or archived, for
example, weekly, following an alarm or anomalous event, or when ever
the audit log is n% full;
* Period for which audit logs are kept;
* Protection of audit logs:
- Who can view audit logs, for example only the audit administrator;
- Protection against modification of audit log, for instance a
requirement that no one may modify or delete the audit records or
that only an audit administrator may delete the audit file as part
of rotating the audit file; and
- Protection against deletion of audit log.
* Audit log back up procedures;
* Whether the audit log accumulation system is internal or external
to the entity;
* Whether the subject who caused an audit event to occur is notified
of the audit action; and
* Vulnerability assessments, for example, where audit data is run
through a tool that identifies potential attempts to breach the
security of the system.
4.5.5 Records Archival
This subcomponent is used to describe general records archival (or
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records retention) policies, including the following:
* Types of records that are archived, for example, all audit data,
certificate application information, and documentation supporting
certificate applications;
* Retention period for archive;
* Protection of archive:
- Who can view the archive, for example, a requirement that only the
audit administrator may view the archive;
- Protection against modification of archive, such as securely
storing the data on a write once medium;
- Protection against deletion of archive;
- Protection against deterioration of the media on which the archive
is stored, such as a requirement for data to be migrated
periodically to fresh media; and
- Protection against obsolescence of hardware, operating systems, and
other software, by, for example, retaining as part of the archive the
hardware, operating systems, and/or other software in order to permit
access to and use of archived records over time.
* Archive backup procedures;
* Requirements for time-stamping of records;
* Whether the archive collection system is internal or external; and
* Procedures to obtain and verify archive information, such as a
requirement that two separate copies of the archive data be kept
under the control of two persons, and that the two copies be
compared in order to ensure that the archive information is
accurate.
4.5.6 Key Changeover
This subcomponent describes the procedures to provide a new public
key to a CA's users following a re-key by the CA. These procedures
may be the same as the procedure for providing the current key.
Also, the new key may be certified in a certificate signed using the
old key.
4.5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery
This subcomponent describes requirements relating to notification
and recovery procedures in the event of compromise or disaster.
Each of the following may need to be addressed separately:
* Identification or listing of the applicable incident and
compromise reporting and handling procedures.
* The recovery procedures used if computing resources, software,
and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be corrupted. These
procedures describe how a secure environment is reestablished, which
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certificates are revoked, whether the entity key is revoked, how
the new entity public key is provided to the users, and how the
subjects are re-certified.
* The recovery procedures used if the entity key is compromised.
These procedures describe how a secure environment is reestablished,
how the new entity public key is provided to the users, and how the
subjects are re-certified.
* The entity's capabilities to ensure business continuity following
a natural or other disaster. Such capabilities may include the
availability of a remote hot-site at which operations may be
recovered. They may also include procedures for securing its
facility during the period of time following a natural or other
disaster and before a secure environment is reestablished either at
the original site or at a remote site. For example, procedures to
protect against theft of sensitive materials from an earthquake-
damaged site.
4.5.8 CA or RA Termination
This subcomponent describes requirements relating to procedures for
termination and for termination notification of a CA or RA,
including the identity of the custodian of CA and RA archival
records.
4.6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
This component is used to define the security measures taken by the
issuing CA to protect its cryptographic keys and activation data
(e.g., PINs, passwords, or manually-held key shares). This
component may also be used to impose constraints on repositories,
subject CAs, subscribers, and other participants to protect their
private keys, activation data for their private keys, and critical
security parameters. Secure key management is critical to ensure
that all secret and private keys and activation data are protected
and used only by authorized personnel.
This component also describes other technical security controls used
by the issuing CA to perform securely the functions of key
generation, user authentication, certificate registration,
certificate revocation, audit, and archival. Technical controls
include life-cycle security controls (including software development
environment security, trusted software development methodology) and
operational security controls.
This component can also be used to define other technical security
controls on repositories, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other
participants.
4.6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation
Key pair generation and installation need to be considered for the
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issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subscribers. For
each of these types of entities, the following questions
potentially need to be answered:
1. Who generates the entity public, private key pair? Possibilities
include the subscriber, RA, or CA. Also, how is the key generation
performed? Is the key generation performed in hardware or software?
2. How is the private key provided securely to the entity?
Possibilities include a situation where the entity has generated it
and therefore already has it, handing the entity the private key
physically, mailing a token containing the private key securely, or
delivering it in a SSL session.
3. How is the entity's public key provided securely to the
certification authority? Some possibilities are in an online SSL
session or in a message signed by the RA.
4. In the case of issuing CAs, how is the CA's public key provided
securely to potential relying parties? Possibilities include
handing the public key to the relying party securely in person,
physically mailing a copy securely to the relying party, or
delivering it in a SSL session.
5. What are the key sizes? Examples include a 1,024 bit RSA modulus
and a 1,024 bit DSA large prime.
6. Who generates the public key parameters, and is the quality of
the parameters checked during key generation?
7. For what purposes may the key be used, or for what purposes
should usage of the key be restricted? For X.509 certificates,
these purposes should map to the key usage flags in X.509 Version 3
certificates.
4.6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
Requirements for private key protection and cryptographic module
need to be considered for the issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs,
RAs, and subscribers. For each of these types of entity, the
following questions potentially need to be answered:
1. What standards, if any, are required for the cryptographic
module used to generate the keys? A cryptographic module can be
composed of hardware, software, firmware, or any combination of
them. For example, are the keys certified by the infrastructure
required to be generated using modules compliant with the US FIPS
140-1? If so, what is the required FIPS 140-1 level of the module?
Are there any other engineering or other controls relating to a
cryptographic module, such as the identification of the
cryptographic module boundary, input/output, roles and services,
finite state machine, physical security, software security,
operating system security, algorithm compliance, electromagnetic
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compatibility, and self tests.
2. Is the private key under n out of m multi-person control?(7)
If yes, provide n and m (two person control is a special case of n
out of m, where n = m = 2)?
3. Is the private key escrowed?(8) If so, who is the escrow agent,
what form is the key escrowed in (examples include plaintext,
encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on the
escrow system?
4. Is the private key backed up? If so, who is the backup agent,
what form is the key backed up in (examples include plaintext,
encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on the
backup system?
5. Is the private key archived? If so, who is the archival agent,
what form is the key archived in (examples include plaintext,
encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on the
archival system?
6. Under what circumstances, if any, can a private key be
transferred into or from a cryptographic module? Who is permitted
to perform such a transfer operation? In what form is the private
key during the transfer (i.e., plaintext, encrypted, or split key)?
7. How is the private key stored in the module (i.e., plaintext,
encrypted, or split key)?
8. Who can activate (use) the private key? What actions must be
performed to activate the private key (e.g., login, power on, supply
PIN, insert token/key, automatic, etc.)? Once the key is activated,
is the key active for an indefinite period, active for one time, or
active for a defined time period?
9. Who can deactivate the private key and how? Examples of methods
of deactivating private keys include logging out, turning the power
off, removing the token/key, automatic deactivation, and time
expiration.
10. Who can destroy the private key and how? Examples of methods of
destroying private keys include token surrender, token destruction,
and overwriting the key.
11. Provide the capabilities of the cryptographic module in the
following areas: identification of the cryptographic module
boundary, input/output, roles and services, finite state machine,
physical security, software security, operating system security,
algorithm compliance, electromagnetic compatibility, and self tests.
Capability may be expressed through reference to compliance with a
standard such as U.S. FIPS 140-1, associated level, and rating.
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4.6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
Other aspects of key management need to be considered for the
issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other
participants. For each of these types of entity, the following
questions potentially need to be answered:
1. Is the public key archived? If so, who is the archival agent and
what are the security controls on the archival system? Also, what
software and hardware need to be preserved as part of the archive to
permit use of the public key over time? Note: this subcomponent is
not limited to requiring or describing the use of digital signatures
with archival data, but rather can address integrity controls other
than digital signatures when an archive requires tamper protection.
Digital signatures do not provide tamper protection or protect the
integrity of data; they merely verify data integrity. Moreover, the
archival period may be greater than the cryptanalysis period for
the public key needed to verify any digital signature applied to
archival data.
2. What is the operational period of the certificates issued to the
subscriber. What are the usage periods, or active lifetimes, for
the subscriber's key pair?
4.6.4 Activation Data
Activation data refers to data values other than whole private keys
that are required to operate private keys or cryptographic modules
containing private keys, such as a PIN, passphrase, or portions of a
private key used in a key-splitting scheme. Protection of
activation data prevents unauthorized use of the private key, and
potentially needs to be considered for the issuing CA, subject CAs,
RAs, and subscribers. Such consideration potentially needs to
address the entire life-cycle of the activation data from generation
through archival and destruction. For each of the entity types
(issuing CA, repository, subject CA, RA, subscriber, and other
participants) all of the questions listed in 4.6.1 through 4.6.3
potentially need to be answered with respect to activation data
rather than with respect to keys.
4.6.5 Computer Security Controls
This subcomponent is used to describe computer security controls
such as: use of the trusted computing base concept, discretionary
access control, labels, mandatory access controls, object reuse,
audit, identification and authentication, trusted path, security
testing, and penetration testing. Product assurance may also be
addressed.
A computer security rating for computer systems may be required.
The rating could be based, for example, on the Trusted System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), Canadian Trusted Products Evaluation
Criteria, European Information Technology Security Evaluation
Criteria (ITSEC), or the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, ISO/IEC 15408:1999. This subcomponent can also
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address requirements for product evaluation analysis, testing,
profiling, product certification, and/or product accreditation
related activity undertaken.
4.6.6 Life Cycle Security Controls
This subcomponent addresses system development controls and
security management controls.
System development controls include development environment
security, development personnel security, configuration management
security during product maintenance, software engineering practices,
software development methodology, modularity, layering, use of
failsafe design and implementation techniques (e.g., defensive
programming) and development facility security.
Security management controls include execution of tools and
procedures to ensure that the operational systems and networks
adhere to configured security. These tools and procedures include
checking the integrity of the security software, firmware, and
hardware to ensure their correct operation.
This subcomponent can also address life-cycle security ratings
based, for example, on the Trusted Software Development Methodology
(TSDM) level IV and V, independent life-cycle security controls
audit, and the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity
Model (SEI-CMM).
4.6.7 Network Security Controls
This subcomponent addresses network security related controls,
including firewalls.
4.6.8 Time-stamping
This subcomponent addresses requirements or practices relating to
the use of timestamps on various data. It may also discuss whether
or not the time-stamping application must use a trusted time source.
4.7 CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES
This component is used to specify the certificate format and, if
CRLs and/or OCSP are used, the CRL and/or OCSP format. This
includes information on profiles, versions, and extensions used.
4.7.1 Certificate Profile
This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following
(potentially by reference to a separate profile definition, such as
the one defined in IETF PKIX RFC 2459):
* Version number(s) supported;
* Certificate extensions populated and their criticality;
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* Cryptographic algorithm object identifiers;
* Name forms used for the CA, RA, and subscriber names;
* Name constraints used and the name forms used in the name
constraints;
* Applicable CP OID(s);
* Usage of the policy constraints extension;
* Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics; and
* Processing semantics for the critical CP extension.
4.7.2 CRL Profile
This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following
(potentially by reference to a separate profile definition, such as
the one defined in IETF PKIX RFC 2459):
* Version numbers supported for CRLs; and
* CRL and CRL entry extensions populated and their criticality.
4.7.3 OCSP Profile
This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following
(potentially by reference to a separate profile definition, such as
the IETF RFC 2560 profile):
* Version of OCSP that is being used as the basis for establishing
an OCSP system; and
* OCSP extensions populated and their criticality.
4.8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENT
This component addresses the following:
* The list of topics covered by the assessment and/or the assessment
methodology used to perform the assessment; examples include
WebTrust for CAs (9) and SAS 70 (10).
* Frequency of compliance audit or other assessment for each entity
that must be assessed pursuant to a CP or CPS, or the circumstances
that will trigger an assessment; possibilities include an annual
audit, pre-operational assessment as a condition of allowing an
entity to being operations, or investigation following a possible or
actual compromise of security.
* The identity and/or qualifications of the personnel performing the
audit or other assessment.
* The relationship between the assessor and the entity being
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assessed, including the degree of independence of the assessor.
* Actions taken as a result of deficiencies found during the
assessment; examples include a temporary suspension of operations
until deficiencies are corrected, revocation of certificates issued
to the assessed entity, changes in personnel, triggering special
investigations or more frequent subsequent compliance assessments,
and claims for damages against the assessed entity.
* Who is entitled to see results of an assessment (e.g., assessed
entity, other participants, the general public), who provides them
(e.g., the assessor or the assessed entity), and how they are
communicated.
4.9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
This component covers general business and legal matters. Sections
9.1 and 9.2 of the framework discuss the business issues of fees to
be charged for various services and the financial responsibility of
participants to maintain resources for ongoing operations and for
paying judgments or settlements in response to claims asserted
against them. The remaining sections are generally concerned with
legal topics.
Starting with Section 9.3 of the framework, the ordering of topics
is the same as or similar to the ordering of topics in a typical
software licensing agreement or other technology agreement.
Consequently, this framework may not only be used for CPs and CPSs,
but also associated PKI-related agreements, especially subscriber
agreements and relying party agreements. This ordering is intended
help lawyers review CPs, CPSs, and other documents adhering to this
framework.
With respect to many of the legal subcomponents within this
component, a CP or CPS drafter may choose to include in the document
terms and conditions that apply directly to subscribers or relying
parties. For instance, a CP or CPS may set forth limitations of
liability that apply to subscribers and relying parties. The
inclusion of terms and conditions is likely to be appropriate where
the CP or CPS is itself a contract or part of a contract.
In other cases, however, the CP or CPS is not a contract or part of
a contract; instead, it is configured so that its terms and
conditions are applied to the parties by separate documents, which
may include associated agreements, such as subscriber or relying
party agreements. In that event, a CP drafter may write a CP so as
to require that certain legal terms and conditions appear (or not
appear) in such associated agreements. For example, a CP might
include a subcomponent stating that a certain limitation of
liability term must appear in a CA's subscriber and relying party
agreements. Another example is a CP that contains a subcomponent
prohibiting the use of a subscriber or relying party agreement
containing a limitation upon CA liability inconsistent with the
provisions of the CP. A CPS drafter may use legal subcomponents to
disclose that certain terms and conditions appear in associated
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subscriber, relying party, or other agreements in use by the CA. A
CPS might explain, for instance, that the CA writing it uses an
associated subscriber or relying party agreement that applies a
particular provision for limiting liability.
4.9.1 Fees
This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding fees
charged by CAs, repositories, or RAs, such as:
* Certificate issuance or renewal fees;
* Certificate access fees;
* Revocation or status information access fees;
* Fees for other services such as providing access to the relevant
CP or CPS; and
* Refund policy.
4.9.2 Financial Responsibility
This subcomponent contains requirements or disclosures relating to
the resources available to CAs, RAs, and other participants
providing certification services to support performance of their
operational PKI responsibilities, and to remain solvent and pay
damages in the event they are liable to pay a judgment or settlement
in connection with a claim arising out of such operations. Such
provisions include:
* A statement that the participant maintains a certain amount of
insurance coverage for its liabilities to other participants;
* A statement that a participant has access to other resources to
support operations and pay damages for potential liability, which
may be couched in terms of a minimum level of assets necessary to
operate and cover contingencies that might occur within a PKI, where
examples include assets on the balance sheet of an organization, a
surety bond, a letter of credit, and a right under an agreement
to an indemnity under certain circumstances; and
* A statement that a participant has a program that offers first-
party insurance or warranty protection to other participants in
connection with their use of the PKI.
4.9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information
This subcomponent contains provisions relating to the treatment of
confidential business information that participants may communicate
to each other, such as business plans, sales information, trade
secrets, and information received from a third party under a
nondisclosure agreement. Specifically, this subcomponent addresses:
* The scope of what is considered confidential information,
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* The types of information that are considered to be outside the
scope of confidential information, and
* The responsibilities of participants that receive confidential
information to secure it from compromise, and refrain from using it
or disclosing it to third parties.
4.9.4 Privacy of Personal Information
This subcomponent relates to the protection that participants,
particularly CAs, RAs, and repositories, may be required to afford
to personally identifiable private information of certificate
applicants, subscribers, and other participants. In specific, this
subcomponent addresses the following, to the extent pertinent under
applicable law:
* The designation and disclosure of the applicable privacy plan that
applies to a participant's activities, if required by applicable law
or policy;
* Information that is or is not considered private within the PKI;
* Any responsibility of participants that receive private
information to secure it, and refrain from using it and from
disclosing it to third parties;
* Any requirements as to notices to, or consent from individuals
regarding use or disclosure of private information; and
* Any circumstances under which a participant is entitled or
required to disclose private information pursuant to judicial,
administrative process in a private or governmental proceeding, or
in any legal proceeding.
4.9.5 Intellectual Property Rights
This subcomponent addresses the intellectual property rights,
such as copyright, patent, trademarks, or trade secrets, that
certain participants may have or claim in a CP, CPS, certificates,
names, and keys, or are the subject of a license to or from
participants.
4.9.6 Representations and Warranties
This subcomponent can include representations and warranties of
various entities that are being made pursuant to the CP or CPS. For
example, a CPS that serves as a contract might contain a CA's
warranty that information contained in the certificate is accurate.
Alternatively, a CPS might contain a less extensive warranty to the
effect that the information in the certificate is true to the best
of the CA's knowledge after performing certain identity
authentication procedures with due diligence. This subcomponent can
also include requirements that representations and warranties appear
in certain agreements, such as subscriber or relying party
agreements. For instance, a CP may contain a requirement that all
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CAs utilize a subscriber agreement, and that a subscriber agreement
must contain a warranty by the CA that information in the
certificate is accurate. Participants that may make representations
and warranties include CAs, RAs, subscribers, relying parties, and
other participants.
4.9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties
This subcomponent can include disclaimers of express warranties that
may otherwise be deemed to exist in an agreement, and disclaimers of
implied warranties that may otherwise be imposed by applicable law,
such as warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose. The CP or CPS may directly impose such disclaimers, or the
CP or CPS may contain a requirement that disclaimers appear in
associated agreements, such as subscriber or relying party agreements.
4.9.8 Limitations of Liability
This subcomponent can include limitations of liability in a CP or
CPS or limitations that appear or must appear in an agreement
associated with the CP or CPS, such as a subscriber or relying party
agreement. These limitations may fall into one of two categories:
limitations on the elements of damages recoverable and limitations
on the amount of damages recoverable, also known as liability caps.
Often, contracts contain clauses preventing the recovery of elements
of damages such as incidental and consequential damages, and
sometimes punitive damages. Frequently, contracts contain clauses
that limit the possible recovery of one party or the other to an
amount certain or to an amount corresponding to a benchmark, such as
the amount a vendor was paid under the contract.
4.9.9 Indemnities
This subcomponent includes provisions by which one party makes a
second party whole for losses or damage incurred by the second
party, typically arising out of the first party's conduct. They may
appear in a CP, CPS, or agreement. For example, a CP may require
that subscriber agreements contain a term under which a subscriber
is responsible for indemnifying a CA for losses the CA sustains
arising out of a subscriber's fraudulent misrepresentations on the
certificate application under which the CA issued the subscriber
an inaccurate certificate. Similarly, a CPS may say that a CA uses
a relying party agreement, under which relying parties are
responsible for indemnifying a CA for losses the CA sustains arising
out of use of a certificate without properly checking revocation
information or use of a certificate for purposes beyond what the CA
permits.
4.9.10 Term and Termination
This subcomponent can include the time period in which a CP or a CPS
remains in force and the circumstances under which the document,
portions of the document, or its applicability to a particular
participant can be terminated. In addition or alternatively, the CP
or CPS may include requirements that certain term and termination
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clauses appear in agreements, such as subscriber or relying party
agreements. In particular, such terms can include:
* The term of a document or agreement, that is, when the document
becomes effective and when it expires if it is not terminated
earlier.
* Termination provisions stating circumstances under which the
document, certain portions of it, or its application to a particular
participant ceases to remain in effect.
* Any consequences of termination of the document. For example,
certain provisions of an agreement may survive its termination and
remain in force. Examples include acknowledgements of intellectual
property rights and confidentiality provisions. Also, termination
may trigger a responsibility of parties to return confidential
information to the party that disclosed it.
4.9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants
This subcomponent discusses the way in which one participant can or
must communicate with another participant on a one-to-one basis in
order for such communications to be legally effective. For example,
an RA may wish to inform the CA that it wishes to terminate its
agreement with the CA. This subcomponent is different from
publication and repository functions, because unlike individual
communications described in this subcomponent, publication and
posting to a repository are for the purpose of communicating to a
wide audience of recipients, such as all relying parties. This
subcomponent may establish mechanisms for communication and indicate
the contact information to be used to route such communications,
such as digitally signed e-mail notices to a specified address,
followed by a signed e-mail acknowledgement of receipt.
4.9.12 Amendments
It will occasionally be necessary to amend a CP or CPS. Some of
these changes will not materially reduce the assurance that a CP or
its implementation provides, and will be judged by the policy
administrator to have an insignificant effect on the acceptability
of certificates. Such changes to a CP or CPS need not require a
change in the CP OID or the CPS pointer (URL). On the other hand,
some changes to a specification will materially change the
acceptability of certificates for specific purposes, and these
changes may require corresponding changes to the CP OID or CPS
pointer qualifier (URL).
This subcomponent may also contain the following information:
* The procedures by which the CP or CPS and/or other documents must,
may be, or are amended. In the case of CP or CPS amendments, change
procedures may include a notification mechanism to provide notice of
proposed amendments to affected parties, such as subscribers and
relying parties; a comment period; a mechanism by which comments are
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received, reviewed and incorporated into the document; and a
mechanism by which amendments become final and effective.
* The circumstances under which amendments to the CP or CPS would
require a change in CP OID or CPS pointer (URL).
4.9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures
This subcomponent discusses procedures utilized to resolve disputes
arising out of the CP, CPS, and/or agreements. Examples of such
procedures include requirements that disputes be resolved in a
certain forum or by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
4.9.14 Governing Law
This subcomponent sets forth a statement that the law of a certain
jurisdiction governs the interpretation and enforcement of the
subject CP or CPS or agreements.
4.9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law
This subcomponent relates to stated requirements that participants
comply with applicable law, for example laws relating to
cryptographic hardware and software that may be subject to the
export control laws of a given jurisdiction. The CP or CPS could
purport to impose such requirements or may require that such
provisions appear in other agreements.
4.9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions
This subcomponent contains miscellaneous provisions sometimes called
"boilerplate provisions" in contracts. The clauses covered in this
subcomponent may appear in a CP, CPS, or agreements and include:
* An entire agreement clause, which typically identifies the
document or documents comprising the entire agreement between the
parties and states that such agreements supersedes all prior and
contemporaneous written or oral understandings relating to the same
subject matter;
* An assignment clause, which may act to limit the ability of a
party to an agreement to assign its rights under the agreement to
another party (such as the right to receive a stream of payments in
the future) or the ability of a party to delegate its obligations
under the agreement;
* A severability clause, which sets forth the intentions of the
parties in the event a court or other tribunal determines that a
clause within an agreement is, for some reason, invalid or
unenforceable, and whose purpose is frequently to prevent the
unenforceability of one clause from causing the whole agreement to
be unenforceable; and
* An enforcement clause, which may state that a party prevailing in
any dispute arising out of an agreement is entitled to attorneys'
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fees as part of its recovery, or may state that a party's waiver of
one breach of contract does not constitute a continuing waiver or a
future waiver of other breaches of contract.
4.9.17 Other Provisions
This subcomponent is a "catchall" location where additional
responsibilities and terms can be imposed on PKI participants that
do not neatly fit within one of the other components or
subcomponents of the framework. CP and CPS writers can place any
provision within this subcomponent that is not covered by another
subcomponent.
5. OUTLINE OF A SET OF PROVISIONS
This section contains a recommended outline for a set of provisions,
intended to serve as a checklist or (with some further development)
a standard template for use by CP or CPS writers. Such a common
outline will facilitate:
(a) Comparison of two certificate policies during cross-
certification or other forms of interoperation (for the purpose of
equivalency mapping).
(b) Comparison of a CPS with a CP to ensure that the CPS faithfully
implements the policy.
(c) Comparison of two CPSs.
In order to comply with the RFC, the drafters of a compliant CP or
CPS are strongly advised to adhere to this outline. While use of
alternate outline is discouraged, it may be accepted if a proper
justification is provided for the deviation and a mapping table is
provided to readily discern where each of the items described in
this outline is provided.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
1.2 Document name and identification
1.3 PKI participants
1.3.1 Certification authorities
1.3.2 Registration authorities
1.3.3 Subscribers
1.3.4 Relying parties
1.3.5 Other participants
1.4 Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses
1.5 Policy administration
1.5.1 Organization administering the document
1.5.2 Contact person
1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
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1.5.4 CPS approval procedures
1.6 Definitions and acronyms
2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1 Repositories
2.2 Publication of certification information
2.3 Time or frequency of publication
2.4 Access controls on repositories
3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (11)
3.1 Naming
3.1.1 Types of names
3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful
3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms
3.1.5 Uniqueness of names
3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
3.2 Initial identity validation
3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key
3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity
3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information
3.2.5 Validation of authority
3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation
3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key
3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request
4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (11)
4.1 Certificate Application
4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application
4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities
4.2 Certificate application processing
4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions
4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications
4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications
4.3 Certificate issuance
4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance
4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate
4.4 Certificate acceptance
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4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA
4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
4.5 Key pair and certificate usage
4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage
4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage
4.6 Certificate renewal
4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal
4.6.2 Who may request renewal
4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests
4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
4.7 Certificate re-key
4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key
4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key
4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests
4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
4.8 Certificate modification
4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification
4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification
4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests
4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation
4.9.2 Who can request revocation
4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
4.9.4 Revocation request grace period
4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request
4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)
4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements
4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available
4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise
4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension
4.9.14 Who can request suspension
4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request
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4.9.16 Limits on suspension period
4.10 Certificate status services
4.10.1 Operational characteristics
4.10.2 Service availability
4.10.3 Optional features
4.11 End of subscription
4.12 Key escrow and recovery
4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices
4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS (11)
5.1 Physical controls
5.1.1 Site location and construction
5.1.2 Physical access
5.1.3 Power and air conditioning
5.1.4 Water exposures
5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection
5.1.6 Media storage
5.1.7 Waste disposal
5.1.8 Off-site backup
5.2 Procedural controls
5.2.1 Trusted roles
5.2.2 Number of persons required per task
5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role
5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties
5.3 Personnel controls
5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
5.3.2 Background check procedures
5.3.3 Training requirements
5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements
5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence
5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions
5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements
5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel
5.4 Audit logging procedures
5.4.1 Types of event recorded
5.4.2 Frequency of processing log
5.4.3 Retention period for audit log
5.4.4 Protection of audit log
5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures
5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject
5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments
5.5 Records archival
5.5.1 Types of records archived
5.5.2 Retention period for archive
5.5.3 Protection of archive
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5.5.4 Archive backup procedures
5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records
5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)
5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
5.6 Key changeover
5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery
5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures
5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures
5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
5.8 CA or RA termination
6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS (11)
6.1 Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1 Key pair generation
6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber
6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer
6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties
6.1.5 Key sizes
6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking
6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls
6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
6.2.3 Private key escrow
6.2.4 Private key backup
6.2.5 Private key archival
6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module
6.2.8 Method of activating private key
6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key
6.2.10 Method of destroying private key
6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating
6.3 Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1 Public key archival
6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
6.4 Activation data
6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation
6.4.2 Activation data protection
6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data
6.5 Computer security controls
6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements
6.5.2 Computer security rating
6.6 Life cycle technical controls
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6.6.1 System development controls
6.6.2 Security management controls
6.6.3 Life cycle security controls
6.7 Network security controls
6.8 Time-stamping
7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES
7.1 Certificate profile
7.1.1 Version number(s)
7.1.2 Certificate extensions
7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers
7.1.4 Name forms
7.1.5 Name constraints
7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier
7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension
7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension
7.2 CRL profile
7.2.1 Version number(s)
7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions
7.3 OCSP profile
7.3.1 Version number(s)
7.3.2 OCSP extensions
8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment
8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor
8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
8.4 Topics covered by assessment
8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency
8.6 Communication of results
9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
9.1 Fees
9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees
9.1.2 Certificate access fees
9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees
9.1.4 Fees for other services
9.1.5 Refund policy
9.2 Financial responsibility
9.2.1 Insurance coverage
9.2.2 Other assets
9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
9.3 Confidentiality of business information
9.3.1 Scope of confidential information
9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information
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9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information
9.4 Privacy of personal information
9.4.1 Privacy plan
9.4.2 Information treated as private
9.4.3 Information not deemed private
9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information
9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information
9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances
9.5 Intellectual property rights
9.6 Representations and warranties
9.6.1 CA representations and warranties
9.6.2 RA representations and warranties
9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties
9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties
9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants
9.7 Disclaimers of warranties
9.8 Limitations of liability
9.9 Indemnities
9.10 Term and termination
9.10.1 Term
9.10.2 Termination
9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival
9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants
9.12 Amendments
9.12.1 Procedure for amendment
9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period
9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed
9.13 Dispute resolution provisions
9.14 Governing law
9.15 Compliance with applicable law
9.16 Miscellaneous provisions
9.16.1 Entire agreement
9.16.2 Assignment
9.16.3 Severability
9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
9.17 Other provisions
6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The development of the predecessor document (RFC 2527) was supported
by the Government of Canada's Policy Management Authority (PMA)
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Committee, the National Security Agency, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), and the American Bar Association
Information Security Committee Accreditation Working Group.
This revision effort is largely a result of constant inspiration
from Michael Baum. Michael Power, Mike Jenkins, and Alice Sturgeon
have also made several contributions.
7. REFERENCES
[ABA1] American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines:
Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Secure
Electronic Commerce, 1996.
[ABA2] American Bar Association, PKI Assessment Guidelines, v0.30,
Public Draft For Comment, June 2001.
[BAU1] Michael. S. Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability
and Policy, NIST-GCR-94-654, June 1994, available at
http://www.verisign.com/repository/pubs/index.html.
[ETS] European Telecommunications Standards Institute, "Policy
Requirements for Certification Authorities Issuing Qualified
Certificates," ETSI TS 101 456, Version 1.1.1, December 2000.
[GOC] Government of Canada PKI Policy Management Authority,
"Digital Signature and Confidentiality Certificate Policies for the
Government of Canada Public Key Infrastructure," v.3.02, April 1999.
[IDT] Identrus, LLC, "Identrus Identity Certificate Policy" IP-IPC
Version 1.7, March 2001.
[ISO1] ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T Recommendation X.509, "Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory:
Authentication Framework," 1997 edition. (Pending publication of
2000 edition, use 1997 edition.)
[PEM1] S. Kent, "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail,
Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," Internet RFC 1422, 1993.
[PKI1] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile," RFC 2459 1998.
[CPF] S. Chokhani and W. Ford, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
Statement Framework," RFC 2527, April 1998.
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8. AUTHORS' ADDRESSES
Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc., an Entrust company
7927 Jones Branch Drive, Suite 100 West
McLean, VA 22102
Phone: (703) 270-3520
Fax: (703) 848-0960
EMail: chokhani@cygnacom.com
Warwick Ford
VeriSign, Inc.
401 Edgewater Place, Suite 280
Wakefield, MA 01880
Phone: (781) 245-6996 x225
Fax: (781) 245-6006
EMail: wford@verisign.com
Randy V. Sabett, J.D., CISSP
Cooley Godward LLP
One Freedom Square, Reston Town Center
11951 Freedom Drive
Reston, VA 20190-5601
Phone: (703) 456-8137
Fax: (703) 456-8100
EMail: rsabett@cooley.com
Charles (Chas) R. Merrill
McCarter & English, LLP
Four Gateway Center
100 Mulberry Street
Newark, New Jersey 07101-0652
Phone: (973) 622-4444
Fax: (973) 624-7070
EMail: cmerrill@concentric.net
Stephen S. Wu
Infoliance, Inc.
101 First St. # 725
Los Altos, CA 94022
Phone: (650) 917-8045
Fax: (650) 618-1454
EMail: swu@infoliance.com
NOTES
1 A paper copy of the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines can be
purchased from the ABA. See http://www.abanet.com for ordering
details. The DSG may also be downloaded without charge from the ABA
website at
http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/digital_signature.html.
2 A draft of the PKI Assessment Guidelines may be downloaded
without charge from the ABA website at
http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/pag/pag.html.
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3 The term "meaningful" means that the name form has commonly
understood semantics to determine identity of the person and/or
organization. Directory names and RFC 822 names may be more or less
meaningful.
4 The subject may not need to prove to the CA that the subject has
possession of the private key corresponding to the public key being
registered if the CA generates the subject's key pair on the
subject's behalf.
5 Examples of means to identify and authenticate individuals include
biometric means (such as thumb print, ten finger print, and scan of
the face, palm, or retina), a driver's license, a credit card, a
company badge, and a government badge.
6 Certificate "modification" does not refer to making a change to an
existing certificate, since this would prevent the verification of
any digital signatures on the certificate and cause the certificate
to be invalid. Rather, the concept of "modification" refers to a
situation where the information referred to in the certificate has
changed or should be changed, and the CA issues a new certificate
containing the modified information. One example is a subscriber
that changes his or her name, which would necessitate the issuance
of a new certificate containing the new name.
7 The n out of m rule allows a private key to be split in m parts.
The m parts may be given to m different individuals. Any n parts
out of the m parts may be used to fully reconstitute the private
key, but having any n-1 parts provides one with no information about
the private key.
8 A private key may be escrowed, backed up, or archived. Each of
these functions has a different purpose. Thus, a private key may go
through any subset of these functions depending on the requirements.
The purpose of escrow is to allow a third party (such as an
organization or government) to obtain the private key without the
cooperation of the subscriber. The purpose of back up is to allow
the subscriber to reconstitute the key in case of the destruction or
corruption of the key for business continuity purposes. The
purpose of archive is to provide for reuse of the private key in
future, e.g., use to decrypt a document.
9 WebTrust refers to the "WebTrust Program for Certification
Authorities," from the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc., and the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants.
10 See <http://www.aicpa.org>.
11 All or some of the following items may be different for the
various types of entities, i.e., CA, RA, and end entities.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ABA - American Bar Association
CA - Certification Authority
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CPS - Certification Practice Statement
CRL - Certificate Revocation List
DAM - Draft Amendment
FIPS - Federal Information Processing Standard
I&A - Identification and Authentication
IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission
IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force
IP - Internet Protocol
ISO - International Organization for Standardization
ITU - International Telecommunications Union
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
OID - Object Identifier
PIN - Personal Identification Number
PKI - Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX - Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) (IETF Working Group)
RA - Registration Authority
RFC - Request For Comment
URL - Uniform Resource Locator
US - United States
< draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-new-rfc2527-01.txt >
Expires in six months from January 3, 2002
Chokhani, Ford, Sabett, Merrill, & Wu INTERNET DRAFT [Page 55]
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