One document matched: draft-ietf-l3vpn-bgpvpn-auto-02.txt

Differences from draft-ietf-l3vpn-bgpvpn-auto-01.txt




L3VPN WG                                              Hamid Ould-Brahim 
Internet Draft                                          Nortel Networks 
Expiration Date: October 2004 
                                                          Eric C. Rosen 
                                                          Cisco Systems 
                                                                        
                                                          Yakov Rekhter 
                                                       Juniper Networks 
                                                                        
                                                              (Editors) 
                                                                        
                                                             April 2004 
                                                                         
    
                     Using BGP as an Auto-Discovery 
                 Mechanism for Layer-3 and Layer-2 VPNs 
                                      
                  draft-ietf-l3vpn-bgpvpn-auto-02.txt 
 
 
    
Status of this Memo 
     
   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with 
      all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [RFC-2026].  
    
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.  
    
   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six 
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents 
   at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as 
   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."  
    
   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt  
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 
 
    
Abstract 
    
   In any Provider Provisioned-Based VPN (PPVPN) scheme, the Provider 
   Edge (PE) devices attached to a common VPN must exchange certain 
   information as a prerequisite to establish VPN-specific 
   connectivity. The purpose of this draft is to define a BGP based 
   auto-discovery mechanism for both layer-2 VPN architectures and 
   layer-3 VPNs ([VPN-VR]). This mechanism is based on the approach 
   used by [RFC2547-bis] for distributing VPN routing information 
   within the service provider(s). Each VPN scheme uses the mechanism 
 
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   to automatically discover the information needed by that particular 
   scheme.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
   In any Provider Provisioned-Based VPN (PPVPN) scheme, the Provider 
   Edge (PE) devices attached to a common VPN must exchange certain 
   information as a prerequisite to establish VPN-specific 
   connectivity. The purpose of this draft is to define a BGP based 
   auto-discovery mechanism for both layer-2 VPN architectures (i.e., 
   [L2VPN-KOMP], [L2VPN-ROSEN]) and layer-3 VPNs ([VPN-VR]). This 
   mechanism is based on the approach used by [RFC2547-bis] 
   for distributing VPN routing information within the service 
   provider(s). Each VPN scheme uses the mechanism to automatically 
   discover the information needed by that particular scheme. 
    
   In [RFC2547-bis] based layer-3 VPNs, VPN-specific routes are 
   exchanged, along with the information needed to enable a PE to 
   determine which routes belong to which VRFs. In [VPN-VR], virtual 
   router (VR) addresses must be exchanged, along with the information 
   needed to enable the PEs to determine which VRs are in the same VPN 
   ("membership"), and which of those VRs are to have VPN connectivity 
   ("topology"). Once the VRs are reachable through the tunnels, routes 
   ("reachability") are then exchanged by running existing routing 
   protocols per VPN basis.  
    
   The BGP-4 multiprotocol extensions are used to carry various 
   information about VPNs for both layer-2 and layer-3 VPN 
   architectures. VPN-specific information associated with the NLRI is 
   encoded either as attributes of the NLRI, or as part of the NLRI 
   itself, or both.   
 
    
2. Provider-Provisioned VPN Reference Model  
    
   Both the layer-2 and layer-3 vpns architectures are using a network 
   reference model as illustrated in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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                     PE                         PE 
               +--------------+             +--------------+ 
   +--------+  | +----------+ |             | +----------+ | +--------+             
   |  VPN-A |  | |  VPN-A   | |             | |  VPN-A   | | |  VPN-A |  
   |  Sites |--| |Database /| |  BGP route  | | Database/| |-|  sites | 
   +--------+  | |Processing| |<----------->| |Processing| | +--------+              
               | +----------+ | Distribution| +----------+ | 
               |              |             |              | 
   +--------+  | +----------+ |             | +----------+ | +--------+             
   | VPN-B  |  | |  VPN-B   | |  --------   | |   VPN-B  | | |  VPN-B | 
   | Sites  |--| |Database /| |-(Backbones)-| | Database/| |-|  sites | 
   +--------+  | |Processing| |  --------   | |Processing| | +--------+ 
               | +----------+ |             | +----------+ |  
               |              |             |              | 
   +--------+  | +----------+ |             | +----------+ | +--------+             
   | VPN-C  |  | |  VPN-C   | |             | |   VPN-C  | | |  VPN-C | 
   | Sites  |--| |Database /| |             | | Database/| |-|  sites | 
   +--------+  | |Processing| |             | |Processing| | +--------+ 
               | +----------+ |             | +----------+ |  
               +--------------+             +--------------+ 
 
 
                Figure 1: Network based VPN Reference Model 
     
 
   It is assumed that the PEs can use BGP to distribute information to 
   each other. This may be via direct IBGP peering, via direct EBGP 
   peering, via multihop BGP peering, through intermediaries such as 
   Route Reflectors, through a chain of intermediate BGP connections, 
   etc. It is assumed also that the PE knows what architecture it is 
   supporting. 
   
 
3. Carrying VPN information in BGP Multi-Protocol (BGP-MP) Attributes 
 
   The BGP-4 multiprotocol extensions are used to carry various 
   information about VPNs for both layer-2 and layer-3 VPN 
   architectures. VPN-specific information associated with the NLRI is 
   encoded either as attributes of the NLRI, or as part of the NLRI 
   itself, or both.  The addressing information in the NLRI field is 
   ALWAYS within the VPN address space, and therefore MUST be unique 
   within the VPN. The address specified in the BGP next hop attribute, 
   on the other hand, is in the service provider addressing space. In 
   L3VPNs, the  NLRI contains an address prefix  which is within the 
   VPN address space, and therefore must be unique within the VPN. 
        
    
3.1 Carrying Layer-3 VPN Information in BGP-MP  
    
   This is done as follows.  The NLRI is a VPN-IP address or a labeled 
   VPN-IP address.  
    
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   In the case of the virtual router, the NLRI address prefix is an 
   address of one of the virtual routers configured on the PE. Thus 
   this mechanism allows the virtual routers to discover each other, to 
   set up adjacencies and tunnels to each other, etc. In the case of 
   [RFC2547-bis], the NLRI prefix represents a route to an arbitrary 
   system or set of systems within the VPN. 
    
3.2 Carrying Layer-2 VPN Information in BGP-MP  
    
   The NLRI carries VPN layer-2 addressing information called VPN-L2 
   address. A VPN-L2 address is composed of a quantity beginning with 
   an 8 bytes Route Distinguisher (RD) field and a variable length 
   quantity encoded according to the layer-2 VPN architecture used. 
 
   Different layer-2 VPN solutions use the same common AFI, but 
   different SAFI. The AFI indicates that the NLRI is carrying a VPN-l2 
   address, while the SAFI indicates solution-specific semantics and 
   syntax of the VPN-l2 address that goes after the RD. The RD must be 
   chosen so as it ensures that each NLRI is globally unique (i.e., the 
   same  NLRI does not appear in two VPNs).  
    
 
   BGP Route target extended community is used to constrain route 
   distribution between PEs. The BGP Next hop carries the service 
   provider tunnel endpoint address. 
    
   This draft doesn't preclude the use of additional extended 
   communities for encoding specific l2vpn parameters. 
    
4. Interpretation of VPN Information in Layer-3 VPNs 
    
4.1 Interpretation of VPN Information in the [RFC2547-bis] Model 
    
   For details see [RFC2547-bis]. 
    
4.2 Interpretation of VPN Information in the [VPN-VR] Model 
    
4.2.1 Membership Discovery 
    
   The VPN-ID format as defined in [RFC-2685] is used to identify a 
   VPN. All virtual routers that are members of a specific VPN share 
   the same VPN-ID. A VPN-ID is carried in the NLRI to make addresses 
   of VRs globally unique. Making these addresses globally unique is 
   necessary if one uses BGP for VRs' auto-discovery. 
 
4.2.1.1 Encoding of the VPN-ID in the NLRI 
    
   For the virtual router model, the VPN-ID is carried within the route 
   distinguisher (RD) field. In order to hold the 7-bytes VPN-ID, the 
   first byte of RD type field is used to indicate the existence of the 
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   VPN-ID format. A value of 0x80 in the first byte of RD's type field 
   indicates that the RD field is carrying the VPN-ID format. In this 
   case, the type field range 0x8000-0x80ff will be reserved for the 
   virtual router case. 
    
    
4.2.1.2 VPN-ID Extended Community 
    
   A new extended community is used to carry the VPN-ID format. This 
   attribute is transitive across the Autonomous system boundary. The 
   type field of the VPN-ID extended community is of regular type to be 
   assigned by IANA [BGP-COMM]. The remaining 7 bytes hold the VPN-ID 
   value field as per [RFC-2685]. The BGP UPDATE message will carry 
   information for a single VPN. It is the VPN-ID Extended Community, 
   or more precisely route filtering based on the Extended Community 
   that allows one VR to find out about other VRs in the same VPN.  
 
 
4.2.2 VPN Topology Information 
    
   A new extended community is used to indicate different VPN topology 
   values. This attribute is transitive across the Autonomous system 
   boundary. The value of the type field for extended type is assigned 
   by IANA. The first two bytes of the value field (of the remaining 6 
   bytes) are reserved. The actual topology values are carried within 
   the remaining four bytes. The following topology values are defined: 
    
         Value    Topology Type 
    
           1          "Hub" 
           2          "Spoke" 
           3          "Mesh" 
    
   Arbitrary values can also be used to allow specific topologies to be 
   constructed. VPN connectivity between two VRs within the same VPN is 
   achieved if and only if at least one of them is a hub (the other is 
   a hub or a spoke), or if both VRs are part of a full mesh VPN 
   topology.   
 
5. Interpretation of VPN Information in Layer-2 VPNs 
    
   The interpretation of the VPN information carried in the VPN-L2 
   address is to be specified as part of each L2VPN solution 
   standardized by L2VPN working group. 
    
 
6. Tunnel Discovery 
    
   Layer-3 VPNs and Layer-2 VPNs must be implemented through some form 
   of tunneling mechanism, where the packet formats and/or the 
   addressing used within the VPN can be unrelated to that used to 
 
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   route the tunneled packets across the backbone. There are numerous 
   tunneling mechanisms that can be used by a network based VPN (e.g., 
   IP/IP [RFC-2003], GRE tunnels [RFC-1701], IPSec [RFC-2401], and MPLS 
   tunnels [RFC-3031]). Each of these tunnels allows for opaque 
   transport of frames as packet payload across the backbone, with 
   forwarding disjoint from the address fields of the encapsulated 
   packets. A provider edge router may terminate multiple type of 
   tunnels and forward packets between these tunnels and other network 
   interfaces in different ways. 
    
   BGP can be used to carry tunnel endpoint addresses between edge 
   routers. For scalability purposes, this draft recommends the use of 
   tunneling mechanisms with demultiplexing capabilities such as IPSec, 
   MPLS, and GRE (with respect to using GRE -the key field, it is no 
   different than just MPLS over GRE, however there is no specification 
   on how to exchange the key field, while there is a specification and 
   implementations on how to exchange the label). Note that IP in IP 
   doesn't have demultiplexing capabilities. 
    
   The BGP next hop will carry the service provider tunnel endpoint 
   address. As an example, if IPSec is used as tunneling mechanism, the 
   IPSec tunnel remote address will be discovered through BGP, and the 
   actual tunnel establishment is achieved through IPSec signaling 
   protocol.  
    
   When MPLS tunneling is used, the label carried in the NLRI field is 
   associated with an address of a VR, where the address is carried in 
   the NLRI and is encoded as a VPN-IP address. 
 
7. Auto-Discovery and VR-[RFC2547-bis] Interworking Scenarios 
 
   Two interwoking scenarios are considered when the network is using 
   both virtual routers and [RFC2547-bis]. The first scenario is a CE-
   PE relationship between a PE (implementing [RFC2547-bis]), and a VR 
   appearing as a CE to the PE. The connection between the VR, and the 
   PE can be either direct connectivity, or through a tunnel (e.g., 
   IPSec).  
    
   The second scenario is when a PE is implementing both architectures. 
   In this particular case, a single BGP session configured on the 
   service provider network can be used to advertise either [RFC2547-
   bis] VPN information or the virtual router related VPN information. 
   From the VR and the [RFC2547-bis] point of view there is complete 
   separation from data path and addressing schemes. However the PE's 
   interfaces are shared between both architectures. 
    
   A PE implementing only [RFC2547-bis] will not import routes from a 
   BGP UPDATE message containing the VPN-ID extended community. On the 
   other hand, a PE implementing the virtual router architecture will 
   not import routes from a BGP UPDATE message containing the route 
   target extended community attribute. 
     
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   The granularity at which the information is either [RFC2547-bis] 
   related or VR-related is per BGP UPDATE message. Different SAFI 
   numbers are used to indicate that the message carried in BGP 
   multiprotocol extension attributes is to be handled by the VR or 
   [RFC2547-bis] architectures. SAFI number of 128 is used for [RFC2547-
   bis] related format. A value of 129 for the SAFI number is for the 
   virtual router (where the NLRI are carrying a labeled prefixes), and 
   a SAFI value of 140 is for non labeled addresses. 
  
8. Scalability Considerations 
    
   In this section, we briefly summarize the main characteristics of 
   our model with respect to scalability. 
    
   Recall that the Service Provider network consists of (a) PE routers, 
   (b) BGP Route Reflectors, (c) P routers (which are neither PE 
   routers nor Route Reflectors), and, in the case of multi-provider 
   VPNs, and (d) ASBRs. 
    
   A PE router, unless it is a Route Reflector should not retain 
   VPN-related information unless it has at least one VPN with an 
   Import Target identical to one of the VPN-related information Route 
   Target attributes.  Inbound filtering should be used to cause such 
   information to be discarded.  If a new Import Target is later added 
   to one of the PE's VPNs (a "VPN Join" operation), it must then 
   acquire the VPN-related information it may previously have 
   discarded. 
    
   This can be done using the refresh mechanism described in [BGP-
   RFSH]. The outbound route filtering mechanism of [BGP-ORF] can also be 
   used to advantage to make the filtering more dynamic. 
    
   Similarly, if a particular Import Target is no longer present in 
   any of a PE's VPNs (as a result of one or more "VPN Prune" 
   operations), the PE may discard all VPN-related information which, 
   as a result, no longer have any of the PE's VPN's Import Targets as 
   one of their Route Target Attributes. 
    
   Note that VPN Join and Prune operations are non-disruptive, and do 
   not require any BGP connections to be brought down, as long as the 
   refresh mechanism of [BGP-RFSH] is used. 
    
   As a result of these distribution rules, no one PE ever needs to 
   maintain all routes for all VPNs; this is an important scalability 
   consideration. 
    
   Route reflectors can be partitioned among VPNs so that each 
   partition carries routes for only a subset of the VPNs supported by 
   the Service Provider. Thus no single route reflector is required to 
   maintain VPN-related information for all VPNs. 

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   For inter-provider VPNs, if multi-hop EBGP is used, then the ASBRs 
   need not maintain and distribute VPN-related information at all. 
    
   P routers do not maintain any VPN-related information.  In order 
   to properly forward VPN traffic, the P routers need only maintain 
   routes to the PE routers and the ASBRs.  
    
   As a result, no single component within the Service Provider network 
   has to maintain all the VPN-related information for all the VPNs. 
   So the total capacity of the network to support increasing numbers 
   of VPNs is not limited by the capacity of any individual component. 
    
   An important consideration to remember is that one may have any 
   number of INDEPENDENT BGP systems carrying VPN-related information. 
   This is unlike the case of the Internet, where the Internet BGP 
   system must carry all the Internet routes. Thus one significant 
   (but perhaps subtle) distinction between the use of BGP for the 
   Internet routing and the use of BGP for distributing VPN-related 
   information, as described in this document is that the former is not 
   amenable to partition, while the latter is. 
    
9. Security Considerations 
    
   This document describes a BGP-based auto-discovery mechanism which 
   enables a PE router that attaches to a particular VPN to discover 
   the set of other PE routers that attach to the same VPN.  Each PE 
   router that is attached to a given VPN uses BGP to advertise that 
   fact. Other PE routers which attach to the same VPN receive these 
   BGP advertisements. This allows that set of PE routers to discover 
   each other. Note that a PE will not always receive these 
   advertisements directly from the remote PEs; the advertisements may 
   be received from "intermediate" BGP speakers. 
    
   It is of critical importance that a particular PE should not be 
   "discovered" to be attached to a particular VPN unless that PE 
   really is attached to that VPN, and indeed is properly authorized to 
   be attached to that VPN.  If any arbitrary node on the Internet 
   could start sending these BGP advertisements, and if those 
   advertisements were able to reach the PE routers, and if the PE 
   routers accepted those advertisements, then anyone could add any 
   site to any VPN.  Thus the auto-discovery procedures described here 
   presuppose that a particular PE trusts its BGP peers to be who they 
   appear to be, and further that it can trusts those peers to be 
   properly securing their local attachments.  (That is, a PE must 
   trust that its peers are attached to, and are authorized to be 
   attached to, the VPNs to which they claim to be attached.). 
    
   If a particular remote PE is a BGP peer of the local PE, then the 
   BGP authentication procedures of RFC 2385 can be used to ensure that 

 
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   the remote PE is who it claims to be, i.e., that it is a PE that is 
   trusted. 
    
   If a particular remote PE is not a BGP peer of the local PE, then 
   the information it is advertising is being distributed to the local 
   PE through a chain of BGP speakers.  The local PE must trust that 
   its peers only accept information from peers that they trust in 
   turn, and this trust relation must be transitive.  BGP does not 
   provide a way to determine that any particular piece of received 
   information originated from a BGP speaker that was authorized to 
   advertise that particular piece of information.  Hence the 
   procedures of this document should be used only in environments 
   where adequate trust relationships exist among the BGP speakers. 
    
   Some of the VPN schemes which may use the procedures of this 
   document can be made robust to failures of these trust 
   relationships.  That is, it may be possible to keep the VPNs secure 
   even if the auto-discovery procedures are not secure.  For example, 
   a VPN based on the VR model can use IPsec tunnels for transmitting 
   data and routing control packets between PE routers.  An 
   illegitimate PE router which is discovered via BGP will not have the 
   shared secret which makes it possible to set up the IPsec tunnel, 
   and so will not be able to join the VPN.  Similarly, [IPSEC-2547] 
   describes procedures for using IPsec tunnels to secure VPNs based on 
   the [RFC2547-bis] model.  The details for using IPsec to secure a 
   particular sort of VPN depend on that sort of VPN and so are out of 
   scope of the current document. 
    
10. IANA Considerations 
 
    New AFI value to be assigned by IANA to indicate that the NLRI is  
    carrying VPN-L2 Address as described in section 3.2 to be used by 
    all L2VPN solutions.  
     
    SAFI number of "128" is used for [RFC2547-bis].     
    SAFI number "129" for indicating that the NLRI is carrying  
    information for VR-based solution.  
    SAFI number "140" for indicating that the NLRI is carrying  
    information for VR for non labeled prefixes. 
    New Extended Community to be assigned by IANA and used for Topology 
    values for VR-based L3VPN solution see section 4.2.2. 
    New Extended Community to be assigned by IANA for carrying VPN-ID  
    format based on RFC2685 format (see section 4.2.1.2) 
 
11. Use of BGP Capability Advertisement 
 
   A BGP speaker that uses VPN information as described in this 
   document with multiprotocol extensions should use the Capability 
 



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   Advertisement procedures [RFC-3392] to determine whether the speaker 
   could use Multiprotocol Extensions with a particular peer. 
 
12. Normative References 
    
    
   [BGP-COMM] Ramachandra, Tappan, et al., "BGP Extended Communities 
      Attribute", June 2001, work in progress 
    
   [BGP-MP] Bates, Chandra, Katz, and Rekhter, "Multiprotocol 
      Extensions for BGP4", February 1998, RFC 2283 
    
   [RFC-3107] Rekhter Y, Rosen E., "Carrying Label Information in 
      BGP4", January 2000, RFC3107 
       
   [RFC2547-bis] Rosen E., et al, "BGP/MPLS VPNs", Work in Progress. 
    
   [RFC-2685] Fox B., et al, "Virtual Private Networks Identifier", RFC 
      2685, September 1999. 
    
   [RFC-3392] Chandra, R., et al., "Capabilities Advertisement with  
      BGP-4", RFC3392, May 2002. 
 
   [VPN-VR] Knight, P., Ould-Brahim H., Gleeson, B., "Network based IP  
      VPN Architecture using Virtual Routers", Work in Progress.  
    
13. Informative References 
 
   [L2VPN-ROSEN] Rosen, E., Radoaca, V., "Provisioning Models and 
       Endpoint Identifiers in L2VPN Signaling", Work in Progress.  
   
   [L2VPN-KOMP] Kompella, K., et al., "Virtual Private LAN Service",    
       Work in Progress. 
 
   [L2VPN-VKOMP-LASS] Kompella, V., Lasserre, M., et al., "Transparent 
       VLAN Services over MPLS", Work in Progress.                           
 
   [RFC-1701] Hanks, S., Li, T., Farinacci, D. and P. Traina, "Generic 
      Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 1701, October 1994. 
 
   [RFC-2003] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC2003, 
      October 1996. 
 
   [RFC-2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 
      3", RFC2026, October 1996. 
 
   [RFC-2401] Kent S., Atkinson R., "Security Architecture for the 
      Internet Protocol", RFC2401, November 1998. 
 
   [RFC-2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate  
      Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.  
 
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   [TLS-TISSA] "BGP/MPLS Layer-2 VPN", draft-tsenevir-bgpl2vpn-01.txt, 
      work in progress, July 2001. 
    
   [IPSEC-2547] Rosen, E., et al., "Use of PE-PE IPsec in RFC2547 
      VPNs", Work in Progress.  
    
   [BGP-RFSH] Chen, A., "Route Refresh Capability for BGP-4", RFC2918, 
      September 2000. 
    
   [BGP-ORF] Chen, E., and Rekhter, Y., "Cooperative Route Filtering 
      Capability for BGP-4", Work in Progress. 
 
    
14. Intellectual Property Rights Notices 
 
   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 
   intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to 
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 
   might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it 
   has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the 
   IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and 
   standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of 
   claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances 
   of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made 
   to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such 
   proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification 
   can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat. 
    
15. Contributors 
 
 
   Bryan Gleeson  
   Tahoe Networks 
   3052 Orchard Drive  
   San Jose, CA 95134 USA  
   Email: bryan@tahoenetworks.com 
                                    
   Peter Ashwood-Smith 
   Nortel Networks 
   P.O. Box 3511 Station C, 
   Ottawa, ON K1Y 4H7, Canada 
   Phone: +1 613 763 4534                       
   Email: petera@nortelnetworks.com 
                        
   Luyuan Fang  
   AT&T 
   200 Laurel Avenue  
   Middletown, NJ 07748    
   Email: Luyuanfang@att.com 
 
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                 draft-ietf-l3vpn-bgpvpn-auto-02.txt       April 2004 
 
    Phone: +1 (732) 420 1920 
 
   Jeremy De Clercq  
   Alcatel 
   Francis Wellesplein 1 
   B-2018 Antwerpen, Belgium 
   Phone: +32 3 240 47 52 
   Email: jeremy.de_clercq@alcatel.be 
 
   Riad Hartani 
   Caspian Networks 
   170 Baytech Drive 
   San Jose, CA 95143 
   Phone: 408 382 5216 
   Email: riad@caspiannetworks.com 
 
   Tissa Senevirathne 
   Force10 Networks 
   1440 McCarthy Blvd,  
   Milpitas, CA 95035. 
    
   Phone: 408-965-5103 
   Email: tsenevir@hotmail.com 
 
 
16. Authors Information 
 
   Hamid Ould-Brahim                        
   Nortel Networks  
   P O Box 3511 Station C                   
   Ottawa, ON K1Y 4H7, Canada                      
   Email: hbrahim@nortelnetworks.com                            
    
 
 
   Eric C. Rosen 
   Cisco Systems, Inc. 
   1414 Massachusetts Avenue 
   Boxborough, MA 01719 
   E-mail: erosen@cisco.com                       
    
                         
   Yakov Rekhter  
   Juniper Networks 
   1194 N. Mathilda Avenue  
   Sunnyvale, CA 94089    
   Email: yakov@juniper.net 





 
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                 draft-ietf-l3vpn-bgpvpn-auto-02.txt       April 2004 
 
 
Full Copyright Statement 
    
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PAFTECH AB 2003-20262026-04-21 03:19:53