One document matched: draft-ietf-dhc-dna-ipv4-11.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-dhc-dna-ipv4-10.txt
DHC Working Group Bernard Aboba
INTERNET-DRAFT Microsoft Corporation
Category: Proposed Standard
<draft-ietf-dhc-dna-ipv4-11.txt>
12 April 2005
Detection of Network Attachment (DNA) in IPv4
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
The time required to detect movement (or lack of movement) between
subnets, and to obtain (or continue to use) a valid IPv4
configuration may be significant as a fraction of the total handover
latency in moving between points of attachment. This document
specifies a procedure for optimizing the detection of network
attachment and IPv4 configuration in order to decrease the handover
latency in moving between points of attachment.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction.............................................. 3
1.1 Requirements .................................... 3
1.2 Terminology ..................................... 3
2. Overview ................................................. 4
2.1 Most Likely Point of Attachment ................. 5
2.2 Reachability Test ............................... 6
2.3 IPv4 Address Acquisition ........................ 9
2.4 IPv4 Link-Local Addresses ....................... 9
3. Constants ................................................ 11
4. IANA Considerations ...................................... 11
5. Security Considerations .................................. 11
6. References ............................................... 11
6.1 Normative references ............................ 11
6.2 Informative references .......................... 12
Acknowledgments .............................................. 13
Authors' Addresses ........................................... 13
Appendix A - Link Layer Hints ................................ 14
A.1 Introduction .................................... 14
A.2 Hints ........................................... 15
Intellectual Property Statement .............................. 16
Copyright Statement .......................................... 17
Disclaimer of Validity ....................................... 17
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1. Introduction
The time required to detect movement (or lack of movement) between
subnets, and to obtain (or continue to use) a valid IPv4 address may
be significant as a fraction of the total handover latency in moving
between points of attachment.
This document synthesizes experience in the deployment of hosts
supporting ARP [RFC826], DHCP [RFC2131], and IPv4 Link-Local
addresses [RFC3927], specifying a procedure for optimizing detection
of network attachment and IPv4 configuration, in order to minimize
the handover latency in moving between points of attachment. Since
this procedure is dependent on the ARP protocol, it is not suitable
for use on media that do not support ARP [RFC826].
1.1. Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
1.2. Terminology
This document uses the following terms:
ar$sha
ARP packet field: Source Hardware Address [RFC826]. The hardware
(MAC) address of the originator of an ARP packet.
ar$spa
ARP packet field: Source Protocol Address [RFC826]. For IP Address
Resolution this is the IPv4 address of the sender of the ARP
packet. If the sender address is unknown, this is set to 0.0.0.0.
ar$tha
ARP packet field: Target Hardware Address [RFC826]. The hardware
(MAC) address of the target of an ARP packet, or the broadcast
address if the target hardware address is unknown.
ar$tpa
ARP packet field: Target Protocol Address [RFC826]. For IPv4
Address Resolution, the IPv4 address for which one desires to know
the hardware address.
DHCP client
A DHCP client or "client" is an Internet host using the Dynamic
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Host Configuration protocol (DHCP) [RFC2131] to obtain
configuration parameters such as a network address.
DHCP server
A DHCP server or "server" is an Internet host that returns
configuration parameters to DHCP clients.
Point of Attachment
A location within the network where a host may be connected. This
attachment point can be characterized by its address prefix and
next hop routing information.
Most Likely Point of Attachment (MLPA)
The point of attachment heuristically determined by the host to be
most likely, based on hints from the network.
Routable address
In this specification, the term "routable address" refers to any
address other than an IPv4 Link-Local address. This includes
private addresses as specified in [RFC1918].
Valid address
In this specification, the term "valid address" refers to either a
static IPv4 address, or an address assigned via DHCPv4 which has
not been relinquished, and whose lease has not yet expired.
2. Overview
DNAv4 consists of three phases: determination of the Most Likely
Point of Attachment (MLPA), reachability testing, and IPv4 address
acquisition.
On connecting to a new point of attachment, the host responds to
"Link Up" indications from the link layer by carrying out the DNAv4
procedure. As noted in Appendix A, hints about the point of
attachment may be available from the link and Internet layers. Based
on these hints, the host determines the "Most Likely Point of
Attachment" (MLPA) and determines whether it has a valid IPv4
configuration associated with it.
If the host believes that it has attached to a network on which it
has a valid IPv4 configuration, then it performs a reachability test
in order to confirm that configuration. In contrast to a DHCPv4
exchange, which may be between a DHCPv4 client and an off-link DHCPv4
server, the reachability test is designed to verify bi-directional
connectivity to the default gateway(s) on the MLPA.
If the reachability test is successful, the host MAY continue to use
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a valid routable IPv4 address without having to re-acquire it. This
reduces roaming latency by allowing the host to bypass DHCPv4 as well
as subsequent Duplicate Address Detection (DAD). If the host
believes that it has attached to a network on which it has no valid
IPv4 configuration, or if the reachability test fails, then the host
attempts to obtain an IPv4 configuration using DHCPv4.
Since DNAv4 represents a performance optimization, it is important to
avoid compromising robustness. In some circumstances, DNAv4 may
result in a host successfully verifying an existing IPv4
configuration where attempting to obtain configuration via DHCPv4
would fail (such as when the DHCPv4 server is down).
To improve robustness, this document suggests that hosts behave
conservatively with respect to assignment of IPv4 Link-Local
addresses, configuring them only in situations in which they can do
no harm. Experience has shown that IPv4 Link-Local addresses are
often assigned inappropriately, and that inappropriate assignment can
compromise both performance and connectivity.
While the performance of DNAv4 is dependent on the reliability of the
hints provided to the client, the host will ultimately determine the
correct IPv4 configuration even in the presence of misleading hints.
Where the host mistakenly concludes that it has attached to a network
on which it has a valid configuration a timeout will occur, providing
poorer performance than would be experienced by initially attempting
to obtain IPv4 configuration using DHCPv4. However, after timing
out, the host will obtain its configuration using DHCPv4, so that
the correct configuration will eventually be obtained.
DNAv4 does not increase the likelihood of an address conflict. The
DNAv4 procedure is only carried out when the host has a valid IPv4
configuration on the MLPA, implying that duplicate address detection
has previously been completed. Restrictions on sending ARP requests
and replies are described in Section 2.2.1.
2.1. Most Likely Point of Attachment
In order to determine the MLPA, it is assumed that the host saves to
stable storage parameters relating to the networks it connects to:
[1] Link and Internet layer hints associated with each
network. For details, see Appendix A.
[2] The IPv4 and MAC address of the default gateway(s) on
each network.
[3] The link type, such as whether the link utilizes
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Ethernet, or 802.11 adhoc or infrastructure mode.
Appendix A discusses hints useful for the determination of the MLPA.
By matching received hints against network parameters previously
stored, the host makes an an educated guess of which network it has
attached to. In the absence of other information, the MLPA defaults
to the network to which the host was most recently attached.
Aside from utilizing link layer indications, a host may also be able
to utilize Internet layer information in order to determine the MLPA.
IPv4 ICMP Router Discovery messages [RFC1256] provide information
relating to prefix(es) available on the link, as well as the routers
that serve those prefix(es). A host may use ICMP Router Discovery to
conclude that an advertised prefix is available; however it cannot
conclude the converse -- that prefixes not advertised are
unavailable.
However, since [RFC1256] is not widely implemented, it is NOT
RECOMMENDED that hosts utilize ICMP Router Discovery messages as an
alternative to the reachability test outlined in Section 2.2.
Instead, ICMP Router Advertisements can be used to obtain information
on available prefixes and default gateway(s). This can provide
additional resilience in the case where default gateway(s) become
unavailable.
Similarly hosts that support routing protocols such as RIP and OSPF
can use these protocols to determine the prefix(es) available on a
link and the default gateway(s) that serve those prefixes. Full
support is not required to glean this information. A host that
passively observes routing protocol traffic may deduce this
information without supporting a fully conformant routing protocol
implementation.
2.2. Reachability Test
If the host has a valid routable IPv4 address on the MLPA, a host
conforming to this specification SHOULD perform a reachability test,
in order to to confirm that it is connected to network on which it
has a valid routable IPv4 address. If the reachability test is not
successful, the host proceeds to the IPv4 address acquisition phase,
described in Section 2.3.
The host skips the reachability test and proceeds to the IPv4 address
acquisition phase if any of the following conditions are true:
[a] The host does not have a valid routable IPv4
address on the MLPA. In this case, the reachability
test cannot confirm that the host has a valid
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routable IPv4 address, so that completing the
reachability test would serve no purpose.
[b] The host does not have information on the default
gateway(s) on the MLPA. In this case, insufficient
information is available to carry out the reachability
test.
[c] Reliable hints are unavailable. Since confirming
failure of the reachability test requires a timeout,
mistakes are costly. In the absence of reliable
hints, a host SHOULD instead send a DHCPREQUEST from
the INIT-REBOOT state, as described in [RFC2131],
Section 3.2 and 4.3.2. Where reliable hints are
unavailable, this will typically complete more
quickly than the reachability test.
[d] If secure detection of network attachment is required.
The reachability test utilizes ARP which is insecure,
whereas DHCPv4 can be secured via DHCPv4 authentication,
described in [RFC3118]. See Section 5 for details.
The host MAY probe only the primary default gateway, or it MAY probe
primary and secondary default gateways in series or in parallel. In
order to ensure configuration validity, the host SHOULD only
configure default gateway(s) which pass the reachability test.
2.2.1. Packet Format
The reachability test is performed by sending an ARP Request. The
ARP Request SHOULD use the host's MAC address as the source, and the
broadcast MAC address as the destination. The host sets the target
protocol address (ar$tpa) to the IPv4 address of the primary default
gateway, and uses its own MAC address in the sender hardware address
field (ar$sha). The host sets the target hardware address field
(ar$tha) to 0.
If the host has a private address as defined in [RFC1918], then it
SHOULD set the sender protocol address field (ar$spa) to the
unspecified address (0.0.0.0). This is to avoid a potential address
conflict when the host changes its point of attachment from one
private network to another.
Note: Some routers may refuse to answer an ARP Request sent with
the sender protocol address field (ar$spa) set to the unspecified
address (0.0.0.0). In this case the reachability test will fail.
If the host has a valid routable IPv4 address other than a private
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address on the MLPA, then it SHOULD set the sender protocol address
field (ar$spa) to that address. It is assumed that the host had
previously done duplicate address detection so that an address
conflict is unlikely.
If a valid ARP Response is received, the MAC address in the sender
hardware address field (ar$sha) and the IPv4 address in the sender
protocol address field (ar$spa) are matched against the list of
networks and associated default gateway parameters. If a match is
found, then if the host has a valid routable IPv4 address on the
matched network, the host continues to use that IPv4 address, subject
to the lease re-acquisition and expiration behavior described in
[RFC2131], Section 4.4.5.
Checking for a match on both the IPv4 address and MAC address of the
default gateway enables the host to confirm reachability even where
it has moved between two private networks. In this case the IPv4
address of the default gateway could remain the same, while the MAC
address would change, so that both addresses need to be checked.
The risk of an address conflict is greatest when the host moves
between private networks, since in this case the completion of
Duplicate Address Detection on the former network does not provide
assurance against an address conflict on the new network. Until a
host with a private address has confirmed the validity of its IPv4
configuration, it SHOULD NOT respond to ARP requests, and SHOULD NOT
send ARP requests containing its address within the sender protocol
address field (ar$spa). Instead it SHOULD use the unspecified
address, as described above. However, where the host has a valid
routable non-private address on the MLPA, it MAY send ARP requests
using its address within the sender protocol address field (ar$spa)
prior to confirming its IPv4 configuration, and MAY respond to ARP
requests.
Sending an ICMP Echo Request [RFC792] to the default gateway IPv4
address does not provide the same level of assurance since this may
require an ARP Request/Response exchange. Where the host has moved
between two private networks, this could result in ARP cache
pollution.
Where a host moves from one private network to another, an ICMP Echo
Request can result in an ICMP Echo Response even when the default
gateway has changed, as long as the IPv4 address remains the same.
This can occur, for example, where a host moves from one home
network using prefix 192.168/16 to another one. In addition, if the
ping is sent with TTL > 1, then an ICMP Echo Response can be received
from an off-link gateway. As a result, if the MAC address of the
default gateway is not checked, the host can mistakenly confirm
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attachment to the MLPA, potentially resulting in an address conflict.
As a result, sending of an ICMP Echo Request SHOULD NOT be used as a
substitute for the DNAv4 procedure.
If the initial ARP Request does not elicit a Response, the host waits
for REACHABILITY_TIMEOUT and proceeds to the IPv4 address acquisition
phase. If a valid ARP Response is received, but cannot be matched
against known networks, the host assumes it does not have a valid
IPv4 configuration and moves on to the IPv4 address acquisition
phase.
2.3. IPv4 Address Acquisition
If the host has a valid routable IPv4 address on the MLPA but the
reachability test fails, the host SHOULD verify the configuration by
entering the INIT-REBOOT state, and sending a DHCPREQUEST to the
broadcast address as specified in [RFC2131] Section 4.4.2.
If the host does not have a valid routable IPv4 address on the MLPA,
the host enters the INIT state and sends a DHCPDISCOVER packet to the
broadcast address, as described in [RFC2131] Section 4.4.1. If the
host supports the Rapid Commit Option [RFC4039], it is possible that
the exchange can be shortened from a 4-message exchange to a
2-message exchange.
If the host does not receive a response to a DHCPREQUEST or
DHCPDISCOVER, then it retransmits as specified in [RFC2131] Section
4.1.
As discussed in [RFC2131], Section 4.4.4, a host in INIT or REBOOTING
state that knows the address of a DHCP server may use that address in
the DHCPDISCOVER or DHCPREQUEST rather than the IPv4 broadcast
address. In the INIT-REBOOT state a DHCPREQUEST is sent to the
broadcast address so that the host will receive a response regardless
of whether the previously configured IPv4 address is correct for the
network to which it has connected.
Sending a DHCPREQUEST to the unicast address in INIT-REBOOT state is
not appropriate, since if the DHCP client has moved to another
subnet, a DHCP server response cannot be routed back to the client
since the DHCPREQUEST will bypass the DHCP relay and will contain an
invalid source address.
2.4. IPv4 Link-Local Addresses
To avoid inappropriate assignment of IPv4 Link-Local addresses, it is
recommended that hosts behave conservatively with respect to
assignment of IPv4 Link-Local addresses. As described in [RFC3927]
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Section 1.7, use of a routable address is preferred to a IPv4 Link-
Local address whenever it is available.
Where the host does not have a valid routable IPv4 address on the
MLPA, the host MAY configure an IPv4 Link-Local address prior to
entering the INIT state and sending a DHCPDISCOVER packet, as
described in Section 2.3. However, should a routable IPv4 address be
obtained, the IPv4 Link-Local address is deprecated, as noted in
[RFC3927].
Where a host has a valid routable IPv4 address on the MLPA, but the
DHCP client does not receive a response after employing the
retransmission algorithm, [RFC2131] Section 3.2 states that the
client MAY choose to use the previously allocated network address and
configuration parameters for the remainder of the unexpired lease.
Where a host can confirm that it remains connected to a point of
attachment on which it possesses a valid routable IPv4 address, that
address SHOULD be used, rather than assigning a IPv4 Link-Local
address.
Since a IPv4 Link-Local address is often configured because a DHCP
server failed to respond to an initial query or is inoperative for
some time, it is desirable to abandon the IPv4 Link-Local address
assignment as soon as a valid IPv4 address lease can be obtained.
As described in [RFC3927] Appendix A, once a Link-Local IPv4 address
is assigned, existing implementations do not query the DHCPv4 server
again for 5 minutes. This behavior violates [RFC2131] Section 4.1.
Where a IPv4 Link-Local address is assigned, experience has shown
that five minutes (see [RFC3927] Appendix A.2) is too long an
interval to wait until retrying to obtain a routable IPv4 address
using DHCP. According to [RFC2131] Section 4.1:
The retransmission delay SHOULD be doubled with
subsequent retransmissions up to a maximum of 64 seconds.
As a result, a DHCP client compliant with [RFC2131] will continue to
retry every 64 seconds, even after allocating a IPv4 Link-Local
address. Should the DHCP client succeed in obtaining a routable
address, then as noted in [RFC3927], the IPv4 Link-Local address is
deprecated.
Since it is inevitable that hosts will inappropriately configure IPv4
Link-Local addresses at some point, hosts with routable IPv4
addresses need to be able to respond to peers with IPv4 Link-Local
addresses, as per [RFC3927]. For example, a host configured with a
routable address may receive a datagram from a link-local source
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address. In order to respond, the host will use ARP to resolve the
target hardware address and send the datagram directly, not to a
router for forwarding.
3. Constants
The suggested default value of REACHABILITY_TIMEOUT is 200 ms. This
value was chosen so as to accommodate the maximum retransmission
timer likely to be experienced on an Ethernet network.
4. IANA Considerations
This specification does not request the creation of any new parameter
registries, nor does it require any other IANA assignments.
5. Security Considerations
Detection of Network Attachment (DNA) is based on ARP and DHCP. ARP
[RFC826] traffic is inherently insecure, so that the reachability
test described in Section 1.3 can be easily spoofed by an attacker,
leading a host to falsely conclude that it is attached to a network
that it is not connected to. Similarly, where DHCP traffic is not
secured, an attacker could masquerade as a DHCP server, in order to
convince the host that it was attached to a particular network.
As a result, it is inadvisable for a host to adjust its security
based on which network it believes it is attached to. For example,
it would be inappropriate for a host to disable its personal firewall
based on the belief that it had connected to a home network.
Where secure detection of network attachment is required, a host
SHOULD skip the reachability test since it cannot be secured, and
instead utilize authenticated DHCP [RFC3118], possibly in combination
with the Rapid Commit Option [RFC4039].
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", RFC 792,
USC/Information Sciences Institute, September 1981.
[RFC826] D. Plummer, "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol -or-
Converting Network Addresses to 48-bit Ethernet Address for
Transmission on Ethernet Hardware", STD 37, RFC 826, November
1982.
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[RFC1256] Deering, S., "ICMP Router Discovery Messages", RFC 1256, Xerox
PARC, September 1991.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March, 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
March 1997.
[RFC3118] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP Messages",
RFC 3118, June 2001.
[RFC3927] Cheshire, S., Aboba, B. and E. Guttman, "Dynamic Configuration
of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927, March 2005.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC1661] Simpson, W., Editor, "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD
51, RFC 1661, Daydreamer, July 1994.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G. and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", RFC 1918,
February 1996.
[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., and J. Roese,
"IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.
[RFC4039] Park, S., Kim, P., and B. Volz, "Rapid Commit Option for the
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 4 (DHCPv4)", RFC
4039, March 2005.
[IEEE-802.1AB]
IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
Station and Media Access Control - Connectivity Discovery,
IEEE Std 802.1AB, March 2005.
[IEEE-802.1X]
IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port
based Network Access Control, IEEE Std 802.1X-2004, December
2004.
[IEEE-802]
IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
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Overview and Architecture, ANSI/IEEE Std 802, 1990.
[IEEE-802.1Q]
IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Draft
Standard for Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks, P802.1Q,
January 1998.
[IEEE-802.11]
Information technology - Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area
networks - Specific Requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium
Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications,
IEEE Std. 802.11-2003, 2003.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge Greg Daley of Monash
University, Erik Guttman and Erik Nordmark of Sun Microsystems, Ted
Lemon of Nominum Thomas Narten of IBM, and David Hankins of ISC for
contributions to this document.
Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
Phone: +1 425 706 6605
Fax: +1 425 936 7329
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Appendix A - Link Layer Hints
A.1 Introduction
In order to assist in IPv4 network attachment detection, information
associated with each network may be retained by the host. Based on
link-layer information, the host may be able to make an educated
guess as to whether it has moved between subnets, or has remained on
the same subnet, as well as whether it has connected to an
infrastructure or adhoc network.
If the host is likely to have moved between subnets, it may be
possible to make an educated guess as to which subnet it has moved
to. Since an educated guess may be incorrect, prior to concluding
that the host remains on the same subnet, further tests (such as a
reachability test or a DHCPREQUEST sent from the INIT-REBOOT state)
are REQUIRED.
In practice, it is necessary for hints to be highly reliable before
they are worth considering, if the penalty paid for an incorrect hint
is substantial.
As an example, assume that a DHCPREQUEST requires DHCPREQUEST_TIME to
determine if a host has remained on the same subnet, while a
reachability test typically completes in REACH_TIME and times out in
REACHABILITY_TIMEOUT, after which a DHCPREQUEST is sent.
If a hint that the host has remained on the same subnet is wrong x
fraction of the time, then it is only worth considering if:
DHCPREQUEST_TIME = (1 - x) * REACH_TIME +
x * (REACHABILITY_TIMEOUT + DHCPREQUEST_TIME)
x = DHCPREQUEST_TIME - REACH_TIME
----------------------------------------------------
REACHABILITY_TIMEOUT + DHCPREQUEST_TIME - REACH_TIME
If we assume that DHCPREQUEST_TIME = 100 ms, REACH_TIME = 10 ms, and
REACHABILITY_TIMEOUT = 1000ms, then:
x = (100 - 10)/(1000 + 100 - 10) = 8.2 percent
Therefore the hint need only be wrong 8.2 percent of the time before
it is not worth considering.
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A.2 Hints
For networks running IPv4 over PPP [RFC1661], IPv4 parameters
negotiated in IPCP provide direct information on whether a previously
obtained address remains valid on the link.
On media supporting EAP [RFC3748], network identification information
may be passed within the EAP-Request/Identity or within an EAP method
exchange. For example, the EAP-Request/Identity may contain the name
of the authenticator. During the EAP method exchange the
authenticator may supply information that may be helpful in
identifying the network to which the device is attached. However,
as noted in [RFC3580], it is possible for the VLANID defined in
[IEEE-802.1Q] to be assigned dynamically, so that static
advertisements may not prove definitive.
On IEEE 802 [IEEE-802] wired networks, hints can be obtained via the
Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) defined in [IEEE-802.1AB]. LLDP
advertisements can include the chassis ID, which represents the
authenticator's chassis identification, enabling a host to determine
if it has attached to a previously encountered device. However,
since a device may support dynamic VLANs, re-attachment does not
necessarily imply that the VLAN has remained the same, although this
is likely.
LLDP also enables advertisement of the port's VLAN identifier, as
well as a VLAN name, allowing the host to determine whether it has
attached to a VLAN on which it had previously obtained a valid
configuration. Since such an advertisement cannot be heard until
802.1X authentication has completed, the advertised VLAN will reflect
a dynamic VLAN assignment if one has been made, so that it is likely
to be definitive.
In IEEE 802.11 [IEEE-802.11] stations provide information in Beacon
and/or Probe Response messages, such as the SSID, BSSID, and
capabilities, as well as information on whether the station is
operating in Infrastructure or Ad hoc mode. As described in
[RFC3580], it is possible to assign a Station to a VLAN dynamically,
based on the results of IEEE 802.1X [IEEE-802.1X] authentication.
This implies that a single SSID may offer access to multiple VLANs,
and in practice most large WLAN deployments offer access to multiple
subnets.
Thus, associating to the same SSID is a necessary, but not
necessarily a sufficient condition, for remaining within the same
subnet: while a Station associating to the same SSID may not
necessarily remain within the same subnet, a Station associating to a
different SSID is likely to have changed subnets.
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INTERNET-DRAFT DNAv4 12 April 2005
In IEEE 802.11, the SSID is a non-unique identifier, and SSIDs such
as "default", "linksys" and "tsunami" are often configured by
manufacturers by default. As a result, matching an advertised SSID
against those of previously encountered networks may be misleading.
Where an SSID known to be configured by default is encountered, it is
recommended that the BSSID be stored and subsequently compared
against the advertised BSSID to determine whether a match exists.
In order to provide additional guidance on the subnets to which a
given AP offers access, additional subnet-related Information
Elements (IEs) have been proposed for addition to the IEEE 802.11
Beacon and Probe Response messages. As noted earlier, VLANs may be
determined dynamically so that these information elements may not be
reliable.
In IEEE 802.11, the presence of an IBSS can be used as a hint that a
point of attachment supports adhoc networking, and therefore that
assignment of a IPv4 Link-Local address is likely. When running IPv4
over PPP, if an IPv4 address is not statically configured or
assigned via IPv4CP, this can also be taken as a hint that assignment
of an IPv4 Link-Local address is likely. In addition, certain media
such as USB or IEEE 1394 may be considered inherently more likely to
support adhoc operation, so that connection to these networks may by
itself be considered a hint.
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Director.
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INTERNET-DRAFT DNAv4 12 April 2005
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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Open issues
Open issues relating to this specification are tracked on the
following web site:
http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/DNA/dnaissues.html
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| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-21 21:37:38 |