One document matched: draft-barnes-ecrit-rough-loc-01.txt
Differences from draft-barnes-ecrit-rough-loc-00.txt
Internet Engineering Task Force R. Barnes
Internet-Draft M. Lepinski
Intended status: Experimental BBN Technologies
Expires: August 4, 2008 February 2008
Using Imprecise Location for Emergency Context Resolution
draft-barnes-ecrit-rough-loc-01.txt
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Abstract
Emergency calling works best when precise location is available for
emergency call routing. However, there are situations in which a
location provider is unable or unwilling to provide precise location,
yet still wishes to enable subscribers to make emergency calls. This
document describes the level of location accuracy that providers must
provide to enable emergency call routing. In addition, we descibe
how emergency services and non-emergency services can be invoked by
an endpoint that does not have access to its precise location.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Determining sufficient location precision . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Location filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Constructing and maintaining filters . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Applying location filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Requesting location-based services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Emergency calling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Non-emergency services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
Information about the location of an emergency caller is a critical
input to the process of emergency call establshment, in that endpoint
location is used to determine which Public Safety Answering Point
(PSAP) should be the destination of the call. (The entire emergency
calling process is described in detail in
[I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework][I.D-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp].) This process
is most likely to work properly when the endpoint is provided with
the most accurate precise information available about its location.
Using location information with maximal precision and accuracy
minimizes the chance that a call will be mis-routed. And when that
location is provided to the endpoint, the endpoint is able to verify
that the location is correct (to the extent of the endpoint's
knowledge of its own location) prior to an emergency call, and is
able to perform emergency call routing functions on its own,
providing redundancy for network-provided functions.
However, there may be situations in which it is not feasible for
endpoints to be provided with maximally precise and accurate
location. These cases may arise when computing precise location is
an expensive or time-consuming operation (e.g., in the case of
wireless triangulation), and location is needed quickly (as is often
the case in emergency situations). Or they may arise because the
policy of the location provider does not allow precise location to be
provided to the endpoint (e.g. due to privacy considerations). While
it is undesirable to use imprecise location for emergency call
routing, the possibility that precise location may not be available
to the calling device must be accomodated in order to make emergency
calling possible in the largest possible set of circumstances.
This document is concerned imprecise location only in the context of
routing emergency calls, i.e., for determining the correct PSAP to
receive a given call (e.g., via a LoST query [I.D-ietf-ecrit-lost]).
(More generally, the provided location information will be needed to
route the call to an entity that is authorized to request precise
location, e.g., an Emergency Services Routing Proxy.)
Location information may also be used in the emergency calling
framework to direct the dispatch of emergency responders. This usage
is treated separately from call routing for purposes of this
document, and this document does not place requirements on the
location provided for dispatch (although it should obviously be as
precise as possible). The only provision for dispatch in this
document is a recommendation that the location provider supply
endpoints with a URI that can be used by a PSAP or other emergency
authority to obtain a different location for use in dispatch,
hopefully more precise than the one used for routing.
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This document describes the use of imprecise location information in
the emergency call routing system. Section 3 describes how location
providers can determine the precision necessary to support emergency
call routing, and how they can use this information to optimize
location delivery. Section 4 describes how emergency calls are
placed in such an environment, and how non-emergency services can be
invoked when precise location is not available to the endpoint by
value.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
We consider in this document patterns of interaction as described in
[I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework]. The two main parties of interest are
endpoints and location providers. Endpoints are hosts connected to
the Internet that originate emergency calls in the emergency calling
architecture, while location providers are entities that supply
location information that is used for emergency calling. In
addition, we will discuss how these parties interact with the LoST
mapping infrastructure [I.D-ietf-ecrit-mapping-arch], and with
emergency and non-emergency location-based service providers.
3. Determining sufficient location precision
A location provider wishing to provide location information usable
for emergency call routing requires a mechanism for determining when
a description of location (e.g., a polygon) is precise enough to be
used for emergency call routing. This mechanism might be used to
decide when to terminate a positioning mechanism that converges over
time, or to choose a polygon larger than the known location of the
endpoint (in order to obscure the known location of the endpoint),
while preserving the utility of the location for emergency call
routing.
There are two base requirements for a location to be usable for
emergency call routing:
1. The location SHOULD be sufficiently precise that a LoST request
with the location and any service URN will return a single URI
mapping value. This may not be possible in all cases, e.g.,
because of overlapping service boundaries (leading to areas that
do not have a unique mapping) or positioning limitations (leading
to insufficient precision).
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2. When the location of the endpoint is known by the provider to
greater precision than is being provided, the provided location
MUST return the same mappings from LoST (for all service URNs) as
the known location.
In this section, we describe how to use a "location filter" to
determine whether a given location is usable for emergency call
routing, and how to construct and maintain such a filter.
3.1. Location filtering
With each service-to-URI mapping, a LoST query provides a service
boundary that represents the set of locations in which that mapping
is valid. A consequence of this is that given a set of service
boundaries for difference services (say, one mapping
"urn:service:sos.fire" to "sip:fire@example.com" and one mapping
"urn:service:sos.police" to "sip:police@example.com"), the
intersection of those service boundaries is the region in which two
mappings are valid ("urn:service:sos.fire" maps to
"sip:fire@example.com" and "urn:service:sos.police" maps to
"sip:police@example.com"). Outside that area, one or more of the
mappings is invalid. Said differently, any region contained in an
intersection uniquely determines mappings for the services used in
the intersection, and any two locations within the same intersection
are equivalent for the purpose of LoST mapping (i.e., emergency call
routing).
A location filter is thus a set of regions (optionally, each region
may be assigned a list of (service URN, service URI) pairs), as
illustrated in Figure 1. Each region is the intersection of the
service boundaries for all services available within the region, and
the lists represent the mappings that are valid within that region.
A filter is used to determine whether a location is useable for
emergency call routing in the following way:
1. The location SHOULD be contained in exactly one of the regions in
the filter. This guarantees that LoST mappings are unique.
2. When the location of the endpoint is known, the provided location
MUST be contained in the same region(s) of the filter as the
known location. This guarantees that LoST queries with the
provided location return the same results as those done with the
known location
When the regions are bound to lists of URN-URI mappings, the
resulting filter can also be used as a cache for LoST mappings; the
LoST mappings for a location are the URN-URI pairs bound to the
region(s) containing it.
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urn:service:sos.police urn:service:sos.fire
+-------+ +-------+
| A | | C |
| +---+ | +---+---+
| | | | | |
+---+---+ | +---+ |
| B | | D |
+-------+ +-------+
| |
| |
+-----------+------------+
|
V
+-------+
| A,C |
| +---+
| | +---+
+---+ |A,D| +---+
+---+ | |
+---+ |
| B,D |
+-------+
Resulting Location Filter
Figure 1: Generating a filter from service boundaries
When the location of the endpoint is known to more precision than the
location provided to the endpoint, although any location meeting the
two criteria above is equivalent to the known location for purposes
of LoST, the provided location MUST contain the known location in
order to avoid errors if the location is used for other purposes in
the course of an emergency (e.g., if the location is provided to
first responders for dispatch). This guarantee also allows the
endpoint to do some course verification that it is within the
provided location (in order to prevent very gross errors in routing).
Nonetheless, any location that (1) contains the known location and
(2) is contained in the same filter region as the known location is
allowable. Adding randomness to the provided locations may have
privacy benefits in some cases, as discussed in the security
considerations below.
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3.2. Constructing and maintaining filters
For simplicity, we assume that the entity performing filtering will
only be using the filter to test locations contained within a
particular geographic "coverage area". Given a coverage area, server
operated by a location service provider can autonomously compute a
location filter using the following algorithm:
First, the server must obtain mappings and service boundaries for all
services and for all points within the coverage area. For each
emergency service URN, the server goes through the following process
to build a service map: First, the server queries LoST for the
complete coverage map for the desired service. This can be done with
a LoST <findService> query of the following form:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<findService
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:lost1"
serviceBoundary="value">
<location>
<!-- Coverage Area -->
</location>
<service>
<!-- Service URN -->
</service>
</findService>
If LoST returns a set of mappings whose service boundaries cover the
coverage area (i.e., if LoST is configured to return all possible
matches for the queried location), then the process termintes here.
The coverage map for this service is the set of returned service
boundaries.
If service boundaries in the LoST response to the above query do not
cover the location provider's coverage area, then the location server
must perform further queries. The location included in each query is
the difference between the coverage area and the current coverage
map, that is, the coverage area with all currently-known service
boundaries removed. The server repeats this process (query, then
remove service boundaries from the query location, then query again)
until either (1) the coverage area is covered by the collected
service boundaries or (2) LoST returns a <notFound> error.
After the location server has performed this procedure for each
service, it will have a set of LoST mappings for each service, for
every point in its coverage region where that service is offered
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The regions in the location filter are computed from these mappings
by iterating over URI tuples: For each service URN, let uris(urn) be
the set of PSAP URIs for that service URN (collected from the
mappings). The set of URI tuples is then the cartesian product of
these sets; if the set of servuce URNs is {urn1,...,urnN}, then the
set of URI-tuples is uris(urn1) x ... x uris(urnN). The server
computes the regions in the filter by iterating through the set of
URI tuples, either by constructing the set of URI tuples and directly
iterating, or by using nested iteration through all the sets
uris(urn).
For each URI tuple, the server compute the intersection of the
service boundaries for the URIs in the tuple. This becomes an entry
in the location filter: The stored region is the intersection of the
service boundaries, and the corresponding mapping table is the list
of (URN, URI) pairs, where the URIs are the URIs from the tuple and
the URNs are the services used to obtain them from LoST. (Empty
filter regions, corresponding to URIs in a tuple with disjoint
service boundaries, can of course be discarded.)
[TODO: Describe how this process works with civic addresses for
service boundaries.]
As the LoST mappings that underlie the filter change, the filter will
need to be updated. The entity maintaining the filter MUST obtain a
new mapping for a region when an existing mapping expires. The
service boundary from the new mapping is compared to the service
boundary from the old mapping: If they are the same, then the filter
need not be updated. If they differ, then regions in the filter that
are contained in either the old service boundary or the new service
boundary will need to be recomputed. Note that since this operation
only requires the server to determine if two service boundaries are
identical, the server need only store a hash of the old boundary (to
which it can compare a hash of the new boundary).
3.3. Applying location filters
After constructing a location filter, a location server can use it to
optimize how it delivers location. When the location server is using
a positioning algorithm that grows more accurate with time, the
filter tells it how long to run the algorithm. Namely, the algorithm
can be terminated when the estimated location is within one of the
regions in the filter.
When the location provider knows the precise location of the caller,
a location filter can also be used as a "location cache". That is,
the location provider can simply look up which of the filter regions
contains the caller's precise location and return that region as the
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caller's location (or some subset that contains the precise
location).
This allows an additional optimization in some cases: If the location
server knows that the caller's precise location will be within the
same region for a period of time, it can instruct the client not to
re-query in that time. For instance, if the server is delivering
location over HELD, then it can use the HTTP cache-control headers
(e.g., Expires). However, the location server MUST NOT instruct the
client to wait for longer than the current filter is valid; the
expiry time of the location MUST be before the earliest expiry of a
LoST mapping used in the filter.
4. Requesting location-based services
When a location provider deliver endpoints location information that
is below its maximum feasible precision while still supporting
emergency calling, it MUST provide to the endpoint both a location
(by value) that is sufficient for emergency call routing (see above)
and a location reference (i.e., a URI) that can subsequently be used
by authorized parties to obtain more precise information about the
location of the endpoint. The endpoint then can then use both the
location value and the location reference to request location-based
services (LBS) as described below.
4.1. Emergency calling
The procedure for placing an emergency call is indentical to that
described in [I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework]. In particular, the endpoint
requirements in Sections 8 and 9 of [I.D-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp] still
apply to an endpoint that receives imprecise location.
In addition, it should be emphasized that an endpoint that receives
location both by value and by reference from its location provider
MUST include both the location value and the location reference in
the SIP INVITE message that initiates an emergency call, as specified
in [I.D-ietf-sip-location-conveyance]. When the endpoint supports
LoST, it SHOULD use the location value to obtain a PSAP URI for LoST
queries (as opposed to attempting to dereference the location
reference). Note that the caller would also have to add the "used-
for-routing" parameter to the geolocation header that points to the
location value as inserted into the INVITE message. Note that this
process crucially relies on the location value having sufficient
precision for routing emergency calls (see Section 3 for techniques
to ensure the location value is suitable for emergency call routing).
When a PSAP receives a SIP INVITE that contains both a location value
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and a location reference, if the value is too imprecise for use in
dispatch then the PSAP SHOULD dereference the LbyR to obtain more
precise information. In turn, the location provided by the location
provider MUST allow access by all PSAPs whose service boundaries
overlap with the region served by the location provider. This means
that either the provider must supply a reference that can be
dereferenced by any party, or else the provider must establish
explicit authentication and authorization relationships with all
PSAPs in its service area.
4.2. Non-emergency services
Non-emergency LBSs will generally require more precise information
than is required for emergency call routing. Therefore, when
requesting a non-emergency LBS, the endpoint SHOULD include the
location reference provided by its location provider, and MAY
additionally provide the location value. If the provided location
value is not sufficient precise to deliver the requested service,
then the LBS provider should then dereference the location value to
request location information of sufficient precision from the
location provider. If the dereference fails, then the request for
service may fail as well.
Note that when the location reference provided by the location
provider is access-controled, this dereference may require a pre-
existing authentication and authorization agreement between the LBS
provider and the location provider. In such a case, the endpoint may
not know whether a given non-emergency service is authorized to
obtain the endpoint's precise location using the location reference.
The endpoint is always capable of requesting services without knowing
whether they are authorized; in this way, the endpoint can discover
authorized services by trial and error. In order to simplify this
process, a location provider may supply the endpoint with references
to authorized service providers, although there is currently no
standard protocol for this transaction.
5. Acknowledgements
This document generalizes the concept of "rough location" that was
originally discussed in the context of the location hiding problem.
This concept was put forward by Henning Schulzrinne and Andy Newton,
among many others, in a long-running ECRIT discussion.
6. Security Considerations
One reason for an LIS to provide location information below its
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maximum precision is to protect the privacy of the target. Some
location provisioning protocols do not enable the location provider
to obtain strong assurance of the identity of the location recipient;
in particular, the location provider may be unable to verify that the
recipient is the target of the location being provided. Therefore,
there is a risk that a sufisticated attacker might be able to spoof
the identifier (e.g. IP address) used by the location provider to
identify the target, and obtain the target's location in this way.
One way to mitigate this risk is to provide only imprecise location
information to the end-point (without authentication), and to provide
precise information only to trusted entities that can authenticate
themselves to the location provider. Additionally, in some
deployment scenarios, location providers have concerns about the
comprimise of endpoint devices. Providing only imprecise location to
the endpoint, prevents malware on a comprised device from obtaining
the precise location of the target.
As described in Section 3.1 above, the location provider choosing to
provide a less precise location than a known location has a
significant amount of choice in deciding which location to provide:
Any location that contains the known location and is in the same
filter region will do. When the provider is reducing precision for
privacy purposes, there is a signficant benefit to choosing a random
location meeting these criteria. If a watcher is interested in
whether or not the endpoint is moving, an imprecise location may
still reveal that fact if it is constant when the endpoint is at
rest. If the provided location is randomized each time it is
provided, then the watcher is unable to obtain even this level of
information.
7. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework]
Rosen, B., Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and A. Newton,
"Framework for Emergency Calling using Internet
Multimedia", September 2007.
[I.D-ietf-ecrit-lost]
Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H.
Tschofenig, "LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation
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Protocol", September 2007.
[I.D-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]
Rosen, B. and J. Polk, "Best Current Practice for
Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling",
September 2007.
[I.D-ietf-sip-location-conveyance]
Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Location Conveyance for the
Session Initiation Protocol", July 2007.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
8.2. Informative References
[I.D-ietf-ecrit-mapping-arch]
Schulzrinne, H., "Location-to-URI Mapping Architecture and
Framework", September 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Richard Barnes
BBN Technologies
9861 Broken Land Pkwy, Suite 400
Columbia, MD 21046
USA
Phone: +1 410 290 6169
Email: rbarnes@bbn.com
Matt Lepinski
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton St
Cambridge, MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 617 873 5939
Email: mlepinski@bbn.com
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