One document matched: draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-04.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-03.txt
INTERNET-DRAFT Mike Swift
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-04.txt University of WA
March 2001 Jonathan Trostle
Cisco Systems
John Brezak
Microsoft
Bill Gossman
Cybersafe
Kerberos Set/Change Password: Version 2
0. Status Of This Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1].
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-
Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as
"work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Comments and suggestions on this document are encouraged. Comments
on this document should be sent to the CAT working group discussion
list: ietf-cat-wg@stanford.edu.
This draft expires on September 30th, 2001.
1. Abstract
The Kerberos (RFC 1510 [3]) change password protocol (Horowitz [4]),
does not allow for an administrator to set a password for a new user.
This functionality is useful in some environments, and this proposal
extends [4] to allow password setting. The changes are: adding new
fields to the request message to indicate the principal which is
having its password set, not requiring the initial flag in the service
ticket, using a new protocol version number, and adding three new
result codes. We also extend the set/change protocol to allow a
client to send a sequence of keys to the KDC instead of a cleartext
password. If in the cleartext password case, the cleartext password
fails to satisfy password policy, the server should use the result
code KRB5_KPASSWD_POLICY_REJECT.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2].
3. The Protocol
The service MUST accept requests on UDP port 464 and TCP port 464 as
well. The protocol consists of a single request message followed by
a single reply message. For UDP transport, each message must be fully
contained in a single UDP packet.
For TCP transport, there is a 4 octet header in network byte order
precedes the message and specifies the length of the message. This
requirement is consistent with the TCP transport header in 1510bis.
Request Message
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| message length | protocol version number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AP_REQ length | AP-REQ data /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ KRB-PRIV message /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
All 16 bit fields are in network byte order.
message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message
including this field.
protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0002 (network
byte order).
AP-REQ length: length of AP-REQ data, in bytes. If the length is zero,
then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV
message.
AP-REQ data: (see [3]) For a change password/key request, the AP-REQ
message service ticket sname, srealm principal identifier is
kadmin/changepw@REALM where REALM is the realm of the change password
service. The same applies to a set password/key request except the
principal identifier is kadmin/setpw@REALM. To enable setting of
passwords/keys, it is not required that the initial flag be set in the
Kerberos service ticket. The initial flag is required for change requests,
but not for set requests. We have the following definitions:
old passwd initial flag target principal can be
in request? required? distinct from
authenticating principal?
change password: yes yes no
set password: no policy (*) yes
set key: no policy (*) yes
change key: no yes no
policy (*): implementations SHOULD allow administrators to set the
initial flag required for set requests policy to either yes or no.
Clients MUST be able to retry set requests that fail due to error 7
(initial flag required) with an initial ticket. Clients SHOULD NOT
cache service tickets targetted at kadmin/changepw.
KRB-PRIV message (see [3]) This KRB-PRIV message must be encrypted
using the session key from the ticket in the AP-REQ.
The user-data component of the message consists of the following ASN.1
encoded structure:
ChangePasswdData :: = SEQUENCE {
newpasswdorkeys[0] NewPasswdOrKeys,
targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
-- only present in set password/key: the principal
-- which will have its password or keys set. Not
-- present in a set request if the client principal
-- from the ticket is the principal having its
-- passwords or keys set.
targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL,
-- only present in set password/key: the realm for
-- the principal which will have its password or
-- keys set. Not present in a set request if the
-- client principal from the ticket is the principal
-- having its passwords or keys set.
flags[3] RequestFlags OPTIONAL
-- 32 bit string
}
NewPasswdOrKeys :: = CHOICE {
passwords[0] PasswordSequence, -- change/set passwd
keyseq[1] KeySequences -- change/set key
}
KeySequences :: = SEQUENCE OF KeySequence
KeySequence :: = SEQUENCE {
key[0] EncryptionKey,
salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
salt-type[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
PasswordSequence :: = SEQUENCE {
newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING,
oldpasswd[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- oldpasswd always present for change password
-- but not present for set password, set key, or
-- change key
}
RequestFlags :: = BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
request-srv-gen-keys(1) -- only in change/set keys
-- if the client desires
-- server to contribute to keys;
-- server will return keys
}
The server must verify the AP-REQ message, check whether the client
principal in the ticket is authorized to set or change the password
(either for that principal, or for the principal in the targname
field if present), and decrypt the new password/keys. The server
also checks whether the initial flag is required for this request,
replying with status 0x0007 if it is not set and should be. An
authorization failure is cause to respond with status 0x0005. For
forward compatibility, the server should be prepared to ignore fields
after targrealm in the structure that it does not understand.
The newpasswdorkeys field contains either the new cleartext password
(with the old cleartext password for a change password operation),
or a sequence of encryption keys with their respective salts.
In the cleartext password case, if the old password is sent in the
request, the request MUST be a change password request. If the old
password is not present in the request, the request MUST be a set
password request. The server should apply policy checks to the old
and new password after verifying that the old password is valid.
The server can check validity by obtaining a key from the old
password with a keytype that is present in the KDC database for the
user and comparing the keys for equality. The server then generates
the appropriate keytypes from the password and stores them in the KDC
database. If all goes well, status 0x0000 is returned to the client
in the reply message (see below). For a change password operation,
the initial flag in the service ticket MUST be set.
In the key sequence case, the sequence of keys is sent to the change
or set password service (kadmin/changepw or kadmin/setpw respectively).
For a principal that can act as a server, its preferred keytype should
be sent as the first key in the sequence, but the KDC is not required
to honor this preference. Application servers should use the key
sequence option for changing/setting their keys. The change/set password
services should check that all keys are in the proper format, returning
the KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED error otherwise.
For change/set key, the request message may include the request flags bit
string with the request-srv-gen-keys bit set. In this case, the client
is requesting that the server add entropy to its keys in the KeySequences
field. When using this option, the client SHOULD attempt to generate
pseudorandom keys with as much entropy as possible in its request. The
server will return the final key sequence in a KeySequences structure in
the edata of the reply message. The server does not store any of the
new keys at this point. The client MUST make a subsequent change/set
key request without the request-srv-gen-keys bit; if the server returns
KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS for this second request, then the new keys have
been written into the database. A conformant server MUST support this
option.
Reply Message
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| message length | protocol version number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AP_REP length | AP-REP data /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ KRB-PRIV message /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
All 16 bit fields are in network byte order.
message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message
including this field.
protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0002 (network
byte order). (The reply message has the same format as in [4]).
AP-REP length: length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the length is zero,
then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV
message. An implementation should check this field to determine
whether a KRB-ERROR message or KRB-PRIV message has been returned.
AP-REP data: the AP-REP is the response to the AP-REQ in the request
packet.
KRB-PRIV from [4]: This KRB-PRIV message must be encrypted using the
session key from the ticket in the AP-REQ.
The server will respond with a KRB-PRIV message unless it cannot
validate the client AP-REQ or KRB-PRIV message, in which case it will
respond with a KRB-ERROR message.
The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data component
of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following data.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| result code | minor status |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| key version (only on success) | edata /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
result code (16 bits) (result codes 0-4 are from [4]):
The result code must have one of the following values (network
byte order):
KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS 0 request succeeds (This value is
not allowed in a KRB-ERROR
message)
KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED 1 request fails due to being
malformed
KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR 2 request fails due to "hard"
error in processing the request
(for example, there is a resource
or other problem causing the
request to fail)
KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR 3 request fails due to an error in
authentication processing
KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR 4 request fails due to a soft
error in processing the request
KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED 5 requestor not authorized
KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION 6 protocol version unsupported
KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIALFLAG_NEEDED 7 initial flag required
KRB5_KPASSWD_POLICY_REJECT 8 new cleartext password fails
policy; the result string should
include a text message to be
presented to the user.
KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_PRINCIPAL 9 target principal does not exist
(only in response to a set
password or set key request).
KRB5_KPASSWD_ETYPE_NOSUPP 10 the request contains a key sequence
containing at least one etype that is
not supported by the KDC. The response
edata contains an ASN.1 encoded
PKERB-ETYPE-INFO type that specifies
the etypes that the KDC supports:
KERB-ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY :: = SEQUENCE {
encryption-type[0] INTEGER,
salt[1] OCTET STRING
OPTIONAL -- not sent, client
-- ignores if sent
}
PKERB-ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF
KERB-ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY
The client should retry the request
using only etypes (keytypes) that are
contained within the PKERB-ETYPE-INFO
structure in the previous response.
KRB5_KPASSWD_ETYPE_SRVGENKEYS 11 the request has the request-
srv-gen-keys flag set and the
server is returning the
KeySequence structure defined
above in the edata field of the
reply. The server returns one key
sequence structure of the same
keytype for each key sequence
structure in the client request,
unless it does not support one of
the keytypes (or etypes). In that
case, it returns error
KRB5_KPASSWD_ETYPE_NOSUPP as
discussed above. The server MUST
add keylength number of bits of
entropy to each key. The assumption
here is that the client may have
added insufficient entropy to the
request keys. The server SHOULD use
the client key from each
KeySequence structure as input
into the final keyvalue for the
returned key.
0xFFFF is returned if the request fails for some other reason.
The client must interpret any non-zero result code as a failure.
minor status (16 bits):
This field contains a minor status code. It can be used to index
into a catalog of strings and the indexed string can then be
displayed to the user. Additional information on a password
set/change policy failure is one use for this string.
key version (16 bits - optional): present if and only if the result
code is KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS. This contains the key version of
the new key(s).
edata: used to convey additional information as defined by the
result code.
4. Acknowledgements
The authors thank Tony Andrea for his input to the document.
5. References
[1] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
[3] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication
Service (V5), Request for Comments 1510.
[4] M. Horowitz. Kerberos Change Password Protocol,
ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/
draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt
6. Expiration Date
This draft expires on September 30th, 2001.
7. Authors' Addresses
Jonathan Trostle
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
Email: jtrostle@cisco.com
Mike Swift
University of Washington
Seattle, WA
Email: mikesw@cs.washington.edu
John Brezak
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com
Bill Gossman
Cybersafe Corporation
1605 NW Sammamish Rd.
Issaquah, WA 98027-5378
Email: bill.gossman@cybersafe.com
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