One document matched: draft-hares-i2nsf-terminology-00.txt
I2NSF S. Hares
Internet-Draft J. Strassner
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei
Expires: September 4, 2016 D. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
L. Xia
Huawei
March 3, 2016
I2NSF Terminology
draft-hares-i2nsf-terminology-00.txt
Abstract
This document describes the terminology for I2NSF.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
This document describes the terminology for the work on the Interface
to Security Functions (I2NSF). This section provides some background
on I2NSF, but a problem statement can be found in
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases]
The growing challenges and complexity in maintaining a secure
infrastructure, complying with regulatory requirements, and
controlling costs are enticing enterprises into consuming network
security functions hosted by service providers. The hosted security
service is especially attractive to small and medium size enterprises
who suffer from a lack of security experts to continuously monitor,
acquire new skills and propose immediate mitigations to ever
increasing sets of security attacks. Small and medium-sized
businesses (SMBs) are increasingly adopting cloud-based security
services to replace on-premises security tools, while larger
enterprises are deploying a mix of traditional and cloud-based
security services.
To meet the demand, more and more service providers are providing
hosted security solutions to deliver cost-effective managed security
services to enterprise customers. The hosted security services are
primarily targeted at enterprises (especially small/medium ones), but
could also be provided to any kind of mass-market customer. As the
result, the Network security functions (NSFs) are provided and
consumed in increasingly diverse environments. Users of NSFs may
consume network security services hosted by one or more providers,
which may be their own enterprise, service providers, or a
combination of both.
2. Terminology
AAA: Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting. See individual
definitions.
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Abstraction: An abstraction defines the salient characteristics and
behavior of an object that distinguish it from all other types of
objects. It manages complexity by exposing common properties
between objects and processes while hiding detail that is not
relevant.
Accounting: TBD
ACL: Access Control List. This is a mechanism for defining a set
of permissions that are attached to an object.
Action: is a set of purposeful activities that have a set of
associated behavior. (see I2NSF Action below.) (from
[I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model])
Authentication: TBD
Authorization: TBD
B2B: Business-to-Business
Bespoke: Something made to fit a particular person, client or
company.
Bespoke security management: Security management systems which are
make to fit a particular customer.
Boolean Clause: A logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE
or FALSE. Also called Boolean Expression.
Capability: TBD
Capability Layer: TBD [Editorial comment from Strassner: the
existing definition in use in documents is descriptive, not
prescriptive.]
Condition: a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to
be compared with a set of known attributes, features, and/or
values in order to make a decision. Examples of an I2NSF
Condition include matching attributes of a packet or flow, and
comparing the internal state of a NSF to a desired state. A
Condition, when used in the context of a Policy Rule, is used to
determine whether or not the set of Actions in that Policy Rule
can be executed or not. (from
[I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model])
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Constraint: A constraint is a limitation or restriction.
Constraints may be added to any type of object (e.g., events,
conditions, and actions in Policy Rules).
Constraint Programming: a type of programming that uses
constraints to define relations between variables in order to find
a feasible (and not necessarily optimal) solution.
Context: The Context of an Entity is a collection of measured and/
or inferred knowledge that describe the state and the environment
in which an Entity exists or has existed. (from
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/i2nsf/current/msg00762.html)
Controller: TBD [Editorial: The definition is lacking content
("used interchangeably with Service Provider Security Controller
or management system throughout this document") and overloaded -
the two terms should be split into two separate definitions in
documents.]
DC: Data Center
Data Model: A data model is a representation of concepts of
interest to an environment in a form that is dependent on data
repository, data definition language, query language,
implementation language, and protocol (typically one or more of
these ). (from [I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model]).
Event: An Event is defined as any important occurrence in time of
a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of
the system being managed. Examples of an I2NSF EVent include time
and user actioins (e.g. logon, logoff, and actions that violate
and ACL.) An Event, when used in the context of a Policy Rule, is
used to determine whether the condition clause of an imperative
Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. (from
[I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model]).
ECA: Event - Condition - Action policy.
FW: Firewall
Flow-based NSF: A NSF that inspects network flows according to a
policy intended for enforcing security properties. Flow based
security also means that packets are inspected in the order they
are received, and without modification to the packet due to the
inspection process (MAC rewrites, TTL decrement action, or NAT
inspection or changes).
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I2NSF Action: An I2NSF Action is a special type of Action that is
used to control and monitor aspects of physical and virtual flow-
based Network Security Functions. Examples of I2NSF Actions
include providing intrusion detection and/or protection, web and
flow filtering, and deep packet inspection for packets and flows.
An I2NSF Action, when used in the context of a I2NSF Policy Rule,
may be executed when both the event and the condition clauses of
its owning I2NSF Policy Rule evaluate to true. The execution of
this action may be influenced by applicable metadata. (see
[I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model]).
I2NSF agent: A piece of software in a device that implements a
network security function that receives provisioning information
and requests for operational data (monitoring data) across the
I2NSF protocol from an I2NSF client.
I2NSF client: A security client software component that utilizes
the I2NSF protocol to read, write or change provisioning and
operational aspects for the NSFs it attaches to by using the I2NSF
protocol
I2NSF Management System: I2NSF client operates within a network
management system, which serves as a collection and distribution
point for security provisioning and filter data. This management
system is denoted as an I2NS management system in this document.
I2NSF Policy: is a set of rules that are used to manage and
control the changing or maintaining of the state of an security
device.
I2NSF Policy Rule: is a policy rule that is adapted for I2NSF.
The I2NSF Policy Rule is assumed to be in ECA form (i.e., an
imperative structure). Other types of programming paradigms
(e.g., declarative and functional) are currently out of scope. An
example of an I2NSF Policy Rule is, in pseudo-code:
IF <event-clause> is TRUE
IF <condition-clause> is TRUE
THEN execute <action-clause>
END-IF
END-IF
In the above example, the Event, Condition, and Action portions of
a Policy Rule are all **Boolean Clauses**.
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I2NSF Registry: a registry which contains I2NSF capability
information that can be controlled by the controller. (An
expansion of Registry definition below.)
IDS: Intrusion Detection System (see below).
IPS: Intrusion Protection System (see below).
Information Model: An information model is a representation of
concepts of interest to an environment in a form that is
independent of data repository, data definition language, query
language, implementation language, and protocol. (from
[I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model]).
Interface: is the set of operations one object knows it can invoke
on another object. It is a subset of all operations that a given
object implements. An example of multiple interfaces can be seen
by considering the interfaces include a firewall uses. A firewall
can have: a) multiple interfaces for data packets to traverse
through and b) an interface for a controller to impose policy, or
retrieve the results of execution of a policy rule. This
illustrates that the same object may have multiple types of
interfaces to serve different purposes.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): a system which detects network
intrusions via a variety of filters, monitors, and/or probes. An
IDS may be stateful or stateless.
Intrusion Protection System (IPS): a system that protect against
network intrusions. An IPS may be stateful or stateless.
Metadata: is data that provides information about other data.
IETF network management protocols (e.g. NETCONF/RESTCONF/IPFix)
or IETF routing interfaces (I2RS), and the I2NSF security
interface may each utilize Metadata regarding the yang data
models.
Middlebox: TBD
NSF: Network security function. An NSF is a function that that
detects unwanted activity and blocks/mitigates the effect of such
unwanted activity in order to support availability of a network.
In addition, the NSF can help in supporting communication stream
integrity and confidentiality.
OCL (the Object Constraint Language) is used to specify constraints
in UML. (from http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/i2nsf/current/msg00762.html)
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OPNFV (Open Network Function Virtualization) TBD
Policy Rule: A Policy Rule is a set of rules that are used to
manage and control the changing or maintaining of the state of one
or more managed objects. Often this is shorterned to Rule or
Policy. (from [I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model]).
An I2NSF Policy Rule is assumed to be in ECA form (i.e., an
imperative structure). Other types of programming paradigms
(e.g., declarative and functional) are currently out of scope.
For the complete definition of an I2NSF Policy Rule please see
above. (see above I2NSF policy rule).
Profile: A structured representation of information that
characterizes the capabilities of an object. This may be used to
simplify how this object interacts with other objects in its
environment. [Editors note: John Strassner suggestse this is a
simplified defintion from a variety of sources (UAProf and CC/PP).
It does not mention the concept of preference, therefore John
wonders if we need a different definition here.]
Registry: is a logically centralized location containing data of a
particular type; it may optionally contain metadata,
relationships, and other aspects of the registered data in order
to use those data effectively. An I2NSF registry is used to
contain capability information that can be controlled by the
controller.
Registration Interface: is an interface dedicated to requesting,
receiving, editing, and deleting information in a Registry.
Security Management System: TBD (Editorial: Placeholder fro split
of definition betweeen controller (see above), and service
provider security controller (see below) which existing I2NSF
documents merge").
Server Layer: The Service Layer is called the Server Layer
Interface in the I2NSF context.
Service Layer: The Service Layer (also called Client-Facing
Interface) enables clients to manage security policies for their
specific flows.
Service Provider Security Controller: TBD (Editorial: Place holder
for a split between controller and security controller
definition.)
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Tenant: a tenant is a gorup of users that share common access
proviliges to the same software. An I2NSF tenanat may be physical
or virtual, and may run on a variety of systems or servers.
Vendor Facing Interface: The Vendor Facing Interface enables
vendors to register their NSFs, along with the capabilities of
their NSFs, with a logically centralized authority.
Virtual NSF: A NSF that is deployed as a distributed virtual
device.
Virtual Network Function (VNF): A virtualized network component
such as a router, switch, security box, or AAA Servier.
VNFM (VNF Manager): Manager of virtual network functions that
creates, deletes, manages, and moves VNFs.
VNFPool: a collection of interchangeable VNFs (i.e., each VNF has
the same set of capabilities).
Virtualization: Virtualization is a type of software that creates
a non-physical version of an object. Examples include virtualized
operating systems, storagte devices, and networking elements.
[Editoris notes: Questions from John: Do we want or need to
differentiate between different tyeps of virtualization? For
example: full vs. partial vs. para-virtualization (all types of
"hardware virtualization")? Do we need to introduce OS
virtualization? What about application virtualization?]
3. IANA Considerations
No IANA considerations exist for this document.
4. Security Considerations
This is a terminology document with no security considerations.
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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5.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis]
Hares, S., Moskowitz, R., and D. Zhang, "Analysis of
Existing work for I2NSF", draft-ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis-00
(work in progress), February 2016.
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases]
Hares, S., Dunbar, L., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., and C.
Jacquenet, "I2NSF Problem Statement and Use cases", draft-
ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-00 (work in progress),
February 2016.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
Bogdanovic, D., Koushik, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-06 (work in progress),
December 2015.
[I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls]
Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet
Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in
progress), October 2012.
[I-D.strassner-supa-generic-policy-info-model]
Strassner, J., Halpern, J., and J. Coleman, "Generic
Policy Information Model for Simplified Use of Policy
Abstractions (SUPA)", draft-strassner-supa-generic-policy-
info-model-04 (work in progress), February 2016.
[RFC4948] Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",
RFC 4948, DOI 10.17487/RFC4948, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4948>.
[RFC7277] Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for IP Management",
RFC 7277, DOI 10.17487/RFC7277, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7277>.
Authors' Addresses
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Susan Hares
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
USA
Phone: +1-734-604-0332
Email: shares@ndzh.com
John Strassner
Huawei
Santa Clara, CA
USA
Email: John.Strassner@huawei.com
Diego R. Lopex
Telefonica I+D
Don Ramon de la Cruz, 82
Madrid 28006
Spain
Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
Liang Xia (Frank)
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing , Jiangsu 210012
China
Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
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