One document matched: draft-ietf-ediint-as2-03.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-ediint-as2-02.txt
EDIINT Working Group Chuck Shih
draft-ietf-ediint-as2-03.txt Dale Moberg
Expires in six months. Rik Drummond
10 February 1999
HTTP Transport for Secure EDI
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance
with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
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progress."
To view the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check
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Abstract
This document describes how to exchange EDI documents securely
using http transport for EDI data that is packaged in MIME messages
that use public key security body parts.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose and relation to previous work
1.2 Overall operation
2. Stages of an HTTP EDI exchange transaction
2.1 EDI sending using POST
2.1.1 Response and Error Codes for POST requests
2.1.2 Using Transport Layer Security
2.2 Receipt Reply
3. Referenced RFCs and their contribution
3.1 RFC 2068: Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1 [11]
3.2 RFC ????: Transport Layer Security [13]
3.3 RFC 1847: MIME Security Multiparts [6]
3.4 RFC 1892: Multipart/report [10]
3.5 RFC 1767: EDI Content [2]
3.6 RFC 2015: PGP/MIME [4]
3.7 RFC 2045, 2046, and 2049: MIME [1]
3.8 RFC 2298: Message Disposition Notification [5]
3.9 RFC 2311: S/MIME Version 2 Specification [8]
3.10 RFC ????: MIME-based Secure EDI [12]
4. Differences between HTTP and SMTP based transport
4.1 Unused MIME headers and operations
4.1.1 Content-Transfer-Encoding not used
4.1.2 Epilogue must be empty
4.1.3 Lengthy message bodies and Message/partial
4.2 Differences in MIME or other headers or parameters used
4.2.1 Content-Length needed.
4.2.2 Final-Recipient and Original Recipient
4.2.3 Message-Id and Original-Message-Id
4.2.3 Host header
5. Acknowledgments
6. References
7. Authors' Addresses
A. Example exchange.
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose and relation to previous work
Early work on Internet EDI focused on specifying MIME content
types for EDI data ([2] RFC 1767). The functional requirements
document [9], "Requirements for Interoperable Internet EDI,"
provides extensive information on EDI security
and the business and user processes surrounding the need for and
use of EDI security. In addition, MIME structures
appropriate for SMTP transport of the packaged EDI data are
specified in ([12] "MIME-based Secure EDI" ).
That specification also describes comprehensive security features,
specifically data privacy, data integrity/authenticity,
non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of receipt.
In this document, it is assumed that the reader is familiar
with the SMTP/MIME transport document, the requirements document,
and the RFCs applied or referenced in those documents.
This draft, like the SMTP/MIME transport document, builds on
previous RFCs and is attempting to "re-invent" as little
as possible. The goal here is to specify how previously specified
MIME messaging structures and operations can be adapted for use with
HTTP servers and clients to obtain secure, reliable,
and acknowledged transport for EDI data.
The applicability statement, [12] "MIME-based Secure EDI,"
explained the basic EDI transaction using the concept of a
"secure transmission loop" for EDI. This loop involves
one organization sending a signed and encrypted EDI
interchange to another organization,
requesting a signed receipt, followed later by the
receiving organization sending this signed receipt back to the
sending organization. In other words, the following transpires:
i. The organization sending EDI/EC data encrypts the data and
provides a digital signature, using either PGP/MIME or S/MIME.
In addition, they request a signed receipt.
ii. The receiving organization decrypts the message and verifies
the signature, resulting in verified integrity of the data and
authenticity of the sender.
iii. The receiving organization then sends a signed receipt
using a signature over the hash of a message disposition
notification, which contains a hash of the received message.
The above describes functionality which if implemented would
satisfy all security requirements. Other restricted subsets of
functionality have also been characterized. In this document, the
goal is to make use of HTTP instead of SMTP as a transport protocol,
and make changes needed to adapt to protocol packaging differences.
In either transport case, the body of the message is a MIME structure.
SMTP RFC 822 headers needed for the secure transmission
loop become either HTTP entity-headers or extension-headers
[11, section 7.1]. Content transfer encodings (such as "base 64" and
"quoted-printable" that have been needed in the SMTP context
are omitted in the HTTP context.
An option to make use of Transport Layer Security [13] to provide
privacy is added; compression can be provided using HTTP content-codings
[11, sections 3.5, 14.3, 14.12]. (Content codings are not be be
confused with the MIME concept of content transfer encodings.)
Other differences are noted in the following and emphasized again
in the concluding section.
Note that the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted
as described in RFC 2119.
1.2 Overall operation
A HTTP POST operation [11] is used to send appropriately packaged
EDI or other business data. The Request-URI ([11], section 9.5)
identifies a process to unpack and handle the message data
and to generate a reply for the client that contains a message
disposition acknowledgement. This request/reply transaction
provides secure, reliable, and authenticated transport for EDI
or other business data using HTTP.
2. Stages of an HTTP EDI exchange transaction
An EDI data file or stream is first structured into one of the
message templates described in [12], sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.4 or
4.3.1 to 4.3.4 for PGP/MIME or S/MIME security. If TLS is to be used,
the typical packaging will be that provided in 4.2.2 or 4.3.2;
that is, a multipart/signed message will be created with no
encryption in the message. Otherwise, if privacy
is desired, message templates 4.2.4 or 4.3.4 are used.
Content transfer encoding MUST not be used. A content-length
field MUST be provided.
To request an unsigned message disposition notification,
additional extension headers MUST be added to the content-type
and content-length headers in the entity header section preceding
the message body.
A Disposition-Notification-To [5] header is added to indicate
that a message disposition notification is requested
in the reply to the POST request. A Message-ID header MUST
be added to support message reconciliation. Both "From"
and "To" headers MUST be supplied. Other headers, especially
"Subject" and "Date", SHOULD be supplied; these values
are often mentioned in the human-readable section of the MDN
to aid in identifying the original message.
A Disposition-Notification-Options header is used to request
a signed message disposition notification. The parameters
used to select protocols for signed message disposition
notification are found in [12].
2.1 EDI sending using POST
For sending EDI, the following protocol elements are typically
present: a request line ([11], section 5.1), entity headers, a
CRLF pair to mark the end of the entity headers, followed by the
message-body.
The request line will have the form: "POST Request-URI HTTP/1.1".
The spaces must be present. The request line must be followed by a CRLF.
The Request-URI is typically exchanged out of band,
as part of setting up a bilateral trading partner agreement.
Automation of this process is outside this specification but
might involve obtaining a session URL from an authentication page,
for example.
The request line MUST be followed by entity headers
specifying content length ([11] section 14.14) and content type
[11] section 14.18. The Host request header ([11] sections 9
and 14.23) MUST be included.
The entity or extension headers used for requesting a message disposition
notification (unsigned or signed) have previously been mentioned,
as have those ("To" "From" "Message-Id") that are needed as values
for MDN fields.
2.1.1 Response and Error Codes for POST requests
The status line for response to errors in the POST request line
will be provided by a status line with the following protocol
elements present ( [11], section 6.1 ) : HTTP version (normally,
HTTP/1.1), a status code, reason phrase, and CRLF.
The status codes return status concerning HTTP operations.
The status code should be 204 ("No Content")
in case the request-URI process does not produce
an entity to return. Other explicit error codes are
documented in [11], sections 6.1.1 and throughout section 10.
For errors in the request-URI, 400 ("Bad Request"),
404 ("Not Found") and similar codes are appropriate status codes.
These codes are specified in [11].
Successful codes will be mentioned in section 2.2 below,
where the inclusion of an entity containing the message
disposition notification is also discussed.
2.1.2 Using Transport Layer Security
To use Transport Layer Security [13], the request-URI should indicate
the appropriate scheme value, https. Usually only a multipart/signed
message body would be sent using TLS, as encrypted message bodies
would be redundant. Encrypted message bodies may be sent, however.
2.2 Receipt Reply
The response to the POST command varies depending upon whether
a receipt has been requested and upon what kind of receipt
has been requested.
With no extended header requesting a receipt, and no errors
accessing the request-URI specified processing, the status
line in the Response to the POST request should be in the
200 range. Status code 200 ("OK") should be used when
an entity is returned (a signed receipt in a multipart/signed
content type or an unsigned receipt in a multipart/report).
The user agent application may respond with an unsolicited
multipart/report as a message body. Entity headers for content-type
and content-length MUST be provided.
When a message disposition notice extension header is present
in the POST request entity headers, then entity headers for
the message disposition notice should be included and a message
body containing the multipart/report [10] or multipart/signed [6]
should be included in the Response entity headers as appropriate.
The basic responsibilities of responding to requests are discussed
at length in [12] section 5, and in detail within section 5.2.1.
Message Disposition Notifications, when used in the HTTP reply
context, will closely parallel a SMTP MDN.
The disposition field is a required element in the machine
readable second part of a multipart/report.
The final-recipient-field([5] section 3.1) value SHOULD
be derived from the entity headers of the request
If the "To" field is missing, for signed messages,
the value for Original-recipient may be the email
address field from the signer's X.509 attribute for
email addresses if that value is available.
An application MUST report the Message-ID of a request.
The human readable part (the first part of the multipart/report)
SHOULD include items such as the subject, date and other information
when those fields are present in entity header fields following the
POST request.
The HTTP reply SHOULD normally omit the third part of the report
(used to return the original message or its headers in the SMTP
context).
3. Referenced RFCs and their contribution
3.1 RFC 2068 [11] : The HyperText Transfer Protocol, HTTP,
provides an application level protocol for distributed hypermedia
information systems. This standard specifies the protocol HTTP/1.1.
3.2 RFC ???? [13] : Transport Layer Security
Security specifies a protocol similar to SSL version 3 that provides
communications privacy over the Internet. Applications can
communicate without eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.
3.3 RFC 1847 [6] : MIME Security Multiparts
This document defines security multiparts for MIME:
multipart/encrypted and multipart/signed.
3.4 RFC 1892 [10] : Multipart/report
This RFC defines the use of the multipart/report content type
that the MDN RFC 2298 [5] presupposes.
3.5 RFC 1767 [2] : EDI Content
This RFC defines the use of content type "application" for ANSI
X12 (application/EDI-X12), EDIFACT (application/EDIFACT) and
mutually defined EDI (application/EDI-Consent).
3.6 RFC 2015 [4] : PGP/MIME
This RFC defines the use of content types
"multipart/encrypted", "multipart/signed", "application/pgp
encrypted" and "application/pgp-signature" for defining MIME PGP
content.
3.7 RFC 2045, 2046, and 2049 [1] : MIME
These are the basic MIME standards, upon which all MIME related RFCs
build, including this one. Key contributions include definition of
"content type", "sub-type" and "multipart", as well as encoding
guidelines, which establishes 7-bit US-ASCII as the canonical
character set to be used in Internet messaging.
3.8 RFC 2298 [5] : Message Disposition Notification
This RFC defines how a message disposition notification
(MDN) is requested, and the format and syntax of the MDN.
The MDN is the basis upon which receipts and signed receipts
are defined in this and in [12].
3.9 RFC 2311 [8] : S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification
This specification describes how MIME shall carry PKCS7 1.5
envelopes.
3.10 RFC ???? [12] : MIME-based Secure EDI
This applicability statement describes security patterns,
MIME content types, and acknowledgement policies and
mechanisms for EDI or business data transport.
4. Comparison of HTTP and SMTP based transport
For HTTP version 1.1, TCP persistent connections are the default,
( [11] sections 8.1.2, 8.2, and 19.7.1).
A number of other differences exist because HTTP does not
conform to MIME [1] as used in SMTP transport. Relevant
differences are summarized below.
4.1 Unused MIME headers and operations
4.1.1 Content-Transfer-Encoding not used in HTTP transport
HTTP can handle binary data and so there is no need to use
the Content transfer encodings of MIME [1]. This difference
is discussed in [11] section 19.4.4.
4.1.2 Epilogue must be empty
The EBNF for a multipart [1] RFC 2046, section 5.1.1 allows
a multipart to have trailing octets after the close delimiter.
In [11] section 3.7.2, it is explicitly noted that multiparts
must have null epilogues.
4.1.3 Lengthy message bodies
In [12], section 5.4.1, options for large file processing are
discussed for SMTP transport. For HTTP, large files should
be handled correctly by the TCP layer. However, [11] sections
3.5 and 3.6 discuss some options for compressing or chunking
entities to be transferred. Section 8.1.2.2 discusses a
pipelining option that may be useful for segmenting large
amounts of data.
4.2 Differences in MIME or other headers or parameters used
4.2.1 Content-Length
Because connections are persistent, closing a connection
cannot be used to indicate the end of an entity. Therefore,
[11] sections 4.4 and 14.14 indicate the need for a
Content-Length entity header in a request.
4.2.2 Final and Original Recipient
The final and original recipient distinction should not
arise for HTTP transport because SMTP aliases and mailing
lists should not be used.
4.2.3 Message-Id and Original-Message-Id
The Message-Id and Original-Message-Id distinction should not
arise for HTTP transport because SMTP MTA alterations should
not occur.
4.2.4 Host header
The host request header field must be included in the
POST request made when sending business data. This field
is to allow one server IP address to service multiple
hostnames, and potentially conserve IP addresses.
See [11], sections 14.23 and 19.5.1.
5. Acknowledgments
Carl Hage, Karen Rosenfeld and Chuck Fenton have provided valuable suggestions
for the improvement of this applicability statement.
6. References
[1] N. Borenstein, N.Freed, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)
Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies", RFC 2045,
December 02, 1996.
N. Borenstein, N.Freed, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)
Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, December 02, 1996.
N. Borenstein, N.Freed, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)
Part Five: Conformance Criteria and Examples", RFC 2049 , December 02,
1996.
[2] D. Crocker, "MIME Encapsulation of EDI Objects", RFC 1767, March
2, 1995.
[3] D. Crocker, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text
Messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 13, 1982.
[4] M. Elkins, "MIME Security With Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)", RFC
2015, Sept. 1996.
[5] R. Fajman, "An Extensible Message Format for Message Disposition
Notifications", RFC 2298, March 1998.
[6] J. Galvin, S. Murphy, S. Crocker, N. Freed, "Security Multiparts
for MIME: Multipart/Signed and Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, Oct.
3, 1995
[7] J. Postel, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", STD 10, RFC 821,
August 1, 1982.
[8] S. Dusse, P. Hoffman, B. Ramsdell, L. Lundblade, L. Repka,
"S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification", RFC 2311.
[9] C. Shih, "Requirements for Interoperable Internet EDI",
Internet draft: draft-ietf-ediint-req05.txt.
[10] G. Vaudreuil, "The Multipart/Report Content Type for the Reporting
of Mail System Administrative Messages", RFC 1892,
January 15, 1996.
[11] R. Fielding, J.Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, T. Berners-Lee,
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2068,
January 1997.
[12] C. Shih, "MIME-based Secure EDI", Internet draft:
draft-ietf-ediint-as1-08.txt.
[13] T. Dierks, "The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0," Internet draft:
draft-ietf-tls-protocol-05.txt.
7. Authors' Addresses
Chuck Shih
Dale Moberg
dale_moberg@stercomm.com
Sterling Commerce
4600 Lakehurst Ct.
Dublin, OH 43016 USA
Rik Drummond
drummond@onramp.com
The Drummond Group
5008 Bentwood Ct.
Ft. Worth, TX 76132 USA
Appendix A. Example Exchange.
NOTE: This example is provided as illustration only
If the example conflicts with the previous text,
the example is wrong.
Likewise, the use of entity or extension fields in
this example is not to be construed as a definition for those type
names or extension fields.
A.1 Sending a multipart signed for trading partner 1 back to
trading partner 2. "#" indicates a comment line.
POST https://tp2server.company2.com/cgi-bin/tp1drawer.pl HTTP/1.1
Host: tp2server.company2.com
From: tp1@company1.com
To: tp2@company2.com
Date: Tue, 06 Nov 2001 12:53:01 UT
Subject: Purchase orders for 6 November 2001
Message-Id: <20011106@company1.com>
Disposition-Notification-To: tp1@company1.com
# continuation lines not used in actual HTTP protocol data unit
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="20011106RsXgYlvCNW" ;
protocol=application/pkcs7-signature; micalg=rsa-md5
Content-Length: 3056
--20011106RsXgYlvCNW
Content-Type: application/edi-x12
Content-Disposition: Attachment; filename=rfc1767.dat
Content-Length: 2605
ISA ...
# EDI transaction data
IEA ...
--20011106RsXgYlvCNW
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Content-Length: 804
# omitted binary data
--20011106RsXgYlvCNW--
A.2
Returning a signed MDN (using the previously established TLS security)
from trading partner 2 back to trading partner 1.
"#" indicates a comment line.
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: HTTPEDI/1.1
Content-type: multipart/signed;
Content-Length: 1200
--boundary1
Content-type: multipart/report
Content-length: 1133
--boundary2
Content-type: text/plain
Content-length: 85
Message <20011106@company1.com> was authenticated;
EDI processing was initiated.
--boundary2
Content-type: message/disposition-notification
Content-length: 213
Reporting-UA: Company2UA
Original-Message-Id: <20011106@company1.com>
Original-Recipient: tp2@company2.com
X-Received-Content-MIC: w7AguNJEmhF/qIjJw6LnnA==,rsa-md5
Disposition: MDN-sent-automatically/processed
--boundary2--
--boundary1
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Content-Length: 560
# Signature data omitted
--boundary1--
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