One document matched: draft-ietf-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-02.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-01.txt
Network Working Group Sheng Jiang
Internet Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Intended status: Informational Sean Shen
Expires: October 23, 2010 CNNIC
Tim Chown
University of Southampton
April 22, 2010
DHCPv6 and CGA Interaction: Problem Statement
draft-ietf-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-02.txt
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Abstract
This document describes potential issues in the interaction between
DHCPv6 and Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs). Firstly, the
scenario of using CGAs in DHCPv6 environments is discussed. Some
operations are clarified for the interaction of DHCPv6 servers and
CGA-associated hosts. We then also discuss how CGAs and DHCPv6 may
have mutual benefits for each other, including using CGAs in DHCPv6
operations to enhance its security features and using DHCPv6 to
provide the CGA generation function.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.................................................3
2. Coexistence of DHCPv6 and CGA................................3
3. What DHCPv6 can do for CGA...................................4
4. What CGA can do for DHCPv6...................................5
5. Security Considerations......................................6
6. IANA Considerations..........................................7
7. Solution Requests............................................7
8. Acknowledgements.............................................7
9. Change Log...................................................7
10. References..................................................8
10.1. Normative References...................................8
10.2. Informative References.................................8
Author's Addresses..............................................9
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1. Introduction
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) [RFC3315]
can assign addresses statefully. Although there are other ways to
assign IPv6 addresses [RFC4862, RFC4339], DHCPv6 is still useful when
an administrator requires more control over address assignments to
hosts. DHCPv6 can also be used to distribute other network
configuration information.
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [RFC3972] are IPv6
addresses for which the interface identifiers are generated by
computing a cryptographic one-way hash function from a public key and
auxiliary parameters. Associated with public & private key pairs,
CGAs are used in protocols, such as SEND [RFC3971] or SHIM6 [RFC5533],
to provide address validation and integrity protection in message
exchanging.
This document describes potential issues in the interaction between
DHCPv6 and Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs). Firstly, the
scenario of using CGAs in DHCPv6 environments is discussed. Some
operations are clarified for the interaction of DHCPv6 servers and
CGA-associated hosts. We then also discuss how CGAs and DHCPv6 may
have mutual benefits for each other, including using CGAs in DHCPv6
operations to enhance its security features and using DHCPv6 to
provide the CGA generation function.
2. Coexistence of DHCPv6 and CGA
CGAs can be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Configuration [RFC4862].
The public key system associated with the CGA address provides
message origin validation and integrity protection without the need
for negotiation and transportation of key materials.
The current CGA specifications do not mandate which device generates
a CGA address. In many cases, a CGA address is generated by the
associated key pair owner, which normally is also the host that will
use the CGA address. However, in a DHCPv6-managed network, hosts
should obtain IPv6 addresses only from a DHCPv6 server. This
difference of roles needs to be carefully considered if there is a
requirement to use CGAs in DHCPv6-managed environments.
The current DHCPv6 specification [RFC3315] has a mechanism that could
be used to allow a host to self-generate a CGA for use in a DHCPv6-
managed environment, i.e. the DHCPv6 server can grant the use of
host-generated CGA addresses on request from the client.
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Specifically, a node can request that a DHCPv6 server grants the use
of a self-generated CGA by sending a DHCPv6 Request message. This
DHCPv6 Request message contains an IA option including the CGA
address. Depending on whether the CGA satisfies the CGA-related
configuration parameters of the network, the DHCPv6 server can then
send an acknowledgement to the node to either grant the use of the
CGA or to indicate that the node must generate a new CGA with the
correct CGA-related configuration parameters of the network. In the
meantime the DHCPv6 server may log the requested address/host
combination.
3. What DHCPv6 can do for CGA
In the current CGA specifications there is a lack of procedures to
enable central management of CGA generation. Administrators should be
able to configure parameters used to generate CGAs. DHCPv6 could be
used to assign subnet prefixes or certificates to CGA address owners.
In some scenarios, the administrator may further want to enforce some
parameters, in particular the necessary security-related parameters
such as the SEC value.
In the CGA generation procedure, the generation of the Modifier field
of a CGA address is computationally intensive. This operation can
lead to apparent slow performance and/or battery consumption problems
for end hosts with limited computing ability and/or restricted
battery power (e.g. mobile devices). In such cases, a mechanism to
delegate the computation of the modifier would be desirable. It is
possible that the whole CGA generation procedure could be delegated
to the DHCPv6 server. This would be especially useful for large SEC
values.
Generating a key pair, which will be used to generate a CGA, also
requires a notable computation. Generation and distribution of a key
pair can also be done by DHCPv6 server. Of course, when designing
these new functions, one should carefully consider the impact on
security. However, the security considerations of specific solutions
are out of scope of this document.
New DHCPv6 options could be defined to carry management parameters
from a DHCPv6 server to the client that wishes to use a CGA. A new
DHCPv6 prefix assignment option could be defined to propagate a
subnet prefix. More DHCPv6 options may be defined to propagate
additional CGA-relevant configuration information, such as the SEC
value, certificate information, SEND proxy information, etc.
It may be possible to define a delegation operation that allows a
client to pass computations to a DHCPv6 server, by introducing new
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DHCPv6 option(s). A node could thus initiate a DHCPv6 request to the
DHCPv6 server requesting the computation of the Modifier or the CGA.
The DHCPv6 server could then either compute the Modifier by itself,
or redirect the computation requirement to another server. Once the
DHCPv6 server generates (or obtains from the redirected computational
server) the Modifier or the CGA address, it can respond to the node
with the Modifier or the resulting address and the corresponding CGA
Parameters data structure.
Depending on the scenario, the configuration information needed to
generate CGAs (including a SEC value, a subnet prefix, a modifier, a
public key, a Collision Count value and any Extension Fields) may be
provided by either hosts or DHCPv6 servers. A DHCPv6 server might
receive from hosts the configuration information customized by hosts,
generate CGAs by using configuration information provided by both
parties and deliver CGAs and their associated CGA Parameters data
structures to hosts. The details of such potential new methods need
to be defined clearly in the solution specifications.
New DHCPv6 options may be defined to support the interactions that
are required when a DHCPv6 server generates a key pair for hosts.
When designing such solutions, the designer should thoroughly
consider the impact on DHCPv6 model and the security of CGA usage. In
order to be compatible with DHCPv6, the configuring procedure of CGA
parameters should be compatible with the current DHCPv6 definition.
When a DHCP6 server configures CGA parameters, integrity protection
may be needed to avoid attacks, such as downgrade attack.
4. What CGA can do for DHCPv6
DHCPv6 is vulnerable to various attacks, e.g. fake address attacks
where a 'rogue' DHCPv6 server responds with incorrect address
information. A malicious rogue DHCPv6 server can also provide
incorrect configuration to the client in order to divert the client
to communicate with malicious services, like DNS or NTP. It may also
mount a Denial of Service attack through mis-configuration of the
client that causes all network communication from the client to fail.
A rogue DHCPv6 server may also collect some critical information from
the client. Attackers may be able to gain unauthorized access to some
resources, such as network access. See Section 23 [RFC3315].
In the basic DHCPv6 specifications, regular IPv6 addresses are used.
However, DHCPv6 servers, relay agents and clients could use CGAs as
their own addresses. A DHCPv6 message (from either a server, relay
agent or client) with a CGA as source address, can carry the CGA
Parameters data structure and a digital signature. The receiver can
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verify both the CGA and signature, then process the payload of the
DHCPv6 message only if the validation is successful. A CGA option
with an address ownership proof mechanism and a signature option with
a corresponding verification mechanism may be introduced into DHCPv6
protocol. With these two new options, the receiver of a DHCPv6
message can verify the sender address of the DHCPv6 message, which
improves communication security of DHCPv6 messages. CGAs can be used
for all DHCPv6 messages/processes as long as CGAs are available on
the sender side.
Using CGAs in DHCPv6 protocol can efficiently improve the security of
DHCPv6, because the address of a DHCPv6 message sender (which can be
a DHCPv6 server, a reply agent or a client) can be verified by a
receiver. The usage of CGA can efficiently avoid the abovementioned
attacks. It improves the communication security of DHCPv6
interactions. The usage of CGAs can also avoid DHCPv6's dependence on
IPSEC [RFC3315] in relay scenarios. This mechanism is applicable in
environments where physical security on the link is not assured (such
as over certain wireless infrastructures) or where available security
mechanisms are not sufficient, and attacks on DHCPv6 are a concern.
A CGA generated from an unauthorized public & private key pair can
prove the source address ownership and provide data integrity
protection.
Furthermore, A CGA generated from a certificated public & private key
pair can also achieve authorization for DHCPv6 servers or relays, or
on another direction, user authorization. The public keys may be pre-
configured on both parties of communication or have a third party
authority available for users to retrieve public keys. The public
keys will be used for users to generate CGAs and verify CGAs and
signatures. The pre-configuration can also include configuring more
CGA parameters such as SEC value or more depend on policies. The pre-
configuration can even be the whole CGA and related parameters, but
in this case the address will be fixed and this situation may not be
desired when users want to keep their addresses unknown.
5. Security Considerations
As Section 4 of this document has discussed, CGAs can provide
additional security features for DHCPv6. However, in defining
solutions using DHCPv6 to configure CGAs, as suggested in Section 3.
of this document, careful consideration is required to evaluate
whether the new mechanism introduces new security vulnerabilities.
When DHCPv6 is used to manage CGAs, CGA relevant information is
stored in a central repository, DHCPv6 server. It does not increase
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privacy risks. The CGA relevant information is only exposed to
network management plane. The privacy risks are not higher than other
network managed entities, like normal IPv6 addresses managed by DHCP,
or addresses log in ACL.
6. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations in this document.
7. Solution Requests
As discussed in this document, CGAs and DHCPv6 can provide additional
services or security features for each other. Solutions that define
the details of such interactions should be investigated to determine
how viable they are.
8. Acknowledgements
Useful comments were made by Marcelo Bagnulo and Alberto Garcia, UC3M,
Spain and other members of the IETF CSI working group.
9. Change Log [RFC Editor please remove]
draft-jiang-csi-dhacpv6-cga-ps-00, original version, 2008-10-27
draft-jiang-csi-dhacpv6-cga-ps-01, revised after comments at IETF 73,
2009-01-08
draft-jiang-csi-dhacpv6-cga-ps-02, revised after comments at CSI
mailing list, 2009-06-17
draft-jiang-csi-dhacpv6-cga-ps-03, revised after comments at CSI
mailing list, 2009-09-18
draft-ietf-csi-dhacpv6-cga-ps-00, revised after comments at CSI
mailing list and wg adoption call, 2009-10-12
draft-ietf-csi-dhacpv6-cga-ps-01, revised after comments at IETF 76,
2009-12-16
draft-ietf-csi-dhacpv6-cga-ps-02, revised after comments received in
CSI mail list, 2010-04-23
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC3315] R. Droms, Ed., J. Bound, B. Volz, T. Lemon, C. Perkins and
M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configure Protocol for IPv6", RFC
3315, July 2003.
[RFC3971] J. Arkko, J. Kempf, B. Zill and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] T. Aura, "Cryptographically Generated Address", RFC 3972,
March 2005.
[RFC4862] S. Thomson and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.
[RFC5533] M. Bagnulo and E. Nordmark, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming
Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533, June 2009
10.2. Informative References
[RFC4339] J. Jeong, Ed., "IPv6 Host Configuration of DNS Server
Information Approaches", RFC 4339, February 2006.
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Author's Addresses
Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
KuiKe Building, No.9 Xinxi Rd.,
Shang-Di Information Industry Base, Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100085
P.R. China
Phone: 86-10-82836081
Email: shengjiang@huawei.com
Sean Shen
CNNIC
4, South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing 100190
P.R. China
Email: shenshuo@cnnic.cn
Tim Chown
University of Southampton
Highfield
Southampton, Hampshire SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
Email: tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk
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