One document matched: draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-08.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-07.txt
PKIX Working Group J. Schaad
Internet-Draft Soaring Hawk Consulting
Expires: September 11, 2008 M. Myers
TraceRoute Security, Inc.
March 10, 2008
Certificate Management over CMS (CMC): Transport Protocols
draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-08.txt
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Abstract
This document defines a number of transport mechanisms that are used
to move CMC (Certificate Management over CMS (Cryptographic Message
Syntax)) messages. The transport mechanisms described in this
document are: HTTP, file, mail and TCP.
1. Overview
This document defines a number of transport methods that are used to
move CMC messages (defined in [CMC-STRUCT]). The transport
mechanisms described in this document are: HTTP, file, mail and TCP.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].
2. File based protocol
Enrollment messages and responses may be transferred between clients
and servers using file system-based mechanisms, such as when
enrollment is performed for an off-line client. When files are used
to transport binary, Full PKI Request or Full PKI Response messages,
there MUST be only one instance of a request or response message in a
single file. The following file type extensions SHOULD be used:
+---------------------+----------------+
| Message Type | File Extension |
+---------------------+----------------+
| Simple PKI Request | .p10 |
| Full PKI Request | .crq |
| Simple PKI Response | .p7c |
| Full PKI Response | .crp |
+---------------------+----------------+
File PKI Request/Response Identification
3. Mail based protocol
MIME wrapping is defined for those environments that are MIME native.
The basic mime wrapping in this section is taken from [SMIMEV3].
When using a mail based protocol, MIME wrapping between the layers of
CMS wrapping is optional. Note that is different from the standard
S/MIME (Secure MIME) message.
Simple enrollment requests are encoded using the "application/pkcs10"
content type. A file name MUST be included either in a content type
or a content disposition statement. The extension for the file MUST
be ".p10".
Simple enrollment response messages MUST be encoded as content-type
"application/pkcs7-mime". An smime-type parameter MUST be on the
content-type statement with a value of "certs-only." A file name
with the ".p7c" extension MUST be specified as part of the content-
type or content-disposition statement.
Full enrollment request messages MUST be encoded as content-type
"application/pkcs7-mime". The smime-type parameter MUST be included
with a value of "CMC-enroll". A file name with the ".p7m" extension
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MUST be specified as part of the content-type or content-disposition
statement.
Full enrollment response messages MUST be encoded as content-type
"application/pkcs7-mime". The smime-type parameter MUST be included
with a value of "CMC-response." A file name with the ".p7m"
extensions MUST be specified as part of the content-type or content-
disposition statement.
+--------------+------------------------+------------+--------------+
| Item | MIME TYPE | File | SMIME-TYPE |
| | | Extension | |
+--------------+------------------------+------------+--------------+
| Simple PKI | application/pkcs10 | .p10 | N/A |
| Request | | | |
| Full PKI | application/pkcs7-mime | .p7m | CMC-request |
| Request | | | |
| Simple PKI | application/pkcs7-mime | .p7c | certs-only |
| Response | | | |
| Full PKI | application/pkcs7-mime | .p7m | CMC-response |
| Response | | | |
+--------------+------------------------+------------+--------------+
Table 1: MIME PKI Request/Response Identification
4. HTTP/HTTPS based protocol
This section describes the conventions for use of HTTP [HTTP] as a
transport layer. In most circumstances, the use of HTTP over TLS
[TLS] provides any necessary content protection from ease-droppers.
In order for CMC clients and servers using HTTP to interoperate, the
following rules apply.
Clients MUST use the POST method to submit their requests.
Servers MUST use the 200 response code for successful reponses.
Clients MAY attempt to send HTTP requests using TLS 1.0 [TLS] or
later, although servers are not required to support TLS.
Servers MUST NOT assume client support for any type of HTTP
authentication such as cookies, Basic authentication or Digest
authentication.
Clients and servers are expected to follow the other rules and
restrictions in [HTTP]. Note that some of those rules are for
HTTP methods other than POST; clearly, only the rules that apply
to POST are relevant for this specification.
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4.1. PKI Request
A PKI Request using the POST method is constructed as follows:
The Content-Type header MUST have the appropriate value from Table 1.
The body of the message is the binary value of the encoding of the
PKI Request.
4.2. PKI Response
An HTTP-based PKI Response is composed of the appropriate HTTP
headers, followed by the binary value of the BER (Basic Encoding
Rules) encoding of either a Simple or Full PKI Response.
The Content-Type header MUST have the appropriate value from Table 1.
5. TCP based protocol
When CMC messages are sent over a TCP-Based connection, no wrapping
is required of the message. Messages are sent in their binary
encoded form.
The connection is closed by the client after recieving a final
response. If a second round of messages is needed, the client can
either re-use the same connection or use a new one.
There is no specific port that is to be used when doing TCP based
transport. Only the Private Ports (49152-65535) may be used in this
manner (without registration). The ports in the range of (1-49151)
SHOULD NOT be used. The port to be used is configured out of band.
6. Security Considerations
Mechanisms for thwarting replay attacks may be required in particular
implementations of this protocol depending on the operational
environment. In cases where the CA maintains significant state
information, replay attacks may be detectable without the inclusion
of the optional nonce mechanisms. Implementers of this protocol need
to carefully consider environmental conditions before choosing
whether or not to implement the senderNonce and recipientNonce
attributes described in section 5.6 of [CMC-STRUCT]. Developers of
state-constrained PKI clients are strongly encouraged to incorporate
the use of these attributes.
Initiation of a secure communications channel between an end-entity
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and a CA or RA (and, similarly, between an RA and another RA or CA)
necessarily requires an out-of-band trust initiation mechanism. For
example, a secure channel may be constructed between the end-entity
and the CA via IPsec [IPsec] or TLS [TLS]. Many such schemes exist
and the choice of any particular scheme for trust initiation is
outside the scope of this document. Implementers of this protocol
are strongly encouraged to consider generally accepted principles of
secure key management when integrating this capability within an
overall security architecture.
In some instances no prior out-of-band trust will have been initiated
prior to use of this protocol. This can occur when the protocol
itself is being used to download onto the system the set of trust
anchors to be used for these protocols. In these instances the
Enveloped Data Content type (section 3.2.1.3.3 in [CMC-STRUCT]) must
be used to provide the same shrouding that TLS would have provided.
7. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations in this document.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors and the Working Group are grateful for the participation
of Xiaoui Lui and Jeff Weinstein in helping to author the original
versions of this document.
The authors would like to thank Brian LaMacchia for his work in
developing and writing up many of the concepts presented in this
document. The authors would also like to thank Alex Deacon and Barb
Fox for their contributions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[CMC-STRUCT]
Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management Messages
over CMS", draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-05.txt ,
September 2005.
[HTTP] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
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[IPsec] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[MUST] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[SMIMEV3] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification",
RFC 3851, July 2004.
9.2. Informative References
[TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
Authors' Addresses
Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
PO Box 675
Gold Bar, WA 98251
Phone: (425) 785-1031
Email: jimsch@nwlink.com
Michael Myers
TraceRoute Security, Inc.
Email: mmyers@fastq.com
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