One document matched: draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-03.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-02.txt
PKIX Working Group Michael Myers (VeriSign)
Internet Draft Xiaoyi Liu (Cisco)
March 3, 1999 Jim Schaad (Microsoft)
expires in six months Jeff Weinstein (Netscape)
Certificate Management Messages over CMS
<draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-03.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
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Abstract
This document defines a Certificate Management protocol using CMS (CMC).
This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the Internet PKI
community:
1. The need for an interface to public key certification products and
services based on [CMS] and [PKCS10], and
2. The need in [SMIMEV3] for a certificate enrollment protocol for DSA-
signed certificates with Diffie-Hellman public keys.
A small number of additional services are defined to supplement the core
certificate request service.
Throughout this specification the term CMS is used to refer to both [CMS]
and [PKCS7]. For signedData the two specifications are equivalent. For
envelopedData CMS is a superset of the PKCS7. In general, the use of
PKCS7 in this document is aligned to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
[CMS] that provides a superset of the PKCS7 syntax. The term CMC refers
to this specification.
The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
1. Protocol Requirements
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- The protocol is to be based as much as possible on the existing CMS,
PKCS#10 and CRMF specifications.
- The protocol must support the current industry practice of a PKCS#10
request followed by a PKCS#7 response as a subset of the protocol.
- The protocol needs to easily support the multi-key enrollment
protocols required by S/MIME and other groups.
- The protocol must supply a way of doing all operations in a single-
round trip. When this is not possible the number of round trips is to
be minimized.
- The protocol needs to support optional key escrow and key archival for
encryption keys.
- The protocol will be designed such that all key generation can occur
on the client.
- The mandatory algorithms must superset the required algorithms for
S/MIME.
- The protocol will contain POP methods. Optional provisions for
multiple-round trip POP will be made if necessary.
- The protocol will support deferred and pending responses to
certificate request for cases where external procedures are required to
issue a certificate.
- The protocol needs to support arbitrary chains of local registration
authorities as intermediaries between certificate requesters and
issuers.
2. Protocol Overview
An enrollment transaction in this specification is generally composed of
a single round trip of messages. In the simplest case an enrollment
request is sent from the client to the server and an enrollment response
is then returned from the server to the client. In some more complicated
cases, such as delayed certificate issuance and polling for responses,
more than one round trip is required.
This specification supports two different request messages and two
different response messages.
Public key certification requests can be based on either the PKCS10 or
CRMF object. The two different request messages are (a) the bare PKCS10
(in the event that no other services are needed), and (b) the PKCS10 or
CRMF message wrapped in a CMS encapsulation as part of a PKIData object.
Public key certification responses are based on the CMS signedData
object. The response may be either (a) a degenerate CMS signedData
object (in the event no other services are needed), or (b) a ResponseBody
object wrapped in a CMS signedData object.
No special services are provided for doing either renewal (new
certificates with the same key) or re-keying (new certificates on new
keys) of clients. Instead a renewal/re-key message looks the same as any
enrollment message, with the identity proof being supplied by existing
certificates from the CA.
A provision exists for Local Registration Authorities (LRAs) to
participate in the protocol by taking client enrollment messages,
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wrapping them in a second layer of enrollment message with additional
requirements or statements from the LRA and then passing this new
expanded request on to the certification authority.
This specification makes no assumptions about the underlying transport
mechanism. The use of CMS is not meant to imply an email-based
transport.
Optional services available through this specification are transaction
management, replay detection (through nonces), deferred certificate
issuance, private key archival, certificate revocation requests and
certificate/CRL fetching.
2.1 Terminology
There are several different terms, abbreviations and acronyms used in
this document that we define here for convenience and consistency of
usage:
"End-Entity" (EE) refers to the entity that owns a key pair and for whom
a certificate is issued.
"LRA" or "RA" refers to a (Local) Registration Authority. A registration
authority acts as an intermediary between an End-Entity and a
Certificate Authority. Multiple RAs can exist between the End-
Entity and the Certificate Authority.
"CA" refers to a Certificate Authority. A certificate authority is the
entity that performs the actual issuance of a certificate.
"Client" refers to an entity that creates a PKI request. In this
document both RAs and End-Entities can be clients.
"Server" refers to the entities that process PKI requests and create PKI
responses. CAs and RAs can be servers in this document.
PKCS#10
CRMF
CMS
DSA
RSA
D-H
SHA-1
Transport wrapper
2.2 Protocol Flow Charts
Figure 1 shows the Simple Enrollment Request and Response messages. The
contents of these messages are detailed in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 below.
Simple PKI Request Simple PKI Response
------------------------- --------------------------
+----------+ +------------------+
| PKCS #10 | | CMS "certs-only" |
+----------+--------------+ | message |
| | +------------------+------+
| Certificate Request | | |
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| | | CMS Signed Data, |
| Subject Name | | no signerInfo |
| Subject Public Key Info | | |
| (K_PUB) | | signedData contains one |
| Attributes | | or more certificates in |
| | | the "certificates" |
+-----------+-------------+ | portion of the |
| signed with | | signedData. |
| matching | | |
| K_PRIV | | encapsulatedContentInfo |
+-------------+ | is empty. |
| |
+--------------+----------+
| unsigned |
+----------+
Figure 1: Simple PKI Request and Response Messages
Full PKI Request Full PKI Response
----------------------- ------------------------
+----------------+ +----------------+
| CMS signedData | | CMS signedData |
| object | | object |
+----------------+--------+ +----------------+--------+
| | | |
| PKIData object | | ResponseBody object |
| | | |
| Sequence of: | | Sequence of: |
| <enrollment attribute>* | | <enrollment attribute>* |
| <certification request>*| | <CMS object>* |
| <CMS objects>* | | <other message>* |
| <other message>* | | |
| | | where * == zero or more |
| where * == zero or more | | |
| | | All certificates issued |
| Certificate requests | | as part of the response |
| are CRMF or PKCS#10 | | are included in the |
| objects. Attributes are | | "certificates" portion |
| (OID, set of ANY | | of the signedData. |
| defined by OID) pairs. | | |
| | +---------+---------------+
+-------+-----------------+ | signed by the |
| signed (keypair | | CA or an LRA |
| used may be pre-| +---------------+
| existing or |
| identified in |
| the request) |
+-----------------+
Figure 2: Full PKI Request and Response Messages
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Figure 2 shows the Full Enrollment Request and Response messages. The
contents of these messages are detailed in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 below.
3. Protocol Elements
This section covers each of the different elements that may be used to
construct enrollment request and enrollment response messages. Section 4
will cover how to build the enrollment request and response messages.
3.1 PKIData Object
The new content object PKIData has been defined for this protocol. This
new object is used as the body of the full PKI request message. The new
body is identified by:
id-ct-PKIData ::= {id-ct 2 }
The ASN.1 structure corresponding to this new content type is:
PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
-- controlSequence consists of a sequence of control attributes. The
control attributes defined in this document are found in section 5.
Other parties can define additional control attributes.
-- reqSequence consists of a sequence of certificate requests. The
certificate requests can be either a CertificateRequest (PKCS10
request) or a CertReqMsg. Details on each of these requests types
are found in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively.
-- cmsSequence consists of a sequence of [CMS] message objects. This
protocol only uses EnvelopedData, SignedData and EncryptedData. See
section 3.5 for more details.
-- otherMsgSequence allows for other arbitrary items to be placed
into the enrollment protocol. The {OID, any} pair of values allows
for arbitrary definition of material. Data objects are placed here
while control objects are placed in the controlSequence field.
3.2 ResponseBody Object
The new content object ResponseBody has been defined for this protocol.
This new object is used as the body of the full PKI response message.
The new body is identified by:
id-ct-PKIResponse ::= {id-ct 3 }
The ASN.1 structure corresponding to this body content type is:
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ResponseBody ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
-- controlSequence consists of a sequence of control attributes. The
control attributes defined in this document are found in section 3.4.
Other parties can define additional control attributes.
-- cmsSequence consists of a sequence of [CMS] message objects. This
protocol only uses EnvelopedData, SignedData and EncryptedData. See
section 3.5 for more details.
-- otherMsgSequence allows for other arbitrary items to be placed
into the enrollment protocol. The {OID, any} pair of values allows
for arbitrary definition of material. Data objects are placed here
while control objects are placed in the controlSequence field.
3.3 Certification Requests (PKCS10/CRMF)
Certification Requests are based on either PKCS10 or CRMF messages.
Section 3.3.1 specifies mandatory and optional requirements for clients
and servers dealing with PKCS10 request messages. Section 3.3.2
specifies mandatory and optional requirements for clients and servers
dealing with CRMF request messages.
3.3.1 PKCS10 Request Body
Servers MUST be able to understand and process PKCS10 request bodies.
Clients MUST produce a PKCS10 request body when using the Simple
Enrollment Request message. Clients MAY produce a PKCS10 request body
when using the Full Enrollment Request message.
When producing a PKCS10 request body, clients MUST produce a PKCS10
message body containing a subject name and public key. Some
certification products are operated using a central repository of
information to assign subject names upon receipt of a public key for
certification. To accommodate this mode of operation, the subject name
in a CertificationRequest MAY be NULL, but MUST be present. CAs that
receive a CertificationRequest with a NULL subject name MAY reject such
requests. If rejected and a response is returned, the CA MUST respond
with the failInfo attribute of badRequest.
The client MAY incorporate one or more standard X.509 v3 extensions in
any PKCS10 request as an ExtensionReq attribute. An ExtensionReq
attribute is defined as
ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension
where Extension is imported from [PKIXCERT] and ExtensionReq is
identified by {pkcs-9 14}.
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Servers are not required to be able to process every v3 X.509 extension
transmitted using this protocol, nor are they required to be able to
process other, private extensions. Servers are not required to put all
client-requested extensions into a certificate. Servers are permitted to
modify client-requested extensions. Servers MUST NOT alter an extension
so as to invalidate the original intent of a client-requested extension.
(For example change key usage from key exchange to signing.) If a
certification request is denied due to the inability to handle a
requested extension and a response is returned, the server MUST respond
with the failInfo attribute of unsupportedExt.
3.3.2 CRMF Request Body
Servers MUST be able to understand and process CRMF request body. Clients
MAY produce a CRMF message body when using the Full Enrollment Request
message.
This draft imposes the following additional changes on the construction
and processing of CRMF messages:
- When CRMF message bodies are used in the Full Enrollment Request
message, each CRMF message MUST include both the subject and publicKey
fields in the CertTemplate. As in the case of PKCS10 requests the
subject may be encoded as NULL, but MUST be present.
- In general, when both CRMF and CMC controls exist with equivalent
functionality, the CMC control SHOULD be used. The CMC control MUST
override any CRMF control.
- The regInfo field MUST NOT be used on a CRMF message. Equivalent
functionality is provided in the regInfo control attribute (section
5.13).
- The indirect method of proving POP is not supported in this protocol.
One of the other methods (including the direct method described in this
document) MUST be used instead if POP is desired. The value of
encrCert in SubsequentMessage MUST NOT be used.
- Since the subject and publicKeyValues are always present, the
POPOSigningKeyInput MUST NOT be used when computing the value for
POPSigningKey.
A server is not required to use all of the values suggested by the client
in the certificate template. Servers are not required to be able to
process every V3 X.509 extension transmitted using this protocol, nor are
they required to be able to process other, private extensions. Servers
are permitted to modify client-requested extensions. Servers MUST NOT
alter an extension so as to invalidate the original intent of a client-
requested extension. (For example change key usage from key exchange to
signing.) If a certificate request is denied due to the inability to
handle a requested extension, the server MUST respond with a failInfo
attribute of unsupportedExt.
3.3.3 Production of Diffie-Hellman Public Key Certification Requests
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Part of a certification request is a signature over the request; Diffie-
Hellman is a key agreement algorithm and cannot be used to directly
produce the required signature object. [DH-SIG] provides a way to
produce the necessary signature.
In brief the "self-signature" method requires either the CA publish a D-H
certificate or the client create a temporary D-H key pair. The client
then computes an HMAC over the certification content using the key
agreement as the shared secret. The details of how this works are found
in [DH-SIG].
Clients and servers producing self-signed D-H certification requests MUST
support [DH-SIG].
3.3.3.1 Diffie-Hellman Empty Signature
The Diffie-Hellman private keys cannot always be used to produce some
type of signature value as they can be in a decrypt only device.
Certification requests require that the signature field be populated.
This section provides a signature algorithm specifically for that
purposes. The following object identifier and signature value are used
to identify this signature type:
id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}
NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
The parameters for id-alg-noSignature MUST be present and MUST be encoded
as NULL. NoSignatureValue contains the hash of the certification
request. It is important to realize that there is no security associated
with this signature type. If this signature type is on a certification
request and the certificate authority policy requires proof-of-possession
on the private key, the POP mechanism defined in section 5.7 MUST be
used.
3.3.3.2 Diffie-Hellman POP Signature
CMC compliant implementations MUST support section 5 of [DH-SIG].
3.3.3.3 Diffie-Hellman MAC signature
CMC compliant implementations MAY support section 4 of [DH-SIG].
3.4 Control Attributes
The overall control flow of how a message is processed in this document
is based on the control attributes. Each control attribute consists of
an object identifier and a value based on the object identifier. Servers
MUST fail the processing of an entire PKIData message if any included
control attribute is not recognized. The response MUST be the error
badRequest with the bodyid set to the invalid or unrecognized control.
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The set of control attributes that are defined by this draft are found in
section 5.
3.5 Content Info objects
This specification uses two different wrapping objects from the CMS
draft. SignedData is used for authentication purposes as well as a
general transport wrapper. EnvelopedData is used for encryption purposes.
3.5.1 Signed Data
The signedData object is used in two different locations when
constructing enrollment messages. The signedData object is used as a
wrapper to a PKIData as part of the enrollment request message. The
signedData object is also used as the outer part of an enrollment
response message.
For the enrollment response the signedData wrapper allows the server to
sign the returning data, if any exists, and to carry the certificates and
CRLs for the enrollment request. If no data is being returned beyond the
certificates, no signerInfo objects are placed in the signedData object.
3.5.2 Enveloped Data
EnvelopedData is the primary method of providing for the protection of
sensitive information in this protocol. The protocol currently uses
EnvelopedData in two different areas: The global shrouding of an entire
request (see section 4.5) and the shrouding of private key material.
The envelopedData object is also used to wrap private key material when
sent as part of either the enrollment request or enrollment response
message. Private key archival MAY be supported through the use of the CMS
envelopedData. If used, clients generate an encrypted blob and include
it in the request message. Senders return this value on later enrollment
messages if requested to do so.
Servers MUST NOT implement envelopedData according to [PKCS7]. There is
an ambiguity (about encrypting content types other than id-data) in the
language that has lead to non-interoperability.
3.5.3 Encrypted Data
EncryptedData can be used to protect private key material when doing
archive of private key material (see section 5.9).
4. PKI Messages
This section discusses the details of putting together the different
enrollment request and response messages.
4.1 Simple Enrollment Request
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The simplest form of an enrollment request is a plain PKCS10 message. If
this form of enrollment request is used for a private key that is capable
of generating a signature, the PKCS10 MUST be signed with that private
key. If this form of the enrollment request is used for a D-H key, then
the D-H POP mechanism described in [DH-SIG] MUST be used.
Servers MUST support the Simple Enrollment Request message. If the Simple
Enrollment Request message is used, servers MUST return the Simple
Enrollment Response message (see Section 3.3) if the enrollment request
is granted. If the enrollment request fails, the Full Enrollment
Response MAY be returned or no response MAY be returned.
Many advanced services specified in this draft are not supported by the
Simple Enrollment Request message.
4.2 Full PKI Request
The Full Enrollment Request provides the most functionality and
flexibility. Clients SHOULD use the Full Enrollment Request message when
doing client enrollment. Servers MUST support the Full Enrollment
Request message. A response MUST be returned to all Full Enrollment
Requests.
The Full Enrollment Request message consists of a PKIData object wrapped
in a signedData CMS object. The objects in the PKIData are ordered as
follows:
1. All Control Attributes,
2. All certification requests,
3. All CMS objects,
4. All other messages.
Each element in a Full Enrollment Request is identified by a unique 4
octet integer. This is encoded either the bodyPartIDs or certReqIds
field of the element. If duplicate ids are found, the server MUST return
the error badRequest with a bodyPartID of 0. The value of 0 has been
reserved to refer to the containing PKIData object.
The signedData object wrapping the PKIData may be signed either by the
private key material of the signature certification request, or by a pre-
existing signature key and certificate. If the private key of a
signature certification request is being used, then:
a) the certification request containing the corresponding public
key
MUST include a Subject Key Identifier extension request,
b) the subjectKeyIdentifier form of signerInfo MUST be used, and
c) the value of the subjectKeyIdentifier form of signerInfo MUST
be the
Subject Key Identifier specified in the corresponding certification
request.
(The subjectKeyIdentifier form of signerInfo is used here because no
certificates have yet been issued for the signing key.) If the request
key is used for signing, there MUST be only one signerInfo object in the
signedData object.
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When creating a renewal message the following should be taken into
consideration:
1. The identification and identityProof control statements are not
required. The same information is provided by the use of an existing
certificate from the CA when signing the enrollment message.
2. CAs and LRAs may impose additional restrictions on the signing
certificate used. They may require that the most recently issued
signing certificate for an entity be used.
3. A renewal message may occur either by creating a new set of keys, or
by re-using an existing set of keys. Some CAs may prevent re-use of
keys by policy. In this case the CA MUST return NOKEYREUSE as the
failure code.
4.3 Simple Enrollment Response
Servers SHOULD use the simple enrollment response message whenever
possible. Clients MUST understand the simple enrollment response
message. The simple enrollment response message consists of a signedData
object with no signerInfo objects on it. The certificates requested are
returned in the certificate bag of the signedData object.
Clients MUST NOT assume the certificates are in any order. Servers SHOULD
include all certificates to form complete chains to the root, not just
the issued certificate. The server MAY additionally return CRLs in the
CRL bag. Servers MAY include the root certificates. Clients MUST NOT
implicitly trust a self-signed certificate merely due to its presence in
the certificate bag. In the event clients receive a new root certificate
from the server, clients SHOULD provide a mechanism to enable the user to
explicitly trust the received root certificate.
4.4 Full PKI Response
Servers MUST return full PKI response messages if a) a full PKI request
message failed or b) additional services other than returning
certificates are required. Servers MAY return full PKI responses with
failure information for simple PKI requests. Following section 4.3 above,
servers returning only certificates and a success status to the client
SHOULD use the simple PKI response message.
Clients MUST understand the full PKI response message.
The full enrollment response message consists of a signedData object
wrapped around a responseBody object. In a responseBody object all
Control Attributes MUST precede all CMS objects. The certificates
granted in an enrollment response are returned in the certificates field
of the immediately encapsulating signedData object.
Clients MUST NOT assume the certificates are in any order. Servers SHOULD
include all certificates to form complete chains to the root, not just
the issued certificate. The server MAY additionally return CRLs in the
CRL bag. Servers MAY include the root certificates. Clients MUST NOT
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implicitly trust a self-signed certificate merely due to its presence in
the certificate bag. In the event clients receive a new root certificate
from the server, clients SHOULD provide a mechanism to enable the user to
explicitly trust the received root certificate.
4.5 Application of Encryption to a PKI Message
There are occasions where a PKI request or response message must be
encrypted in order to prevent any information about the enrollment from
being accessible to unintended entities. This section describes the
means used to encrypt a PKI message. This section is not applicable to a
simple enrollment message.
Shrouding is obtained by wrapping the PKI message (a signedData object)
in a CMS EnvelopedData object. The nested content type in the
EnvelopedData is id-signedData. Note that this is different from S/MIME
where there is a MIME layer placed between the encrypted and signed data
objects. It is recommended that if an enveloped data layer is applied to
a PKI message, a second signing layer be placed outside of the enveloped
data layer. The following figure shows how this nesting would be done:
Normal Option 1 Option 2
------ -------- --------
SignedData EnvelopedData SignedData
PKIData SignedData EnvelopedData
PKIData SignedData
PKIData
Options 1 and 2 provide the benefit of preventing leakage of sensitive
data by encrypting the information. LRAs may remove the enveloped data
wrapping, and replace or forward without further processing.
PKI Messages MAY be encrypted or transmitted in the clear. Servers MUST
provided support for all three versions.
Alternatively, an authenticated, secure channel could exist between the
parties requiring encryption. Clients and servers MAY use such channels
instead of the shrouding technique described above to provide secure,
private communication of PKI request and response messages.
5. Control Attributes
Control attributes are carried as part of both PKI requests and
responses. Each control attribute is encoded as a unique Object
Identifier followed by that data for the control attribute. The encoding
of the data is based on the control attribute object identifier.
Processing systems would first detect the OID and process the
corresponding attribute value prior to processing the message body.
The following table lists the names, OID and syntactic structure for each
of the control attributes documented in this draft.
Control Attribute OID Syntax
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----------------- ---------- --------------
cMCStatusInfo pkix-cmc 1 CMCStatusInfo
identification pkix-cmc 2 UTF8String
identityProof pkix-cmc 3 OCTET STRING
dataReturn pkix-cmc 4 OCTET STRING
transactionId pkix-cmc 5 INTEGER
senderNonce pkix-cmc 6 OCTET STRING
recipientNonce pkix-cmc 7 OCTET STRING
addExtensions pkix-cmc 8 AddExtensions
encryptedPOP pkix-cmc 9 EncryptedPOP
decryptedPOP pkix-cmc 10 DecryptedPOP
lraPOPWitness pkix-cmc 11 LraPOPWitness
keyArchival pkix-cmc 12 KeyArchival
keyRecoveryReq pkix-cmc 13 KeyRecoveryReq
keyRecoveryRsp pkix-cmc 14 KeyRecoveryRsp
getCert pkix-cmc 15 GetCert
getCRL pkix-cmc 16 GetCRL
revokeRequest pkix-cmc 17 RevokeRequest
regInfo pkix-cmc 18 OCTET STRING
responseInfo pkix-cmc 19 OCTET STRING
privateKey pkix-cmc 20 PrivateKeyInfo
QueryPending pkix-cmc 21 OCTET STRING
idPOPLinkRandom pkix-cmc 22 OCTET STRING
idPOPLinkWitness Pkix-cmc 23 OCTET STRING
5.1 CMC Status Info Control Attribute
The CMC status info control is used in full PKI Response messages to
return information on a client request. This statement uses the
following ASN.1 definition:
CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo } OPTIONAL
}
PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
pendToken OCTET STRING,
pendTime GeneralizedTime
}
-- cMCStatus is described in section 5.1.1
-- bodyList contains the list of body parts in the request message
to which this status information applies. If an error is being
returned for a simple enrollment message, body list will contain a
single integer of value '1'.
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-- statusString contains a string with additional description
information. This string is human readable.
-- failInfo is described in section 5.1.2. It provides a detailed
error on what the failure was. This choice is present only if
cMCStatus is failed.
-- pendToken is the token to be used in the queryPending control
attribute.
-- pendTime contains the suggested time the server wants to be
queried about the status of the request.
If the cMCStatus field is success, the CMC Status Info Control MAY be
omitted unless it is only item in the response message. If no status
exists for a certificate request or other item requiring processing, then
the value of success is to be assumed.
5.1.1 CMCStatus values
CMCStatus is a field in the CMCStatusInfo structure. This field contains
a code representing the success or failure of a specific operation.
CMCStatus has the ASN.1 structure of:
CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
success (0),
-- request was granted
-- reserved (1),
-- not used, defined where the original structure was defined
failed (2),
-- you don't get what you want, more information elsewhere in
the message
pending (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed,
-- requester is responsible to poll back on this
-- pending may only be return for certificate request
operations.
noSupport (4),
-- the requested operation is not supported
}
5.1.2 CMCFailInfo
CMCFailInfo conveys information relevant to the interpretation of a
failure condition. The CMCFailInfo has the following ASN.1 structure:
CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
badAlg (0)
-- Unrecognized or unsupported algorithm
badMessageCheck (1)
-- integrity check failed
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badRequest (2)
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3)
-- Message time field was not sufficiently close to the system
time
badCertId (4)
-- No certificate could be identified matching the provided
criteria
unsuportedExt (5)
-- A requested X.509 extension is not supported by the
recipient CA.
mustArchiveKeys (6)
-- Private key material must be supplied
badIdentity (7)
-- Identification Attribute failed to verify
popRequired (8)
-- Server requires a POP proof before issuing certificate
popFailed (9)
-- POP processing failed
noKeyReuse (10)
-- Server policy does not allow key re-use
internalCAError (11)
tryLater (12)
}
Additional failure reasons MAY be defined for closed environments with a
need.
5.2 Identification and IdentityProof Control Attributes
Some CAs and LRAs require that a proof of identity be included in a
certification request. Many different ways of doing this exist with
different degrees of security and reliability. Most people are familiar
with the request of a bank to provide your mother's maiden name as a form
of identity proof.
CMC provides one method of proving the client's identity based on a
shared secret between the certificate requestor and the verifying
authority. If clients support full request messages, clients MUST
implement this method of identity proof. Servers SHOULD provide this
method or have a bilateral method of similar strength available.
The CMC method starts with an out-of-band transfer of a token (the shared
secret). The distribution of this token is beyond the scope of this
document. The client then uses this token for an identity proof as
follows:
1. The reqSequence field of the PKIData object (encoded exactly as it
appears in the request message including the sequence type and length)
is the value to be validated.
2. A SHA1 hash of the token is computed.
3. An HMAC-SHA1 value is then computed over the value produced in Step 1,
as described in [HMAC], using the hash of the token from Step 2 as the
shared secret value.
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4. The 160-bit HMAC-SHA1 result from Step 3 is then encoded as the value
of the identityProof attribute.
When the server verifies the identityProof attribute, it computes the
HMAC-SHA1 value in the same way and compares it to the identityProof
attribute contained in the enrollment request.
If a server fails the verification of an identityProof attribute and the
server returns a response message, the failInfo attribute MUST be present
in the response and MUST have a value of badIdentity.
Optionally, servers may require the inclusion of the unprotected
identification attribute with an identityProof attribute. The
identification attribute is intended to contain either a text string or a
numeric quantity, such as a random number, which assists the server in
locating the shared secret needed to validate the contents of the
identityProof attribute. Numeric values MUST be converted to text string
representations prior to encoding as UTF8-STRINGs in this attribute. If
the identification control attribute is included in the message, the
derivation of the shared secret in step 2 is altered so that the hash of
the concatenation of the token and the identity value are hashed rather
than just the token.
5.3 Linking Identity and POP Information
In a PKI Full Request message identity information about the
creator/author of the message is carried in the signature of the CMS
SignedData object containing all of the certificate requests. Proof-of-
possession information for key pairs requesting certification, however,
is carried separately for each PKCS#10 or CRMF message. (For keys
capable of generating a digital signature the POP is provided by the
signature on the PKCS#10 or CRMF. For encryption-only keys the controls
described in Section 5.7 below are used.) In order to prevent
substitution-style attacks we must guarantee that the same entity
generated both the POP and proof-of-identity information.
5.3.1 This section describes two mechanisms for linking identity and POP
information: witness values cryptographically derived from the
shared-secret (Section 5.3.1) and shared-secret/subject DN
matching (Section 5.3.2). Clients and servers MUST support the
witness value thechnique. Clients and servers MAY support shared-
secret/subject DN matching or other bilateral techniques of
similar strength. The idea behind both mechanisms is to force the
client to sign some data into each certificate request that can be
directly associated with the shared-secret; this will defeat
attempts to include certificate requests from different entities
in a single Full PKI Request message.Witness values derived from
the shared-secret
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The first technique for doing identity-POP linking works by forcing the
client to include a piece of information cryptographically-derived from
the shared-secret token as a signed extension within each certificate
request (PKCS#10 or CRMF) message. This technique is useful if null
subject DNs are used (because, for example, the server can generate the
subject DN for the certificate based only on the shared secret).
Processing begins when the client receives the shared-secret token out-
of-band from the server. The client then computes the following values:
1. The client generates a random byte-string, R, which SHOULD be
at
least 512 bits in length.
2. A SHA1 hash of the token is computed.
3. An HMAC-SHA1 value is then computed over the random value
produced
in Step 1, as described in [HMAC], using the hash of the token from
Step 2 as the shared secret.
4. The random value produced in Step 1 is encoded as the value of
an
idPOPLinkRandom control attribute. This control attribute MUST be
included in the Full PKI Request message.
5. The 160-bit HMAC-SHA1 result from Step 3 is encoded as the
value of
an idPOPLinkWitness extension to the certificate request.
a. For CRMF, idPOPLinkWitness is included in the
controls section
of the CertRequest structure.
b. For PKCS#10, idPOPLinkWitness is included in the
attributes
section of the CertificationRequest structure.
Upon receipt, servers MUST verify that each certificate request contains
a copy of the idPOPLinkWitness and that its value was derived in the
specified manner from the shared secret and the random string included in
the idPOPLinkRandom control attribute.
5.3.2 Shared-secret/subject DN matching
The second technique for doing identity-POP linking is to link a
particular subject distinguished name (subject DN) to the shared-secrets
that are distributed out-of-band and to require that clients using the
shared-secret to prove identity include that exact subject DN in every
certificate request. It is expected that many client-server connections
using shared-secret based proof-of-identity will use this mechanism. (It
is common not to omit the subject DN information from the certificate
request messages.)
When the shared secret is generated and transferred out-of-band to
initiate the registration process (Section 5.2), a particular subject DN
is also associated with the shared secret and communicated to the client.
(The subject DN generated MUST be unique per entity in accordance with CA
policy; a null subject DN cannot be used. A common practice could be to
place the identification value as part of the subject DN.) When the
client generates the Full PKI Request message, it MUST use these two
pieces of information as follows:
1. The client MUST include the specific subject DN that it received
along with the shared secret as the subject name in every
certificate request (PKCS#10 and/or CRMF) in the Full PKI Request.
The subject names in the requests MUST NOT be null.
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2. The client MUST include the identityProof control attribute
(Section 5.2), derived from the shared secret, in the Full PKI
Request.
The server receiving this message MUST (a) validate the identityProof
control attribute and then, (b) check that the subject DN included in
each certificate request matches that associated with the shared secret.
If either of these checks fails the certificate request MUST be rejected.
5.3.3 Renewal and Re-Key Messages
In a renewal or re-key message, the subject DN in (a) the certificate
referenced by the CMS SignerInfo object, and (b) all certificate requests
within the request message MUST match according to the standard name
match rules described in [PKIXCERT].
5.4 Data Return Control Attribute
The data return control attribute allows clients to send arbitrary data
(usually some type of internal state information) to the server and to
have the data returned as part of the enrollment response message. Data
placed in a data return statement is considered to be opaque to the
server. The same control is used for both requests and responses. If
the data return statement appears in an enrollment message, the server
MUST return it as part of the enrollment response message.
In the event that the information in the data return statement needs to
be confidential, it is expected that the client would apply some type of
encryption to the contained data.
An example of using this statement is for a client to place an identifier
marking the exact source of the private key material. This might be the
identifier of a hardware device containing the private key.
5.5 Add Extensions Control Attribute
The Add Extensions control attribute is used by LRAs in order to specify
additional extensions that are to be placed on certificates. This
attribute uses the following ASN.1 definition:
AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartID
certReferences SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
extensions SEQUENCE OF Extension
}
The pkiDataReference field contains the body part id of the embedded
request message.
The certReferences field is a list of references to one or more of the
payloads contained within a PKIData. Each element of the certReferences
sequence MUST be equal to either the bodyPartID of a
TaggedCertificationRequest or the certReqId of the CertRequest within a
CertReqMsg. By definition, the listed extensions are to be applied to
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every element referenced in the certReferences sequence. If a request
corresponding to bodyPartID cannot be found, the error badRequest is
returned referencing this control attribute.
The extensions field contains the sequence of extensions to be applied to
the referenced certificate requests.
Servers are not required to be able to process every v3 X.509 extension
transmitted using this protocol, nor are they required to be able to
process other, private extensions. Servers are not required to put all
LRA-requested extensions into a certificate. Servers are permitted to
modify LRA-requested extensions. Servers MUST NOT alter an extension so
as to reverse the meaning of a client-requested extension. If a
certification request is denied due to the inability to handle a
requested extension and a response is returned, the server MUST return a
failInfo attribute with the value of unsupportedExt.
If multiple Add Extensions statements exist in an enrollment message, the
exact behavior is left up to the certificate issuer policy. However it
is recommended that the following policy be used. These rules would be
applied to individual extensions within an Add Extensions control
attribute (as opposed to an "all or nothing" approach).
1. If the conflict is within a single PKIData object, the certificate
request would be rejected with an error of badRequest.
2. If the conflict is between different PKIData objects, the outermost
version of the extension would be used.
5.6 Transaction Management Control Attributes
Transaction management attributes are an optional portion of CMC. A
server does not need to implement this section to be compliant with CMC.
Transactions MAY be identified and tracked using a transaction
identifier. If used, clients generate transaction identifiers and retain
their value until the server responds with a message that completes the
transaction. Servers correspondingly include received transaction
identifiers in the response.
The transactionId attribute identifies a given transaction. It is used
between client and server to manage the state of an operation. It MAY be
included in service request messages. If included, responses MUST
included the transmitted value. A server MUST use only transactionIds in
the outermost PKIdata object. TransactionIds on inner PKIdata objects are
for intermediate entities.
Replay protection can be supported through the use of sender and
recipient nonces. If used, clients generate a nonce value and include it
in the request as a sender nonce. Servers return this value as recipient
nonce along their own value for sender nonce. A server MUST use only
nonces in the outermost PKIdata object. Nonces on inner PKIdata objects
are for intermediate entities.
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The senderNonce and recipientNonce attribute can be used to provide
application-level replay prevention. They MAY be included in service
request messages. Originating messages include only a value for
senderNonce. If included, responses MUST include the transmitted value of
the previously received senderNonce as recipientNonce and include a value
for senderNonce.
If nonces are used, in the first message of a transaction, no
recipientNonce is transmitted; a senderNonce is instantiated by the
message originator and retained for later reference. The recipient of a
sender nonce reflects this value back to the originator as a
recipientNonce and includes it's own senderNonce. Upon receipt by the
transaction originator of this message, the originator compares the value
of recipientNonce to its retained value. If the values match, the
message can be accepted for further security processing. The received
value for senderNonce is also retained for inclusion in the next message
associated with the same transaction.
If a transaction originator includes a value for the senderNonce
attribute, responses MUST include this value as a value for
recipientNonce AND include a value for the SenderNonce attribute.
If a transaction originator includes a value for the transactionid
attribute in a service request, responses MUST include this value as a
value for transactionid attribute.
5.7 Proof-of-possession (POP) for encryption-only keys
Everything described in this section is optional to implement. Servers
MAY require this POP be used only if another POP method is unavailable.
Servers MAY reject all requests contained within a PKIData if any
required POP is missing for any element within the PKIData.
Many servers require proof that an entity requesting a certificate for a
public key actually possesses the corresponding private component of the
key pair. For keys that can be used as signature keys, signing the
certification request with the private key serves as a POP on that key
pair. With keys that can only be used for encryption operations, POP
MUST be performed by forcing the client to decrypt a value. See Section
5 of [CRMF] for a detailed discussion of POP.
By necessity, POP for encryption-only keys cannot be done in one round-
trip, since there are four distinct phases:
1. Client tells the server about the public component of a new encryption
key pair.
2. Server sends the client a POP challenge, encrypted with the presented
public encryption key, which the client must decrypt.
3. Client decrypts the POP challenge and sends it back to the server.
4. Server validates the decrypted POP challenge and continues processing
the certificate request.
CMC defines two different attributes. The first deals with the encrypted
challenge sent from the server to the user in step 2. The second deals
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with the decrypted challenge sent from the client to the server in step
3.
The encryptedPOP attribute is used to send the encrypted challenge from
the server to the client. As such, it is encoded as a tagged attribute
within the controlSequence of a ResponseBody. (Note that we assume that
the message sent in Step 1 above is an enrollment request and that the
response in step 2 is a Full Enrollment Response including a failureInfo
specifying that a POP is explicitly required, and providing the POP
challenge in the encryptedPOP attribute.)
EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
request TaggedRequest,
cms contentInfo,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
witnessAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
witness OCTET STRING
}
DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
thePOP OCTET STRING
}
The encrypted POP algorithm works as follows:
1. The server generates a random value y and associates it with the
request.
2. The server returns the encrypted pop with the following fields set:
a. request is the certificate request in the original request message
(it is included here so the client need not key a copy of the
request),
b. cms is an EnvelopedData object, the content type being id-data and
the content being the value y. If the certificate request contains
a subject key identifier (SKI) extension, then the recipient
identifier SHOULD be the SKI. If the issuerAndSerialNumber form is
used, the IsserName MUST be encoded as NULL and the SerialNumber as
the bodyPartId of the certificate request,
c. thePOPAlgID contains the algorithm to be used in computing the
return POP value,
d. witnessAlgID contains the hash algorithm used on y to create the
field witness,
e. witness contains the hashed value of y.
3. The client decrypts the cms field to obtain the value y. The client
computes H(y) using the witnessAlgID and compares to the value of
witness. If the values do not compare or the decryption is not
successful, the client MUST abort the enrollment process. The client
aborts the process by sending a request message containing a
CMCStatusInfo control attribute with failInfo value of popFailed.
4. The client creates the decryptedPOP as part of a new PKIData message.
The fields in the decryptedPOP are:
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a. bodyPartID contains the certificate request in the new enrollment
message,
b. thePOPAlgID is copied from the encryptedPOP,
c. thePOP contains the possession proof. This value is computed by
thePOPAlgID using the value y and request referenced in (4a).
5. The server then re-computes the value of thePOP from its cached value
of y and the request and compares to the value of thePOP. If the
values do not match, the server MUST NOT issue the certificate. The
server MAY re-issue a new challenge or MAY fail the request
altogether.
When defining the algorithms for thePOPAlgID and witnessAlgID care must
be taken to ensure that the result of witnessAlgID is not a useful value
to shortcut the computation with thePOPAlgID. Clients MUST implement
SHA-1 for witnessAlgID. Clients MUST implement HMAC-SHA1 for
thePOPAlgID. The value of y is used as the secret value in the HMAC
algorithm and the request referenced in (4a) is used as the data. If y
is greater than 64 bytes, only the first 64 bytes of y are used as the
secret.
One potential problem with the algorithm above is the amount of state
that a CA needs to keep in order to verify the returned POP value. This
describes one of many possible ways of addressing the problem by reducing
the amount of state kept on the CA to a single (or small set) of values.
1. Server generates random seed x, constant across all requests. (The
value of x would normally be altered on a regular basis and kept for a
short time afterwards.)
2. For certificate request R, server computes y = F(x,R). F can be, for
example, HMAC-SHA1(x,R). All that's important for statelessness is
that y be consistently computable with only known state constant x and
function F, other inputs coming from the cert request structure. y
should not be predictable based on knowledge of R, thus the use of a
OWF like HMAC-SHA1.
5.8 LRA POP Witnesses Control Attribute
In an enrollment scenario involving an LRAs the CA may allow (or require)
the LRA to perform the POP protocol with the entity requesting
certification. In this case the LRA needs a way to inform the CA it has
done the POP. This control attribute has been created to address this
issue.
The ASN.1 structure for the LRA POP witness is as follows:
LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataBodyid BodyPartID,
bodyIds SEQUENCE of BodyPartID
}
-- pkiDataBodyid field contains the body part id of the nested CMS
body object containing the client's full request message.
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pkiDataBodyid is set to 0 if the request is in the current
PKIRequest body.
-- attribute contains a list of certificate requests for which the
LRA has performed an out-of-band authentication. The method of
authentication could be archival of private key material, challenge-
response or other means.
If a certificate server does not allow for an LRA to do the POP
verification, it returns an error of POPFAILURE. The CA MUST NOT start a
challenge-response to re-verify the POP itself.
5.9 Key Archival and Recovery
Everything described in this section is optional to implement. Servers
MAY require key archival of encryption keys as a condition of issuing a
certificate for that encryption key pair. Servers MAY reject all requests
contained within a PKIData if any required key archival message is
missing for any element within the PKIData.
There are four objects involved in key archival and recovery scenarios:
1. The Key Archival control attribute,
2. The Key Recovery Request control attribute,
3. The Key Recovery Response control attribute,
4. A ContentInfo containing private key material.
It is assumed that a key recovery operation will only return previously-
archived material. (That is, if an archival operation and a recovery
operation happen simultaneously, the newly archived key material is not
returned as part of the recovery response.)
The Key Recovery Response control can also be used to implement off-
client generation of encryption keys. A control statement containing the
required fields for key generation is generated on the client as part of
the enrollment request message. This is then sent up to the server and
the server responds with a Key Recovery Response containing the newly
generated key. The details of the request control statement not covered
in this document and would be done on a bilateral basis.
5.9.1 Key Archival Control Attribute
The key archival control attribute has the following ASN.1 syntax:
KeyArchival ::= SEQUENCE {
reqBodyPartID BodyPartID,
cmsBodyPartID BodyPartID,
selectionCriteria OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
The reqBodyPartID is a reference to the payload within the enclosing
PKIData that contains the certification request for the public key
component of the encryption key pair. If multiple certification requests
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for the same public key are included in the PKIData, reqBodyPartID may
point to any one of them.
The cmsBodyPartID is a reference to the payload within the enclosing
PKIData that contains the private key to be archived. The private key
MUST be the private component corresponding to the public key referenced
by reqBodyPartID.
The selectionCriteria is optional information to be associated with the
archived key material to facilitate key recovery of subsections of the
archive database.
5.9.2 Key Recovery Request Control Attribute
The key recovery request control attribute has the following ASN.1
syntax:
KeyRecoveryReq ::= SEQUENCE {
shroudIdentification ShroudIdentification,
bulkEncryptionAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
selectionCriteria OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
ShroudIdentification ::= CHOICE {
subjectPublicKeyInfo [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
encryptionToken [1] AlgorithmIdentifier
}
The shroudIdentification structure defines the encryption method and key
material that MUST be used in the key recovery response to encrypt the
recovered private key material. Two methods of identification are
currently defined. In the first, the public key component of an
encryption key pair is explicitly included in the request. The second
method derives a key from a known secret shared between client and
server, such as an out-of-band token. This method is defined as an
AlgorithmIdentifier as it must identify (a) the source of the key
material, (b) any public/salt information, and (c) the method of deriving
an encryption key using the request data, source key material and salt.
Clients and servers MUST support the subject public key method. Clients
and servers support of other methods is based on a bilateral agreement.
The bulkEncryptionAlgID identifies the bulk encryption algorithm that
MUST be used by the server to encrypt the key material in the subsequent
key recovery response.
The selectionCriteria is optional information to be associated with the
archived key material to facilitate key recovery of subsections of the
archive database. If selectionCriteria is absent, all archived keys
associated with the enrolling identity MUST be returned.
Notice that the recovery request does not include any end-entity
identification. Determination of the identity comes from other
locations: The name in a certificate request, the name in an identity
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proof, the name in the shrouding certificate or the name in the signing
certificate on the containing SignedInfo structure. Servers need to
establish a policy to be used by that server for identifying the entity
doing the request operation.
5.9.3 Key Recovery Response Control Attribute
The key recovery response control attribute has the following ASN.1
syntax:
KeyRecoveryRsp ::= SEQUENCE {
cmsBodyPartID BodyPartID,
selectionCriteria OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
-- cmsBodyPartID identifies a TaggedContentInfo contained within the
enclosing PKIData. The ContentInfo contains the requested private
key material.
-- selectionCriteria is the optional information that was used to
retrieve a subset of the keys archived in the archive database.
5.9.4 Private Key Info Attribute
The private key info attribute is imported from [PKCS8]. Private key
information is tagged by the private key info attribute. This attribute
has the ASN.1 structure:
PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
privateKey OCTET STRING,
attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL
}
Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
-- version MUST be the value 0
-- privateKeyAlgorithm contains the identifier for the private key
object
-- privateKey is an octet string whose contents is the private key
and whose format is defined by the value of privateKeyAlgorithm.
-- attributes is a set of attributes. These are extended
information that is part of the private key information.
We are defining the structures here to be used for three algorithms.
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5.9.4.1 D-H Private Keys
When creating a PrivateKeyInfo for a D-H key, the following rules apply:
1. The privateKeyAlgorithm MUST be set to id-dh-private-number. The
parameter for id-dh-private-number is DomainParameters (imported from
[PKIXCERT]).
2. The ASN structure for privateKey MUST be
DH-PrivateKey ::= INTEGER
3. attributes MUST be omitted.
5.9.4.2 DSA Private Keys
When creating a PrivateKeyInfo for a DSA key, the following rules apply:
1. The privateKeyAlgorithm MUST be set to id-dsa. The parameters for
id-
dsa is Dss-Parms (imported from [PKIXCERT]).
2. The ASN structure for privateKey MUST be
DSA-PrivateKey ::= INTEGER
3. attributes MUST be omitted.
5.9.4.3 RSA Private Keys
When creating a PrivateKeyInfo for an RSA key, the following rules apply:
1. The privateKeyAlgorithm MUST be set to rsaEncryption.
2. The ASN structure for privateKey MUST be RSAPrivateKey (defined in
[PKCS1])
3. Attributes MUST be omitted.
5.9.5 ContentInfo Objects for Private Key Material
ContentInfo object that contain private key material MUST be one of
EnvelopedData, EncryptedData or Data. Private key material placed in a
Data ContentInfo MUST be encrypted through some other mechanism; it is
beyond the scope of this document to specify that mechanism.
The inner content of the EnvelopedData or EncryptedData is a
ResponseBody. The private keys are then encoded as private key info
control attributes.
5.9.6 Control Flow
In the following control flow examples, "client" refers to the entity
archiving a private key or requesting recovery of a private key, and
"server" refers to the key archive facility.
Control flow for Key Archival is assumed to proceed as follows:
1. Client retrieves an encryption certificate for the archiving server,
so that key material to be archived may be encrypted to it.
2. Client generates an encryption key pair.
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3. Client submits an enrollment request for the key pair. As part of the
PKIData, the client includes:
a. A certificate request (PKCS10 or CRMF) for the key pair, which
includes the public key component and a message identifier (either
bodyPartID or certReqId),
b. A Key Archival control attribute, which includes two message
identifier references:
i. The identifier of the certification request in (3a), and
ii. The identifier of the ContentInfo in (3c).
c. A ContentInfo containing inside it the private key material
corresponding to the public key contained in the request in (3a)
and encrypted using the public key from the certificate obtained in
(1).
4. Server receives the request, archives the key material, and issues
certificates as appropriate. Server responds with an enrollment
response containing the issued certificates.
It is assumed that whatever mechanisms are used to identify the entity
requesting certification also serve to identify the archiving party.
Control flow for Key Recovery is assumed to proceed as follows:
1. Client sends a Full PKI Request message containing the Key Recovery
Request control attribute to the server. (The PKIData need contain
only the Key Recovery Request attribute.)
2. Server performs policy-based operations to determine whether the
recovery request is valid.
3. Assuming the request is indeed valid, the server sends back to the
client a Full PKI Response containing:
a. One or more Key Recovery Response control attributes.
b. One or more Private Key attributes containing encrypted private key
material as defined in section 5.9.4 above.
4. Client processes the response and extracts private key material from
the ContentInfo(s).
The above control flow for key recovery assumes that the client possesses
at least a previously-certified signature key, which is used to sign the
Full PKI Request message. In the event of a catastrophic failure on the
client resulting in loss of all client keys, generation and certification
of a new signature key may occur simultaneously to a request for recovery
of private encryption keys. Control flow for recovering from
catastrophic failure may proceed as follows:
1. Client generates a new signature key pair and creates a certification
request for the public component of the new signature key.
2. Client creates a Full PKI Request message containing:
a. The certificate request from Step 1,
b. A Key Recovery Request control attribute.
The Full PKI Request message is signed using the private signature key
generated as part of Step 1. Following Section 4.2, the signerInfo
field of the signed message will contain a NULL issuer name and a
serial number corresponding to the bodyPartID of the certificate
request within the PKIData. Notice that as it is not possible for the
client to prove identity within the PKI (because all certified key
pairs have been lost), another form of proof-of-identity is required
(such as use of the identification and identityProof control
attributes).
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3. Client sends the Full PKI Request to the server.
4. Server performs policy-based operations on the request message to
determine:
a. Whether the certification request on the new signature key should
be granted, and
b. Whether the recovery request is valid.
5. Assuming that both requests are valid, the server sends back to the
client a Full PKI Response containing:
a. A certificate for the signature key, corresponding to the
certification request generated by the client.
b. One or more Key Recovery Response control attributes.
c. One or more Private Key attributes containing private key material
as defined in section 3.4.8.4.
6. Client processes the response and extracts private key material and
certificates.
5.10 Get Certificate Control Attribute
Everything described in this section is optional to implement.
The get certificate control attribute is used to retrieve previously
issued certificates from a repository of certificates. A certificate
server, an LRA or an independent service may provide this repository. The
clients expected to use this facility are those operating in a resource-
constrained environment. (An example of a resource-constrained client
would be a low-end IP router that does not retain its own certificate in
non-volatile memory.)
The get certificate control attribute has the following ASN.1 structure:
GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName GeneralName,
serialNumber INTEGER }
The service responding to the request will place the requested
certificate in the certificates field of a SignedData object. If the get
certificate attribute is the only control in a Full PKI Request message,
the response would be a Simple Enrollment Response..
5.11 Get CRL Control Attribute
Everything described in this section is optional to implement.
The get CRL control attribute is used to retrieve CRLs from a repository
of CRLs. A certificate server, an LRA or an independent service may
provide this repository. The clients expected to use this facility are
those where a fully deployed directory is either infeasible or
undesirable.
The get CRL control attribute has the following ASN.1 structure:
GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
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cRLName GeneralName OPTIONAL,
time GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
reasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }
The fields in a GetCRL have the following meanings:
-- issuerName is the value of the Issuer DN in the subject
certificate.
-- cRLName may be the value of CRLDistributionPoints in the subject
certificate or equivalent value in the event the certificate does
not contain such a value.
-- time is used by the client to specify from among potentially
several issues of CRL that one whose thisUpdate value is less than
but nearest to the specified time. In the absence of a time
component, the CA always returns with the most recent CRL.
-- reasons is used to specify from among CRLs partitioned by
revocation reason. Implementers should bear in mind that while a
specific revocation request has a single CRLReason code--and
consequently entries in the CRL would have a single CRLReason code
value--a single CRL can aggregate information for one or more
reasonFlags.
A service responding to the request will place the requested CRL in the
crls field of a SignedData object. If the get CRL attribute is the only
control in a full enrollment message, the response would be a simple
enrollment response.
5.12 Revocation Request Control Attribute
The revocation request control attribute is used to request that a
certificate be revoked.
The revocation request control attribute has the following ASN.1 syntax:
RevRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
serialNumber INTEGER,
reason CRLReason,
sharedSecret OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
comment UTF8string OPTIONAL }
For a revocation request to become a reliable object in the event of a
dispute, a strong proof of originator authenticity is required. However,
in the instance when an end-entity has lost use of their signature
private key, it is impossible to produce a reliable digital signature.
The RevRequest provides for the optional transmission from the end-entity
to the CA of a shared secret that may be used as an alternative
authenticator in the instance of loss of use. The acceptability of this
practice is a matter of local security policy.
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(Note that in some situations a Registration Authority may be delegated
authority to revoke certificates on behalf of some population within its
scope control. In these situations the CA would accept the LRA's digital
signature on the request to revoke a certificate, independent of whether
the end entity still had access to the private component of the key
pair.)
Clients MUST provide the capability to produce a digitally signed
revocation request control attribute. Clients SHOULD be capable of
producing an unsigned revocation request containing the end-entity's
shared secret. If a client provides shared secret based self-revocation,
the client MUST be capable of producing a revocation request containing
the shared secret.
The structure of an unsigned, shared secret based revocation request is a
matter of local implementation. The shared secret does not need to be
shrouded when sent in a revocation request. The shared secret has a one-
time use, that of causing the certificate to be revoked, and public
knowledge of the shared secret after the certificate has been revoked is
not a problem. Clients need to inform users that the same shared secret
SHOULD NOT be used for multiple certificates.
A full response message MUST be returned for a revocation request.
5.13 Registration and Response Information Control Attributes
The regInfo control attribute is for clients and LRAs to pass additional
information as part a PKI request. The regInfo control attribute uses
the ASN.1 structure:
RegInfo ::= OCTET STRING
The content of this data is based on bilateral agreement between the
client and server.
If a server (or LRA) needs to return information back to a requestor in
response to data submitted in a regInfo attribute, then that data is
returned as a responseInfo control attribute. The content of the OCTET
STRING forresponse information is based on bilateral agreement between
the client and server.
5.14 Query Pending Control Attribute
In some environments, process requirements for manual intervention or
other identity checking can cause a delay in returning the certificate
related to a certificate request. The query pending attribute allows for
a client to query a server about the state of a pending certificate
request. The server returns a token as part of the CMCStatusInfo
attribute (in the otherInfo field). The client puts the token into the
query pending attribute to identify the correct request to the server.
The ASN.1 structure used by the query pending control attribute is:
QueryPending ::= OCTET STRING
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If a server returns a pending state (the transaction is still pending),
the otherInfo MAY be omitted. If it is not omitted then the same value
MUST be returned (the token MUST NOT change during the request).
6. Local Registration Authorities
This specification permits the use of Local Registration Authorities
(LRAs). An LRA sits between the client and the certification authority.
From the client the LRA appears to be the certification authority and
from the server the LRA appears to be a client. LRAs receive the
enrollment messages, perform local processing and then forward onto
certificate authorities. Some of the types of local processing that an
LRA can perform include:
- batching multiple enrollment messages together,
- challenge/response POP proofs,
- addition of private or standardized certificate extensions to all
requests,
- archival of private key material,
- routing of requests to different CAs.
When an LRA receives an enrollment message, it may either add its own
layer of wrapping to produce a nested message or strip off the SignedData
objects and produce a new non-nested message. LRAs SHOULD use nested
messages rather than non-nested messages when possible. LRAs SHOULD NOT
remove a signedData object wrapping layer if it was added by the original
requesting entity. LRAs MUST NOT alter a certificate request body (PKCS
#10 or CRMF) as any alteration invalidates the signature on the body and
thus the POP for the private key.
6.1 Nested Messages
The expected procedure for an LRA to add information to an end entities
certificate request message is to take the request and place it into a
new PKIData object. The request is placed in the cmsSequence if it is a
full pki message and the reqSequence field for a simple enrollment
message. Control attributes, such as the add extension attribute, are
then added to the controlSequence field of the PKIData object. An LRA
can combine multiple messages into a single new PKIData object by placing
more than one item in the sequence.
An example of how this would look is illustrated by the following figure:
SignedData (by LRA)
PKIData
controlSequence
LRA added control statements
reqSequence
Zero or more Simple CertificationRequests from clients
cmsSequence
Zero or more Full PKI messages from clients
SignedData (by client)
PKIData
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6.2 Non-Nested Messages
LRAs occasionally need to strip off the SignedData portion of a PKIData
message. In this case it is necessary for the LRA to correctly merge the
control statements in the submitted full PKI message with the changes to
be made by this LRA.
6.3 Multiple LRA Operation
In some instances there may be more than one LRA in the path from end
entity to certification authority, in this case the second LRA in the
sequence has two options for adding new control statements. The LRA may
either add a new layer of wrapping (resulting in three levels of nested
signedData objects) or it may strip the previous LRA's signature and
create a new signedData object. In this case the LRA is responsible for
merging together any control statements that the previous LRA may have
added.
7. Transport Wrapping
Depending on the transport mechanism that is being used to deliver the
enrollment request and responses different types of wrapping is required.
We document for use three different wrapping items here. Mime wrapping
is for transports that are natively mime based such as HTTP and E-mail.
A binary file transport is defined since floppy disk transport is still
very common. File transport can be done either as MIME wrapped (section
7.1) or bare (section 7.2).
7.1 MIME Wrapping
MIME wrapping is defined for those environments that are MIME native.
These include E-Mail based protocols as well as HTTP.
The basic mime wrapping in this section is taken from [SMIMEV2] and
[SMIMEV3]. Simple enrollment requests are encoded using the
application/pkcs10 content type. A file name MUST be included either in
a content type or content disposition statement. The extension for the
file MUST be ".p10".
Simple enrollment response messages MUST be encoded as content-type
application/pkcs7-mime. An smime-type parameter MUST be on the content-
type statement with a value of "certs-only." A file name with the ".p7c"
extension MUST be specified as part of the content-type or content-
disposition.
Full enrollment request messages MUST be encoded as content-type
application/pkcs7-mime. The smime-type parameter MUST be included with a
value of "CMC-enroll". A file name with the ".p7m" extension MUST be
specified as part of the content-type or content-disposition statement.
Full enrollment response messages MUST be encoded as content-type
application/pkcs7-mime. The smime-type parameter MUST be included with a
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value of "CMC-response." A file name with the ".p7m" extensions MUST be
specified as part of the content-type or content-disposition.
MIME TYPE File Extension SMIME-TYPE
application/pkcs10 .p10 N/A
(simple PKI request)
application/pkcs7-mime .p7m CMC-request
(full PKI request)
application/pkcs7-mime .p7c certs-only
(simple PKI response)
applicication/pkcs7-mime .p7m CMC-response
(full PKI response)
7.2 File-Based Transport
Enrollment messages and responses may also be transferred between clients
and servers using file system-based mechanisms, such as when enrollment
is performed for an off-line client. When files are used to transport
binary, BER-encoded Full Enrollment Request and Response messages, the
following file type extensions SHOULD be used:
Message Type File Extension
Full PKI Request .crq
Full PKI Response .crp
7.3 Socket-Based Transport
When enrollment messages and responses are sent over sockets, no wrapping
is required. Messages SHOULD be sent in their binary, BER-encoded form.
8. Interoperability
8.1 Mandatory and Optional Algorithms
CMC clients and servers MUST be capable of producing and processing
message signatures using the Digital Signature Algorithm [DSA]. DSA
signatures MUST be indicated by the DSA AlgorithmIdentifier value (as
specified in section 7.2.2 of [PKIXCERT]). PKI clients and servers
SHOULD also be capable of producing and processing RSA signatures (as
specified in section 7.2.1 of [PKIXCERT]).
CMC clients and servers MUST be capable of protecting and accessing
message encryption keys using the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange
algorithm. D-H/3DES protection MUST be indicated by the D-H
AlgorithmIdentifier value specified in [CMS]. PKI clients and servers
SHOULD also be capable of producing and processing RSA key transport.
When used for PKI messages, RSA key transport MUST be indicated as
specified in section 7.2.1 of [PKIXCERT].
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8.2 Minimum Conformance Requirements
A minimally compliant CMC server:
a) MUST accept a Full PKI Request message
i) MUST accept CRMF Request Bodies within a Full PKI Request
ii) MUST accept PKCS#10 Request Bodies within a Full PKI Request
b) MUST accept a Simple Enrollment Request message
c) MUST be able to return a Full PKI Response. (A Full PKI Response is
always a valid response, but for interoperability with downlevel clients
a compliant server SHOULD use the Simple Enrollment Response whenever
possible.)
A minimally-complaint CMC client:
a) MAY use either the Simple Enrollment Message or the Full PKI Request.
i) clients MUST use PKCS#10 with the Simple Enrollment Message
ii) clients MAY use either PKCS#10 or CRMF with the Full PKI Request
b) MUST understand the Simple Enrollment Response.
c) MUST understand the Full PKI Response.
9. Security Considerations
Initiation of a secure communications channel between an end-entity and a
CA or LRA (and, similarly, between an LRA and another LRA or CA)
necessarily requires an out-of-band trust initiation mechanism. For
example, a secure channel may be constructed between the end-entity and
the CA via IPSEC or TLS. Many such schemes exist and the choice of any
particular scheme for trust initiation is outside the scope of this
document. Implementers of this protocol are strongly encouraged to
consider generally accepted principles of secure key management when
integrating this capability within an overall security architecture.
Mechanisms for thwarting replay attacks may be required in particular
implementations of this protocol depending on the operational
environment. In cases where the CA maintains significant state
information, replay attacks may be detectable without the inclusion of
the optional nonce mechanisms. Implementers of this protocol need to
carefully consider environmental conditions before choosing whether or
not to implement the senderNonce and recipientNonce attributes described
in section 5.6. Developers of state-constrained PKI clients are strongly
encouraged to incorporate the use of these attributes.
Under no circumstances should a signing key be archived. Doing so allows
the archiving entity to potentially use the key for forging signatures.
Due care must be taken prior to archiving keys. Once a key is given to
an archiving entity, the archiving entity could use the keys in a way not
conducive to the archiving entity. Users should be made especially aware
that proper verification is made of the certificate used to encrypt the
private key material.
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Clients and servers need to do some checks on cryptographic parameters
prior to issuing certificates to make sure that weak parameters are not
used. A description of the small subgroup attack is provided in [X942].
CMC implementations ought to be aware of this attack when doing parameter
validations.
10. Open Issues
There appears to be a need to add one or more control statements to
acknowledge the fact that key archival has been completed. (In fact,
there may be a need for a general mechanism for an LRA to communicate
certain process-related information to the next upstream LRA/CA.)
11. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Brian LaMacchia for his work in
developing and writing up many of the concepts presented in this
document. The authors would also like to thank Alex Deacon and Barb Fox
for their contributions.
12. References
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax",
draft-ietf-smime-cms-06.txt, June 1998
[CRMF] M. Myers, C. Adams, D. Solo, D. Kemp, "Internet X.509
Certificate Request Message Format",
draft-ietf-pkix-crmf-01.txt, May 1998
[DH] B. Kaliski, "PKCS 3: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement v1.4"
[DH-SIG] H. Prafullchandra, J. Schaad, "Diffie-Hellman Signing
Algorithm", draft-schaad-dhsign-00.txt, November 1998
[HMAC] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[PKCS1] Kaliski, B. "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption, Version 1.5", RFC 2313,
March 1998.
[PKCS7] B. Kaliski, "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax v1.5",
RFC 2315, October 1997
[PKCS8] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS#8: Private-Key Information Syntax
Standard, Version 1.2", November 1, 1993.
[PKCS10] B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax v1.5",
RFC 2314, October 1997
[PKIXCERT] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo "Internet Public
Key Infrastructure X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile",
draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-part1-11.txt, September 1998
Myers, Liu, Schaad, Weinstein Page 35
Internet Draft March 1999
[RFC 2119] "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119
[SMIMEV2] S. Dusse, P. Hoffman, B. Ramsdell, L. Lundblade, L. Repka,
"S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification", RFC 2311, March 1998
[SMIMEV3] B. Ramsdell, "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
draft-ietf-smime-msg-05.txt, August 1998
[X942] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method".
(currently draft-ietf-smime-x942-*.txt)
13. Author's Addresses
Michael Myers
VeriSign Inc.
1350 Charlston Road
Mountain View, CA, 94043
(650) 429-3402
mmyers@verisign.com
Xiaoyi Liu
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
(480) 526-7430
xliu@cisco.com
Jim Schaad
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
(425) 936-3101
jimsch@microsoft.com
Jeff Weinstein
Netscape Communications Corporation
501 Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
jsw@netscape.com
Appendix A ASN.1 Module
EnrollmentMessageSyntax
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(4) internet(1)
security(5) mechansims(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmc(6) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All --
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
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-- in the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them for
-- their own purposes.
IMPORTS
-- Information Directory Framework (X.501)
Name
FROM InformationFramework { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5)
modules(1) informationFramework(1) 3 }
-- Directory Authentication Framework (X.509)
AlgorithmIdentifier, AttributeCertificate, Certificate,
CertificateList, CertificateSerialNumber
FROM AuthenticationFramework { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5)
module(1) authenticationFramework(7) 3 }
-- PKIX Part 1 - Implicit
GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}
-- PKIX Part 1 - Explicit
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, Extension
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax
ContentInfo, Attribute
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 1}
-- CRMF
CertReqMsg
FROM CRMF { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 5 };
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
id-pkix-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix <TBD>}
id-dh-private-number OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix id-alg(6) <TBD>}
id-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 2}
id-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 3}
id-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 4}
id-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 5}
id-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 6}
id-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 7}
id-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 18}
id-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 19}
id-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 21}
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-- This is the content type used for a request message in the
protocol
id-ct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix id-ct(5) 2 }
PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
bodyIdMax INTEGER ::= 4294967295
BodyPartID ::= INETGER(0..bodyIdMax)
TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartId,
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue
}
AttributeValue ::= ANY
TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
tcr [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
crm [1] CertReqMsg
}
TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
certificationRequest CertificationRequest
}
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING
}
TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartId,
contentInfo ContentInfo
}
OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
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otherMsgType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
otherMsgValue ANY DEFINED BY otherMsgType }
-- This defines the response message in the protocol
id-ct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix ct(5) 3 }
ResponseBody ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
-- Used to return status state in a response
id-cMCStatusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 1}
CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF INTEGER,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo } OPTIONAL
}
PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
pendToken INTEGER,
pendTime GENERALIZEDTIME
}
CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
success (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
failed (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
pending (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed,
-- requester is responsible to poll back on this
noSupport (4)
-- the requested operation is not supported
}
CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
badAlg (0),
-- Unrecognized or unsupported algorithm
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- Message time field was not sufficiently close to the system
time
badCertId (4),
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-- No certificate could be identified matching the provided
criteria
unsuportedExt (5),
-- A requested X.509 extension is not supported by the recipient
CA.
mustArchiveKeys (6),
-- Private key material must be supplied
badIdentity (7),
-- Identification Attribute failed to verify
popRequired (8),
-- Server requires a POP proof before issuing certificate
popFailed (9),
-- Server failed to get an acceptable POP for the request
noKeyReuse (10)
-- Server policy does not allow key re-use
internalCAError (11)
tryLater (12)
}
-- Used for LRAs to add extensions to certificate requests
id-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 8}
AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartID,
certReferences SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
extensions SEQUENCE OF Extension
}
id-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 9}
id-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 10}
EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
request TaggedRequest,
cms ContentInfo,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
witnessAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
witness OCTET STRING
}
DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
thePOP OCTET STRING
}
id-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 11}
LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataBodyid BodyPartID,
bodyIds SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
}
id-keyArchival OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 12}
id-keyRecoveryReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 13}
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id-keyRecoveryRsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 14}
KeyArchival ::= SEQUENCE {
reqBodyPartID BodyPartID,
cmsBodyPartID BodyPartID,
selectionCriteria OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
KeyRecoveryReq ::= SEQUENCE {
shroudIdentification ShroudIdentification,
bulkEncryptionAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier,
selectionCriterial OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
ShroudIdentification ::= CHOICE {
subjectPublicKeyInfo [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
encryptionToken [1] AlgorithmIdentifier
}
KeyRecoveryRsp ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
selectionCriteria OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
id-privateKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 20}
PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
privateKey OCTET STRING,
attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL
}
Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
DH-PrivateKey ::= INTEGER
--
id-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 15}
GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName GeneralName,
serialNumber INTEGER }
id-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 16}
GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
cRLName GeneralName OPTIONAL,
time GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
reasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }
id-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-cmc 17}
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RevRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
serialNumber INTEGER,
reason CRLReason,
passphrase OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
comment UTF8String OPTIONAL }
-- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added to a
certificate
id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}
ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension
-- The following exists to allow Diffie-Hellman Certificate Requests
Messages to be
-- well-formed
id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}
NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
END
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