One document matched: draft-haddad-mipshop-hmipv6-security-04.txt
Differences from draft-haddad-mipshop-hmipv6-security-03.txt
MIPSHOP Working Group W. Haddad
Internet-Draft S. Krishnan
Expires: December 28, 2006 Ericsson Research
H. Soliman
Qualcomm-Flarion
June 26, 2006
Using Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) to secure HMIPv6
Protocol (HMIPv6sec)
draft-haddad-mipshop-hmipv6-security-04
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This memo describes a method for establishing a security association
between the mobile node and the selected mobility anchor point in an
hierarchical mobile IPv6 domain. The suggested solution is based on
using the cryptographically generated address technology.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. New Messages and Options Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. The Pre-Binding Update (PBU) Message Format . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Third Party Shared Key (TPSK) Option . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. The MAP Session Mobility Secret (MSMS) Option . . . . . . 10
5.4. Third Party Hash Secret (TPHS) Option . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.5. The Session Mobility Secret (SMS) Option . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Introduction
The Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 Mobility Management [HMIPv6] did not
specify nor favor any particular mechanism for establishing a
Security Association (SA) between the Mobile Node (MN) and the
Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) located within an HMIPv6 domain.
This memo describes a method, which allows the MN to establish an SA
with the selected MAP. The suggested solution is based on using the
Cryptographically Generated Address technology (described in [CGA]).
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2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [TERM].
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3. Glossary
Access Router
The Access Router is the Mobile Node's default router. The AR
aggregates the outband traffic of mobile nodes.
Mobility Anchor Point (MAP)
A Mobility Anchor Point is a router located in a network visited
by the mobile node, which is used by the MN as a local Home Agent
(HA).
Regional Care-of Address (RCoA)
A Regional Care-of Address is an address obtained by the MN from
the visited network. An RCoA is an address on the MAP's subnet
and is auto-configured by the MN when receiving the MAP option.
On-link Care-of Address (LCoA)
The LCoA is the on-link CoA configured on a mobile node's
interface based on the prefix advertised by its default router.
Local Binding Update (LBU) Message
The MN sends a Local Binding Update message to the MAP in order to
establish a binding between the RCoA and the LCoA.
Pre-Binding Update (PBU) Message
The MN's default router sends a Pre-Binding Update message to the
MAP upon receiving a Router Solicitation (RtSol) message signed
with CGA technology as described in the secure neighbor discovery
protocol [SEND].
Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
A technique described in [CGA] whereby an IPv6 address of a node
is cryptographically generated by using a one-way hash function
from the node's public key (Kp) and some other parameters.
Binding Acknowledgment (BA) Message
The MAP sends a binding acknowledgment message to the MN in
response to an LBU message.
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4. Proposed Solution
We assume that the MN's LCoA is always computed based on the CGA
technology, in order to allow the MN to run SEND protocol. Such
assumption has also been made in [FMIPkey], which aims to provide a
security mechanism for [FMIPv6] protocol, and in the [OptiSEND]
protocol, which aims to optimize SEND protocol.
In addition, we assume that the MN can discover the presence of an
HMIPv6 domain before sending a RtSol message, e.g., by using
technologies described in [FRD]. However, the proposed solution
works with the same performance without such assumption. In fact,
our motivation behind suggesting the FRD protocol aims above all to
reduce the handoff latency.
The suggested solution introduces a new signaling message, i.e., the
Pre-Binding Update (PBU) message, which is sent by the AR to the MAP
upon receiving a RtSol message from the MN carrying a valid signature
(i.e., the message is signed with the MN's CGA private key).
The following figure shows the signaling diagram for establishing a
bidirectional SA between the MN and the MAP:
1. MN to AR: Router Solicitation [CGA Signature] (RtSol)
2a. AR to MN: Router Acknowledgement [Ks] (RtAdv)
2b. AR to MAP: Pre-Binding Update [Ks + LCoA] (PBU)
3. MN to MAP: Local Binding Update [DH value (X)] (LBU)
4. MAP to MN: Binding Acknowledgment [HKs + DH value (Y)] (BA)
The suggested solution is described in the following steps:
o the MN configures a 64-bit interface identifier (IID) from using
CGA technology then use it to send a RtSol message signed with
CGA, according to the SEND protocol. Note that at this stage, the
MN may not be aware that it has entered an HMIPv6 domain.
o Upon receiving a valid unicast RtSol message, the AR replies
immediately by sending back a unicast RtAdv message to the MN and
in parallel, a PBU message to the MAP. For this purpose, the AR
MUST compute a secret (Ks), encrypts it with the MN's CGA public
key and sends it in the unicast RtAdv message. The shared secret
is inserted in a new option (Third Party Shared Key (TSPK)), which
is carried by the unicast RtAdv message.
The AR MUST also compute the LCoA and RCoA that the MN is supposed
to autoconfigure. For this purpose, the LCoA is computed by
appending the 64-bit IID used in the RtSol message to the 64-bit
prefix advertised by the AR and the RCoA is computed by appending
the 64-bit prefix advertised by the MAP with the 64-bit IID
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computed in the following way:
RCoA (IID) = First (64, SHA1(Ks | LCoA))
Where First(x,y) is a function, which extracts the first x bits
from y and LCoA is the MN's on link care-of address.
After computing the MN's LCoA and RCoA, the AR inserts the two
IPv6 addresses and Ks in the PBU message and sends it to the MAP.
Note that it is assumed that the PBU messages are signed by the
ARs and the paths between the ARs and the MAP are secure.
o After receiving the PBU message, the MAP creates a binding cache
entry (BCE) for the MN, in which it stores the MN's LCoA, RCoA and
Ks carried by the PBU message. Once the BCE is created, the MAP
waits for a limited amount of time for the owner of the two
addresses to send the LBU message. If no valid LBU message is
received during the BCE preconfigured lifetime then the MAP SHOULD
delete it.
o When the MN gets a valid RtAdv message, it discovers that it has
entered an HMIPv6 domain. The following is based on the
assumption that the MN decides to use the MAP as its local Home
Agent, which means that the MN has to configure an RCoA then
request the MAP to create a BCE. For this purpose, the MN SHOULD
use the same method as the AR (described earlier) to autoconfigure
its RCoA and LCoA. After that, the MN initiates a Diffie-Hellman
(DH) procedure with the MAP by sending its DH public value (X) in
a new option (Session Mobility Secret (SMS)), which is carried by
the first LBU message sent to the MAP. The first LBU message is
also used to request the MAP to bind its LCoA to its new RCoA.
o Upon receiving an LBU message, the MAP searches its BCEs table for
an LCoA, which matches the one sent in the LBU message. If the
same LCoA is found, then the MAP computes the RCoA IID in the same
way as described above, and compares it to the one claimed by the
MN in the LBU message.
If the two addresses are the same, then the MAP completes the DH
exchange by sending its own DH public value (Y) in a new option
(MAP Session Mobility Secret (MSMS)), which is carried by the BA
message sent to the MN. In addition, the MAP MUST send in the BA
message the hash of Ks (i.e., hash(Ks) = HKs), which will be
carried in another new option (Third Party Hash Secret (TPHS)).
By sending (Y) to the MN, both nodes will be able to compute the
session mobility key (Ksm) (i.e., from values (X) and (Y)).
Note that if the two IPv6 addresses are not identical then the MAP
MUST simply discard the LBU message.
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o When the MN gets a BA message, it searches first if it carries
HKs. If the correct HKs is found, then the MN computes Ksm and
establishes a bidirectional SA with the MAP.
o By completing the DH procedure, both nodes will be able to compute
the session mobility key (Ksm) (i.e., from values (X) and (Y)) and
use it to authenticate all subsequent LBU/BA messages exchanged
between them.
Note that the SA lifetime is set to 24 hours, after which the MN has
to request the MAP to renew it.
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5. New Messages and Options Format
In the following, we describe the PBU message structure and the
format of the four new options.
5.1. The Pre-Binding Update (PBU) Message Format
When the AR receives a valid RtSol message signed with CGA, it sends
a PBU message to the MAP, which carries the MN's LCoA, RCoA and Ks.
The format of the PBU message is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ LCoA +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ RCoA +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Ks .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Code 0
Checksum
The ICMP checksum. For more details see [ICMPv6].
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Reserved
This field is unused. It MUST be initialized to zero by the sender
and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
LCoA
This field contains the MN's LCoA.
RCoA
This field contains the MN's RCoA.
Ks
The shared secret sent by the AR to the MN and to the MAP.
5.2. Third Party Shared Key (TPSK) Option
The Third Party Shared Key Option is carried by the unicast RtAdv
message sent by the AR to the MN, in response to a RtSol message
carrying a valid signature. The TPSK option MUST carry the shared
secret Ks.
When used, the TPSK option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = Ks .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option.
Option Data
This field contains the shared secret Ks.
5.3. The MAP Session Mobility Secret (MSMS) Option
The MSS Option is used by the MAP to carry the DH public value (Y)
sent in the BA message, in response to the first LBU message carrying
an SMS option sent by the MN to the MAP.
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Note that the first BA message sent by the MAP to the MN MUST be
authenticated with Ks.
The MSMS option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = (Y) .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option.
Option Data
The Option Data field contains the DH public value (Y) sent by the
MAP to the MN in the BA message.
5.4. Third Party Hash Secret (TPHS) Option
When sending a BA message carrying an MSS option, the MAP MUST insert
the hash of Ks (HKs) in the BA message. For this purpose, the TPHS
option is used to carry the HKs in the BA message.
The TPHS option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = HKs .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
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Option Length
Length of the option.
Option Data
The Option Data field contains the hash of Ks.
5.5. The Session Mobility Secret (SMS) Option
The SMS option is carried by the first LBU message sent by the MN to
the MAP after receiving an unicast RtAdv message carrying a TPSK
option. The SMS option contains the DH public value (X) sent by the
MN to the MAP to initiate a DH exchange, which will allow both nodes
to compute a shared secret (Ksm).
Note that the first LBU message sent by the MN to the MAP MUST be
authenticated with Ks.
The SMS option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Option Data = (X) .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Option Type
<To Be Assigned By IANA>
Option Length
Length of the option.
Option Data
The Option Data field contains the DH public value (X) sent by the MN
to the MAP in the first LBU message.
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6. IANA Considerations
This document introduces 4 new types of options and one new type of
message. The values of these types are 8-bit unsigned integers.
These values are allocated according to the Standards Actions or IESG
approval policies defined in [IANA].
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7. Security Considerations
This proposal suggests using the CGA technology to secure the
exchange between the MN and the AR as described in the SEND protocol,
to derive a first shared secret between the two entities and to use
it later to authenticate mobility signaling messages exchanged
between the MN and the MAP. This is recommended due to the fact that
public key signature is a computationally expensive and lengthy
procedure.
The suggested proposal does not create nor enhance any new and/or
existing threats. In particular, launching a man-in-the middle
attack against the MN is not possible because the attacker is not
aware of the shared secret Ks. In addition, launching a denial of
service (DoS) attack against the MAP or the MN is mitigated due to
the fact that both nodes can quickly scan incoming messages for a
partial authenticity before processing the entire message.
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8. Change Log
This document introduces the following changes from previous
versions:
- Remove the reliance on the crypto-based identifier (CBID) in order
to further simplify the protocol.
- Remove any new option from the RtSol message and adopt the same
format as used in SEND.
- Reduce the size of the PBU message by eliminating the need to send
the MN's CGA public key.
- Change the document title to reflect the new modifications.
- Correct few typos.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[CGA] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.
[HMIPv6] Soliman, H., Castelluccia, C., El Malki, K., and L.
Bellier, "Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6)", Internet
Draft, draft-soliman-mipshop-4140bis-00.txt, June 2006.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alverstrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2434, BCP 26,
October 1998.
[ICMPv6] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2463, July 2005.
[SEND] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Nikander, P., and B. Zill, "Secure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[TERM] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP , March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[FMIPkey] Kempf, J. and R. Koodli, "Bootstrapping a Symmetric IPv6
Key Handover Key from SEND", Internet
Draft, draft-kempf-mipshop-handover-key-00.txt, June 2006.
[FMIPv6] Koodli, R., "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6", Internet
Draft, draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rev-00.txt, April 2006.
[FRD] Choi, J., Chin, D., and W. Haddad, "Fast Router Discovery
with L2 Support", Internet
Draft, draft-ietf-dna-frd-01.txt, June 2006.
[OptiSEND]
Haddad, W., Krishnan, S., and J. Choi, "Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) Optimization and Adaptation for Mobility:
The OptiSEND Protocol", Internet
Draft, draft-haddad-mipshop-optisend-01.txt, March 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Wassim Haddad
Ericsson Research
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Phone: +46 8 4044079
Email: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com
Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson Research
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900
Email: Suresh.Krishnan@ericsson.com
Hesham Soliman
Qualcomm-Flarion
Phone: +1 908 997 9775
Email: hsoliman@qualcomm.com
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