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Internet Draft IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication November 2007
Network Working Group Manav Bhatia
Internet Draft Alcatel-Lucent
Expires: May 2008 Vishwas Manral
IP Infusion
(Editors)
IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication
draft-ietf-isis-hmac-sha-04.txt
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Abstract
This document proposes an extension to IS-IS to allow the use of any
cryptographic authentication algorithm in addition to the already
documented authentication schemes, described in the base
specification and RFC 3567.
Although this document has been written specifically for using HMAC
construct along with the SHA family of cryptographic hash functions,
the method described in this document is generic and can be used to
extend IS-IS to support any cryptographic hash function in the
future.
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Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. [KEYWORDS]
Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2
2. IS-IS Security Association.....................................3
3. Authentication Procedures......................................4
3.1 Authentication TLV.........................................4
Figure 1..........................................................4
3.2 Authentication Process.....................................4
3.3 Cryptographic Aspects......................................4
3.4 Procedures at the Sending Side.............................6
3.5 Procedure at the Receiving Side............................6
4. Security Considerations........................................7
5. Acknowledgements...............................................8
6. IANA Considerations............................................8
7. References.....................................................9
7.1 Normative References.......................................9
7.2 Informative References.....................................9
8. Author's Addresses............................................10
1. Introduction
IS-IS [ISO] [RFC1195] specification allows for authentication of its
PDUs via the authentication TLV 10 that is carried as the part of the
PDU. The base spec has provision for only clear text passwords and
RFC 3567 [RFC3567] augments this to provide the capability to use
HMAC MD5 authentication for its PDUs.
The first octet of value field of TLV 10 specifies the type of
authentication to be carried out. Type 0 is reserved, Type 1
indicates a cleartext password, Type 54 indicates HMAC MD5 and Type
255 is used for routing domain private authentication methods. The
remainder of the value field contains the actual authentication data
determined by the value of the authentication type.
This document proposes a new authentication type to be carried in TLV
10, called the generic cryptographic authentication (CRYPTO_AUTH).
This can be used to specify any authentication algorithm for
authenticating and verifying IS-IS PDUs.
This document also explains how HMAC-SHA authentication can be used
in IS-IS.
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By definition, HMAC [RFC2104] requires a cryptographic hash function.
We propose to use any one of SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512 [NIST] for this purpose to authenticate the IS-IS PDUs.
We propose to do away with the per interface keys and instead have
key IDs that map to unique IS-IS Security Associations.
While there are no openly published attacks on the HMAC-MD5
mechanism, some reports [Dobb96a, Dobb96b] create concern about the
ultimate strength of the MD5 cryptographic hash function.
2. IS-IS Security Association
An IS-IS Security Association (SA) contains a set of shared
parameters between any two legitimate IS-IS speakers.
Parameters associated with an IS-IS SA:
O Key ID – This is a one octet unsigned integer used to uniquely
identify an IS-IS SA, as manually configured by the network operator.
The receiver determines the active SA by looking at this field in the
incoming PDU. The sender puts this Key ID based on the active
configuration.
Using key IDs makes changing keys while maintaining protocol
operation convenient. Each key ID specifies two independent parts,
the authentication protocol and the authentication key, as explained
below. Normally, an implementation would allow the network operator
to configure a set of keys in a key chain, with each key in the chain
having fixed lifetime. The actual operation of these mechanisms is
outside the scope of this document.
Note that each key ID can indicate a key with a different
authentication protocol. This allows multiple authentication
mechanisms to be used at various times without disrupting IS-IS
peering, including the introduction of new authentication mechanisms.
o Authentication Algorithm – This signifies the authentication
algorithm to be used with the IS-IS SA. Valid values are HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512.
o Authentication Key – This value denotes the key associated with the
IS-IS SA. The length of this key is variable and depends upon the
authentication algorithm specified by the IS-IS SA.
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3. Authentication Procedures
3.1 Authentication TLV
A new authentication code, 0x3, indicates the CRYPTO_AUTH mechanism
described in this document is in use, is inserted in the first octet
of the existing IS-IS Authentication TLV (10).
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type 10 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type | Key ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| Authentication Data (Variable)|
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1
3.2 Authentication Process
When calculating the CRYPTO_AUTH result for Sequence Number PDUs,
Level 1 Sequence Number PDUs SHALL use the Area Authentication string
as in Level 1 Link State PDUs. Level 2 Sequence Number PDUs shall use
the domain authentication string as in Level 2 Link State PDUs.
IS-IS HELLO PDUs SHALL use the Link Level Authentication String,
which MAY be different from that of Link State PDUs. The CRYPTO_AUTH
result for the IS-IS HELLO PDUs SHALL be calculated after the PDU is
padded to the MTU size, if padding is not disabled. Implementations
that support the optional checksum for the Sequence Number PDUs and
IS-IS HELLO PDUs MUST NOT include the Checksum TLV.
3.3 Cryptographic Aspects
In the algorithm description below, the following nomenclature, which
is consistent with [FIPS-198], is used:
H is the specific hashing algorithm (e.g. SHA-256).
K is the password for the PDU type as per ISO 10589.
Ko is the cryptographic key used with the hash algorithm.
B is the block size of H, measured in octets rather than bits.
Note that B is the internal block size, not the hash size.
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For SHA-1 and SHA-256: B == 64
For SHA-384 and SHA-512: B == 128
L is the length of the hash, measured in octets rather than bits.
XOR is the exclusive-or operation.
Opad is the hexadecimal value 0x5c repeated B times.
Ipad is the hexadecimal value 0x36 repeated B times.
Apad is the hexadecimal value 0x878FE1F3 repeated (L/4) times.
(1)Preparation of the Key
In this application, Ko is always L octets long.
If the Authentication Key (K) is L octets long, then Ko is equal
to K. If the Authentication Key (K) is more than L octets long,
then Ko is set to H(K). If the Authentication Key (K) is less
than L octets long, then Ko is set to the Authentication Key (K)
with zeros appended to the end of the Authentication Key (K) such
that Ko is L octets long.
(2)First Hash
First, the IS-IS packet's Authentication Data field is filled with
the value Apad and the Authentication Type field is set to 0x3.
Then, a first hash, also known as the inner hash, is computed
as follows:
First-Hash = H(Ko XOR Ipad || (IS-IS PDU))
(3)Second Hash
Then a second hash, also known as the outer hash, is computed
as follows:
Second-Hash = H(Ko XOR Opad || First-Hash)
(4)Result
The result Second-Hash becomes the Authentication Data that is
sent in the Authentication Data field of the IS-IS PDU. The length
of the Authentication Data field is always identical to the
message digest size of the specific hash function H that is being
used.
This also means that the use of hash functions with larger output
sizes will also increase the size of the IS-IS PDU as transmitted
on the wire.
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3.4 Procedures at the Sending Side
An appropriate IS-IS SA is selected for use with an outgoing IS-IS
PDU. This is done based on the active key at that instant. If IS-IS
is unable to find an active key, then the PDU is discarded.
If IS-IS is able to find the active key, then the key gives the
authentication algorithm (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384 or HMAC-SHA-512) that needs to be applied on the PDU.
An implementation MUST fill the authentication type and the length
before the authentication data is computed. The authentication data
is computed as explained in the previous section. The length of the
TLV is set as per the authentication algorithm that is being used.
It’s set to 22 for HMAC-SHA-1, 30 for HMAC-SHA-224, 34 for HMAC-SHA-
256, 50 for HMAC-SHA-384 and 66 for HMAC-SHA-512. Note that one octet
has been added to account for the Key ID and one octet for the
authentication type.
The key ID is filled.
The Checksum and Remaining Life time fields are set to Zero for the
LSPs before authentication is calculated.
The result of the authentication algorithm is placed in the
Authentication data, following the key ID.
The authentication data for the IS-IS IIH PDUs MUST be computed after
the IIH has been padded to the MTU size, if padding is not explicitly
disabled.
3.5 Procedure at the Receiving Side
The appropriate IS-IS SA is identified by looking at the Key ID from
the Authentication TLV 10 from the incoming IS-IS PDU.
Authentication algorithm dependent processing, needs to be performed,
using the algorithm specified by the appropriate IS-IS SA for the
received packet.
Before an implementation performs any processing it needs to save the
values of the Authentication Value field, the Checksum and the
Remaining Life time.
It should then set the Authentication Value field with Apad and zero
the Checksum and Remaining Life time fields before the authentication
data is computed. The calculated data is compared with the received
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authentication data in the PDU and the PDU is discarded if the two do
not match. In such a case, an error event SHOULD be logged.
An implementation MAY have a transition mode where it includes
CRYPTO_AUTH information in the PDUs but does not verify this
information. This is provided as a transition aid for networks in the
process of migrating to the new CRYPTO_AUTH based authentication
schemes.
Similarly, implementations not supporting the CRYPTO_AUTH field MAY
accept PDUs that contain this particular field in TLV 10.
4. Security Considerations
The document proposes extensions to IS-IS which would make it more
secure than what it is today. It does not provide confidentiality as
a routing protocol contains information that does not need to be kept
secret. It does however, provide means to authenticate the sender of
the PDUs which is of interest to us.
The technology in this document provides an authentication mechanism
for IS-IS. The mechanism described here is not perfect and does not
need to be perfect. Instead, this mechanism represents a significant
increase in the work function of an adversary attacking the IS-IS
protocol, while not causing undue implementation, deployment, or
operational complexity.
The mechanism detailed in this document does not protect IS-IS
against replay attacks. An adversary could in theory replay old IIHs
and bring down the adjacency [CRYPTO] or replay old CSNPs and PSNPs
that would cause a flood of LSPs in the network. Using some sort of
crypto sequence numbers in IS-IS IIHs and CSNP/PSNPs is an option to
solve this problem. Discussing this is beyond the scope of this
document and it’s a matter which needs to be followed in the WG.
This document states that the remaining lifetime of the LSP MUST be
set to zero before computing the authentication, thus this field is
not authenticated. This field is excluded so that the LSPs may be
aged by the ISes in between without requiring to recompute the
authentication data. This can be exploited by an attacker.
To ensure greater security, the keys used must be changed
periodically and implementations MUST be able to store and use more
than one key at the same time.
It should be noted that the cryptographic strength of the HMAC
depends upon the cryptographic strength of the underlying hash
function and on the size and quality of the key.
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If a stronger authentication were believed to be required, then the
use of a full digital signature [RFC-2154] would be an approach that
should be seriously considered. It was rejected for this purpose at
this time because the computational burden of full digital signatures
is believed to be much higher than is reasonable given the current
threat environment in operational commercial networks.
5. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Hugo Krawczyk, Arjen K. Lenstra (Bell
Labs) and Eric Grosse (Bell Labs) for educating us on some of the
finer points related to Crypto Mathematics.
We would also like to thank Bill Burr, Tim Polk, John Kelsey, and
Morris Dworkin of (US) NIST for review of portions of this document
that are directly derived from the closely related work on RIPv2
Cryptographic Authentication [RFC-4822].
6. IANA Considerations
This document requests that IANA create a new code point registry to
administer the Authentication Type code points for TLV 10. This
registry would be part of the existing IS-IS code points registry as
established by [RFC-3563] and [RFC-3359]. This registry should be
managed using the Designated Expert policy as described in
[RFC-2434bis] and will be called IS-IS Authentication Type Codes.
The values in the IS-IS Authentication Type Codes registry should be
recorded in decimal and should only be approved after a designated
expert, appointed by the IESG area director, has been consulted.
The intention is that any allocation will be accompanied by a
published RFC. However, the Designated Expert can approve
allocations once it seems clear that an RFC will be published,
allowing for the allocation of values prior to the document being
approved for publication as an RFC. New items should be documented in
a publicly and freely available specification. We should also have
the provision of allowing external specifications to allocate and use
the IS-IS Authentication Type Codes maintained by this registry.
Initial values for the IS-IS Authentication Type Codes registry are
given below; future assignments are to be made through Expert Review.
Assignments consist of an authentication type name and its associated
value.
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Authentication Type Code Value Reference
------------------------ ------ ---------
Reserved 0 [ISO]
Cleartext Password 1 [ISO]
ISO 10589 Reserved 2 [ISO]
Cryptographic Authentication 3
HMAC-MD5 Authentication 54 [RFC3567]
Routeing Domain private authentication method 255 [ISO]
This document currently defines and uses the value 3 to foster
prestandard implementations.
7. References
7.1 Normative References
[ISO] "Intermediate system to Intermediate system routeing
information exchange protocol for use in conjunction with
the Protocol for providing the Connectionless-mode Network
Service (ISO 8473)", ISO/IEC 10589:1992
[RFC1195] Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and
dual environments", RFC 1195, December 1990.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC3567] Li, T. and Atkinson, R. "Intermediate System to
Intermediate System (IS-IS) Cryptographic Authentication",
RFC 3567, July 2003
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H. et al., "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997
[NIST] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002
[FIPS-198] US National Institute of Standards & Technology, "The
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)", FIPS PUB
198, March 2002.
7.2
Informative References
[Dobb96a] Dobbertin, H, "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress", Technical
Report, 2 May 1996. (Presented at the Rump Session of
EuroCrypt 1996.)
[Dobb96b] Dobbertin, H, "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
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CryptoBytes, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1996.
[CRYPTO] Manral, V. et al., "Issues with existing Cryptographic
Protection Methods for Routing Protocols", Work in
Progress, February 2006
[RFC-2154] S. Murphy, M. Badger, and B. Wellington, "OSPF with
Digital Signatures", RFC 2154, June 1997.
[RFC-4822] R. Atkinson, M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 4822, February 2007.
[RFC-3359] Przygienda, T., "Reserved Type, Length and Value (TLV)
Codepoints in Intermediate System to Intermediate System",
RFC 3359, August 2002.
[RFC-3563] Zinin, A., "Cooperative Agreement Between the ISOC/IETF
and ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1/Sub Committee 6
(JTC1/SC6) on IS-IS Routing Protocol Development",
RFC 3563, July 2003.
[RFC-2434bis] Narten, T. and Alvestrand, H., "Guidelines for Writing
an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", Work in
Progress, March 2007
8. Author's Addresses
Manav Bhatia
Alcatel-Lucent
Bangalore, India
Email: manav@alcatel-lucent.com
Tony Li
Cisco Systems
San Jose, CA
USA
EMail: tli@cisco.com
Vishwas Manral
IP Infusion
Almora, Uttarakhand
India
Email: vishwas@ipinfusion.com
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Russ White
Cisco Systems
RTP North Carolina
USA
Email: riw@cisco.com
Randall J. Atkinson
Extreme Networks
3585 Monroe Street
Santa Clara, CA 95051
USA
Email: rja@extremenetworks.com
Matthew J. Fanto
Ciber Inc.
Dearborn, Mi
USA
Email: mfanto@ciber.com
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