One document matched: draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-01.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-00.txt
Internet Engineering Task Force R. Pereira
IP Security Working Group TimeStep Corporation
Internet Draft S. Anand
Expires in six months Microsoft Corporation
November 12, 1997
The ISAKMP Configuration Method
<draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-01.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is a submission to the IETF Internet Protocol
Security (IPSECond) Working Group. Comments are solicited and
should be addressed to the working group mailing list
(ipsec@tis.com) or to the editor.
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
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Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document describes a new ISAKMP method that allows
configuration items to be set by using both push/acknowledge and
request/reply paradigms.
R. Pereira, S. Anand [Page 1]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method November, 97
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................2
1.1. Specification of Requirements..............................2
2. Configuration Method...........................................3
3. Configuration Transaction......................................3
3.1. Configuration NOTIFY Codes.................................4
4. Configuration NOTIFY Data......................................4
5. Configuration Attributes.......................................4
6. Security Considerations........................................5
7. References.....................................................5
8. Acknowledgments................................................6
9. Editors' Addresses.............................................6
1. Introduction
ISAKMP provides a framework to negotiate and derive Security
Associations. But since it is used within the IPSec framework, it
may also be used to configure secure hosts. This configuration may
take place between a gateway, an end-host client, or a
configuration manager. For example, this can be used to configure
multi-protocol IP tunnels securely.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and
concepts described in the "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol" [Atkinson95] and "IP Security Document Roadmap"
[Thayer97] documents.
Readers are advised to be familiar with both [Harkins97] and
[ISAKMP] because of the terminology used within this document and
the fact that this document is an extension of both of those
documents.
1.1. Specification of Requirements
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
NOT", and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted
as described in [Bradner97].
R. Pereira, S. Anand [Page 2]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method November, 97
2. Configuration Method
Configuration Method uses an exchange mode type of InfoMode for the
ISAKMP header. This mode SHOULD NOT be used prior to the
establishment of an ISAKMP Phase 1 Security Association.
The InfoMode exchange used to transport configuration items uses
the exact format as defined in [Harkins97] under "ISAKMP
Information Exchanges".
Thus if there is an ISAKMP SA already established between the
peers, then the message will be sent out encrypted and
authentication.
3. Configuration Transaction
A "Configuration Transaction" is defined as two Configuration Mode
exchanges, the first being either a Set or a Request and the second
being either a Acknowledge or a Reply respectively. The Message ID
within the ISAKMP header identifies the configuration transaction
and MUST NOT be zero.
There are two paradigms to follow for this mode.
o "Set/Acknowledge" works on the push principle that allows a
configuration manager (a host that wishes to send information to
another) to start the configuration transaction. The
Acknowledge code MUST return zero length attributes that it
accepted. Those attributes that it did not accept will NOT be
sent back in the acknowledgement.
o "Request/Reply" allows a host to request information from an
informed host (a configuration manager). Attributes in the
Request exchange may have values filled in to request these
values once again. The Reply exchange MAY wish to choose those
values, or return new values. It MAY also add new attributes
and not include some requested attributes.
Transactions are completed once the Reply or Acknowledge code is
received. If one is not received, the implementation MAY wish to
retransmit the original exchange.
If a badly formatted exchange is received, the message SHOULD be
silently discarded and perhaps logged locally, as per local policy.
Badly formatted exchanges MIGHT also include those with unknown
codes or unknown attributes within the Configuration Method.
R. Pereira, S. Anand [Page 3]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method November, 97
3.1. Configuration NOTIFY Codes
Code Value
========================== ===========
ISKAMP_CFG_REQUEST 101
ISKAMP_CFG_REPLY 102
ISKAMP_CFG_SET 103
ISKAMP_CFG_ACK 104
Since the Configuration Method uses NOTIFY codes for information
exchange, if the peer does not support this, it will quietly
discard the message without breaking any SA negotiation.
4. Configuration NOTIFY Data
The data of the NOTIFY payload that contains the configuration
information is a set of ISAKMP attributes [ISAKMP].
5. Configuration Attributes
Attribute Value Type Length
========================== ======= ================ ============
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS 1 Variable 4 octets
INTERNAL_IPX_ADDRESS 2 Variable 6 octets
INTERNAL_NB_ADDRESS 3 Variable 16 octets
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS 4 Variable 4 octets
INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS 5 Variable 4 octets
RENEW_SECONDS 6 Basic/Variable 2 or 4 octets
USE_IP4_DHCP 7 Variable 4 octets
o INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS - Specifies an IPv4 address within the
internal network. This address is sometimes called a red node
address. This address is sometimes an illegal address on the
Internet.
o INTERNAL_IPX_ADDRESS - Specifies an IPX address within the
internal network.
o INTERNAL_NB_ADDRESS - Specifies a NetBios address within the
internal network.
o INTERNAL_IP4_DNS - Specifies an IPv4 address of a DNS server
within the network.
o INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS - Specifies an IPv4 address of a NetBios Name
Server (WINS) within the network.
R. Pereira, S. Anand [Page 4]
Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method November, 97
o RENEW_SECONDS - Specifies the number of seconds that the host
can use all of the information set within the configuration
transaction. The host MUST renew this information before this
expiry time and MUST not use any of the information obtained
through the configuration transaction after the expiry time.
o USE_IP4_DHCP - Instructs the host to request any subsequent
information through the DHCP protocol. This attribute holds the
IPv4 address of a DHCP server.
It is hoped that more attribute types will be defined in the
future. Some suggestions would be to distribute local policy, or
even authentication certificates. Also, note that no
recommendations are made to how an implementation actually figures
out what information to send. i.e. we do not recommend any
specific method of (a gateway) determining which DNS server should
be returned to a requesting host.
6. Security Considerations
This entire draft discusses a new ISAKMP configuration method to
allow entities in the network to acquire and share configuration
information.
The draft mandates that this exchange should usually occur after
the Phase I Security Association has been set up and that the
entire exchange be protected by the Phase I SA. Thus the exchange
is as secure as any Phase II SA.
7. References
[Atkinson95] Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-arch-sec-01
[Bradner97] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC2119, March 1997
[ISAKMP] D. Maughan, M. Schertler, M. Schneider, J. Turner,
"Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol",
draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-08
[Harkins97] D. Harkins, "The Resolution of ISAKMP and Oakley",
draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-05
[Thayer97] R. Thayer, N. Doraswamy, R. Glenn, "IP Security Document
Roadmap", draft-ietf-ipsec-doc-roadmap-00
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Internet Draft The ISAKMP Configuration Method November, 97
8. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank Peter Ford of Microsoft and Bob
Moskowitz of Chrysler.
9. Editors' Addresses
Roy Pereira
rpereira@timestep.com
TimeStep Corporation
+1 (613) 599-3610 x 4808
Sanjay Anand
sanjayan@microsoft.com
Microsoft Corporation
+1 (206) 936-6367
The IPSec working group can be contacted via the IPSec working
group's mailing list (ipsec@tis.com) or through its chairs:
Robert Moskowitz
rgm@chrysler.com
Chrysler Corporation
Theodore Y. Ts'o
tytso@MIT.EDU
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
R. Pereira, S. Anand [Page 6]
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