One document matched: draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-01.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-00.txt
DNS Working Group Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd
INTERNET-DRAFT IBM
Expires: April 2000 October 1999
draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-01.txt
Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)
------ --- ------------- --- --- ----- ---
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Status of This Document
This draft, file name draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-01.txt, is intended to
be become a Proposed Standard RFC. Distribution of this document is
unlimited. Comments should be sent to the DNS working group mailing
list <namedroppers@internic.net> or to the author.
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months. Internet-Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by
other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet-
Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as a
``working draft'' or ``work in progress.''
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd [Page 1]
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Abstract
[draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt] provides a means of authenticating and
securing Domain Name System (DNS) queries and responses using shared
secret keys via the TSIG resource record (RR). However, it provides
no mechanism for setting up such keys other than manual exchange.
This document describes a TKEY RR that can be used in a number of
different modes to establish shared secret keys between a DNS
resolver and server.
Acknowledgments
The substantial comments and ideas of the following persons (listed
in alphabetic order) have been incorporated herein and are gratefully
acknowledged:
Olafur Gudmundsson
Stuart Kwan
Brian Wellington
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd [Page 2]
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Table of Contents
Status of This Document....................................1
Abstract...................................................2
Acknowledgments............................................2
Table of Contents..........................................3
1. Introduction............................................4
1.1 General Principles.....................................4
1.2 Overview of Contents...................................5
2. The TKEY Resource Record................................6
3. Exchange via Resolver Query.............................7
3.1 Query for Server Assigned Keying.......................8
3.2 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying..............9
3.3 Query for GSS-API Established.........................10
3.4 Query for Querier Assigned Keying.....................10
3.5 Query for TKEY Deletion...............................11
4. Spontaneous Server Inclusion...........................11
4.1 Spontaneous GSS-API Exchange..........................11
4.2 Spontaneous Key Deletion..............................12
5. Methods of Encryption..................................12
6. IANA Considerations....................................12
7. Security Considerations................................13
Changes from Previous Draft...............................14
References................................................15
Author's Address..........................................16
Expiration and File Name..................................16
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1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical, distributed, highly
available database used for mapping between domain names and
addresses, for email routing, and for other information [RFC 1034,
1035]. It has been extended to provide for public key security and
dynamic update [RFC 2136, RFC 2535]. Familiarity with these RFCs is
assumed.
[draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt] provides a means of more efficiently
authenticating and securing DNS messages using shared secret keys via
the TSIG resource record (RR) but provides no mechanism for setting
up such keys other than manual exchange. This document describes a
TKEY RR that can be used in a number of different modes to establish
such shared secret keys between a DNS resolver and server.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
1.1 General Principles
TKEY is a meta-RR that is not stored or cached in the DNS and does
not appear in zone files. It supports a variety of modes for the
establishment and deletion of shared secret keys between DNS entities
such as resolvers and servers. The establishment of such a key
requires that state be maintained at both the resolver and the server
and the allocation of the resources to maintain such state may
require mutual agreement. In the absence of such agreement, servers
are free to return errors such as NotImp or Refused for any attempt
to use TKEY and resolvers are free to ignore any TKEY RRs they
receive.
In all cases herein, the term "resolver" includes that part of a
server which makes full and incremental [RFC 1995] zone transfer
queries as well as other queries.
Servers are not required to implement any particular mode or modes of
the defined modes of TKEY shared secret key establishment or deletion
and may return errors such as NotImp for any they do not support. In
the future, based on experience, more modes may be added or some
modes described herein may be made mandatory or deprecated.
The means by which the shared secret keying material, exchanged via
TKEY, is actually used in any particular TSIG algorithm is algorithm
dependent and is defined in connection with that algorithm.
Note that TKEY established keying material and TSIGs that use it are
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associated with DNS hosts. They are not necessairly associated with
zones. They may be used to authenticate queries and responses but
they do not provide zone stored DNS data origin or denial
authentication [RFC 2535].
Two modes of TKEY, the server assigned and resolver assigned modes,
perform encryption which may effect their export or
import status for some countries. All other aspects of DNS security,
including the SIG, KEY, NXT, and TSIG RRs and all other currently
defined modes of TKEY perform authentication (signatures and
signature verification) only.
General protection against denial of service via the use of TKEY is
not provided.
Only one TKEY RR may occur in a queryr or response. Between any pair
of hosts, only one set of keying material may be in place at the same
time for any particulary key name. An attempt to establish another
set of keying material at a server for an existing name should return
a BADNAME error.
A reasonable key naming strategy is as follows:
If the key is generated as the result of a query with root as
its owner name, they the server can create a name consisting of
a hash of the key plus the server host name. For example
89n3mdg072pp.host.example.com.
If the key is generated as the result of a query with a non-root
name, say foo.example.net, the use the concatenation of that
with the server host name. For example
foo.example.net.host.example.com.
1.2 Overview of Contents
Section 2 below specifies the TKEY resource record (RR) and provides
a high level description of its constituent fields.
Section 3 discusses key exchange via requests with the Query opcode
for type TKEY. This is applicable to all currently defined TKEY
modes and in some cases in not what would intuitively be called a
"query".
Section 4 discusses spontaneous inclusion of TKEY RRs in responses by
servers. This is applicable to key deletion and to server assigned
modes.
Section 5 describes encryption methods for transmitting secret key
information.
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Section 6 covers IANA considerations in assignment of TKEY modes.
Finally, Section 7 touches on some security considerations.
2. The TKEY Resource Record
The TKEY resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR
type code is 249.
Field Type Comment
----- ---- -------
NAME domain see description below
TTYPE u_int16_t TKEY
CLASS u_int16_t ignored, should be zero
TTL u_int32_t SHOULD be zero
RDLEN u_int16_t size of RDATA
RDATA: Algorithm: domain
Inception: u_int32_t
Expiration: u_int32_t
Mode: u_int16_t
Error: u_int16_t
Key Size: u_int16_t
Key Data: octet-stream
Other Size: u_int16_t
Other Data: octet-stream undefined by this protocol
The Name field's meaning differs somewhat with mode and context as
explained in subsequent sections.
The TTL field SHOULD always be zero to be sure that older DNS
implementations do not cache TKEY RRs.
The algorithm name is a domain name with the same meaning as in
[draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt]. The algorithm determines how the
secret keying material exchanged using the TKEY RR is actually used
to derive the algorithm specific key that is used.
The inception time and expiration time are in number of seconds since
the beginning of 1 January 1970 GMT ignoring leap seconds treated as
modulo 2**32 using ring arithmetic [RFC 1982]. In messages between a
DNS resolver to a DNS server where these fields are meaningful, they
are either the requested validity interval for the keying material
asked for or specify the validity interval of keying material
provided. See Security Considerations section in reference to replay
attacks.
The mode field specifies the general scheme for key agreement or
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purpose of the TKEY DNS message. Note that implementation of TKEY as
a whole and of any particular mode is optional. The following values
of the Mode octet are defined, available, or reserved:
Value Description
----- -----------
0 - reserved
1 server/responder assignment
2 Diffie-Hellman exchange
3 GSS-API negotiation
4 resolver/querier assignment
5 key deletion
6-65534 - available, see IANA considerations section
65535 -reserved
The error code field is an extended RCODE. The following values are
defined:
Value Description
----- -----------
0 - no error
1-15 a DNS RCODE
16 BADSIG
17 BADKEY
18 BADTIME
19 BADMODE
The key data size field is an unsigned 16 bit integer in network
order which specifies the size of the key exchange data field in
octets. The meaning of the key data depends on the mode.
The Other Size and Other Data fields are not used. The RDLEN field
MUST equal the length of the RDATA section through the end of other
data or the RR is to be considered malformed and rejected.
3. Exchange via Resolver Query
One method for a resolver and a server to negotiate about shared
secret key for use in TSIG is through DNS requests from the resolver
which are syntactically queries for type TKEY. Such queries MUST be
accompanied by a TKEY RR in the additional information section to
indicate the mode in use and other information where required or the
resolver and server must have a prior agreement that supplies any
information that would otherwise have had to be conveyed by a TKEY RR
in the query.
For TKEY(s) appearing in a query, the TKEY RR name SHOULD be a domain
locally unique at the resolver (or globally unique), less than 128
octets long, and meaningful to the resolver to distinguish keys
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and/or key agreement sessions. (For resolvers not wishing to make
this use of the name, it may be specified as root to minimize
length.) For TKEY(s) appearing in a response to a query, the TKEY RR
name SHOULD be a globally unique server assigned domain. If the TKEY
in a response is the result of a query containing a TKEY with a non-
root name, that query TKEY name SHOULD be incorporated in the
response TKEY name. Specific suggestions are given under some modes
below.
Type TKEY queries SHOULD NOT be flagged as recursive and servers MAY
ignore the recursive header bit in TKEY queries they receive.
3.1 Query for Server Assigned Keying
In server assigned keying, the DNS server host generates the keying
material and it is sent to the resolver encrypted under a resolver
host key. See section 5 for description of encryption methods.
A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR
specifying the "server assignment" mode and a resolver host KEY RR to
be used in encrypting the response, both in the additional
information section. The TKEY algorithm field is set to the signature
algorithm the resolver plans to use. It is recommended that any "key
data" optionally provided in the query TKEY by the resolver be
strongly mixed with server generated randomness [RFC 1750] to derive
the keying material to be used. The KEY that appears in the query
SHOULD have a zero TTL. It need not be accompanied by a SIG(KEY) and
if the query is signed by the resolver host and that signature is
verified, then any SIG(KEY) provided MAY be ignored for key exchange
purposes. The KEY RR in such a query SHOULD have a name that
corresponds to the resolver host but it is only essential that it be
a public key for which the resolver has the corresponding private key
so it can decrypt the response data.
Accepting and responding to an unsigned query of this sort may drain
some entropy from an entropy pool being maintained by the server and
used for secret key generation and so might enable an entropy
exhaustion attack. In addition, some significant amount of
computational resources may be used in the public key encryption of
response data. To protect against these effects, a server SHOULD
require such a query to be signed and MAY rate limit responses.
The server response contains a TKEY in its answer section with the
server assigned mode and echoes back the KEY RR provided in the query
in its additional information section
If the error field of the response TKEY is non-zero, the query failed
for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query specified no
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encryption key.
If the error field is zero, the key data portion of the response TKEY
RR will be the server assigned keying data encrypted under the public
key in the resolver provided KEY RR. In this case, the name of the
answer TKEY RR will be the server assigned name of the key and SHOULD
be globally unique.
The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY are those requested
for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in the
response TKEY are the maximum period the server will consider the
keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys so this is not a
guarantee.
3.2 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange is means whereby two parties can
derive some shared secret information without requiring any secrecy
of the messages they exchange [Schneier]. Provisions have been made
for the storage of DH public keys in the DNS [RFC 2539].
A client sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR in the
additional information section specifying the "Diffie-Hellman" mode
and accompanied by a KEY RR specifying a client host Diffie-Hellman
key. The TKEY algorithm field is set to the signature algorithm the
resolver plans to use. Any "key data" provided in the TKEY is ignored
by the server.
Accepting and responding to an unsigned query of this sort may use
significant computation at the server; however, if the server
requires that the request be signed, then if no shared secret is in
place to permit a TSIG to be used on the request, it would be
necessary to use a SIG(0) the verification of which would impose its
own computational load.
The server response contains a TKEY in its answer section with the
Diffie-Hellman mode. If the error field is non-zero, the query failed
for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query included no DH
KEY and BADKEY is given if the query included an incompatible DH KEY.
If the error field is zero, the client host supplied Diffie-Hellman
KEY should be echoed back and a server host Diffie-Hellman KEY RR
will also be present in the response.
Both parties can then calculate the same shared secret quantity from
the pair of Diffie-Hellman keys used [Schneier], provided they use
the same modulus, and the data in the TKEY. The TKEY data is
strongly mixed with the DH result by TBD.
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The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY are those requested
for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in the
response TKEY are the maximum period the server will consider the
keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys so this is not a
guarantee.
3.3 Query for GSS-API Established
This is described in a separate document [draft-skwan-gss-tsig-*.txt]
which should be seen for the full description. Basically, when an
acceptable symmetric key is not yet in place, the resolver can send a
query for type TKEY with a TKEY specifying the GSS-API mode in the
additional information section and a GSS-API token in the key data
portion. The server responds with a TKEY specifying the GSS-API mode
and a GSS-API token in the key data portion. The resolver and server
feed these tokens to their local GSS implementation and iterate until
an error is encountered or a key (GSS-API session) is established. A
similar exchange can be used to delete a GSS-API session.
Any issues of possible encryption of the GSS-API token data being
transmitted are handled by the GSS-API level. In addition, the GSS-
API level provides its own authentication so that this mode of TKEY
query and response MAY be, but do not need to be, signed with TSIG
or SIG(0).
The inception and expiry time in a GSS-API mode TKEY are ignored.
3.4 Query for Querier Assigned Keying
Optionally, a server can accept resolver assigned keys. The keying
material must be encrypted under a server host key for protection in
transmission as described in Section 5.
The resolver sends an update request to add a TKEY RR that specifies
the keying data with a KEY RR in the additional information section
specifying the server host public key used to encrypt the data. The
name of the key and the keying data are completely controlled by the
sending resolver so a globally unique key name SHOULD be used. The
server SHOULD require that this request be signed with a TSIG, if
there already exists an appropriate shared secret, or a SIG(0) by the
resolver host. The KEY RR used MUST be one for which the server has
the corresponding private key or it will not be able to decrypt the
keying material and will return a FORMERR.
The query TKEY inception and expiry give the time period the querier
intends to consider the keying material valid. The server can return
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a lesser time interval to advise that it will not maintain state for
that long.
3.5 Query for TKEY Deletion
Keys established via TKEY can be treated as soft state. Since DNS
transactions are originated by the resolver, the resolver can simply
toss keys, although it may have to go through another key exchange if
it later needs one. Similarly, the server can discard keys although
that will result in an error on receiving a query with a TSIG using
the discarded key.
The key expiration provided in the TKEY and the ability of each party
to discard keys may be adequate but servers may implement key
deletion whereby the server discards a key on receipt from a resolver
of a delete request for a TKEY with the key's name. If the server
has no record of a key with that name, it returns BADNAME.
4. Spontaneous Server Inclusion
A DNS server may include a TKEY RR spontaneously as additional
information in responses. This SHOULD only be done if the server
knows the querier understands TKEY and has this option implemented.
This technique can be used for GSS-API exchange, and to delete a key.
A disadvantage of this technique is that there is no way for the
server to get any immediate error or success indication back and, in
the case of UDP, no way to even know if the DNS response reached the
resolver.
4.1 Spontaneous GSS-API Exchange
A server can spontaneously include in the additional information
section of a response, a GSS-API mode TKEY. The information in the
key data section of such a TKEY is a GSS-API token which SHOULD be
fed by the resolver to its local GSS-API implementation. If such a
response is signed, the signature must verify before processing the
data. To the extent that GSS-API provides its own security, such a
response may not need to be signed. To the extent that GSS-API
handles duplicated messages, such a spontaneous TKEY can be sent
repeatedly, until, perhaps, a response via a GSS-API mode TKEY query
is received.
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4.2 Spontaneous Key Deletion
A server can hint to a client that it has deleted a symmetric key by
spontaneously including a TKEY RR in the additional information
section of a response with the key's name and specifying the key
deletion mode. Such a response SHOULD be signed. If authenticated,
it deletes the key with the given name. The inception and expiry
times of the delete TKEY are ignored. Failure by a client to receive
or properly process such additional information in a response would
simply mean that the client might use a key that the server had
discarded and then get an error indication.
5. Methods of Encryption
For the server assigned and resolver assigned key exchange, the
keying material is sent within the key data field of a TKEY RR
encrypted under the public key in an accompanying KEY RR [RFC 2535].
The KEY RR MUST correspond to a name for the destination host such
that the destination host has the corresponding private key to
decrypt the data. The secret keying material being send will
generally be fairly short, usually less than 256 bits, because that
is adequate for very strong protection with modern keyed hash or
symmetric algorithms.
If the KEY RR specifies the RSA algorithm, then the keying material
is encrypted as per the description of RSA encryption in PKCS#1 [RFC
2437]. (Note, the secret keying material being sent is directly RSA
encrypted in PKCS#1 format, It is not "enveloped" under some other
symmetric algorithm.) In the unlikely event that the keying material
will not fit within one RSA modulus of the chosen public key,
additional RSA encryption blocks are included. The length of each
block is clear from the public RSA key specified and the PKCS#1
padding makes it clear what part of the encrypted data is actually
keying material and what part is formatting or the required at least
eight bytes of random [RFC 1750] padding.
6. IANA Considerations
This section is to be interpreted as provided in [RFC 2434].
Mode field values 0x0000 through 0x00FF, and 0XFF00 through 0XFFFF
can only be assigned by an IETF standards action (and 1 through 5 are
assigned by this Proposed Standard). Special consideration should be
given before the allocation of meaning for Mode field values 0x0000
and 0xFFFF.
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Mode field values 0x0100 through 0x0FFF and 0xF0000 through 0xFEFF
are allocated by an IETF consensus.
Mode field values 0x1000 through 0xEFFF are allocated based on RFC
documentation of their use.
Mode values should not be changed when the status of their use
changes. I.E. a mode value assigned for an Experimental Standard
should not be changed later just because that standard's status is
changed to Proposed.
7. Security Considerations
To avoid different interpretations of the inception and expiration
times in TKEY RRs, resolvers and servers exchanging them must have
the same idea of what time it is. One way of doing this is with the
NTP protocol [RFC 2030] but that or any other time synchronization
MUST be done securely.
TKEY queries SHOULD be signed and those using the querier
establishment mode MUST be signed to authenticate their origin.
However, for currently defined modes, relatively little damage will
be done if an unsigned query of this sort is accepted and processed,
as described above, for each mode. In addition, requiring that a TKEY
query be signed by a TSIG (if there exists an acceptable exchanged
key between the parties) or a SIG(0) may itself impose significant
computational requirements on the server, particularly in verifying
SIG(0) public key signatures.
Responses to TKEY queries MUST always have DNS transaction signatures
to protect the integrity of any keying data, error codes, etc. This
signature MUST use a previously established secret (TSIG) or public
(SIG(0)) key and MUST NOT use any key that the response to be
verified is itself providing.
To avoid replay attacks, it is necessary that a response or querier
establishment mode query involving TKEY not be valid if replayed on
the order of 2**32 second (about 136 years) later. To acomplish
this, the keying material used in any TSIG or SIG(0) RR that
authenticates a TKEY message MUST NOT have a lifetime of more then
2**31 - 1 seconds. Thus, on attempted replay, the authenticating
TSIG or SIG(0) RR will not be verifyable due to key expiration and
the replay will fail.
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Changes from Previous Draft
Prohibit more than one TKEY in a request or response. Prohibit more
than one key with the same name (even if they have non-overlapping
validity periods).
Spontaneous server inclusion of Diffi-Hellman TKEYs and server
assigned key have been eliminated.
"Update" opcode TKEY operations have all been moved to the "Query"
opcode even if they are not something you would naturally think of as
a query.
Error codes for more error conditions listed explicitly.
More explicit TKEY key naming suggestions.
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References
RFC 1034 - P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities",
STD 13, November 1987.
RFC 1035 - P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names - Implementation and
Specifications", STD 13, November 1987.
RFC 1750 - D. Eastlake, S. Crocker & J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", December 1994.
RFC 1982 - Robert Elz, Randy Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic",
09/03/1996.
RFC 1995 - masataka Ohta, "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", August
1996.
RFC 2030 - D. Mills, "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", October 1996.
RFC 2119 - S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
RFC 2136 - P. Vixie, S. Thomson, Y. Rekhter, J. Bound, "Dynamic
Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", 04/21/1997.
RFC 2434 - T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs, October 1998.
RFC 2437 - B. Kaliski, J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.0", October 1998.
RFC 2535 - D. Eastlake, "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
March 1999.
RFC 2539 - D. Eastlake, "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain
Name System (DNS)", March 1999.
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and Sons
draft-ietf-dnssec-update2-*.txt - Donald E. Eastlake 3rd, "Secure
Domain Name System Dynamic Update".
draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt - P. Vixie, O. Gudmundsson, D.
Eastlake, "Secret Key Transaction Signatures for DNS (TSIG)".
draft-skwan-gss-tsig-*.txt - S. Kwan, P. Garg, R. Viswanathan, "GSS
Algorithm for TSIG (GSS-TSIG)"
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Author's Address
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
IBM
65 Shindegan Hill Road, RR #1
Carmel, NY 10512 USA
Telephone: +1 914-276-2668 (h)
+1 914-784-7913 (w)
FAX: +1 914-784-3833 (w)
email: dee3@us.ibm.com
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires October 1999.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-01.txt.
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd [Page 16]
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