Stalin's Baltic Fleet and Palm's T-Office

Two Sides in the Emerging Cold War 1946–1947

Sam Nilsson

NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

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Preface

Sam Nilsson has written a very interesting study about *Stalin's Baltic Fleet and Palm's T-Office – Two Sides in the Emerging Cold War 1946–1947*. Access to source materials in this field has long been a challenge for scholarly research. However, things have changed after the end of the Cold War and now it is easier to get access to this type of source material, even from the military intelligence.

The history of the Swedish intelligence service, and particularly the Humint service, is rather unknown outside Sweden. In this fine study Sam Nilsson traces the beginning of the service in a greater scale during the Second World War (within the Swedish Defence Staff, Section II) and focuses on the transition years 1946-1947 when a new intelligence agency, the 'T-Office' ('T-kontoret'), was established and headed by Ph.D. Thede Palm. These were the years when a new international order was emerging leading up to the beginning of the Cold War in 1948-1949.

The T-Office's archive is a gold mine for the intelligence historian, and Nilsson demonstrates how it can be fruitful to use it in combinations with other type of source materials and within the analysis framework of the so called 'intelligence cycle'. Nilsson is the first scholar to analyze the T-Office in depth and has succeeded to interpret the complicated lists of source groups and receivers among the source material. The capabilities and the hardware of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea were systematically followed by the T-Office and others and therefore in the long run well known to the Swedes. However, the Soviet intensions were more difficult to trace and analyze.

On basis of his study Nilsson discusses if Sweden was a part of the 'Western Intelligence Regime', or on its way of becoming one, already in 1946–1947. He is cautious and notes that it is a good idea to be careful in drawing such a conclusion.

For the research project 'Sweden's Defence and Defence Forces during the Cold War' (FOKK), now launched by The Swedish National Defence College, The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and The Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences, Nilsson's study is of a great value, setting a good starting-point for further intelligence research in the field.

One important role of military intelligence in the Cold War was that intelligence assessments played a significant role in stabilising a situation that could have gone out of control between the power blocs.

After the end of the Cold War the need for intelligence has not been reduced. Studies of methods, concepts and co-operation in this field is therefore of a great interest. Sam Nilsson's case study is a good contribution to this research field.

Professor Kent Zetterberg
Departement of Military History, Swedish National Defence College

Author's Foreword

After several years of research and writing in my spare time, it is with a sense of relief I can see this work of mine finally coming to an end. Despite all the endless hours spent in the archives and in front of the computer, it has been a very stimulating and interesting time. Slowly, an elusive picture of a secret intelligence organization from the post-war days has become clearer, and various pieces have fallen into their proper places. It all started as a hobby work after a completed Master's degree in history, when I wanted to start up a small research project 'just for fun'. My tutor, Professor Kent Zetterberg at the Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm, then suggested that I should take a look at the T-Office's archive and see if something interesting could be made out of it. Indeed it could; I found the archive to be extremely interesting.

The T-Office's archive is one of those rare and stimulating things, which provide the researcher with new discoveries and insights every time he takes a look at it. Simply by looking at the reports and struggling to understand the environment in which the T-Office was active, the researcher gradually develops a deeper understanding for what is hiding behind the formal writings in Swedish. When doing research for such a long time on a subject like the T-Office, it is hard to avoid feeling some affection and sympathy for the small organization. Thede Palm, Ove Lilienberg, Curt H. Andreasson, Sven Wahlqvist, Sixten Heppling and the others who carried out their very difficult, and perhaps sometimes even dangerous, tasks in the mysterious world called the intelligence community. They did their duty, probably badly paid, and they did it well. We must also not forget the many unknown individuals who contributed to the success of the T-Office during its existence. Some of them did not take any personal risks while others paid with their lives. I dedicate this work to them, the unknown 'frontline' sources of the T-Office.

Once the basic idea of how to proceed with the work was clear, I made a hard attempt to define a very narrow research area, wise from earlier experiences as I was. Initially, it appeared narrow enough, but as time went on it became obvious that it would end up as something much more comprehensive than I ever thought. The result can perhaps best be described as a research documentation and a detailed history of low-level intelligence reporting on a specific subject. Those looking for some thrilling agent stories to read will not turn so many pages before giving up. But those who are interested in the finer details of intelligence activities and the post-war naval history in the Baltic Sea will hopefully find it a stimulating read. Intelligence historians and navy buffs are likely to become the main readers of this work.

It would be ungrateful of me not to mention the many persons without whose support and encouragement this work would hardly have been completed. Professor Kent Zetterberg initated this study and has patiently and actively supported it along the way. A veteran from the T-Office, Curt H. Andreasson, very kindly and despite frail health volunteered to answer my questions to the best of his abilities, and thereby provided me with useful insight as to the activities of the 1940s. As always, the personnel at the Military Archives in Stockholm deserve praise for their knowledge of the archives and their willingness to help me in all ways possible. My father unwittingly provided me with the basic idea of how to attack the T-Office's archive, when he asked me to mow his lawns back in June 2000; a few hours of walking behind the lawn mower gave me a good opportunity to think. Despite having a busy life, Michael Herman in Cheltenham, Great Britain, kindly read through the draft, and thereafter sent me stimulating and useful thoughts and comments. So did Dr Olav Riste, Oslo, Norway, and Dr C.G. Mckay, Uppsala, Sweden. Excellent friends and competent colleagues have supported and assisted me with their specialist knowledge—thank you all, none mentioned and none forgotten. I am especially grateful for the initial proofreading made by A.G., arguably the best voice intercept operator in the world and a fine comrade-in-arms, and Mrs Lorraine Holm who, in her capacity as a native English-speaker, corrected the final manuscript. Remaining errors in writing are my fault. A generous grant from the Swedish Society for Maritime History made it possible to publish this study; I am most grateful to the Society for that support. Last but not least, Ulf Söderberg, Director of the Swedish Military Archives, has scrutinized this work and kindly cleared it for publication. He also provided me with suggestions on how to improve and clarify important details.

Bro, May 2006
    S.N.

1 Introduction

In November 1997 a briefcase with 31 microfilms (and a gold tooth) was handed over to the Military Archives in Stockholm by a former Supreme Commander, General Stig Synnergren. The films contained parts of an archive that was destroyed in the late 1960s; thanks to someone's clear-sightedness it was copied on microfilm before the documents were destroyed. Until General Synnergren showed up with the briefcase, it was not known that the microfilms existed. The archive belonged to the T-Office (*T-kontoret*), which for almost twenty years was arguably the most secret part of the intelligence community in Sweden, responsible for obtaining intelligence information from foreign countries through other ways than the official ones.[1]

After the Second World War Sweden found itself in a new situation. No longer was the country surrounded by the German *Wehrmacht*, instead she was facing steadily rising tensions between the former allied powers[2] and inconveniently situated in between at that. Naturally, the intelligence organizations had mostly kept an eye on German intentions and movements during the war. Since the German surrender did not automatically make Europe the calm and peaceful place everybody desired, a continued need for intelligence activities outside Sweden soon made itself known. Information was needed from the areas occupied by Great Britain, USA, France and most of all from the closed Soviet zone; the flow had not only to go on, but it also had to be adjusted somewhat to the

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1 Ekman (2000), *Den militära underrättelsetjänsten—Fem kriser under det kalla kriget*, p. 12. Söderberg (2000), *Försvar och arkiv under 1990-talet*, pp. 63–65. Wallberg (1998), *Den militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänstens arkiv 1920–1979, Inventeringsrapport*, pp. 16–18.

2 Lundestad (1991), *Øst, Vest, Nord, Sør*, pp. 37–38. Wallerfelt (1999), *Si vis pacem—para bellum. Svensk säkerhetspolitik och krigsplanering 1945–1975*, pp. 16–20.

new situation. New intelligence requirements surfaced; no longer were German troop movements in Norway any priority. Some of the old sources could still be useful, particularly in the east, but new ones had to be found and new information channels created. Thus, apart from the targets nothing much had changed for the Swedish intelligence community. It had to go on working almost like before, albeit under somewhat changed circumstances. Like other parts of the community, the T-Office (and up to January 1946 its predecessor the C-Bureau (*C-byrån*) also had to adapt to the emerging Cold War and respond to new intelligence requirements.[3]

With the microfilms' unexpected appearance, an exciting window opened to the intelligence world in post-war days up to the 1960s. Using the microfilms as a starting-point, will it be possible to investigate Sweden's secret service's response to the intelligence requirements of those days? Expressed very simply, a cyclical process comprising the elements requirements, collection, reporting and feedback is the foundation of an intelligence process. A lot of thinking has gone into this so-called intelligence cycle; the literature presents more or less refined models describing how this cycle should function. But does it? And how? By comparing reports from the T-Office and the requirements of the day—all set against a theoretical background—this work aims to make a case study of the intelligence cycle in work during the years succeeding the war.

Modern intelligence communities are comprised of several organizations dealing with various kinds of collection sources; the intention is that they shall compliment each other. Human intelligence (Humint) is the oldest kind of intelligence gathering, still useful, and can be run on a fairly low budget. Signals intelligence (Sigint) has risen out of the twentieth century's explosion in radio transmissions and telecommunications. It is increasingly expensive, but has on many occasions proved to be of great importance. Imagery intelligence (Imint) also has a fairly long history. It deals with everything of interest that can be observed and reproduced. These three sources are the main providers of intelligence information today. Each one of them can be sub-divided into several disciplines. For instance, Sigint is traditionally divided in communications intelligence (Comint) and electronic intelligence (Elint).[4] No matter what kind of intelligence organization we think of, it is always positioned somewhere between source and user[5] and has to keep its senses alert in both directions. To a

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3   Frick & Rosander (1998), *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, pp. 280–281.

4   For a detailed description of intelligence sources see Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, pp. 61–81.

5   Those who receive intelligence reports go by different names. User, customer or recipient are expressions often encountered in the literature. I have chosen the word 'user', simply because that implies what the receiving end is supposed to do with the information.

large degree the T-Office was a Humint organization, but in a way it also made good use of Imint. If not really dealing in Comint by definition, the T-Office sometimes used radio transmissions for contact with agents.[6] To these disciplines can also be added, open sources intelligence (Osint), which is more and more used today, primarily as a result of the publication of increasing amounts of information on the Internet.

Since the history of the Swedish intelligence service, and particularly the Humint service, is virtually unknown outside the country, the interested reader may find it rewarding to learn a bit about the background.

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6   Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 108–109. In early 1947 radio equipment intended for agent use were planned to be tested under field conditions during an army exercise 9–15 March in the Morjärv area in northern Sweden. It had been suggested by the T-Office that a special detachment from FRA should carry out the tests during the ongoing exercise. The plan was given a go-ahead. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I, vol. 1; memorandum by Thede Palm, 18 january 1947; letter from Major Bengt Hjelm to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Hallström, 28 January 1947; responding letter from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Hallström to Major Bengt Hjelm, 30 january 1947.

2 Background

It might be of interest to take a brief look at the origins of the T-Office—the collector of intelligence whose activities this work sets out to study. Of course there was a user as well, and at that time it was primarily the Defence Staff, Section II. The T-Office was subordinated directly to the head of the Defence Staff, and therefore, in a way, placed on the same level as Section II. This arrangement was somewhat different from earlier days, when the C-Bureau was subordinated to the head of Section II.[7] Nevertheless, its position seems to have been very independent. The head of the T-Office, Dr Thede Palm, expressed it in this way:

> My experience is that young journalists, who have neither read nor understood history, actually believe that I asked for permission for various things, and that I then reported what I had carried out. [...] I have written more or less clearly that I had no powers given to me. I gave them to myself. On the whole it was a good arrangement, I think.[8]

These words are remarkable. As head of the secret T-Office, Thede Palm appears to have been more or less responsible to no one; quite an extraordinary situation for a civil servant.

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7 Wikström (2002), *Militär underrättelsetjänst i inledningen av det kalla kriget. T-kontoret och dess rapportering 1946–1948*, p. 94.

8 'Min erfarenhet är att unga journalister, som varken läst eller förstått historia, faktiskt tror att jag begärde tillstånd för olika saker och att jag anmälde vad jag sedan uträttat. [...] Jag har skrivit mer eller mindre klart, att jag inte hade några befogenheter mig tilldelade. Jag tog dem själv. På det hela taget var det väl bra.' Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp. 96–97.

Collectors—from the UB to the T-Office

Sweden is no exception from many other countries; it is today a country with several intelligence disciplines at its disposal. Like so many other European countries that fought wars for centuries (though last time Sweden participated in a war was in 1814), intelligence gathering is nothing new to her; it was conducted to support military campaigns on land and sea as well as to promote the interests of kings and politicians. However, any serious attempt to organize the intelligence activities did not take place before the summer of 1905, during the height of the so called 'union crisis' between Sweden and Norway, when a Scandinavian war did not seem unrealistic.

The union between Sweden and Norway, a result of the last phase of the Napoleonic wars, was in the end peacefully dissolved and no war flared up. Before the disintegration was a fact, the General Staff (*Generalstaben*) in Stockholm found that it was critically short on information about Norwegian intentions and military movements. A foreign section was quickly set up within the General Staff, based on some components created in 1873 in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war, and tasked to deal with the lack of information on Norwegian intentions. Its approach was amateurish in many ways. In addition to sending Swedish officers in disguise over the border, Swedish agents in London started to recruit retired British officers to act as spies in Norway on Sweden's behalf. Five gentlemen were actually sent from England to Norway, but they were probably of little use.

Though that summer's attempt to create a more organized and structured intelligence gathering was made in haste, the obvious need for an intelligence organization had been recognized and had a lasting effect. A secret royal decree of 24 November 1905 stated that Sweden was to establish a secret service aimed at intelligence gathering in foreign countries. This can be regarded as the birth of the Swedish intelligence community. In 1907 a reorganization resulted in the creation of the Intelligence Bureau (*Underrättelsebyrån*—UB) at the General Staff, which was to be the platform for secret intelligence activities such as agent running, for a long time.[9]

Up to the outbreak of the First World War the UB had focused on internal security activities; activities in foreign countries were not given priority. This changed with the outbreak of the war. The existing agent nets in Finland, then

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9   For a summary of intelligence activities during 1905 and the permanenting of the secret service, see Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 19–28, and also Frick & Rosander (1998), *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, pp. 172–181. Approximately half of Frick's and Rosander's book is concerned with various Swedish intelligence activities before the twentieth century. The events are also summarized in Ulfving (2003), *Spegellabyrinten—Operativ-strategisk underrättelsetjänst*, pp. 112–114.

a Grand Duchy within the Russian empire, were expanded, and agents were recruited in Russia. Since Russia had been a hereditary foe for centuries, the Swedish military was preoccupied with the threat from the east. Combined with the strong German influence in Sweden in those days, this resulted in UB agents in Finland more or less being taken over by Germany during the war.[10]

The two decades between the two devastating world wars was a period of decline for the Swedish secret intelligence service as well as for the entire Swedish defence. However, organizational patterns and working procedures were retained but drastically cut down. Once again, in the light of social tensions in the country in the aftermath of the Russian revolution and the civil war between 'reds' and 'whites' in Finland, UB prioritised internal security activities. Paid agents abroad still existed but were few, though most of the former agents remained in 'reserve' without pay in case they should be needed again. The tasks for the agents were to maintain contacts with certain foreign powers' intelligence services,[11] to carry out special missions, and also to collect information in countries where no Swedish military attachés were posted. In 1931 more drastic cuts in subsidies resulted in a secret service with hardly any agents abroad. Despite resorting to such desperate means as private funding, UB had no choice but to concentrate almost entirely on internal security. Some contacts were however maintained abroad. Since the General Staff was not alone in possessing an intelligence service—the defence branches also had their own ones—problems concerning parallel work, secrecy and rivalry also occurred. But, due to growing tensions in Europe in the latter half of the 1930s, the situation for UB gradually became better.[12]

As a result of the Defence Bill of 1936 a rearming process started in the Swedish defence, and out of the General Staff came the reorganized Defence Staff (*Försvarsstaben*). In 1937 an official intelligence service—the Intelligence Department (*Underrättelseavdelningen*)—under Colonel Carlos Adlercreutz was set up in the Defence Staff.[13] Internal security work was separated from this service and remained so for 28 years. Its tasks did at first not consist of secret intelligence work; it was confined to work with open information, diplomat reports and attaché reports. Not until December 1939, with a war in full swing on the continent and in Finland, was money granted to organize a secret

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10 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 44–48. Frick & Rosander (1998), *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, pp. 186. Ulfving (2003), *Spegellabyrinten—Operativ-strategisk underrättelsetjänst*, pp. 113,

11 Unfortunately, it is not known with which foreign powers contacts were maintained.

12 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 63–76.

13 Ulfving (2003), *Spegellabyrinten—Operativ-strategisk underrättelsetjänst*, pp. 113. Frick & Rosander (2004), *Bakom hemligstämpeln. Hemlig verksamhet i Sverige i vår tid*, p. 64.

intelligence service. Initially it was known as the G-Section (*G-sektionen*, G as in *gräns*, 'border'), but was from 1942 to be called the C-Bureau (*C-byrån*, C as in *centralen*, 'the central'). Major Carl Petersén, a veteran of the early 20th century Persian gendarmerie, the Gallipoli landings and the Finnish civil war, was appointed head of the new service. During the war the organization built up its network along the Swedish borders and cultivated contacts abroad. Radio contacts were established with agents in the Baltic states. For some peculiar reason the work, previously an officer's realm, attracted a lot of academics who often showed a talent for the unconventional work. One of them was Dr Thede Palm, a religion historian and university librarian, who was later to head the T-Office during its entire existence.[14]

Especially along the Norwegian border the C-Bureau placed observers and ran many underground lines, where couriers went in and out of the occupied Norway. The border leaked like a sieve. Of utmost importance was, of course, information about the locations of German troops and their intentions concerning Sweden. At the end of the war the C-Bureau could produce an impressive amount of information about Norway.[15] The value of this information can probably be argued, but nevertheless the C-Bureau had shown itself active in a way that impressed higher military commanders. Norway was not the only country of interest. Denmark, Finland and the occupied Baltic states were also arenas where the C-Bureau was active. Starting in 1943 a number of refugees from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were recruited as agents and ferried back across the Baltic Sea. Until late 1944, at least 60 agent-ferrying operations were carried out with Gotland as base. The failure percentage was high, and many Balts paid with their lives. It is difficult to estimate the value of the information collected in this way. Like the information collected in Norway, it was never put to operational use, and could therefore not prove its value. Some authors suggest that the contacts established with Baltic resistance movements from 1943 onwards, were to be of good use in the post-war years.[16] That claim is not unfounded.

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14 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 77–86. Frick & Rosander (1998), *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, pp. 241–242, 244–246. Frick & Rosander (2004), *Bakom hemligstämpeln. Hemlig verksamhet i Sverige i vår tid*, pp. 65–69. Ulfving (2003), *Spegellabyrinten—Operativ-strategisk underrättelsetjänst*, pp. 113.

15 The reporting from Norway is investigated from an early warning perspective in Thun (2002), *C-byråns verksamhet i Norge 1939–1945—sedd ur ett förvarningsperspektiv*, pp. 13–54.

16 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 87–117. Frick & Rosander (1998), *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, pp. 275–277. Frick & Rosander (2004), *Bakom hemligstämpeln. Hemlig verksamhet i Sverige i vår tid*, pp. 184–192. Ulfving (2003), *Spegellabyrinten—Operativ-strategisk underrättelsetjänst*, pp. 115.

Despite some good work during the war, the C-Bureau was not universally liked. There were officers who found the bureau's unconventional work and unbureaucratic approach very controversial. Suspicions about shady business deals by a fronting company, Skandiastål, concerning sales of Finnish submachine guns to the Danish and Norwegian resistance movements caused the set-up of an investigation committee. However, no one was convicted in the ensuing trials, but Major Petersén was dismissed in January 1946. His dismissal was followed by the organization's name change in due time to the T-Office, Dr Thede Palm took over after Petersén and the show went on—business as usual.[17] According to Ottosson and Magnusson, the letter 'T' probably stood for the Technical Department or the Technical Office (*Tekniska avdelningen* or *Tekniska kontoret*).[18] On the other hand, the researcher Niklas Wikström has found solid proof in the T-Office's archive that it was actually the Technical Investigation (*Tekniska utredningen*).[19]

After the war, as has been said in the introduction, it was concluded that Sweden could not do without a human intelligence service. Areas south and east of the country were of great interest with emphasis on ground, naval and air forces of the victorious powers. Information about such subjects was difficult to collect openly, especially in the Soviet zone. In the emerging Cold War, the C-Bureau, soon to be the T-Office, could now use its wartime agent nets built up in the east, and the contacts established in the west. Prospects of information exchange with western intelligence services surfaced. No apparent changes in organization took place as a consequence of peace in Europe, but it was cut

17 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 147–154, 161. Frick & Rosander (1998), *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, pp. 280–281. Frick & Rosander (2004), *Bakom hemligstämpeln. Hemlig verksamhet i Sverige i vår tid*, p. 218. According to Lieutenant-General Carl-August Ehrensvärd, the then Chief of the Defence Staff, Dr Palm was 'somewhat surprised' that he was offered the job, but he accepted nevertheless. Ehrensvärd (1991), *Dagboksanteckningar 1938–1957*, p. 286, entry for 25 January 1946.

18 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, p. 161.

19 Wikström (2002), *Militär underrättelsetjänst i inledningen av det kalla kriget. T-kontoret och dess rapportering 1946–1948*, p. 102.

Doctor Thede Palm, head of the T-Office during its entire existence from 1946–1964. (National Defence College)

down in personnel strength.[20] However, its wartime organization remained a legacy of the C-Bureau for at least several years.[21]

So the T-Office was no new invention that suddenly came into existence after the Second World War. It merely continued a tradition of organized secret intelligence collection in foreign countries dating back to 1905. Neither was it the last service of its kind. The continuity was secured by its various successors, albeit with periods of controversial internal security activities after the merger in 1965 between the T-Office and the B-Bureau (*B-byrån*—the internal security service organized in 1957), which resulted in an organization called IB.[22]

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20 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, pp. 157–160.

21 A list from 1947 of wartime personnel assigned to the T-bureau consists of 125 names. According to the veteran Curt H. Andreasson most of the names are from the C-Bureau's days; Dr Palm did not show any interest in the wartime organization until the early 1950s. Obviously, the personnel from the Second World War simply remained on the list. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:2, E, vol. 21; mobilization table for Section II, series F, nr. 1, 25 October 1947, compiled by the Defence Staff's personnel section—list of wartime personnel for Section II, department U, C-Bureau, 1948. The use of the name C-Bureau is, more than one and a half year since the name change, probably a sign of organizational inertia.

22 Ulfving (2003), *Spegellabyrinten—Operativ-strategisk underrättelsetjänst*, pp. 116–117.

Two journalists unveiled some of its activities in 1973. The subsequent scandal resulted in the so-called 'IB affair'.

Sources of the T-Office

Little is known about the T-Office's collection and analysis methods. It is reasonable to assume that basically, but with some modifications due to changed circumstances, much of the C-Bureau's ways of collecting intelligence was retained after the war. These included, according to Rune Svensson's research, questioning of travellers, refugees and seamen, running agents in foreign countries, recruiting and training officers in the merchant marine, conducting courier service on behalf of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and exchanging and buying intelligence information.[23]

Humint sources tend to be a very sensitive matter in many ways. For instance, a limited part of the microfilms were released for research because 'no names of sources do ever occur in the reports'.[24] Actually, they do—though most of them are codenames. Sources are noted on most of the reports by handwriting, which has the disadvantage that it in some cases makes them hard to read. Most of them are denoted by codenames such as *'mk'*, *'S-19'* or *'dak'*. In rare cases individual names can be discerned. An excellent example of this is a source denoted on T-reports as *'Deks'* or *'Dekn'*, who was a Lithuanian called Jonas Deksnys who worked for the Lithuanian resistance movement in the late 1940s, and in that process was turned by the Soviets.[25] Deksnys is a

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23 Svensson (1999), *Sveriges hemliga vapen? C-byråns verksamhet under andra världskriget—en analys av mål, medel, organisation och verksamhet i stort*, pp. 100–101.

24 *'Några namnuppgifter på källor förekommer aldrig i rapporterna.'* Söderberg (2000), *Försvar och arkiv under 1990-talet*, p. 66. Generally, films nr. 1–5 are available for research, but the rest of them may be released after each individual application has been tried or, as in a few cases, not released at all.

25 Interview with Curt H. Andreasson, 27 December 2000. A fairly large amount of reports dealing with the Lithuanian resistance movement can be studied in the T-Office's archive. Though a fascinating and little-known subject, the struggle for the re-establishment of an independent Lithuania after the Second World War is not in any way included in this paper. On Deksnys, see also Mockunas (1997), *Pavarges herojus. Jonas Deksnys triju zvalgibu tarnyboje*, passim; Bower (1989), *The Red Web. MI6 and the KGB Master Coup*, passim; Luksa (2005), *Skogsbröder. Den väpnade kampen i Litauen mot Sovjetockupationen*, p. 324, 328–331; Kadhammar (1999), *De sammansvurna*, passim. References to several of the persons mentioned in this work can be found in Mockunas' book: Curt H. Andreasson (pp. 270–271, 273, 320–321, 327, 334, 338, 340, 342–343, 345, 347–350), Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt (p. 79), Ove Lilienberg (14, 27, 197–200, 223, 238–239, 243–244, 265, 270–273, 298, 300, 320, 327–328, 333–334, 337–338, 340, 342–343, 347–348, 403, 405, 423, 463), Sven Wahlqvist (pp. 265–266, 270–271, 349). It is surprising that Thede Palm's name has escaped Mockunas in his researches.

rare exception, the great majority of the source designations are cryptic, and often comprise of a group of sources. For example, the designation *'tyk'*, which most probably means 'German source' (*tysk källa*), can be expected to consist of an unknown number of individual sources of German origin. Nonetheless, a source designation gives a clue of where the information originated from.[26]

Apart from the source notes on the reports there are, on many of them, notes indicating which users outside the normal circulation list that also received copies. These notes are even harder to interpret, but the patient researcher should be able to reach fascinating results. From the cryptic notes it is possible to deduce that, for instance, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Intelligence Service and the Danish Intelligence Service (codename *Total*) frequently received copies of the T-reports. Other foreign partners hide behind the notes, for example a partner named *'C'*.[27] Of course, intelligence information received from one foreign partner must not be disguised as one's own product and shared with another foreign partner—that is one of the golden rules governing intelligence activities. Judging from a quick investigation the T-Office seems to have stuck to this rule, and Thede Palm was also aware of the risks associated with doing things in the opposite way.[28]

The importance of these small handwritten notes is an understanding gained during the research for this work. Some very interesting research subjects suddenly surface. It would, for example, be possible to analyze the development of various sources and foreign partners over the years, what information was provided by which sources, and maybe also what the various foreign partners' interests were. Since this is not something that this work is intended to deal with, it will not be elaborated upon, but I can only hope that future researchers will descend upon this unique possibility in intelligence history research.

Good use was made of captains or mates on Swedish merchant ships plying the waters of primarily the Baltic Sea. The T-Office trained observers on the ships; observers that knew what to look for, and later reported their observa-

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26 The source note can be found in the square stamped on the lower left corner of a report's first page. In the stamp there are three dotted lines numbered 1, 2 and 3. The author of the report wrote his signature on the first line, and very often the source note was then scribbled after that signature. On the second line is the signature of the secretary who typed the report, and the third line seems never to have been used. The rubber stamp used by the T-Office looks like a standard design for general office use. On a report's first page, at the bottom, there is also the signature of the person who approved of the report being issued. Normally, at least in 1946 and 1947, that was Thede Palm (signature ThP) or Ove Lilienberg (signature OLi).

27 These notes were written along the diagonal stripe stamped across the upper left corner of a report's first page. The stamped stripe was red on the original reports, but the colour of course does not show on the microfilms, which are black and white.

28 Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp.59-60.

tions when their ships next time entered a Swedish port. Thede Palm describes this procedure in his memoirs:

> In order to keep under control whatever moved in the Baltic Sea it was required that preferably all Swedish ships, and particularly those which regularly visited e.g. Russian, Polish and East German ports, had someone on board that could tell which ships were of special interest and regarding the harbours what happened in them [...] We should thus train and engage observers...[29]

The importance of Swedish merchantmen in collecting intelligence in foreign ports can be further divined by two letters to the naval attaché in Moscow, where it was mentioned that a few Swedish ships were destined to Liepaja and Ventspils in January and February 1946, but that this route later dried up, at least temporarily. Most ships were then obviously heading for Poland in the spring of 1946.[30] As a matter of fact, many of the reports used in this work emanate from observations and information provided by merchant marine officers. It is not possible to identify individuals or the ships on which they worked. All sources of this kind are grouped together under the designation 'mk', which most probably means 'marine source' (marin källa). As a parenthesis it can be mentioned that the Danish Intelligence Service also used the same kind of sources.[31]

Various designations of source groups and a few individual sources were noted on the reports used for this work, and since almost no individual names can be discerned from them, it cannot be considered a damaging act to reveal them here. Therefore, the designations are presented in table 1 together with possible interpretations. It must be kept in mind that the rare source notes where an individual name can be discerned does not by all means indicate, that this particular individual was the person who collected the information *in situ*. In most cases, the chain from the eyes and ears 'at the front' to the T-Office in Stockholm can be assumed to have often consisted of several steps with one or several middlemen. Heppling (see the table on next page) and Sven Wahlqvist, the T-Office representative in the southern Swedish city of Malmö, were two such middlemen.

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29 'För att ha det som rörde sig i Östersjön under kontroll krävdes att helst alla fartyg, och särskilt de som regelbundet besökte t ex ryska och polska och östtyska hamnar hade ombord någon som kunde berätta vilka fartyg som var särskilt intressanta och vad beträffande hamnarna vad som hände i dem [...] Vi skulle alltså dels utbilda och engagera iakttagare...' Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp. 52–53.

30 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:15, vol. 1; letters from Commander Kull to naval attaché in Moscow, Navy Lieutenant Edenberg, 21 January and 6 March 1946.

31 Christmas-Møller (1995), *Obersten og kommandøren. Efterretningstjeneste, sikkerhedspolitik og socialdemokrati 1945–55*, pp. 28–29, 93–94.

Sources, as designated on the reports	Possible interpretations of the source designations
Ak	Curt H. Andreasson's source (Andreassons källa)
AX	Stig Axelson[32]
Da/dak/dk	Danish source (dansk källa)
Divk	Various sources (diverse källor)
Ek	Own source (egen källa) or English source (engelsk källa)
Hu	Unidentified, possibly an indivual's surname starting with the letters 'Hu'
H-p	Most probably K. D. Sixten Heppling, employee of the C-Bureau and the T-Office[33] and responsible for contacts with Latvia
K-g	Unidentified, possibly an individual's surname starting with letter 'K'
M	Unidentified
mk	Merchant marine source (marin källa)
mke	Unidentified, possibly a variant of merchant marine source (marin källa)
No/no	Norwegian source (Norge/norsk)
pk	Polish source (polsk källa)
tk	German source (tysk källa)
tot	Danish Intelligence Service (Total), confirmed source designation[34]
Wi	Unidentified, probably an individual's surname starting with the letters 'Wi'

Table 1. Source designations noted by the T-Office on reports that have been used in the research for this work.

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32 Stig Axelson was a navy officer and a captain in the merchant marine, who had been assigned to FRA and the C-Bureau during the Second World War. After the war he worked for a Swedish marine insurance company and was stationed in London. Axelson (1996), Från *Vaggeryd till Biscaya*, pp.65–83, 96–97.

33 Ericson (2002), *Exodus och underrättelseinhämtning. Det svenska försvaret och Baltikum hösten 1943–våren 1945*, pp. 107, 114. Heppling was an academic with a Masters degree who was consripted during the war. His task was to interview refugees from the Baltic states and select suitable agents to send back. He can also be found in the mobilization table from 1948. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:2, E, vol. 21; mobilization table for Section II, series F, nr. 1, 25 October 1947, compiled by the Defence Staff's personnel section—list of wartime personnel for Section II, department U, C-Bureau, 1948.

34 KrA, T-Office, film 20, microfiche 11, letter from Thede Palm to Sven Wahlqvist in Malmö, 2 September 1947. A delegation of Swedish high-ranking officers, including the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Nils Swedlund, was scheduled to meet the Danish Intelligence Service, and Wahlqvist was charged with informing Total about their arrival and arrange their transport over to Denmark. It is not known if Total was a codename chosen by the Danes, or if it originated from some brainstorming session in the T-Office. It is interesting to note that in the Danish-German intelligence co-operation the Danish Intelligence Service was called Begonie by the German *Organisation Gehlen*, whereas the Danes in their turn called their German partner organization 'T'. Christmas-Møller (1995), *Obersten og kommandøren. Efterretningstjeneste, sikkerhedspolitik og socialdemokrati 1945–55*, p. 121.

Apart from own agent networks and sailors on Swedish merchant ships, the T-Office made good use of businessmen and other travellers in the areas of interest. Information was also routinely exchanged with foreign intelligence services. Thede Palm mentions co-operation to various degrees with intelligence organizations in Finland, Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, USA, France, Switzerland, Germany, and also a brief contact with Israel.[35] Another author presents indications of co-operation with foreign intelligence services, particularly the British and American ones.[36]

Like all intelligence activities, Humint has its limitations. Most important, of course, is that the sources must come across something of interest—otherwise they can hardly hand over any information. Obvious rubbish does not please the 'employer'. And the intelligence service, in this case the T-Office, must have access to the sources now and then in order to receive the information. Depending on the type of source and the means of communication, the access can be everything from frequent and regular to random and sporadic. We generally know very little of the sources used, and under which circumstances they were in contact with the T-Office. In the case of the merchant marine officers, it is more clear that the natural occasions to establish contact were when ships entered Swedish ports. However, the T-Office could hardly decide where and when merchantmen would be destined; that was naturally the shipping lines' business.

User—the Defence Staff's Section II

The older General Staff was transformed into a Defence Staff in 1936. Since reorganizations seem to be a cherished occupation of defence forces everywhere, a new reorganization of the Defence Staff resulting in three sections took place in the autumn of 1942. In principle, this organization was to last for several decades. Intelligence was organized in Section II with a Foreign and an Internal Department plus a War History Department.[37] The Foreign Department was responsible for handling intelligence about the world outside Sweden, and consisted of various desks for army, air force and navy matters. One can say that the

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35 Palm, *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp. 69–91.
36 Hess, *The Clandestine Operations of Hans Helmut Klose and the British Baltic Fishery Protection Service (BBFPS) 1949–1956*, passim.
37 Almgren et al. (1973), *Generalstab och Generalstabskår 1873–1973*, pp. 39–41. Frick & Rosander (1998), *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, p. 266. An interesting thing is that there also exists references to the C-Bureau as being part of Section II from 1 October 1943 to 30 June 1945. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:2a, E, vol. 19, 1946.

Foreign Department was at the top of the pyramide of the Swedish intelligence collection activities.

Head of Section II from 1945 to 1946 was Colonel Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt,[38] an experienced intelligence officer who sharpened his teeth during his long service as Sweden's military attaché in Berlin from 1933 to 1945.[39] In 1947 he returned to work abroad and became military attaché in Bern in Switzerland. Navy Captain Gustaf Tham replaced him.[40] Juhlin-Dannfelt's successor was sometimes called 'Tam' ('a' pronounced like in 'calm'), which is the Swedish word for tame, by the personnel in the T-Office.[41] Tham later became general director of FRA.

In charge of the Foreign Department was another former military attaché. Colonel Curt Kempff who was stationed in Helsinki in Finland when the Second World War broke out on the Continent, and also a few months later when the Soviet Union attacked Finland. He was in Finland during the Winter War, when Finland defended herself gallantly and in the end avoided sharing the fates of the Baltic states and eastern Poland, all occupied by the Soviet Union. Kempff remained head of the Foreign Department up to September 1946.[42] He was, at the end of the war, not entirely satisfied with the C-Bureau and Major Petersén. The reason behind his scepticism was his opinion of the C-Bureau's work as being inferior in quality compared to that carried out by the military attachés, and also a dissatisfaction with its lack of administrative skills and the somewhat undisciplined Major Petersén.[43] Thede Palm, Petersén's successor, was held in higher regard by Kempff, and he once described Palm as 'an all right man' ('en allrightman').[44]

On 1 October 1946, as part of a reorganization of Section II, the Foreign Department was divided in an Attaché Bureau under Colonel Engelbrekt Flodström, and an Intelligence Bureau headed by Major Bengt Hjelm. In the Intelligence Bureau we find the Naval Desk, the user that produced the intelligence requirements we are going to discuss later. Apart from Commander Allan Kull, the small Naval Desk consisted in late 1946 of the Navy Lieutenants Kuylenstierna and Christiansson.[45]

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38 *Svenska Försvarsväsendets Rulla 1946.*
39 Carlgren (1985), *Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939–1945*, p. 179.
40 *Svenska Försvarsväsendets Rulla 1946, 1947.*
41 Interview with Curt H. Andreasson, 27 December 2000.
42 *Svenska försvarsväsendets Rulla 1945, 1946.*
43 Carlgren (1985), *Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939–1945*, pp. 183–185.
44 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:12, vol. 1; personal letter nr. 134 from Colonel Kempff to the assistant military attaché in Oslo, Captain Broms, 8 March 1946.
45 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I, vol. 1; personal letter nr. 568 from Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt to all attachés, 4 October 1946.

It is today difficult to establish where the T-reports went. In most cases, each report was made in four copies. Copy nr. 1 remained at the T-Office. However, when the subject had anything to do with sea routes, sea transports, ships, navies, ports etc., five copies were made. This implies that in those cases a copy was sent to an additional user. A qualified guess is that an extra copy went to the Navy Staff; a study of the Navy Staff's archive actually reveals that the Intelligence Section was the receiver of the extra copy.[46] There is no doubt that at least one copy went to Section II at the Defence Staff—some of the intelligence information disseminated in their daily communiqués, clearly originating from the T-Office, confirms this. After all, it makes sense; Section II was the main counterpart of the T-Office. Copy nr. 2 was definitely distributed to Section II. This is proven by a find made during the research for this work—an attested copy of a T-report—copy nr. 2—was found enclosed with a personal letter from Colonel Curt Kempff to the naval attaché in Moscow.[47] Where did copies nr. 3 and nr. 4 go? Were they also distributed to Section II?

46 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, F IIa, vol. 13. Some original copies of reports from the T-Office, and its predecessor the C-Bureau, survive in this volume.
47 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:15, vol. 1; personal letter nr. 379 from Colonel Kempff to the naval attaché in Moscow, Navy Lieutenant Edenberg, 20 June 1946. The T-report was nr. 573, issued on 28 May 1946; it can be studied on film 1A, microfiche 3. It is not used in this paper, since it does not deal with any of the research questions.

3 Searching for Intelligence Requirements

The Necessary Contact Between an Organization and the Surrounding World

Already on the first page it was pointed out that intelligence requirements changed once the Second World War ended, and that requirements are a basic ingredient in the intelligence process. Thus it is clear that, in order to continue this work, the intelligence requirements of 1946 and 1947 must become known to us. Are there any surviving documents in the archives containing such requirements directed to the T-Office? Or must we try another approach?

An intelligence service is an organization, and organizations tend to follow peculiar rules. One of the deductions that can be made from the famous Parkinson's law is that, given a certain size, any organization tends to become independent of inputs and outputs for its own occupation. It simply self-oscillates and generates within itself all the work necessary to keep all the employees busy.[48] This state may in reality not be reached by any organization, but some

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48 Parkinson (1958), *Parkinsons lag och andra studier i administrationens konst*, p. 19. Parkinson does not exactly claim that organizations above a certain size can function totally cut off from the rest of the world. What he writes is that seven persons can end up doing the work previously done by one of them. From this follows that such a large expansion in manpower does not necessarily result in an increased output, but merely in an expanding amount of internal paper-shuffling that takes up most of the seven persons' working time.

of them are certainly perceived by many external observers to come fairly close. Government administrations are usually more prone than other organizations to gain a reputation for being detached from the real world, and spend most of the employees' energy and taxpayers' money on an internal (and eternal) circulation of papers. This could be an unfair reputation, but some grain of truth surely exists in the claim.

However, some kind of contact with the outer world must be maintained by all organizations. Otherwise, they would simply fade away. An obvious reason is that an organization consists of people who spend a large part of their lives outside the organization. Naturally, what the employees did during last weekend is often the subject of the coffee breaks' small talk; if in no other way and writing with a touch of irony, this brings the organization in touch with the outer world. Expansion in personnel may not necessarily result in an increased amount of output, just as Parkinson observed, but input and output do continue to be important for the organization's survival.

What flows in and what flows out of the organizational box is of particular importance to intelligence organizations. To them the quality, and also to a lesser extent the quantity, of the input is of utmost importance to their ability to produce intelligence assessments and reports. What also matters very much for the survival of an intelligence organization is that its products arrive on time to the users, and that they contain information of interest. In short, timeliness and relevance are important factors to be considered all the time by the intelligence organization. Therefore, it has a constant need to be well aware of what is sought after at any particular moment; it must develop the sensors to pick up user reactions (and wishes, of course). In addition to that, it is important to point out that the producer will benefit greatly if it has also developed a fingertip feeling for what information the users do not yet really know they need, or did not understand that they can actually receive.

An intelligence producer must also think of working simultaneously in several dimensions. Some information may have a short life span, while in other cases it can have a medium or a long-term value. This all depends on the subject. Of course, information that will be obsolete within the next few hours or days must be reported quickly. However, many other subjects are of a more inertial character, and do not necessitate immediate reporting, and can therefore be stored on the desk while waiting for additional information to (hopefully) fill in the picture. Often, in so-called 'strategic discussions', the necessity to also observe the latter dimension tends to be brushed aside in favour of short term

reporting.[49] As will be pointed out later, in the intelligence cycle discussion, short-termism is a risk that must be taken seriously.

No doubt the T-Office was in contact with realities. How could it otherwise function? It was not a large organization; actually it consisted of only eight permanently employed persons in early 1946,[50] and did not reach the critical stage observed by Professor Parkinson. This means it was part of an intelligence environment, where everybody to various degrees was dependent on each other. Because of the obvious need to be in contact with the outer world, and despite its secret status, the T-Office left traces of its existence and activities in its contacts with the users in the Defence Staff. There are useful pieces of information to be found above all in the Defence Staff's archive, and those will be touched upon later. But what did the Swedish intelligence community, in which the T-Office was active, look like in those days?

T-Office as Part of an Intelligence Community

It must be remembered that the T-Office was not the only intelligence organization at the disposal of the Defence Staff. As earlier mentioned it was one part of the intelligence environment or, as it is usually expressed, the intelligence community. To start with, there were military attachés posted in various countries of interest. From a modest start in 1937 as the Defence Staff's Codes and Ciphers Section before the Second World War, via remarkable feats in breaking the German *Geheimschreiber* during the war, and the establishing in 1942 of FRA (*Försvarsväsendets radioanstalt*, later *Försvarets radioanstalt*—in English: *National Defence Radio Establishment*), Sigint was at the end of the war an established intelligence source in Sweden.[51] The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was also in reality an information provider for the Defence Staff, though diplomats may

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49 One Swedish intelligence establishment adopted for a short period as its motto the three words 'Fast, Right, Actionable', concocted by a senior manager. Since the word 'actionable' is somewhat ambiguous—in most dictionaries its primary meaning is something that is giving cause for a lawsuit—the motto gave rise to several in-house jokes.

50 Wikström (2002), *Militär underrättelsetjänst i inledningen av det kalla kriget. T-kontoret och dess rapportering 1946–1948*, p. 102. Frick & Rosander (2004), *Bakom hemligstämpeln. Hemlig verksamhet i Sverige i vår tid*, p. 221. The persons based in Stockholm were Dr Thede Palm, Commander Ove Lilienberg, Lieutenant in the reserve Curt H. Andreasson, a secretary, a cashier and an orderly. In the southern city of Malmö Captain Sven Wahlqvist and a secretary were employed. It is plausible that the number of secretaries in Stockholm quickly became somewhat higher, judging from the number of issued reports and the signatures on them.

51 Beckman (1996), *Svenska kryptobedrifter*, passim. McKay & Beckman (2003), *Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900–1945*, passim.

not like to regard themselves as intelligence collectors.[52] Other sources could also have existed.

An important part of any intelligence service's activity is the exchange of information with fellow services in other countries. In fact this is an almost necessary activity for an intelligence service—an isolated existence would be nearly impossible in the long run. It has been suggested that an isolated intelligence community was implicitly demanded by the Swedish neutrality policy, but that it was ignored, such a demand was of course totally unreasonable.[53] Several of the T-Office's foreign partners have already been mentioned. Information exchange between the T-Office and its partners abroad is a fascinating subject, which is possible to research at least to some extent, but would deserve a research effort of its own and is only briefly touched upon in this work.

It is reasonable that the Defence Staff had a number of general intelligence requirements at any given moment. At first glance, one would assume that they were broken down and handed out in adapted versions to the various intelligence organizations. If it were done carefully, each organization would have received a list of requirements tailored to its specific collection capabilities. However, that is on the condition that the users had a fairly good knowledge of every producer's capabilities. Given the atmosphere of secrecy in the intelligence community, it is perhaps to go too far by presupposing the existence of such a dialogue between the two sides. Dialogues, if there were any at all, did most probably take place on high levels only. But after some time of reading intelligence reports, users should have got at least a vague idea of each producer's capabilities. It is possible that intelligence requirements could be better adapted to each producer in that way, but it must have taken its time. The question is if users found it worth the trouble to produce specific requirements for each intelligence producer, at least on a regular basis. In any case, since the intelligence community as a whole presumably strived towards a common goal, intelligence requirements should have been generally similar for all producers. Maybe it was up to each of them to interpret the wishes from the Defence Staff,

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52 To get an idea of the volume of information going from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Defence Staff, it is enough to browse through the daily communiqués produced for internal information. Plenty of more or less confidential information from Swedish diplomats in foreign countries is inserted in the texts. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3, 1946, and vol. 4, 1947. For example, the Swedish Embassy in Oslo was an important link in the close contacts between Norway and Sweden, and the Defence Staff and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs received very sensitive information on Norway and NATO. Peterson (2003), *'Brödrafolkens väl'. Svensk-norska säkerhetspolitiska relationer 1949–1969, pp. 248–249*. See also chapter 2 in Herman (2002), *Intelligence Services in the Information Age*, which deals with the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy.

53 Andersson & Hellström (2002), *Bortom horisonten—Svensk flygspaning mot Sovjetunionen 1946–1952*, p. 30.

expressed in writing or during discussions, as it best suited their particular capabilities? If so, requirements given to others should also give a hint of what the Defence Staff hoped the T-Office would collect and report—perhaps we have here found a way to go forward.

This reasoning leads us to the conclusion that it might be a good idea to study requirements given to other elements in the intelligence community—if such requirements can be found. One way of characterizing research in intelligence history is to compare it to the study of medieval history; one has to make do with what is preserved.[54] In this case fate has not been totally ungracious. Several documents with various intelligence requirements do really exist in the archives.

Some letters from other defence authorities ask for specific information on subjects within their particular interest sphere.[55] A personal letter from the head of the Foreign Department at the Defence Staff's Section II to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs clearly contains information from the T-Office, information that was apparently asked for by the Ministry.[56] But these documents present only fragments of intelligence requirements. Other researchers have made similar experiences. Rune Svensson has noted that concerning the C-Bureau's activities during the Second World War, there are very few surviving documents indicating intelligence requirements. Such instructions were perhaps transferred verbally, or the documents could have been removed.[57] Krister Thun has found that some reports from the C-Bureau were explicitly produced as a result of questions from Section II—but it is unclear in what way those questions were put forward, only that they came from the head of Section II at the Defence Staff.[58] Niklas Wikström observed the same thing concerning the T-Office in

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54 Professor Kent Zetterberg, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm.

55 The Royal Army Fortification Board (*Kungliga fortifikationsförvaltningen*) requested results about detonations of ammunitions and explosives stored in underground tunnels. The Board wanted to be given access to any possibly existing reports of such incidents, and also asked for as complete information as possible to be collected from abroad. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:2a, E, vol. 20; letter from the Royal Army Fortification Board to Section II, 13 July 1946.

56 Colonel Kempff reported that, according to information from 'special sources', dated 6 February 1946, no new fortification work was under way on the Åland Islands. Earlier destructions of fortifications had in some cases not been considered good enough, and further blasting had taken place. Also, the number of Russians on the islands had not changed. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I, vol. 1; Hb. 83, from Colonel Curt Kempff to Head of Department (*utrikesråd*) Sven Grafström, 13 February 1946. Kempff's letter is very similar, in some sentences word by word, to T-reports nr. 355, 6 Februari 1946 (the date mentioned in Kempff's letter), and also to nr. 364, 11 February 1946; KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11.

57 Svensson (1999), *Sveriges hemliga vapen? C-byråns verksamhet under andra världskriget—en analys av mål, medel, organisation och verksamhet i stort*, p. 96.

58 Thun (2002), *C-byråns verksamhet i Norge 1939–1945—sedd ur ett förvarningsperspektiv*, p. 38.

his prize-winning paper.[59] In any case, it seems difficult to point at intelligence requirements given specifically to the T-Office.

Despite the existence of some fragments, we need something more comprehensive. Recalling the discussion on the T-Office as one of several parts of an intelligence community striving towards a common goal, is there any intelligence requirements issued to other elements of the Swedish intelligence community? A search in the archive of Section II actually reveals a series of letters to naval attachés that looks promising, and can be used as a basis for this study of the T-Office and the intelligence cycle. A significant advantage is that the letters offer an insight into the users' changing needs during 1946 and 1947.

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59 Wikström (2002), *Militär underrättelsetjänst i inledningen av det kalla kriget. T-kontoret och dess rapportering 1946–1948*, p. 137.

4 Naval Intelligence Requirements

In a comprehensive book by Olav Riste and Arnfinn Moland about the Norwegian Intelligence Service some references to the T-Office can be found. It is suggested that a division of efforts existed in the co-operation between Norwegian and Swedish intelligence services. Thede Palm also writes that results were shared between the T-Office and the Norwegian Intelligence Service soon after the war. Such procedures were naturally assisted by the personal friendship between Palm and Wilhelm Evang, the head of the post-war Norwegian Intelligence Service. They had met in Sweden during the war.[60] In naval matters the Soviet Northern Fleet was for natural reasons the number one target for Norway, but the Baltic Sea was also considered an important area.

> The Baltic Sea, and especially Leningrad, was also strongly represented. It may very well have been a division of work, because here the secret Swedish intelligence organization 'the T-bureau' carried out an intensive work based on Swedish seamen and fishermen [...] It was Palm who through the so-called T-Office—'the T-bureau'—led the more clandestine Humint work on the Swedish side, especially that directed towards surveillance of the Baltic Sea with the help of Swedish shipping and the fishing fleet.[61]

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60 Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, p. 73.

61 'Men Austersjøen, og spesiellt Leningrad, var også sterkt representert. Her må det likevel ha vore ei arbeidsdeling, ettersom det hemmelege svenske etterretningsorganet "T-byrån" her dreiv ein omfattande aktivitet basert på svenske sjøfolk og fiskarar [...] Det var Palm som gjennom det såkalla T-kontoret—"T-byrån"—leide det meir klandestine HUMINT-arbeidet på svensk side, spesielt det som gjekk på overvaking av Østersjøen ved hjelp av svensk skipsfart og fiskeflåten.' Riste & Moland (1997), *"Strengt hemmelig": Norsk etterretningteneste 1945–1970*, pp. 119, 274.

An important area of the T-Office's activity is clearly discerned in this writing: naval activity in the Baltic Sea. The subject of interest, though not the only one, was the Soviet Navy. If Norway was interested in the region though it has no coast there, Sweden with its long coast on the Baltic Sea was naturally much more keen on keeping an eye on what happened in its own navy's home waters. It can be expected that the Swedish side put in a lot of effort to get as much naval information as possible, using all available sources, with the ultimate aim to provide early warning. Collected information could of course also be profitably exchanged for other information from partners.[62] Moreover, in this quotation from the Norwegian book, we once again see a reference to intelligence collection by using merchant shipping. To satisfy the need, the Defence Staff could use several sources. One of them was the T-Office, another was naval attachés.

From the Foreign Department of the Defence Staff's Section II four letters were sent to the naval attachés in Helsinki, Copenhagen–Oslo (one attaché was accredited in both capitals), London, Moscow and Warsaw during 1946 and 1947.[63] Apart from general information about the internal organization of Section II, and formal matters like which reports to send to whom, these letters methodically described the naval intelligence requirements of the day. At that time, the Foreign Department consisted of five parts or desks: Central, Air Force, Naval, Eastern and Western.[64] Commander Allan Kull, the head of the Naval Desk, wrote the letters we are interested in.

In all, the Naval Desk wished to receive information on 16 various subjects, though not all at the same time. Some subjects required a longer period of work, while others could be completed in a shorter time. When reading the requirements, it becomes clear that the Naval Desk planned its tasks. This is probably an indication of the eternal struggle between tasks and resources; the Naval Desk consisted of only three officers.

The earlier discussion in this work about the T-Office as part of a system, where general intelligence requirements directed the whole community's efforts, is a mainstay of the method applied in this work. From that discussion, one can assume that requirements sent out to the attachés were also given to the T-Office. Maybe not all of them, and maybe not unmodified, but at least those

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62 In Andersson & Hellström (2002), *Bortom horisonten—Svensk flygspaning mot Sovjetunionen 1946–1952*, p. 44, it is pointed out that this area of interest was one of the main tasks assigned to the T-Office. This is also supported by Peterson (2003), *'Brödrafolkens väl'. Svensk-norska säkerhetspolitiska relationer 1949–1969*, pp. 251–252.

63 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I, vol. 1; letters from Commander Kull to naval attachés in Helsinki, Copenhagen–Oslo, London, Moscow and Warsaw, 18 April 1946, 13 November 1946, 5 March 1947, 10 September 1947.

64 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I, vol. 1; personal letter nr. 568, Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt to all attachés, 4 October 1946.

where it was thought the T-Office could make some contribution. So, the four letters from Commander Kull will form the basis of the analysis as to how the T-Office met intelligence requirements within a particular area.

What the Naval Desk Wanted to Know in 1946 and 1947

Describing the requirements in the letters, will give us an opportunity to define a number of questions to use in investigating the compliance of the T-Office, with the intelligence cycle; in other words, the eventual connection between requirements and reporting. In order to make the requirements easier to grasp they are presented below in a structured and somewhat simplified summary, each subject given an individual number. Apart from listing the subjects, comments are added to several of them in order to clarify some details in the letters as well as some general observations.

The First Letter

On 18 April 1946 the first of the four letters was written. It contained eight various subjects of interest. At least four of them concerned the Soviet Navy and the Soviet sphere.

1) Study of Soviet sea power in southern Baltic Sea. (Information had been collected for some time, and a list of the Soviet Navy was to be compiled and released soon. However, data on landing vessels was still lacking.)
2) Study of ports in the occupied Baltic states. (This subject was broken out from subject 1. Collection had been carried out during the winter, and allowed for a summary of conditions in the ports, though German floating docks' fates were still unknown.)
3) The size of the Soviet merchant marine. (Also originally a part of subject 1. No information was available on ships handed over by the Allies and former German ships.)
4) Fate of German naval ships.
5) Data on landing vessels. (No new information was available.)
6) Coastal artillery installations in neighbouring countries. (Large areas of the eastern Baltic coast and the German coast were unknown.)
7) Statistics about loss of ships.
8) Composition of the British Home Fleet.

The Second Letter

Next letter with requirements was written on 13 November 1946. It was clearly stated that it was a follow-up to the letter from 18 April. Some of the earlier subjects were finished or put aside, and a few new ones were added.

1) Soviet sea power in southern Baltic Sea. (Work was half completed, and a ship list was due to be released).
2) Study of ports in the occupied Baltic states. (Subject was cancelled due to lack of information. Some valuable details had been received, but not enough for a comprehensive study).
3) Soviet merchant marine. (Subject was put aside hoping for open information to be released).
4) Fate of German naval ships. (Work was carried out. However, work on large artillery ships and destroyers were completed).
5) Data on landing vessels. (Continued work with emphasis on modern types.)
6) Coastal artillery installations. (Concerning the neighbouring Nordic countries the study was completed, but there was not much knowledge on the Soviet sphere east of the British zone in Germany.)
7) Statistics about loss of ships. (Continued work on other types than submarines, a subject that was completed.)
8) British Home Fleet's composition. (An 'extremely difficult' subject and therefore cancelled.)
9) Composition of amphibious forces. (New subject.)
10) Intentions of abandoning particular types of ships. (New subject.)
11) Submarines versus anti-submarine ships. (New subject.)
12) Ships' air defence at sea and in port. (New subject.)
13) Experiences of coastal artillery as an anti-invasion defence. (New subject.)
14) Principles for manning ships in war and peace. (New subject.)
15) Principles for defending shipping in narrow waters. (New subject.)

The Third Letter

A third letter was dated 5 March 1947. No new subjects were added, but a few were completed and some continued to be worked upon.

1) —
2) —
3) —
4) Fate of German naval ships. (Artillery ships not included any longer. An interest existed concerning the destroyer—Kull wrote 'heavy cruiser', but

she was a destroyer—*Z 30*; did she really end up in the Soviet Union? Photos of ex-German ships in the Soviet Navy were also of interest.)

5) Data on landing vessels in the post-war navies. (Work was continued.)

6) —

7) Statistics of loss of ships. (Completed, though information considered of interest would still be received.)

8) —

9) Composition of amphibious forces. (Work was continued.)

10) Intentions of abandoning particular types of ships. (Work was continued.)

11) Submarines versus anti-submarine ships. (Work was continued.)

12) Ships' air defence at sea and in port. (Work was continued.)

13) Experiences of coastal artillery as an anti-invasion defence. (Subject was now less relevant since the 'Åkerhielm commission'[65] had finished its work.)

14) Principles for manning ships in war and peace. (Work was continued.)

15) Principles for defending shipping in narrow waters. (Work was continued.)

The Fourth Letter

The last letter in the series was from 10 September 1947, and contained a few subjects earlier abandoned, but now taken up again.

1) Soviet Navy. (No more details were given in the letter, but can be regarded as the earlier subject 'Soviet sea power in southern Baltic Sea' now taken up again.)

2) Study of ports in the occupied Baltic states. (Subject was taken up again.)

3) —

4) Fate of German naval ships. (Completed subject since a list of German ships formally handed over to the Soviet Union was now available. There was no information of illegal transfers, though the destroyer *Z 30* was still of interest.)

5) Data on landing vessels. (Now included in subject 16.)

6) —

7) —

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65 The commission under Lieutenant-General Samuel Åkerhielm investigated future command structure in the Swedish Defence. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:16, vol 1; Fst 38:5, letter from Åkerhielm to military attaché in Bern, Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt, 13 March 1947. It also dealt with other things such as the issue whether the coastal artillery would remain a separate arm or merge with the army. The commission's report had been under scrutiny at, among others, the navy commander, whose opinion on it had been very negative. KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:1, vol. 1; letter from Navy Captain Tham to naval attaché in Washington, Navy Captain Angelin, 19 December 1947.

8) —
9) Composition of amphibious forces. (Work was continued.)
10) Intentions of abandoning particular types of ships. (Now included in subject 16.)
11) Submarines versus anti-submarine ships. (Work was halted due to a lack of information.)
12) Ships' air defence at sea and in port. (Work was halted due to a lack of information.)
13) —
14) Principles for manning ships in war and peace. (Work was halted due to a lack of information.)
15) Principles for defending shipping in narrow waters. (Work was halted due to a lack of information.)
16) Data on post-war types of ships. (Partly new subject, including some earlier separate subjects.)

From this list of 16 subjects we shall now select those which can be considered related to the Soviet Navy and its activities in the Baltic Sea, the area in which, to use Riste's and Moland's words, the T-Office 'carried out an intensive work'. Several of the requirements given to the attachés can be regarded as 'fact-finding missions' on experiences from the Second World War, and need not be dealt with in this work. To this group belong subjects like loss of ships, the Home Fleet, amphibious forces, abandoned types of ships, submarines versus anti-submarine ships, ship's air defence, anti-invasion potential of coastal artillery, principles for manning ships and defending ships in narrow waters. The reason for excluding these requirements is simply that, since they are strongly related to occurrences and experiences from the war at sea, the connection to the Soviet Union is very loose. Battles at sea and amphibious landings were to a very large extent something that involved Great Britain, USA, Germany, Italy and Japan. Therefore, the task to collect information about such things was something that was primarily shouldered by attachés stationed in the west. Soviet Union's war with Germany was to an overwhelming extent a land war, and the Soviet Navy had relatively few opportunities to distinguish itself in battle.

This selection process leaves us with seven subjects on whom we can reasonably expect to find information in the T-Office's archive, and these will be most conveniently grouped as follows:

— Soviet sea power and Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea.
— Ports in the Baltic states.
— Soviet merchant marine.
— German naval ships' fates.
— Landing vessels.

— Coastal artillery in neighbouring countries.
— Abandoned types and post-war types of ships.

There were a few remarks in the first letter that collection of information on Soviet sea power and Baltic ports had been going on for some time during the winter of 1945-1946. This indicates that the intelligence requirements had been in force at least during that period. However, no earlier letters from the Naval Desk similar to those just presented above can be found in Section II's archive. That does not automatically mean that such letters did not exist; someone could have neglected to put letters and other documents in the archive. There was also a possibility that the naval attachés were made aware of the needs through other means than letters. Though not often, it happened that the attachés visited Stockholm for discussions or holidays, and on those occasions intelligence requirements could be disseminated verbally. Moreover, one can assume that the T-Office was also informed from time to time of the requirements in force 'through other means', i.e. talks face to face.

5   The Intelligence Cycle in Theory and Reality

We have so far mentioned the intelligence cycle, and also discussed producers, users, sources and intelligence requirements. Let us now take a closer look at the intelligence cycle. To the casual observer it might seem nothing but common sense that the top of the society's pyramid, political or military, somehow lets it be known to its various information-gathering establishments what is considered important, thus prompting the intelligence organizations to direct their collection in order to satisfy the needs. What comes in is then processed, analyzed and reported back up the chain. The users may react on the reports and thus make the intelligence organizations adjust collection, processing or analysis. Of course, users may not react visibly at all. In that case it may cause confusion: is the silence a sign of complete satisfaction, or did the users find the reports of no use, or simply so miserable that they shrugged and did not bother to tell the producer?

This process is originally a military creation called the intelligence cycle, and it is often used in intelligence literature as a metaphor describing the way the system works. In essence, it is a nice case of the chicken existing before the egg. Collection, analysis, reporting and response are activities that existed in the intelligence world long before anyone invented the concept of an imaginary cycle to explain the system. Perhaps the cyclical process was for the first time made more discernible when the routines became formalized, when someone started to draw lines symbolizing activities between boxes on an organizational chart? In viewing the intelligence process it is usually taken for granted that user requirements are the driving forces. Such a view generally gives an impres-

sion of 'intelligence as an orderly process originating in users' needs.'[66] It also implies that, since the requirements are supposed to change in various directions over time, the intelligence organization can respond to these changes fairly quickly by redirecting collection and analysis. In short, the intelligence cycle as described provides us with an impression of intelligence production as an ideal world; the way it should work.

Often the truth may be somewhat different. Users' requirements do seldom, on the formal level, change very much from one year to another. For the intelligence organization to develop collection from new sources is often a time-consuming business taking years to carry out successfully.[67] Analysis methods often also take their time to develop. Therefore, the whole exercise is usually characterized by slow changes and inertia, but since general requirements in most cases (e.g. the situation in the Middle East) remain fairly fixed over the years it may not matter very much. (Though the focus can of course also shift quickly, whether on a general or a detailed level.) Nevertheless, the intelligence cycle has some advantages; not much can be argued against it as a principle. As pointed out by Michael Herman, it is a way for the society to control intelligence, and for the intelligence services to be given a sort of approval, an authorization, of their activities.[68] Several versions of the cycle can be found in the literature. A typical self-explanatory one is pictured below. It is also the ideal version where users direct the process.

Figure 1. Military concept of the intelligence cycle.[69] *In this work the user in 1946–1947 was the Naval Desk at Section II of the Defence Staff, and the T-Office did the work of adjusting collection, collecting, analysis and dissemination.*

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66 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 286.
67 'Intelligence often needs to take longer views, especially in collection'. Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 289.
68 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 286.
69 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 285.

But what if this ideal intelligence cycle does not fully apply to real life? Herman goes a bit beyond simply describing the cycle; he discusses the way it really works, not only the way it is supposed to work.

In addition to a number of procedural and bureaucratic limitations of the whole process, Herman stresses that requirements alone cannot command the intelligence cycle; '...requirements are no more than one factor in what actually happens'.[70] Various users present various requirements. Collection and analysis—by some natural law always short on resources and manpower—must be optimized between the competing demands and balanced between what is wanted and what can be done. There is always a limit to how far the intelligence organization can exploit the opportunities presented by a target (which naturally does, or should do, its best to close such weakness gaps and stay one step ahead). Technical capabilities are an increasingly important, limit-setting factor in today's intelligence organizations. If a user wants the moon taken down and placed on his desk, it does not matter how high a priority is assigned to the task; the necessary technology for doing that job is not yet invented. 'All this rules out a simplistic coupling between requirements with action, which is influenced fundamentally by what is possible.'[71]

By discussing a number of examples Herman concludes that formally issued requirements are no guarantee for success since they lag behind reality. Nevertheless, he does not discard them; requirements can constitute a basis for fruitful dialogue between practitioner and user, in the end hopefully resulting in improved collection and analysis. There is also a role for them as an instrument for establishing the territory of the organization's activities and ensuring that no breaches of the legal mandate are made.[72] 'The military metaphor of the cycle brilliantly captures its need for adaptation and optimisation; but not with *requirements* as the driving force.'[73] So what is the driving force then?

In an interesting way Herman sets out to establish that producers are the active part and drive the intelligence cycle. Instead of users adapting their needs to optimize their input, producers aggressively use feedback from users to optimize output. An effective intelligence organization should, writes Herman, constantly hunt for new targets and experiment with new forms of output in order to maximize user satisfaction. He compares an intelligence service to a guided missile whose sensors receive radar echoes, and is then steered by the onboard controlling device to hit the target. Transferred to the intelligence world this metaphor means that the organization must develop its 'sensors' to pick up the echoes, i.e. the users' reactions, and process them to improve the output.

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70 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 290.
71 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, pp. 290–291.
72 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 294.
73 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, pp. 292–293.

An argument against this modified cycle is that it results in shortsighted 'intelligence to please'. Indeed, this is a risk that must not be underestimated. But by stretching the guided missile metaphor a bit further, Herman counters that a guided missile aims not towards maximum radar echoes, but to the position where the target is calculated to be at the moment the missile is able to reach it. In a sentence that should, in my view, be read more often by intelligence managers, Herman states that 'part of intelligence's imperative is to maximize user satisfaction years ahead, when long-term sources come on stream or unpopular lines of analysis turn out to be right.'[74] In other words, the intelligence organization must have within itself a keen intellectual atmosphere in which bold thinking is encouraged in order to maximize user satisfaction in the present time, and also predict users' requirements in the future. Especially when it comes to implementing new technical equipment, which always seems to demand more money and time than initially calculated, it is important to think and plan years in advance.

Figure 2. The modified intelligence cycles where the intelligence producer acts as driving force.[75]

It is obvious that the intelligence cycle, regardless of whether producer or user is the driving force, is depending on feedback. If there is no feedback, one vital link in the cycle is missing. To attach this discussion of the intelligence cycle to the purpose of this work: what elements of the cycle are discernible regarding the T-Office's activities? The one element that is complete in the cycle is the disseminated products, the T-reports on the microfilms. Fragments of feedback

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74   Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, pp. 293–294.
75   Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 295.

to the T-Office exist in the Defence Staff's archive, but these are from the 1950s and not from the early years.[76] According to a veteran of the early years, Thede Palm met the head of Section II and the Chief of the Defence Staff regularly, at least once a week—and then Palm did not go to them, but they came to him—and he was most probably given verbal information of requirements and feedback on these occasions. The veteran could not remember written requirements reaching the T-Office.[77]

Finally, it may be a good idea to reflect for a few moments on where in the post-war Swedish intelligence community one can expect to 'identify' intelligence cycles. There was not one big intelligence cycle comprising all the players. We are going to focus our attention on the cycle comprising the 'top user', the Defence Staff's Section II, and one of the collectors at its disposal, the T-Office. There were also cycles between Section II and the attachés, which is very apparent in the correspondence between Stockholm and the officers posted in foreign capitals. Moreover, it is probably safe to assume that the same phenomenon existed between Section II and the three staffs of the armed services: the Army Staff, the Navy Staff and the Air Staff. FRA was part of another cycle, as was of course the foreign partners of the T-Office. In other words, one can apply the concept of the intelligence cycle to several places in the intelligence community.

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76 Ottosson & Magnusson (1991), *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget*, p. 162.

77 Interview with Curt H. Andreasson, 27 December 2000. Though he could not remember anything about written intelligence requirements, Andreasson did not exclude the possibility that such documents were given to Palm personally. See also Kadhammar (1999), *De sammansvurna*, p. 43. Thede Palm writes that he met the Head of Section II regularly, and also mentions regular meetings in the Defence Staff. Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, p. 61.

6 The Framework

Defining Research Questions

The particular subjects for the investigation are now selected. So, with the discussion of the intelligence requirements and the intelligence cycle in fresh memory, what remains to be done is to define the questions that will be asked. Questions to be answered are twofold.

Firstly, for each subject we will investigate to what degree the T-Office managed to provide intelligence to Section II, i.e. how well it was able to respond to the requirements. Such an investigation shall be carried out by looking at relevant T-reports with releasing dates during 1946 and 1947.

Secondly, an attempt will be made to establish where the centre of gravity was in the intelligence cycle. Did Section II run the cycle, or was the T-Office one step ahead of the user? By comparing dates of requirements and dates of T-reports containing relevant information, it will perhaps be possible to say which one—user or producer—that really constituted the driving force in the process. I prefer to use the word possible in this case, because this is without doubt the more difficult part, and a satisfactory answer to the question is in the end by no means certain. Especially so, since a T-veteran claims that, with a few exceptions such as obvious rubbish, virtually all the incoming information was reported up the ladder.[78] Such a habit creates problems for today's researcher, but that was certainly not something that bothered the T-Office in the late 1940s.

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78   Interview with Curt H. Andreasson, 27 December 2000.

Disposition

In the following chapters answers to the selected questions will be looked for. For each one of the seven subjects the two main questions will be answered; response to requirements and the driving force behind the intelligence cycle. A logical way of presenting this is to do so subject by subject; each subject will be investigated with respect to the two main questions. This approach of the presentation was found to be preferable, since it nicely ties together the two points of view. Thus it will keep the reader focused on a single subject until it is over and done with, and the attention can then switch to next subject. In the end the results will be summarized, and an overall discussion will round off the work.

In order to assist other researchers, present or future, in their work with the fascinating area of intelligence history and particularly the history of the T-Office, an overview of the archival sources and the literature used is presented at the end of this work. The more important of the sources and literature are described in detail on the following pages. Examples of the original reports are presented in original Swedish and translated to English in a documentary appendix.

7   Sources and Literature

Military Archives

The archival research has been done entirely at the *Krigsarkivet* (Military Archives) in Stockholm. Attempts were made to locate traces of the T-Office in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which are stored at the *Riksarkivet* (National Archives) in Stockholm, but these attempts did not turn up anything at all.

Studies in intelligence history are notoriously difficult because of the very nature of the business. Few documents, working papers and notes survive the shredding machine's iron-fisted rule. Unfortunately, most of the information was never written down and remained locked away in the practitioners' memories. Government authorities may have had to obey regulations laying down the rules for filing documents of various kinds. This is normally no problem as long as the documents are not considered very sensitive. In that case regulations may not be followed and entire archives can be destroyed, as was obviously the case with the T-Office's archive—a clear break of regulations in force. Sometimes the community follows its own rules.

Issued reports and other registered documents emanating from the intelligence community, and which are classified, may be locked away in the archives for up to 70 years. Such is the Swedish law in force.[79] Depending on the sensi-

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79   Wallberg (2001), *Rikets säkerhet. Försvarssekretessen i ett historiskt perspektiv*, p. 83.

tivity of particular documents, declassification can take place before the stipu-
lated time.

Most important of all sources are of course the microfilms that surfaced so
suddenly a few years ago; this work is based on these films. The films are copied
to microfiche cards, now available to a limited extent for research at the Military
Archives in Stockholm. A total of 31 microfilms make up the archive from the
T-Office.[80] Reports from 1946 and 1947 can be studied on films nr. 1a and nr.
1. The quality of film nr. 1a is poor. Many of the reports on that film are very
difficult, in some cases almost impossible, to read. Though report numbers,
issuing dates and headlines can be discerned in most cases. Film nr. 1 is gener-
ally of a much better quality, and can be studied without straining the eyes.

Reports from the T-Office cover a wide spectrum, with a natural concen-
tration on the European areas close to Sweden. Each report was given a serial
number starting from (very logically) report nr. 1. Serial numbers ran consecu-
tively in one-year periods from 1 July to 30 June, which of course makes it very
easy to spot any missing reports.

A very interesting source in the Military Archives, though primarily not
for the subject of this work, are the so-called daily communiqués (*dagskommu-
nikéer*) produced by Section II. Despite the designation, they were not released
on a daily basis, and were certainly not for public use. These products were
classified as secret and of two kinds, labelled DK S and DK respectively. DK
S communiqués were issued to the Supreme Commander, the Chief of the
Defence Staff, the heads of Section I and Section III respectively, and finally
the Foreign Department within Section II. As is easily understood, since these
summaries were intended for high-level use, they therefore contained selected
pieces of information considered to be of interest to the recipients. More fre-
quently issued and more comprehensive, the DK communiqués were probably
intended for a wider circulation within the Defence Staff. However, no circula-
tion list has been found, so it is not possible to establish how far they reached.

What makes these daily communiqués interesting for an intelligence
researcher is that they contain intelligence information, clearly labelled, from the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, military attachés *and* the secret organizations: the
T-Office (and its predecessor the C-Bureau) and FRA. It can here be ascertained
which information was disseminated within the military intelligence commu-
nity. Ironically, these daily communiqués have been declassified for years—the
Humint and Sigint information have been there for the public to study at any
time. At first, the information from the C-Bureau was labelled as emanating
from *'C-byrån'*. Starting with a DK communiqué issued on 21 January 1946,
this was changed to 'special source' (*särskild källa*). The same phenomenon can

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80 Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp. 99–105.

be noted on a DK S communiqué issued the next day. This coincides nicely with the transformation of the C-Bureau to the T-Office, and probably reflects a desire to tighten the security around the Humint organization.[81]

A change in the internal reporting routines took place in late February 1947, when the daily communiqués were replaced with commanders' summaries (*chefsorienteringar*) and staff summaries (*stabsorienteringar*). The staff summaries consisted of two kinds of reports: weekly summaries (*veckoorienteringar*) and special summaries (*specialorienteringar*).[82] It has not been possible to locate the new summaries in the Military Archives, the possibility of following the intelligence information chain ends in early 1947.

Though this work does not aim to investigate in detail the information flow further out in the intelligence community, it might be a good idea to keep these daily communiqués in mind during the forthcoming investigation. The occurrence of intelligence from the T-Office in the communiqués can give us an indication of how relevant the information was considered to be compared to information from other sources. This connection will be used in discussing the reporting provided by Thede Palm and his small organization on the various subjects we are going to investigate.

In a way, these occurences can perhaps be regarded as a sort of 'indirect feedback'; the pieces that were copied from the T-Office's reports and included in the communiqués must reasonably have been considered important (and also correct) enough to disseminate further up and down the food chain. To use the existence of this indirect feedback further than perhaps just discussing the importance attached to the reporting by Section II would, in my view, be to stretch things too far. One may argue that this is the feedback missing in the intelligence cycle—and therefore can be used to try to pinpoint the driving force in the cycle—but a few things must then be remembered. Firstly, that the communiqués were presumably not intended for the T-Office (though it is plausible that at least Thede Palm read them), and secondly that it is unclear which criterias were used by Section II for selecting the information that went into the communiqués. Some intelligence may have been very good and well received, but too sensitive to distribute to a wider circle. All that we can assume with some certainty is, once again, that the information from the T-Office, which can be found in the communiqués, was considered important and correct enough to merit a wider circle of readers.

Apart from the archive of the Defence Staff's Section II, the Intelligence Section of the Navy Staff's Operational Department is also of interest. Its

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81 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol 3; DK S nr. 4, 22 January 1946; DK nr. 10, 21 January 1946. Concerning FRA, the same phenomenon took place in early May 1946. Sigint information was thereafter labelled with source 'XXX'.

82 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 4; HQ Order nr. 7:8, 28 February 1947.

archive is stored at the Military Archives. Since traces of the T-Office can be found not only in Section II's archive but also in other archives, it is not surprising that there are surviving copies of T-reports in the Navy Staff's archive. A very impressive report compiled by Commander Ragnar Thorén, an expert in long-range photography and photo analysis, that describes the Soviet Baltic Fleet as of 1946 was found to be of great assistance in sorting out facts. The 'report' is actually three bound volumes in folio. Since the three volumes are declassified, and contain more facts and unique photos of Soviet naval hardware in the 1940s than any published book this author has seen, it should, in my view, be seriously considered by a publisher for a facsimile print and subsequent publication.

Literature

Sweden has in many ways been more secretive than several other countries when it comes to publishing papers and books on the country's intelligence community. The occupants of the academic ivory towers have not really wanted to touch the issue; maybe it has been politically incorrect for decades? Neither has there been much of a public interest in such things; news stories on intelligence activities are remarkably short-lived—unless it is about domestic intelligence. The government have possibly not felt really comfortable when handling intelligence information. If I may use a touch of irony, intelligence services have more or less been regarded as something dirty that other nations have, primarily the great powers, but cosy, alliance-free little Sweden does not 'spy' on other countries. Of course, those who were in the middle of the business—politicians and professionals alike—knew the truth.

Simply put, things started to change after the end of the Cold War. The last decade has seen a small but growing number of books and academic papers published on intelligence matters. This is partly a result of a growing historical interest in Sweden's political and military activities during the Cold War, and partly a result of an increased access to classified archives. In recent years several very interesting books on Swedish intelligence history have reached the bookshops. This is indeed good news for the intelligence historian, who now has a wider range of published works to choose from to support his research.

On the other hand, there is no shortage of publications in the international intelligence literature market. Intelligence and intelligence history is a larger and more institutionalized research field in other countries, mainly Great Britain, USA and Germany; countries where it is not unusual for the intelligence practitioners to turn to the academic disciplines. This development is yet

to be seen in Sweden. As a consequence of this 'flow' of intelligence veterans to the universities, there is an abundance of available literature dealing with, for example the theoretical side of the art of intelligence. It was therefore not a problem to select the appropriate literature to build the theoretical framework of this work.

The selected research questions demand a certain knowledge of details of naval forces and ships of the post-war years. We must try to establish the accuracy in the T-Office's reports, and therefore need the assistance of several works specializing in types of ships, navies of the 1940s, radar technology and several other subjects of a more or less technical nature.

Some works have been especially useful or can be considered of great importance to intelligence history, and they are mentioned below. Apart from them, a considerable number of other books and articles have been used in this work. All literature is listed at the end of this work. This chapter can also be regarded as an overview of the present knowledge of the Swedish intelligence services in general, and the T-Office in particular, during the period up to the late 1940s.

Starting with the historical background, the early attempts of Swedish intelligence activities are covered by Lennart Frick and Lars Rosander in *Det vakande ögat. Svensk underrättelsetjänst under 400 år*, which together with *Hemliga makter—Svensk hemlig militär underrättelsetjänst från unionstiden till det kalla kriget* by Jan Ottosson and Lars Magnusson, provides a good overview of the development of Swedish intelligence services in the 20th century. These two books have above all been used for describing the historical context in this work. Frick and Rosander recently published a new book—*Bakom hemligstämpeln. Hemlig verksamhet i Sverige i vår tid*—which focuses on intelligence activities carried out by Sweden, and such activities carried out in Sweden by other powers, in the 20th century.

Professor Wilhelm Carlgren wrote almost 20 years ago an impressive book on the intelligence services during the Second World War: *Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939–1945*. It is a thorough investigation in all the ways available for the Swedish military and government to obtain information from the warring nations. The importance that intelligence information played for the country's possibilities to steer clear of the war is made very obvious by Carlgren.

What has not been publicly known for so many years is the role played by Sigint in providing sometimes extremely valuable information. It has been known for some time that German enciphered telegrams were decoded in Sweden, but the details and the extent of the work was first described by Bengt Beckman in the comprehensive *Svenska kryptobedrifter*. Beckman spent his professional life at FRA, the Swedish Sigint organization that won its laurels during the war years, and he certainly knows the business. In early 2003 an extended book, *Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900–1945*, was published by Beckman and

the Uppsala historian C.G. McKay. With these books Sweden has finally won a much-deserved place in history among the code breaking nations of the Second World War. Bletchley Park and *Enigma* are now accompanied by Lovön and the *Geheimschreiber*.

Continuing with the period after the Second World War, another area of intelligence activities is covered in remarkable detail in *Bortom horisonten. Svensk flygspaning mot Sovjetunionen 1946–1952* by Lennart Andersson and Leif Hellström. The book deals with aerial reconnaissance carried out by the Royal Swedish Air Force against the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1952. A fact that few are aware of is that a Swedish Spitfire P.R. XIX, made a covert reconnaissance flight over northern Finland to Kandalaksha on the Kola Peninsula in September 1949. Ending with the tragic shoot-down of a Swedish Sigint aircraft (a DC-3)[83] over the Baltic Sea on 13 June 1952, the book describes a cooler period of the Cold War as seen from the perspective of Swedish airborne intelligence.

In *Si vis pacem—para bellum*, Lieutenant-Colonel Bengt Wallerfelt provides the reader with a well-researched history of Swedish security policy and war planning during the Cold War. By looking at the war planning during the late 1940s, it is possible to get a feeling for the threat perceptions among the military leadership in those days. Threat perceptions constitute an important factor in formulating intelligence requirements.

In 1997 Olav Riste and Arnfinn Moland wrote and published a remarkable book about the Norwegian Intelligence Service: *"Strengt Hemmelig": Norsk etterretningsteneste 1945–1970*. Secret Norwegian archives were opened to the two historians, and the result is an astonishingly detailed and interesting book. Some references to Sweden and the Swedish intelligence services can be found, and a few lines about exchange of intelligence information between the Norwegians and the T-Office have already provided this work with valuable assistance.

In recent years the T-Office and its predecessor the C-Bureau has caught the attention of several researchers. The knowledge of their activities is slowly increasing, and is now being based more on documented facts than on speculation, trained historians are now conquering the field where scoop-searching journalists once roamed. Historians have generally more patience with digging in archives, and are better trained to place fragments in the right context than journalists having to meet a deadline.

Thede Palm's little book *Några studier till T-kontorets historia* is so far the best available overview of the T-Office's history. It was Anders Björk (Swedish

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83 The DC-3 was actually discovered in June 2003, and parts were salvaged by the Swedish Navy in the autumn that year. The heavily damaged fuselage was finally lifted in March 2004.

defence minister 1991–1994) who encouraged Thede Palm to write down his memories. The book contains a lot of interesting information, and sometimes an initiated reader can read even more between the lines. It is amazing that Thede Palm could remember so much when he sat down at an old age to tell the history of the T-Office—he had no access to any of the relevant archives. The manuscript was edited and thoroughly commented by Evabritta Wallberg at the Military Archives, and subsequently published four years after Thede Palm's death in 1995 by the Royal Association for Publishing Manuscripts on the History of Scandinavia (*Kungl. Samfundet för utgivande av handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia*). Dr Palm was dismissed as head of the T-Office in 1964 at the same time as the T-Office merged with the domestic security service, the B-Bureau. The reasons for these actions are still unclear. In 2000 a debate raged in the *Proceedings and Journal of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences* (*Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademins handlingar och tidskrift*) regarding Palm's dismissal. Lieutenant-General Bo Westin, who as a colonel was Head of Section II in the first half of the 1960s, claimed that Thede Palm made a grave mistake which caused his removal, whereas the T-Office employees John Magnus Lindberg and Curt H. Andreasson in two articles emphasize political reasons behind the actions.[84] Palm could be described as a conservative civil servant. Both Lindberg and Andreasson name Olof Palme as a significant force in the process. Palme was in those days a former employee at Section II and a coming man in the Social Democratic Party; he later became Sweden's Prime Minister, and was tragically assassinated on a Stockholm street in 1986. Andreasson once said that the then Prime Minister Tage Erlander suffered from a 'very bad conscience' for having dismissed Thede Palm, his old friend from the student days in Lund.[85]

A comprehensive paper that is included in a recently published anthology on intelligence services provides a lot of information of the T-Office. Niklas Wikström has in *Militär underrättelsetjänst i inledningen av det kalla kriget. T-kontoret och dess rapportering 1946–1948* investigated the strategic and operative reporting from the T-Office during the first years of its existence, by coincidence the same period as this work is investigating, plus an additional six months up to 30 June 1948. Wikström's approach is somewhat different; the two and a half years are divided into five periods in which the issued reports

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84   Westin (2000), *Omständigheterna kring Thede Palms avsked från underrättelsetjänsten.* Lindberg (2000), *Thede Palms avskedande i ny belysning,* and Andreasson (2000), *Politiska motiv bakom Thede Palms avsked.* Bo Westin was head of Section II 1961–1966. Bo Westin, at that time a colonel, was negative to Thede Palm already when he took office, and the two men were in conflict regarding the control over the T-Office's funding. As long as Palm remained at his post, Westin did not succeed in his attempts. Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia,* pp. 16, 61.

85   Interview with Curt H. Andreasson, 27 December 2000.

are grouped according to country and further divided in strategic and operative intelligence. His aim is to search for changes in the reporting over time, and in that way deduce the requirements from the users. My method is the other way around: I start from requirements issued to one part of the intelligence community and look at the results as they are mirrored in the reporting. Furthermore, Wikström makes a qualitative attempt at assessing the quality of the sources and the contents in the reports. Apart from having missed some niceties in interpreting details of sources etc., Wikström's paper is a very good product and well deserves the 'Prize in Military History in Memory of Hugo Raab' that it was awarded.

The involvement in the training and ferrying of agents to the Baltic states is perhaps the most widely known area of the T-Office's activities. This was initiated by the C-Bureau during the last years of the war and continued for a few years afterwards. Lars Ericson has in *Exodus och underrättelseinhämtning. Det svenska försvaret och Baltikum hösten 1943–våren 1945* desribed the operations run by the C-Bureau. In the post-war period, and also earlier as is mentioned by Ericson, it appears that the operations were often carried out in co-operation with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or, as it is often known, MI6). Tom Bower wrote in 1989 a detailed history, *The Red Web. MI6 and the KGB Master Coup,* of the attempts of SIS to infiltrate agents in the Baltic states and how KGB in a masterly way managed to counter infiltrate the operations. Most agents sent across the Baltic Sea faced death or prison. The T-Office veteran Curt H. Andreasson, who was involved in these activities, regarded Bower's book as not entirely correct in many details.[86] Some ferrying took place with the assistance of a German *Schnellboot* (fast patrol boat) commanded by Hans Helmut Klose, who operated under SIS. The *Schnellboot S 208* and Klose is dealt with by Tom Bower as well as in a paper by Dr Sigurd Hess, *The Clandestine Operations of Hans Helmut Klose and the British Baltic Fishery Protection Service (BBFPS) 1949–1956.* A Swedish journalist named Peter Kadhammar wrote *De sammansvurna* in which the reader can follow the life of an Estonian agent, Evald Hallisk, who was trained by the T-Office in Sweden and ferried over to the Baltic coast. Hallisk was captured and spent many years in a prison camp in eastern Siberia before resettling in Estonia.

Going back to the Second World War and the C-Bureau, the predecessor of the T-Office has been the subject for two researchers who have published their papers. Rune Svensson, an officer in the Swedish Navy, has in *Sveriges hemliga vapen? C-byråns verksamhet under andra världskriget—en analys av mål, medel, organisation och verksamhet i stort,* made an overall study of the C-Bureau's aims, means, organization and activities. Among other things, he discusses the

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86   Letter from Curt H. Andreasson to author, 30 May 2001.

various steps in the intelligence cycle. Svensson's observations on intelligence requirements and sources support the views put forward in this work. In his paper *C-byråns verksamhet i Norge 1939–1945—sedd ur ett förvarningsperspektiv* Krister Thun has studied the C-Bureau's reporting from the occupied Norway with a concentration on the early warning perspective: was there a danger of a German invasion of Sweden launched from Norwegian territory? Thun has actually found references in the reports to specific requirements from Section II.

Intelligence theory is a discipline, which tries to establish some order in what may appear to be a haphazard, already existing system; much like grammar being imposed on a spoken language. Theoretical reasoning should always be based on common sense. This applies to intelligence theory as well.

I have used mainly one important book in working out the theoretical approach in this work. Based on experiences gained during a long career in the British Sigint organization, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Michael Herman provides a carefully analyzed study of the mechanisms of the intelligence community in above all Great Britain and USA in his *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*. The theoretical reasoning of the intelligence cycle used in this work is based on Herman's writings. For a long-time practitioner it is refreshing, as well as providing a sense of *déjà vu*, to read Herman's observations on the intelligence system in reality, and the managing of a community consisting of more or less eccentric individuals. Herman also wrote the more recently published *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* where he discusses the role and the future of intelligence in the modern world.

Details of the Soviet Navy during the reign of Josef Stalin is provided abundantly in *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet* by Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov. The two researchers have made extensive use of old Soviet archives, and were therefore able to present facts on a hitherto unprecedented scale. The book is crammed with type designations, digits and tables, and it is perhaps unavoidable in such a monumental work that a few mistakes have slipped through the net. Despite these, it is a great achievement of Rohwer and Monakov to have dug up all information presented in their book; I have used it extensively.

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8 The T-reports—What They Said and When They Said It

The theoretical framework and the research questions are now defined, and it is time to turn our attention to the archives. This chapter turned out to be by far, the most comprehensive one of this work. On some subjects the T-Office produced an impressive amount of intelligence reports; on others the reporting was found to be very fragmentary.

Intelligence Requirements and Reports

The first main line of investigation in this work is to find out how well the reports could answer the intelligence requirements. Each subject is opened with a discussion about the particular intelligence requirement. This is primarily made in order to hone the criteria used in selecting the desired information from the vast T-Office archive. Another reason for doing this is to discuss the more or less probable reasons why the requirement surfaced—this helps us to put it all in a wide context.

It should be noted that in several cases some overlapping occurs between the subjects. This may cause a few problems, but in these cases the same information is then presented under several subjects. Such an approach is preferable to placing one piece of information here and another piece there, when both pieces really should appear under both subjects. Another problem faces the modern researcher. Many place names in the Baltic area have changed since the Second

World War. In the 1940s many ports along the coast were commonly known under other and older names of mainly German origin; the German influence in the area was centuries old. Ventspils was, for instance, known as Windau, and Gdansk as Danzig. I have chosen to use today's names—with Leningrad the only exception, since it is such an ingrained name and still in official use in some contexts—despite the fact that the older names are more often used in the T-reports, since these are the names that can be found on modern maps. For the interested reader, a list of the names used in various areas is compiled and presented below in table 2.

Name in use today	Older name
Baltiysk	Pillau
Elblag	Elbing
Gdansk	Danzig
Gdynia	Gotenhafen
Hiuumaa	Dagö (island)
Kaliningrad	Königsberg
Kaliningradskiy zaliv	Frisches Haff
Klaipeda	Memel
Kolobrzeg	Kolberg
Liepaja	Libau
Neringa	Kurische Nehrung
Nowy Port	Neufahrwasser
Osmussaar	Odensholm (island)
Paldiski	Baltischport
Pregolya	Pregel (river)
Saaremaa	Ösel (island)
Szczecin	Stettin
St Petersburg	Leningrad (in use in the Soviet era)
Swinoujscie	Swinemünde
Tallinn	Reval
Ustka	Stolpmünde
Ventspils	Windau

Table 2. Place names etc. as they are used today and the older names.

Intelligence Requirements and Dates of Issue

The second research question is based on Michael Herman's discussion about where to find the centre of gravity in the intelligence cycle. Thus, was Section II the driving force in the intelligence cycle, or was it the T-Office? To most of the specific intelligence requirements expressed by the Naval Desk, the T-Office managed to produce relevant reporting as we shall see—but was it timely reporting, and who was ahead of whom?

Let us consider the three possible variants we can expect to find. Firstly, if intelligence information on a specific subject was reported after the requirement was sent out, and then the producer reacted to the wishes of the user, in this case the Naval Desk at Section II, which was thus the driving force. Secondly, if the relevant reporting was issued during a period before the requirement was known, and continued afterwards, then one could say that the producer was one step ahead of the user and thus anticipated his wishes (perhaps without realizing it in the first place). In that case, it could very well be that the user's interest was raised by the reports—on a subject he might not have expected to receive—and reacted by expressing a requirement for more information on the issue. Such things happen in real life, and then the producer is clearly the driving force. Or, in the third and worst case, reports were issued before the requirement was formulated, but the production ceased afterwards. Then the producer really lost the game. Such worst-case scenarios can also happen in real life; a particular source can 'dry up,' not be accessible anymore, or the intelligence subject may cease to exist.

To illustrate the last point, an example from modern times may suffice. Intelligence reports on the Soviet Air Force in Poland and DDR were possible to produce as long as the Soviet air units were based there. Alas, in the early 1990s they were not there any longer, and then that area of intelligence reporting was gone as well—and it was definitely not the intelligence producer's fault. Admittedly, the intelligence requirement also vanished shortly after the last aeroplane's take-off.

There must be other variants also, someone might argue. What if the user wants intelligence reports on a particular subject, and the producer is unable to fulfil that wish? Could it not also happen that intelligence reports are issued, and that the user finds them irrelevant and off the mark? Yes, such things also occur in reality. However, these are extreme cases and should really not last long. If they do, it indicates a dangerous lack of dialogue between user and producer. Both sides must talk as openly as conditions admit about each other's needs and possibilities in order to gain a mutual understanding, and avoid placing impossible demands on each other.

I admit that it will no doubt be difficult to discern which of the actors was the driving force in the intelligence cycle involving Section II and the T-Office. A circumstance, which in this case makes things more difficult, is the remark by the T-Office veteran pointed out earlier in this work; that almost every received piece of information was reported. A strict adherence to stated intelligence requirements seems therefore not to have been the case. Moreover, the T-Office had few possibilities to direct their sources to look for specific information. They could ask for the information, of course, but the sources' opportunities

to find it, was in the end dependent upon local conditions outside their own control.[87]

One way, and the only practical one in my view, is by making a quantitative approach to the problem and concentrate on the dates of the intelligence requirements and the relevant reports. In what other ways can it be done with the information available to us? The crucial facts are the issuing dates of the requirements in combination with the reporting dates. An attempt at answering the research question can be carried out by using these facts. Dates of reported intelligence must be placed in relation to issuing dates of intelligence requirements.

To avoid too much confusion in this particular investigation, I chose to present the facts (i.e. the dates) in tables—one for each intelligence requirement from the Naval Desk—and then discuss the results. Since answers to more than one requirement in some cases were found in one single report, such a report is then represented in several of the tables. For that reason, the tables must not be interpreted as presenting the total number of reports used to answer all questions.

8.1 Soviet Sea Power and Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea

What is Sea Power?

This is a wide subject indeed. It can be argued, and rightly so, that this subject encompasses all the other intelligence requirements that are to be examined in this work (and some of them were also taken out of this subject and listed separately in the requirement letters). But it can also be argued that there remain many issues, which do not fit into any of the other requirements. A sea power means so many other things than the number of cruisers and submarines, their armament, transport capability and coastal forts. What about command structure, doctrines, exercise patterns, personnel strength and level of training? These things, for instance, are also valuable information when it comes to making an assessment of a foreign naval force. Judging from the letters, the Naval Desk was primarily looking for information about the naval units of the Soviet Navy, i.e. the hardware that constituted the fighting force of the navy.

It is evident from Commander Kull's letter of April 1946 that the Naval Desk had been compiling a list of ships during the winter, and that a release was not too far away. The subject was not repeated again in the second letter,

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87 Interview with Curt H. Andreasson, 27 December 2000.

so the work seems to have been completed during the interval. Initially, it was the Soviet sea power in the southern Baltic Sea that was of interest. As time went on, a renewed interest of the subject seems to have risen, and it resulted in a new intelligence requirement in the fourth letter. By paying strict attention to whether reported information concerns the southern Baltic Sea or not, this chapter could easily become too complicated to grasp; better then to treat the Baltic Sea as a whole.

A significant part of the T-Office's reports dealing with the Soviet Navy concerned the transfers and locations of former German ships. When these were presumed to be in a not too bad shape, they must surely have been regarded as adding to the naval strength of the Soviet Union. Since the whereabouts of the remnants of the *Kriegsmarine* was listed as a separate intelligence requirement during most of the investigation period, it makes more sense to leave all the former German units to be treated later in this work. That means that this subject, Soviet Sea Power and Soviet Navy, will be limited to intelligence reported about Soviet naval ships of non-German origin.

Furthermore, Kull indicated in the first letter that the knowledge of landing vessels was not satisfactory. Since data on landing vessels was a separate requirement in the same letter, all reported intelligence on that subject is naturally treated under that heading.

In line with the discussions above, this chapter should thus try to investigate to what extent the T-Office could acquire information on the strength of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea.

Soviet Naval Ships in the Intelligence Reports

Summaries

At first, it would be interesting to take a look at an overall assessment of the Baltic Fleet, which was reported in the middle of the period with which this work is dealing. Reciting the opinions of a 'foreign expert' in a report dated 30 January 1947, the combat capability in the Soviet Baltic Fleet was not assessed to be very high at the time.

> The relatively large number of ships, particularly light surface ships and submarines, at the disposal of the Russians in the Baltic Sea, can probably not be effectively used due to difficulties with the personnel. Russia has always had difficulties in providing the Navy with good sailors, and it is even more difficult now, when Baltic coastal inhabitants cannot be used for naval service to the same extent as before the world war 1914–18 because of present unreliability in political considerations.

> Furthermore, the training of the Russian naval officer corps had been severely neglected during the war years. The quality of higher as well as lower staffs is likely to be seriously inferior to staffs of a number of other countries.[88]

Battleships would, the 'foreign expert' meant, hardly be of any other use than as floating batteries, probably to be used only as fire support during ground operations. There were no plans to build carriers, and it was therefore unlikely that the Soviets could have made any use of the unfinished German carrier *Graf Zeppelin*. Concerning the use of cruisers, destroyers and submarines of the Baltic Fleet, the report was more optimistic. Shipyards, on the other hand, generally faced some difficulties.[89]

> All shipyard activity is severely handicapped due to a shortage of workers and materiel, and the completion of surface ships under construction is considerably delayed. On the other hand, it is known that a few submarines of the *K* and *M* types have been completed after the war.[90]

Another comprehensive report is also worth a few lines and some comments. It is a list of the operative ships—an 'order of battle'—of the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1947, originating from 'foreign sources', and an excellent example of the 'bean-counting' which has kept so many intelligence practitioners occupied over the years.[91] The report also lends itself to some detailed comparison of information, due to the results of recent efforts by Rohwer and Monakov in researching the history of the Soviet Navy, where the 'available' ships of the Baltic Fleet after the war are listed in various ways.[92] Since the summary is fairly comprehensive, it becomes easier to grasp the information if it is split in two parts: surface ships and submarines.

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88 'Det förhållandevis stora fartygsbestånd, särskilt av lätta övervattensfartyg och ubåtar, som ryssarna förfoga över i Östersjön, torde icke kunna effektivt utnyttjas på grund av personalsvårigheter. Ryssland har alltid haft svårigheter med att för örlogsflottan erhålla gott sjöfolk och än svårare är det nu, då baltiska kustbefolkningen icke kan utnyttjas för örlogstjänst i samma utsträckning som före världskriget 1914–18, på grund av nuvarande opålitlighet i politiskt hänseende. Vidare har den ryska sjöofficerskårens träning och fortsatta utbildning blivit avsevärt eftersatt under krigsåren. Kvaliteten hos såväl högre som lägre staber torde vara avsevärt underlägsen ett flertal andra länders.' KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.

89 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.

90 'All varvsverksamhet är svårt handicappad av arbetar- och materialbrist, och färdigställandet av under byggnad varande övervattensfartyg blir avsevärt fördröjt. Däremot är det känt att några u-båtar efter kriget färdigställts av typerna K och M.' KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.

91 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 22; report nr. 448, 20 June 1947. Source 'No'.

92 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Navy*, pp. 170–171, 192, 226, 243–256, 260–268.

Starting with the surface ships, the T-Office listed a total of 32 units of battleships, cruisers and destroyers. These are presented in table 3 below. No minesweepers or auxiliary ships were listed in the summary. Names of ships are given in the table as they were reported by the T-Office; the only exception being where the original transcription of Russian names is in obvious need of correction. Furthermore, it points out where information from Rohwer and Monakov is congruent with details from the T-Office. Some extra information is also added, like ships that existed in reality, but cannot be found in the summary from 1947.

Type of ship as designated by the T-Office	Operative ships as reported by the T-Office, spring 1947	Available ships in the September 1945, according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comments
Battleship	Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya	Agree	
-"-	—	Petropavlovsk (ex-Marat)	Damaged and grounded off Kronshtadt, not reported by the T-Office
Armoured ship	Väinämöinen	Agree, Vyborg	Ex-Finnish Väinämöinen
Heavy cruiser	Kirov	Agree	
-"-	Maksim Gorkiy	Agree	
Torpedo cruiser	Leningrad	Agree (designated as destroyer leader)	
-"-	Minsk	Agree (designated as destroyer leader)	
Destroyer	Vitseadmiral Drozd	Agree	
-"-	Grozyashchiy	Agree	
-"-	Opytny	Agree	
-"-	Silny	Agree	
-"-	Slavny	Agree	
-"-	—	Steregushchiy	Not reported by the T-Office
-"-	Storozhevoy	Agree	
-"-	Strashny	Agree	
-"-	Stroyny	Agree	
-"-	Strogiy	Agree	
-"-	Svirepy	Agree	
-"-	Goryashchiy	No information	Confused with Grozyashchiy?
Escort destroyer/torpedo boat	Yastreb	Agree	
-"-	Orel	Disagree	Orel was laid down in 1941 but commissioned as late as 1950
-"-	Vikhr	Agree	
-"-	—	Tayfun	Not reported by the T-Office
-"-	Tucha	Agree	
-"-	Rym	Agree (designated as minesweeper)	

Table 3. The list of operative surface ships in the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1947.

The battleship *Petropavlovsk* (formerly *Marat*) was missing in the list from the T-Office. Not so strange considering the damage the battleship suffered during the war. In fact, the battleship was sunk and grounded in Kronshtadt in September 1941, and after that used as stationary battery.[93] It can be presumed that by 1947 she must have looked more like a rusty wreck standing on the bottom than an operative unit, and an observer would hardly regard her as a ship capable of combat action. In fact, in another report issued in September 1947, *Petropavlovsk* was described as a wreck. It is therefore surprising that Rohwer and Monakov count the *Petropavlovsk* as an 'available' ship by 2 September 1945.[94]

Kronshtadt, 10 July 1944. Photo taken by a German reconnaissance aircraft from an altitude of 9,000 metres. The old battleship Petropavlovsk (at nr. 4) can be seen with the bow under water. The T-Office reported the Petropavlovsk as still partly sunk in June 1946. (Military Archives)

93 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 170, 226. On an aerial photo from June 1944 *Petropavlovsk* (ex-*Marat*) is lying in the central basin in Kronshtadt with the bow under water. KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 15–16.

94 Breyer, *Soviet Warship Development, volume 1: 1917–1937*, pp. 222–231. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 170.

Finland's only surviving armoured ship *Väinämöinen* was renamed *Vyborg*, probably in April 1947 when it was commissioned in the Soviet Navy, and transferred to Kronshtadt as late as early June 1947. Since the summary covers the spring of 1947, it seems plausible that the name change had not taken place by the time the information was gathered.

One destroyer, the *Steregushchiy*, was missed in the 'bean counting', while another destroyer named *Goryashchiy* was on the list, but that name is not to be found in the book by Rohwer and Monakov. A confusion of names must have been the reason for *Goryashchiy's* appearance; the very similar name *Grozyashchiy* was given to an existing destroyer.

Also, reported information concerning two smaller surface ships, the *Orel* and the *Tayfun*, differ from that uncovered by modern research. *Orel* was not commissioned before 1950, and despite the fact that her construction started already in 1941, she could probably not be considered as an operative ship in the spring of 1947. The T-Office missed the *Tayfun* altogether.

Thus, some mistakes can be found in the summary's list of surface ships, but on the whole and in hindsight it can be regarded as not too far off the mark. Few pieces of intelligence reporting of such an extent are 100 per cent accurate.

When the same method of comparison is applied to the information concerning submarines (see table 4), a noticeable increase in differences can be observed.

Type of ship as designated by the T-Office	Operative ships as reported by the T-Office, spring 1947	Available ships in the middle of 1945, according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comments
Submarine	P-2	No information on the post-war status of P-2 Zvezda	Breyer writes that P-2 was repaired after the war and resumed service in 1949 as B-31[95]
-"-	P-3	No information on the post-war status of P-3 Iskra	Breyer writes that P-3 was repaired after the war and resumed service in 1949 as B-1[96]
-"-	L-3	Agree, L-3 Frunzovets	
-"-	L-21	Agree	
-"-	—	D-2 Narodvolets	Not reported by the T-Office
-"-	K-24	No information	
-"-	K-51	Agree	
-"-	K-52	Agree	
-"-	K-53	Agree	

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95 Breyer, *Soviet Warship Development, volume 1: 1917–1937*, p. 203
96 Breyer, *Soviet Warship Development, volume 1: 1917–1937*, p. 203.

Type of ship as designated by the T-Office	Operative ships as reported by the T-Office, spring 1947	Available ships in the middle of 1945, according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comments
-"-	K-54	Disagree	K-54 was damaged during the war while uncompleted and never commissioned
-"-	K-55	Agree	
-"-	K-56	Agree	
-"-	S-4	Disagree	Lost in 1945
-"-	S-9	Disagree	Lost in 1943
-"-	S-12	Disagree	Lost in 1943
-"-	S-13	Agree	
-"-	S-17	Agree, S-17 Sovetskaya Svanetiya	
-"-	S-18	Agree	
-"-	S-20	Agree	
-"-	—	Shch-303 Yorsh	Not reported by the T-Office
-"-	307	Agree, Shch-307 Treska	
-"-	309	Agree, Shch-309 Delfin	
-"-	310	Agree, Shch-310 Beluga[97]	
-"-	318	Agree, Shch-318	
-"-	407	Agree, Shch-407	
-"-	408	Disagree, Shch-408	Lost in 1943
-"-	409	Disagree, Shch-409	Laid down in Murmansk, cancelled in 1941
-"-	410	Disagree, Shch-410	Laid down in Murmansk, cancelled in 1941
-"-	411	Agree, Shch-411	
-"-	412	Agree, Shch-412	Commissioned in 1946
-"- .	420	No information	
-"-	421	Disagree, Shch-421	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939
-"-	422	Disagree, Shch-422	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939
-"-	426	No information, M-426?	
-"-	428	No information, M-428?	
-"-	Lembit	Agree (ex-Estonian Lembit)	
-"-	M-73	No information on post-war status on M-73	
-"-	74	Disagree, M-74	Bomb-damaged in Kronshtadt in 1941
-"-	75	No information on post-war status on M-75	
-"-	77	Agree, M-77	
-"-	—	M-79	Not reported by the T-Office

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97 The names *Yorsh, Treska, Delfin* and *Beluga* from Breyer, *Soviet Warship Development, volume 1: 1917–1937*, p. 212.

Type of ship as designated by the T-Office	Operative ships as reported by the T-Office, spring 1947	Available ships in the middle of 1945, according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comments
-"-	82	Disagree, M-82	Transferred by rail from the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-43
-"-	84	Disagree, M-84	Transferred by rail from the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-44
-"-	85	Disagree, M-85	Transferred by rail from the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-45
-"-	86	Disagree, M-86	Transferred by rail from the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-46
-"-	87	Disagree, M-87	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-171
-"-	88	Disagree, M-88	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-172
-"-	89	Disagree, M-89	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-173
-"-	90	Agree, M-90	
-"-	91	Disagree, M-91	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-174
-"-	92	Disagree, M-92	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-175
-"-	93	Disagree, M-93	Transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1939, commissioned there as M-176
-"-	96	Disagree, M-96	Lost in 1944
-"-	102	Agree, M-102	
-"-	103	Disagree, M-103	Lost in 1941
-"-	—	M-171	Not reported by the T-Office

Type of ship as designated by the T-Office	Operative ships as reported by the T-Office, spring 1947	Available ships in the middle of 1945, according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comments
-"-	200	Disagree, M-200 Mest	Building started in Leningrad, completed in Astrakhan and Baku, transferred to the Northern Fleet in 1943
-"-	201	Disagree, M-201	Building started in Leningrad, completed in Astrakhan and Baku, transferred to the Northern Fleet in 1943
-"-	202	Disagree, M-202 Rybnik Donbassa	Building started in Leningrad, completed in Astrakhan and Baku, transferred to the Black Sea Fleet in 1943
-"-	Five ex-Finnish sub-marines	No information	Vetehinen, Vesihiisi, Iku-Turso, Vesikko and Saukko were never transferred to the Soviet Navy[98]

Table 4. Operative submarines in the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1947, as reported by the T-Office.

No less than 61 submarines were combat-ready in the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1947, according to the report. An impressive number—had it been true. Plenty of mistaken information can be discerned. A quick calculation shows that of these 61 submarines no fewer than 31 for one reason or another cannot be considered to have been operative submarines of the Baltic Fleet. One was never completed, eight were lost during the war, two were built in Murmansk and never completed, as many as fifteen started their lives in the Baltic Fleet but were transferred to other Soviet fleets before and during the war. Finally, the five Finnish submarines, never handed over to the Soviet Union, were reported as part of its submarine fleet. Moreover, four submarines, designated as 'available' by Rohwer and Monakov, were not reported at all. In the case of four submarines, there is no information concerning their status after the war.

This was an inaccurate piece of intelligence, which probably gave the Naval Desk an exaggerated opinion of the potential adversary's submarine strength. To be fair, submarines are notoriously difficult objects for 'bean-counters' to

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98 Forsén & Forsén (1999), *Tysklands och Finlands hemliga ubåtssamarbete*, pp. 304–307. Kijanen (1986), *Finlands ubåtar i fred och krig*, pp. 197–200. All Finnish submarines, except *Vesikko*, were in 1953 sold as scrap to Belgium. *Vesikko* is now a museum submarine placed at the Sveaborg fortress in the entrance to Helsinki harbour.

handle. Not only is a submarine a small ship, at least in the 1940s, and therefore fairly easy to hide in harbours, but its very nature prevents it from being easily spotted on the sea surface—it is after all designed to submerge and hide in the water. No wonder, then, that the T-Office was not able to produce a more accurate list. As can be clearly seen, a lot of the information was out of date or simply incorrect, often apparently based on pre-war information. Since submarines at sea, like any naval ship out of port, must, or at least should, communicate more or less regularly with headquarters or other units, it is a fair assumption that the Sigint service, FRA, produced a far better estimate of the number of operational submarines.

New Constructions

A short report dated 2 September 1947, which summarizes the knowledge of the day of the Soviet shipbuilding programme, reports that the Baltic Fleet had under construction by the summer of 1947 one battleship, four cruisers, six to eight destroyers and approximately ten submarines.[99] Since the post-war construction of several surface ships is discussed in detail below, there is no reason to do it here. Of interest, however, is the information that work was progressing very slowly on the battleship and the cruisers. No progress at all could be discerned on some of them. The reason for this was thought to be lack of professional workers and construction material. Higher priority was, then, probably given to the building of destroyers and submarines, where the work went 'normally'. This line of reasoning will be looked at later in this work.

Battleships

The Second World War proved to be the swan song of the gigantic artillery ships that had dominated the minds of the large sea powers since the turn of the century. Despite the enormous amount of steel in the armoured hulls, they too easily fell victims to torpedoes, mines and air bombs. Aircraft carriers and submarines came out of the Second World War as the new main elements of sea power.

> So 47 per cent of the lost battleships, carriers and cruisers of all navies were victims of aircraft, 29 per cent of submarines, 15 per cent of torpedoes of surface ships, and only 8.5 per cent of gunfire. And as was clearly to be seen, anti-aircraft artillery was not able to defend a ship alone against air attacks.[100]

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99 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 27; report nr. 102, 2 September 1947. Source 'no + da'.
100 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 189.

It is, with this hindsight, interesting to note that the T-Office in May 1946 actually reported two Soviet battleships of 35,000 tons nearing their final stages at a shipyard in Leningrad. (Battleship construction was also, as we have just seen, more than a year later reported in the summary mentioned above.) From what the observer could see of the exterior, the ships were seen to be almost completed.[101] Less than a week later, in another report, doubts were expressed whether these hulls would ever be completed, and if so, it could not be excluded that they would end up as something else than battleships.[102]

However, the source must have been mistaken, no battleships as 'light' as 35,000 tons were laid down before the war descended upon the Soviet Union in 1941, and no battleships were built after the war. Actually, only four battleships were ordered and laid down before the war, and none of these were ever completed. The *projekt 23* battleships, as they were designated, displaced as much as 59,150 tons.[103]

Were there then any hulls of 35,000 tons at the Leningrad shipyards? Yes, but only one. In 1946 there was one battlecruiser of *projekt 69* still uncompleted in Leningrad; the *Kronshtadt* was laid down in November 1939, and survived the siege of the city without being destroyed. Some parts from the *Kronshtadt* were used for strengthening Leningrad's defences, and after the war there was some discussion about rebuilding the hull as an aircraft carrier. In the end the hull was dismantled.[104] So, whatever the observer saw, it could hardly have been two nearly completed battleships.

A heavily damaged battleship was observed in Kronshtadt's harbour in June 1946. It appeared to be blown up in two parts with the stern mainly intact. The 'temporary observer' could see no salvage work.[105] This was probably the old battleship *Petropavlovsk* (ex-*Marat*), built in 1914, which was sunk at Kronshtadt during a German air raid in September 1941.[106] Whether this was the 'older battleship' at Kronshtadt reported two months later, in August 1946, is unclear, but since there was no damage mentioned, it seems more plausible that it was the *Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya* (ex-*Gangut*) from 1914.[107] The *Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya* was also seen in Kronshtadt one year later, on 9 September 1947.[108]

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101 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 547, 13 May 1946. Source 'mk'.

102 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 559, 18 May 1946.

103 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 95, 120, 194, 229. Pavlov (1997), *Warships of the USSR and Russia 1945–1995*, p. 3.

104 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 96, 114, 121, 195, 199, 230.

105 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 16, 10 July 1946. Source 'mk'.

106 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 136, 170, 226.

107 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 87, 26 August 1946. Source 'dk'. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 170, 226.

108 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 137, 24 September 1947. Source 'mk'.

Cruisers

In the middle of May 1946, a *Kirov*-class cruiser was reportedly back in active service in the Baltic Fleet after repairs due to a mine explosion off Kronshtadt in the autumn of 1945.[109] It was shortly thereafter reported by a 'foreign observer' that, apart from the *Kirov* and *Maksim Gorkiy*, two additional cruisers of the same class had been launched and were intended for service in the Baltic Fleet.[110]

Of the mentioned class (in the Soviet Union called *projekt 26*) only one unit had been built for the Baltic Fleet, and that was the lead ship *Kirov*. Additionally, one cruiser of an improved type designated *projekt 26-bis* and named *Maksim Gorkiy* was in active service in the Baltic Sea.[111] It is maybe too much to expect that a temporary observer, probably an officer on a merchant ship, could distinguish between these two cruisers unless being able to read the names. Since the mine-damaged ship was identified only as belonging to the *Kirov*-class, it is not possible to be more specific than that one of the cruisers had been damaged in 1945. Of course, it cannot be excluded that the Naval Desk at Section II had information from other sources about which cruiser that actually hit the mine.

Regarding the other two cruisers reportedly launched, it can be said that there were no new *Kirov*-cruisers under way at that time. *Kirov* and *Maksim Gorkiy* had two sister ships in the Black Sea Fleet, both commissioned before the German attack in 1941, but none in the Baltic Fleet. Moreover, no new cruisers were laid down after the war until the construction of the numerous *Sverdlov*-class in the early 1950s.[112] The 'foreign observer' clearly made a slight mistake in his observations.

Maksim Gorkiy was later seen in Kronshtadt in the middle of August 1946 together with four large destroyers and four submarines.[113]

Some technical details of the cruisers were also reported. Both *Kirov* and *Maksim Gorkiy* had as their main artillery three triple-turrets with 18 centimetre guns.[114] This is also what the T-Office reported in June 1947. It was furthermore stated that the maximum firing range was 27,000 metres, and that

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109 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 547, 13 May 1946. Source 'mk'.

110 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 559, 18 May 1946.

111 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 50–51, 63–64, 83–84, 92, 98–99, 136, 170, 230.

112 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 50–51, 98–99, 136, 170, 230, 276.

113 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 87, 26 August 1946. Source 'dk'.

114 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 92, 99.

three salvoes per minute could be fired against a target. The gun laying of the three turrets was centrally controlled.[115]

Destroyers

In a report about two types of Soviet destroyers, the *Silny* and *Gromkiy*, at the end of March 1946, it was claimed that twelve units were completed and commissioned in the Baltic Fleet. Seven of them were of the *Silny* type, and five of the *Gromkiy* type, the *Silny* destroyer being an improvement of the *Gromkiy* type with, for instance, a completely covered bridge. Names of the *Silny* destroyers were known, but that was not the case regarding the five *Gromkiy* units. The T-Office blamed the uncertainty concerning their names on the fact that some ships had been assigned to the Northern Fleet. Some technical data on the *Gromkiy* destroyer was provided, and moreover, the type was rumoured to have a weak hull.[116] The number of twelve destroyers in service in the Baltic Fleet was repeated again in a report in May the same year.[117]

This report makes an interesting case for a comparative study. To start with, at the end of the war a total of ten ships of the two types were available in the Baltic Fleet, according to Rohwer and Monakov. Furthermore, eight of these were of the *Silny* type (Soviet designation was *projekt 7-u*), but only two were *Gromkiy* type units (*projekt 7*).[118] However, the numbers seven and five, reported by the T-Office, match the numbers available in the Baltic Fleet four years earlier, in June 1941.[119] Thus, it seems that the T-Office did not get the exact number of the two types of destroyers. But there was another destroyer in service at that time, the *Opytny* of *projekt 45*, which makes a total of eleven destroyers—fairly close to the reported number of twelve destroyers.[120]

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115 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 22; report nr. 447, 19 June 1947. Source 'No'.
116 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 7; report nr. 463, 27 March 1946.
117 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 559, 18 May 1946.
118 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 170.
119 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 136.
120 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 170.

The destroyer Tucha, apparently in good condition, in Helsinki, 29 June 1945. The photographer was Commander Ragnar Thorén. Tucha was reported by the T-Office as an operative unit, two years later, in June 1947. (Military Archives)

Regarding the ships' names, the T-Office reported the *Silny* type destroyers to carry the names *Strogiy, Strashny, Silny, Storozhevoy, Drozd, Stroyny* and *Svirepy*, whereas Rohwer and Monakov state the *Strogiy, Strashny, Silny, Storozhevoy, Vitse-Admiral Drozd, Stroyny, Svirepy* and *Slavny* to be available in the Baltic Fleet after the war. Apart from 'missing' one ship, the *Slavny*, and giving *Vitse-Admiral Drozd* an incomplete name, the T-Office managed to give correct information on that point.[121]

Few Soviet naval ships entered the port of Gdynia in Poland, but a destroyer leader (the T-Office used the word *torpedkryssare*, i.e. torpedo cruiser) of the *Leningrad*-class had visited the port during the six months preceding early March 1946.[122] Since only one unit of the type actually existed in the Baltic Fleet at that time, it must have been the *Leningrad* that had visited Gdynia—unless the type was incorrectly identified.[123]

A new '*torpedkryssare*' had been completed after the war. That was at least what was claimed in a report from the middle of May 1946.[124] This is doubtful,

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121 The types' original designations were *projekt 7* and *projekt 7-u*, and a total of 35 and 18 units, respectively, were built 1935–1942. The lead ships of the types were *Gnevny* and *Storozhevoy*, not *Gromkiy* and *Silny* as might be presumed by the T-report. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 170, 233–235.

122 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 7; report nr. 482, 3 April 1946. Source 'mk'.

123 The type was given the original designation *projekt 1*. One unit was built for the Baltic Fleet and two units for the Black Sea Fleet. Breyer, *Soviet Warship Development, volume 1: 1917–1937*, pp. 216–222. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 35–36, 51, 54, 92, 136–137, 170, 232.

124 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 559, 18 May 1946.

since all existing destroyer leaders were built before the war, and the Baltic Fleet had only two units: the above-mentioned *Leningrad* and the *Minsk*. There is of course a possibility that the T-Office meant the *Minsk*, but was incorrectly informed as to the year of its commission, which was 1939.[125]

The destroyer leaders surfaced again in a report in late 1947. Or rather, it was thought that two naval ships of about 3,000 tons observed in Swinoujscie in the end of November could have been *'torpedkryssare'*.[126] *Leningrad* and *Minsk* displaced slightly over 2,000 tons each, which is a noticeable difference from 3,000 tons, but it must be borne in mind that assessing the displacement of a ship from observation only, and maybe from some distance, can be a tricky activity.

A general observation of 1946 was the presence of a significant anti-aircraft capacity on board the modern Soviet destroyers.[127] By installing, or increasing, that capacity on board destroyers, certain lessons must have been learned during the war.

On 9 September 1947 three larger and two smaller destroyers (or torpedo boats, as it was written in the report) were observed in Kronshtadt's harbour. Pennant numbers[128] for the larger destroyers were *10*, *20* and *21*, whereas the smaller ones had numbers *215* and *218*.[129] Destroyers, like other surface combat ships of the Soviet Navy, always carried (and still carry) names, and had no fixed visible number designations (preceded by a letter-code) like minesweepers and other small ships. Pennant numbers were changed more or less regularly. Therefore, it is not even possible to guess at the identity of these destroyers from the T-reports.

In eastern Germany, in Warnemünde, two Soviet destroyers of unknown type were noticed in late September 1947.[130] Judging from the report, these were not ex-German ships, as may be expected, since the next sentence deals with other destroyers in Rostock; destroyers which actually were ex-German units. The source can therefore be assumed to have been knowledgeable enough to distinguish between Soviet and ex-German types.

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125 *Minsk* was of *projekt 38*, a development of *project 1* though identical in appearance. Breyer, *Soviet Warship Development, volume 1: 1917–1937*, pp. 216–222. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 51, 92, 136, 170, 232

126 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 32; report nr. 217, 3 December 1947. Source 'Wi'.

127 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 87, 26 August 1946. Source 'dk'.

128 Pennant number is the recognized term for the number that is painted on the bow of a surface combatant or on a submarine's sail.

129 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 137, 24 September 1947. Source 'mk'.

130 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 148, 1 October 1947. Source 'mk'.

Submarine Chasers

Approximately 180 vessels were transferred to the Soviet Navy from USA under the Lend-Lease Deal. Among these vessels were at least 31 submarine chasers of the *SC*-type.[131] The T-Office referred in a report from May 1946 to one ex-American submarine chaser with the original number *S.C.221* (but it should be *SC-221*). The report says that this particular ship carried the Soviet designation *BO-1*, was capable of carrying 14 depth charges, was equipped with radar and could make a speed of 15 knots.[132] Commander of the vessel was *kapitan-leytenant* Dreval.[133]

As far as the depth charges and the speed are concerned, the reported information was correct (but the maximum speed should rather be 18 knots). More confusing is the designation *BO-1*, since the ex-American submarine chasers, according to Rohwer & Monakov became *BO-301*, *BO-302* etc. in the Soviet Navy.[134] According to information from a website, specializing in the history of US Navy ships, it is probably safe to say that *SC-221* was not transferred to the Soviet Union; in fact, it was sold to a private person in USA as far back as 1921. There was probably one submarine chaser with the Soviet designation *BO-1*, but in that case it should be *SC-719*, handed over to the Soviet Navy in 1943.[135] Thus, the report concerning this particular issue can hardly be considered to be correct.

Submarines

In 1939 the Soviet Union had the largest submarine fleet in the world with 181 units. By June 1941, at the time of *Operation Barbarossa*, the number had increased to 212, 68 of these in the Baltic Sea.[136] After the war, it was assessed in May 1946 that the main effort in the Soviet Union's naval shipbuilding would be invested in an expansion of the submarine fleet, to no small degree profit-

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131 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 166–167.
132 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 548, 14 May 1946. Source 'dk'.
133 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 550, 15 May 1946.
134 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 166–167.
135 *SC*-vessels displaced 85 tons, had a length of 110 feet, and had wooden hulls. During the Second World War a total of 580 units were built, and 142 of them were transfered under the Lend-Lease deal to allies, among them the Soviet Union. Information received on 15 August 2002 from Joe Radigan, a manager at the website, says: '*SC-221*; built at Newcomb Lifeboat Co., Hampton, Virginia; commissioned 13 March 1918; sold 24 June 1921 to Joseph G. Hitner, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Regarding the *SC-719/BO-1* the following information was received from Mr Radigan: *SC-719*; built at Fisher Boat Works, Detroit, Michigan; keel laid 22 September 1942; launched 3 April 1943; commissioned 16 July 1943; transferred to Russia 14 August 1943'. E-mail from Joe Radigan to author, 15 August 2002. http://www.navsource.org/archives/12/15idx.htm.
136 Ulfving (2002), *Sjökriget Sverige – Sovjetunionen. Det inofficiella kriget i Östersjön mellan Sovjetunionens ubåtsvapen och Sveriges flotta sommaren och hösten 1942*, p. 236.

ing on studies of various German submarine types. A possible future area of operation for the Soviet submarines could very well be the Atlantic, since it was pointed out that the White Sea Canal was expected to be usable in the summer of 1946, thus facilitating transfers of submarines to the Northern Fleet.[137]

One of the larger-sized classes of Soviet submarines in the middle 1940s was the so-called *K*-class (or *series XIV*). When the Second World War started in 1939 a total of twelve *K*-class submarines were under construction for the Soviet Navy, and in the end five of them were commissioned in the Baltic Fleet.[138]

A report from the middle of May 1946 provides us with some technical data of the *K*-class submarines.[139] There are several discrepancies in the information, which leads to the conclusion that the T-Office—or rather its source—must have got a few things mixed up. If we look in more detail at some of the information, the report says that the displacement was 1,120 tons. In fact, a *K*-class submarine displaced 1,500 tons, whereas 1,120 tons fits in nicely on a *series XIII*-submarine. The same goes for the length of the hull. The *K*-class measured 97.6 meters, and not 86 meters as is written in the report; once again, the number coincides much better with the *series XIII* (85.3 meters). The engine power was reported as 4,200 hp, which as far as a single engine goes is correct; there were actually two main engines of 4,200 hp each in a *K*-submarine. Armament consisted of, except the guns for surface use, ten torpedo tubes, which was the correct number of the *K*-class. The crew was reported to consist of 45 men, and that number does not fit in at all on any of the larger submarine classes; they had crews from 53 up to 65 men. To find a submarine with a crew of 45, one must look at the medium-sized submarines and the *S*-class (*series IX* and *IXbis*).[140]

It is obvious that the report was not correct in all details. It is perhaps more correct to say, with the hindsight possible today, that the report was incorrect. This highlights a problem that the Swedish intelligence community probably had to cope with in those days as best as they could; the lack of information

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137 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 559, 18 May 1946.

138 These were the *K-51*, *K-52*, *K-53*, *K-55* and *K-56*. Two other units of the class were intended for service in the Baltic Fleet: however, *K-3* was transfered from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet in 1941, and *K-54* was damaged beyond repair at the shipyard in Leningrad and was never commissioned. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 171, 250.

139 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 560, 18 May 1946

140 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 93–94. Concerning the artillery, it was written in the report that the *K*-class had two 10,5 cm guns and two 37 mm guns. Other, modern information suggests that the calibers were 10 cm and 45 mm respectively, so in that case the T-Office did not venture too far from the facts. Thorén (1992), *Ryska ubåts-kriget i Östersjön 1941–1945*, p. 29.

was so great in some areas, that there was little or no chance to crosscheck the intelligence coming in. (Admittedly, that is not a problem confined only to intelligence practitioners half a century ago; it is an eternal problem even if the areas of scant knowledge change over time.) If the officers of the Naval Desk did not have any other information on *K*-class submarines, they probably accepted the T-Office's information and thus got a few things wrong.

Four submarines of unknown type had been observed in Kronstadt in early September 1947. The observer could obviously see numbers on only two of them: nr. 79 and nr. 202.[141] The first one was probably *M-79* (*series VI-bis*), and the second one can at first glance have been the *M-202 Rybnik Donbassa* (*series XV*). However, *M-202* was in 1944 transferred to the Black Sea Fleet.[142] Probably, the number 202 was misread; there were other submarines with similar numbers in the Baltic Fleet, e.g. *M-205* and *M-206*.

The Soviet submarines K-51, K-53 and K-56 in Helsinki alongside the submarine depot ship Irtysh. Photo by Commander Ragnar Thorén, 29 June 1945. (Military Archives)

Motor Torpedo Boats

A small number of Soviet motor torpedo boats was at the end of March 1946 based in Sassnitz in the Soviet zone of Germany. The port was also reported to

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141 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 137, 24 September 1947. Source 'mk'.
142 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 247, 254.

be in a fairly undamaged condition, and a Soviet commander with staff, responsible for the island of Rügen, was based there.[143]

Minesweepers

Service on minesweepers does generally not count for the more 'glorious' work in a fighting navy. But there are few weapons that are so 'cost-effective' as mines. A small number of mines in the right place can effectively block movements in and out of a port for a period of time. Mine clearing is a time-consuming job. In fact, the mere suspicion that waters have been mined can cause great reluctance on behalf of the sailors to steer their vessels in that direction. An effective mine-clearing force is therefore of great importance to a navy's ability to operate freely.

About 30 minesweepers (and also some minor patrol ships) were based in Ventspils at the end of July 1946. It was thought that some of these were former German vessels.[144] Further north, in Tallinn, approximately ten minesweepers had been noted.[145] From Swinoujscie, an unspecified number of Soviet minesweepers were reported in late August 1946.[146] Along the German coast Soviet minesweepers had been observed in Rostock and Warnemünde, and also in Szczecin and Swinoujscie in August 1946.[147]

In early January 1947 twelve small Soviet minesweepers were based in the Polish naval base Oksywie in the Gdynia area. The nascent post-war Polish Navy had in Oksywie gathered some 30 ships of various origins; Polish, German and Soviet.[148] Eight months later, in September, some minesweepers (and also a few patrol boats) were observed to be normally lying in the harbour of Wismar in the Soviet zone of Germany.[149] In the same month the presence of twenty minesweepers of various types was reported from Kronshtadt.[150] Also in September, and from the Soviet zone of Germany, came a report of about ten Soviet minesweepers in the harbour of Warnemünde.[151]

In Swinoujscie in early November 1947, twenty-five minesweepers of various types had been seen. One of them was designated *T-358*, seven others *MKK* and fifteen were marked *KT*.[152] The correctness of this report is doubtful, since

143 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 7; report nr. 469, 29 March 1946.

144 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 27, 17 July 1946. Source 'mk'.

145 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 30, 19 July 1946. Source 'ak'.

146 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 100, 30 August 1946. Source 'mk'.

147 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 76, 21 August 1946. Source 'mk'.

148 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 14; report nr. 298, 7 January 1947. Source 'mk'.

149 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 126, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

150 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 137, 24 September 1947. Source 'mk'.

151 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 148, 1 October 1947. Source 'mk'.

152 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 31; report nr. 189, 6 November 1947. Source 'mk'.

no information on *T-358* or vessels marked *MKK* or *KT* can be found. There were many minesweepers in the Soviet Navy carrying the letter '*T*' plus three digits, but no *T-358*, at least according to Rohwer and Monakov. The Russian word for minesweeper is *tralshchik*, hence the letter '*T*'. The letters '*M*' and '*K*' probably stand for small (*maly*) and boat or ship (*kater* or *korabl*), whereas the second '*K*' in *MKK* is harder to interpret.

Miscellaneous Types of Ships

Apart from the more defined types of ships that we have just treated, the T-Office also produced intelligence information on a multitude of other types.

The first report of a unit belonging to the group 'miscellaneous ships' found in the T-Office's archive was reported in the first days of February 1946; it was a submarine salvage ship of unspecified type that was observed in Liepaja's 'southern harbour'.[153]

Small patrol boats are clearly best dealt with here. The T-Office reported them as well, though they hardly constituted a threat to Sweden. But patrol boats guarded harbours and coastlines, and having the agent-ferrying activities in mind information on numbers and whereabouts of patrol boats do not seem totally irrelevant.

A few small Soviet patrol boats were based in Gdynia in the middle of February 1946,[154] whereas in May 1946 two fast patrol boats were observed in Haapsalu and also a few, evidently slow-going patrol boats lying on the slips there.[155] Some minor patrol boats were observed in August 1946 in Wismar in the Soviet-occupied zone in Germany.[156] A few unarmed, grey-painted patrol boats had been seen in Kolobrzeg in Poland in December 1946. They lacked visible numbers or names, and were seldom seen at sea.[157] Three to four Soviet patrol boats were based in Warnemünde in September 1947.[158] An unspecified number of small patrol boats were seen in Stralsund in October 1947.[159]

A large 6,000-ton, grey-painted ship lay in Swinoujscie on 1 November 1947. It was assessed to be either a transport ship or a hospital ship. No armament was discernible, though a range finder was installed on the ship.[160]

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153 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 354, 5 February 1946.

154 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 379, 21 February 1946. Source 'mk'.

155 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 4; report nr. 554, 16 May 1946.

156 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 76, 21 August 1946. Source 'mk'.

157 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 283, 16 December 1946.

158 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 126, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

159 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 30; report nr. 181, 27 October 1947. Stralsund was once the main port of Swedish Pomerania. Inhabitants in the area are still sometimes called *Südschwedische*.

160 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 31; report nr. 189, 6 November 1947. Source 'mk'.

Radar Equipment

One of the technical inventions made before the Second World War that really proved its worth during six years of battle around the world was the radar. Suddenly there was a possibility to 'look' beyond the visual range, even in darkness and in all kinds of weather. The value of this in battle cannot be overestimated. Radar was used at sea for navigation, air defence, surface surveillance and artillery guidance. Today, modern and versatile radar equipment is ubiquitous in all armed forces. (And like so many other inventions originally made for the military, the radar has been put to extremely good use in the civilian world.)

Though Germany was not as far behind as is sometimes presumed (in some cases she was leading the development),[161] the Allies got the upper hand in radar development during the war, and radar sets were also handed over to the Soviet Union. A well-armed and modern Soviet artillery ship could in itself constitute a respectable threat to the Swedish Navy, but if it was also equipped with various radar installations, its fighting value increased significantly. Radar, or 'echo radio' (*ekoradio*) as it was then called in Sweden, was hardly a thing that could be ignored when assessing the strength of the Soviet Navy. Though information about Soviet radar was not, as far as we can see from Kull's letters, explicitly declared as an intelligence requirement, it would be hard to motivate the omission of such a force multiplier in this work.

Early radars worked on lower frequencies and longer wavelengths than modern ones. For instance, Germany's *Würzburg* anti-aircraft radar worked on the (for the early 1940s) high frequency band slightly above 500 MHz (or on a wavelength below 60 centimetres).[162] In May 1946 a summary of contemporary radar systems on Soviet naval ships were issued; it was not very detailed but contained at least some basic data. In those days it was more common to talk about wavelengths rather than frequencies, and this is also reflected in the T-reports.

It was reported that Soviet battleships and cruisers were equipped with radar systems working on a wavelength of 50 centimetres that were used for artillery guidance up to a distance of 40 kilometres. The same type of ships, and also

161 For example, the German *Würzburg* radar was in 1938 the first radar system capable of assisting the anti-aircraft gunners. Dewar (1989), *The Art of Deception in Warfare*, p. 150. See also Dahllöf (2001), *Teknikkriget som förändrade världen*, pp. 16, 18 and Carroll (1966), *Secrets of Electronic Espionage*, pp. 91–92.

162 Dewar (1989), *The Art of Deception in Warfare*, p. 150. The existence of the *Würzburg* radar was confirmed by the British through a nice piece of scientific intelligence work, which resulted in a search for transmissions with wavelengths about 50 centimetres, followed by photographic evidence and the subsequent capture of a radar set. Jones (1998), *Most Secret War*, pp.193–194, 223–249.

the Soviet destroyers, had two types of air defence radars, one for distances up to 4.5 kilometres and one designed for a further 2 kilometres. Moreover, an improved air defence radar for a maximum range of 25 kilometres was claimed to exist.[163]

Surface surveillance radars on the capital ships worked on the impressive wavelength of 7 metres. Such radars reportedly had a range of 130 kilometres. For even longer distances, 160 kilometres, there existed a version with a wavelength of 'only' 3.5 metres. Smaller ships, like destroyers, submarines and some other minor vessels had surveillance radars with 1.5 metres wavelength for ranges up to 50 kilometres. The battleship *Arkhangelsk*, based in the Northern Fleet, had a similar, though improved model.[164]

Radars with high frequencies (for those days) and wavelengths in the range of 10 centimetres existed, the T-Office claimed, and they were probably meant for cruisers and destroyers. Maximum ranges were given as 25 kilometres for cruiser radars, and 15 kilometres for the radars intended for destroyers.[165]

Some information about the Soviet capacity of electronic countermeasures had also been obtained. Emitters for radar jamming had been installed on battleships and cruisers. These emitters worked on various wavelengths up to 50 centimetres. Some gadgets for electronic identification purposes—today one would call such things transponders—existed and worked on a wavelength of 1.5 metres.[166]

At the end of the report, it was pertinently pointed out that it was not known if radars of the various types were installed on all battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines etc. Had there been information available on exactly which ships were equipped with radar, the value of the report would have been significantly greater.[167]

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163 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 532, 3 May 1946. Source 'M'.

164 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 532, 3 May 1946. Source 'M'. *Arkhangelsk* was an ex-British battleship, the *HMS Royal Sovereign* of the *R*-class, and was lent to the Nothern Fleet from 1944 to 1949 in exchange for the Soviet part of the Italian fleet. *Arkhangelsk* was returned to Great Britain in 1949 and soon thereafter scrapped. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 165, 184, 188.

165 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 532, 3 May 1946. Source 'M'.

166 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 532, 3 May 1946. Source 'M'.

167 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 532, 3 May 1946. Source 'M'. Frequency in Herz is defined as the speed of light in metres per second divided with the wavelength in metres. The reported wavelengths then result in frequencies around 42.8 MHz (wavelength 7 metres), 85.7 MHz (wavelength 3.5 metres), 200 MHz (wavelength 1.5 metres), 600 MHz (wavelength 0.5 metres) and 3.0 GHz (wavelength 0.10 metres). As a comparison broadcasting radio stations usually transmit on frequencies between 88 and 108 MHz. Kristiansen (1978), *Radarteknik*, pp. 11–13.

In addition to radar equipment of British and American origin, German radars had appeared on Soviet ships in August 1946.[168] Former German radar stations along the coast from the island of Rügen to Ustka were in November 1946 reported to be put back in working conditions with the assistance of German technicians.[169]

No radar manufacture in the Soviet Union had started by January 1947, according to a report dealing partly with radar presence in the Soviet forces. However, German radar sets of every type existent at the time of the surrender were in Soviet hands. Moreover, they had some older American radar types and also British radars of the types *281*, *286* and *291*.[170]

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Despite the number of ships in its organization, the efficiency of the Soviet armadas may not have been so impressive. It was assessed that the Soviet Navy faced huge problems after the war with war-damaged shipyards, difficulties in recruiting suitable personnel to man its ships and bases, and a general low quality of the personnel.

A fairly correct list of operative surface combatants was provided by the T-Office, whereas an exaggeration of the size of the submarine fleet can be established in a comparison with modern research. In fact, it was quite an exaggeration; the number of submarines was reported to be twice as high as it really was. Both battleships of the Baltic Fleet were correctly reported, as was also the destroyer fleet, albeit with a few pieces of information off the mark. The two *Kirov*-class cruisers reported to be under construction were, however, not *Kirov* cruisers since none were built after the war. Some smaller-sized destroyers were reported, but the identities could not be established since no names but only pennant numbers were included in the reporting. The odd one out was an American creation, a submarine chaser of the *SC*-type. USA provided a lot of such small ships to the Soviet Union during the Second World War, so the existence of one in the Baltic Fleet was no sensation. What the T-Office apparently got wrong was the actual number of that particular unit. A report with some technical data on *K*-class submarines seems to have been more of a mix of data emanating from other submarine classes. Finally, various and fragmentary intelligence information was provided on motor torpedo boats, minesweepers, patrol boats and also Soviet radar equipment.

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168 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 87, 26 August 1946. Source 'dk'.
169 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 10; report nr. 235, 14 November 1946. Source 'mk + dak'.
170 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 325, 29 January 1947. Source 'dak'.

After having investigated two years' reporting on the Soviet naval ships in the Baltic Sea, there is no doubt that a lot of details for the 'bean-counters' was issued by the secret Humint organization. Reports covered most subjects from shipyards and battleships to patrol boats and radar equipment. The Naval Desk can safely be assumed to have been provided with collateral information on this subject from above all attachés and FRA, so it would be surprising if there were not many opportunities to cross-check the intelligence information from the T-Office with other sources. In the end, and considering the circumstances, the cumulative knowledge of the Baltic Fleet cannot have been too bad.

What did Section II think of the reports it received on this subjects from the T-Office? What kind of intelligence information was considered to be of interest to a wider circle of readers, and was thus inserted in the daily communiqués? To start with, large ships have always fascinated navy people, and any information of that kind seems to have caught the attention of the officers compiling the daily communiqués. The two 35,000 ton battleships allegedly under construction in Leningrad, and also the later doubts whether they would ever be completed, can be found in two daily communiqués.[171] Old *Petropavlovsk*, half-sunk in Kronshtadt, was included in another one.[172]

Another daily communiqué contained the news of two new *Kirov*-class cruisers intended for the Baltic Fleet.[173] The whereabouts of the *Kirov*-class cruiser *Maksim Gorkiy* and some other surface combatants—in this case they were in Kronshtadt—also merited a few lines in a daily communiqué.[174]

If we move down one size and focus on destroyers, importance was apparently attached to the twelve destroyers of the *Silny* and the *Gromkiy* types in service in the Soviet Baltic Fleet; this information was inserted in two daily communiqués.[175] In the same summaries we also find references to the information claiming that few Soviet naval units entered Gdynia in the spring of 1946, and also to the new destroyer leader that the T-Office reported was completed after the war.

Such minor units as minesweepers and patrol boats in Rostock, Warnemünde, Szczecin and Swinoujscie was included.[176] Maybe the editors had few other naval items to choose from when they did their compiling for this particular daily communiqué? Or was it the ships' location in southern Baltic ports that was interesting? It seems a bit odd to find information on small and not very threatening ships in a daily communiqué.

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171 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 52, 20 May 1946; DK 56, 3 June 1946.
172 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 68, 19 July 1946.
173 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 56, 3 June 1946.
174 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 75, 2 September 1946
175 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 39, 9 April 1946; DK 56, 3 June 1946.
176 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 75, 2 September 1946

The details of radars installed on Soviet warships was naturally of interest, and subsequently was inserted in the periodic summary from Section II.[177] German radar sets appearing on ships also merited a notice in a daily communiqé; earlier it was known that only British and American radar sets were installed on Soviet ships.[178]

Clearly, a lot of the intelligence information received from the T-Office on this subject was considered interesting by Section II, and also good enough to be distributed further out in the military intelligence circles.

Soviet Naval Ships and the Intelligence Cycle

The somewhat loosely defined wish to receive intelligence reports on the subject Soviet Sea Power and the Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea, was first issued on the 18 April 1946. Judging from the remarks in the letter to the attachés, the need for such information was not new. The Naval Desk had collected information on the subject for some time. This intelligence requirement can be assumed to have originated once the Soviet Navy was again cruising in the Baltic Sea, which would probably mean during the first months of 1945, or at least after the defeat of Germany.

Commander Kull wrote that the knowledge of Soviet landing vessels was not satisfactory. In any case, preferrably with more information about landing vessels, a list of the Soviet Navy would be compiled soon, it was claimed. It is plausible that the product Kull hinted at was the three bound volumes named *The Russian Baltic Sea Fleet 1946* (*Ryska Östersjöflottan 1946*), compiled by Commander Ragnar Thorén and released by the Navy Staff. It contains photos and drawings of all known Soviet vessels in the Baltic Sea. Many photos were taken from land or from ships, which indicates that the T-Office provided parts of the information.[179] The wish for more information on landing vessels has not been included in this subject for reasons already pointed out; it will be discussed later.

At the time of the next letter to the attachés, dated 13 November the same year, it was stated that this compiled list mentioned in the first letter was due to be released, and hence the work was over and done with.

When the third letter was issued on 5 March 1947 this subject was not on the wish list, but it surfaced again in the last letter, dated 10 September 1947. The reason for the reappearance of the subject can only be guessed at, but it

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177 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 48, 8 May 1946
178 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 75, 2 September 1946
179 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 1–2.

seems plausible that it was based on a need to update the 'naval order of bat-
tle'—new ships had been put into service, and others had been withdrawn from
active service or scrapped.

The intelligence requirements were not specified in detail in any of the let-
ters, which facilitates the investigation of whether the T-Office adhered to the
requirements over time.

All the available dates are entered into table 5 below. The design is self-
explanatory, but it is perhaps wise to clarify that the shaded boxes in the intel-
ligence requirement columns signify the periods during which the particular
requirement was in force (for the sake of simplicity, let us call them requirement
periods).

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	7, 29, 30
	February	5, 21		February	
	March	27, 29	5	March	
18	April	3		April	
	May	3, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18		May	
	June			June	19, 20
	July	10		July	
	August	26, 30		August	
	September		10	September	2, 19, 24
	October			October	1, 27
13	November	14		November	6
	December	16		December	3

*Table 5. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on the subject
Soviet Sea Power and Soviet Navy in the Baltic Sea.*

First of all, it is once again clear that the T-Office did indeed produce relevant
reports during the periods of expressed interest for this subject, and also outside
them. It should come as no surprise to find that the T-Office reported on the
Soviet Navy in early 1946, remembering the discussion above; the Naval Desk
could hardly neglect an expanding navy once it came out of the Gulf of Finland.
The T-Office would probably have done the same thing without a specific intel-
ligence requirement; the target was simply so self-evident. Without knowing if
a requirement was expressed or issued in, for instance, late 1945, it is not pos-
sible to say if the T-Office was actually ahead of the user in early 1946.

It is also clear that more reports can be found inside than outside the require-
ment periods: eighteen and ten respectively. A marked increase in the number of
reports is discernible shortly after the first and fourth requirement letters were

sent out. It is tempting to assume that this is a sign of reaction on the T-Office's part. It could very well be so, but that would rather imply a heap of intelligence lying on the desk waiting for a suitable requirement to appear from Section II; time would otherwise probably not allow for the sources to collect the required information so quickly. But the T-Office hardly worked in the same way as a tabloid paper having scandal stories on the shelf, waiting for the right moment to publish them. Other factors may have had an impact on the production of T-reports; for example access to sources. The absence of reporting during the period February to May 1947 is striking in the table. This can indicate that the T-Office was not able to contact sources during that period—or that sources could not reach the targets. The hiatus can also have had a natural explanation. Since the winter of 1946–1947 was very severe, and the Baltic Sea froze solid for months, it was more or less impossible for shipping to move on the sea. Then the normal sources of the T-Office could of course not reach ports and areas where the Soviet Navy ruled. One Swedish steamer, *S/S Manfred*, spent 64 days stuck in the ice, west of the German island of Fehmarn; so severe were the ice conditions that winter.[180]

* * *

The conclusion must be that no direct connection between the four letters and the T-reports can be discerned in this case, though it cannot be completely ruled out. It was possibly a coincidence that so many relevant reports were issued in May 1946. Nonetheless, the requirement may have reached the sources during the period April-November 1946, and this is maybe the reason for the continued flow of reporting after the requirement was cancelled in the second letter—one must take into account a certain amount of inertia in the process, since Humint collection can be a slow-moving business. This inertia can thus be the reason for the apparently quick response to the resurfaced requirement in the fourth letter. Reporting on the subject continued throughout the last months of 1947.

Even if it is not possible for us to say that the T-Office's collection quickly adjusted to the requirement letters, it is obvious that Section II received an increased flow of relevant information after issuing the letters. It also received reports outside the requirement periods. The T-Office was at least not out of phase with the user on this subject.

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180 Pousette (2002), *Dansk-svensk kamp mot isen 1947*, pp. 12–14.

8.2 Ports in the Baltic States

Importance of Ports

In modern war, where logistics play an increasingly important part in warfare, a military force needs an area from where to stage an attack. Older armies could to some extent live off the land they passed through. Armed forces of the 20th century became more and more dependant on other sorts of equipment and materiel than just bullets and powder (but modern weapons also meant that greater quantities of ammunition were needed). Logistic bases, depots, stores, workshops and maintenance installations are necessary to provide a military force with whatever it needs for operations. Such arrangements must not be too far away from the operation area, though not too close either; successful enemy attacks in the rear can severely disrupt the ability to carry on with the warfare.

A perception easily gained today, after the Gulf War, the operations in Bosnia, the Kosovo War and recently the Afghan War, is that air bases and carriers are today's high-tech hubs of warfare, sending out streams of aircraft to pound the adversary. But there is one crucial limit on air warfare; an aircraft can, once it is airborne, stay in the air for a limited number of hours, and then it has to land for refuelling and rearming before it can take off again for another mission. Ships, on the other hand, have much better endurance, and can stay at sea for weeks or months. Once a ship goes out to sea it can do without a port for as long as it has fuel for the engines, food and water for the crew and ammunition for the weapons. However, sooner or later it must return to port to reload supplies just like an aircraft must return to the base. So, despite today's emphasis on airbases, let us not forget the age-old importance of ports. If an invasion over the sea is to take place, ports are vital installations for loading equipment and troops on all the various ships that make up an invasion force.

As a result of Germany's collapse the Soviet Union suddenly had access to the Baltic Sea coast from eastern Germany to the Gulf of Finland—in 1939 only a narrow strip in the Leningrad area reached the Baltic Sea. Soviet Union was now the dominant power in the Baltic Sea area, and a strategic study made in the summer of 1945 by the Swedish Supreme Commander pointed out that war with the Soviet Union was the most probable and also most dangerous alternative of the war cases considered.

Accordingly, higher commanders of the Swedish armed forces received orders during the latter half of 1945 to prepare new operational war plans for a war in which the Soviet Union invaded Sweden. The older plans were made for a war with Germany; now clearly obsolete after Germany's surrender. The Supreme Commander painted a very gloomy picture of the new threat. Soviet Union's armed forces in the Baltic Sea area had an overwhelming superiority,

and it was assessed that large ground forces were readily available for an inva-
sion attack on Sweden, though the capacity to carry out offensive operations
were considered initially somewhat limited due to the relative lack of transport
ships.[181]

It is not surprising, then, that Section II had an interest in keeping its
knowledge of the ports 'on the other side' up to date, an interest expressed by
the Naval Desk. Should an invasion attempt be carried out, the troops had to
board ships in those ports and naval bases. It was therefore naturally of interest
to find out in what condition the various ports were after the war, and also to
what extent destroyed quays, blown-up cranes and bombed shipyards had been
repaired. Some ports had been mined and blocked with scuttled ships by the
retreating Germans. Had they yet been cleared by the Soviets? The better the
shape of the port, the greater its potential use for an invasion force.

Due to the smooth, sandy coast of the Baltic states there are relatively few
ports with the capacity to handle a number of larger ships. Those that exist have
always been valuable for trade as long as boats and ships have plied the Baltic
waters. Many wars have been fought over their possession. Sweden, among
other kingdoms, was in the game up to the early 18th century. Now, from several
of the once Swedish-owned ports a hostile Soviet force could in the worst case
embark on an invasion of Sweden.

As we have seen, Commander Allan Kull first wrote of this intelligence
requirement in his letter dated 18 April 1946. The Naval Desk had collected
information during the winter, so the interest was clearly not something that
had surfaced recently. Actually, a trace of an earlier expressed interest in the
subject can be found in a letter to Naval Attaché Sjöberg-Silfverling in Helsinki,
written in early October 1945. Sjöberg-Silfverling is urged to approach the
Finnish authorities and, in a most careful way, try to find out the conditions in
the port of Liepaja and also some other information. Colonel Kempff did not
hide the fact that it would be hard for the naval attaché to reach any result.

> It is most probable that even carefully and cunningly placed bait will not
> result in a bite. But I have not wanted to omit to inform you that these
> questions are of a certain interest to us.[182]

Nevertheless, in 1946 the Naval Desk felt it had received enough information
to make a summary of the conditions in the ports of the Baltic States. What was
still unclear was what had happened to German floating docks.

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181 Wallerfelt (1999), *Si vis pacem—para bellum. Svensk säkerhetspolitik och krigsplanering 1945–
1975*, pp. 38–48, 52–53, 62–63.
182 'Det är högst sannolikt att även försiktigt och listigt utlagt bete i dessa frågor inte kan ge något
napp. Men jag har inte velat underlåta att meddela Dig, att dessa spörsmål äro av ett visst
intresse för oss.' KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:6, vol 1; personal letter from Colonel Kempff to
naval attaché in Helsinki, Commander Sjöberg-Silfverling, 4 October 1945.

In November that year, in the second letter to the naval attachés, the subject was mentioned but then noted as cancelled. The available information was not sufficient to make a 'comprehensive study'. Obviously, the aim had been set higher during the seven months since the first letter: from a mere summary to a comprehensive study. Though some valuable information had been received, it was not considered enough.

Almost a year later, in September 1947, the subject was taken up again in the fourth letter of intelligence requirements; the third letter in March 1947 did not mention Baltic ports at all. It was not stated why the interest resurfaced, but it may have been due to the rising tensions between the former allied powers.

The T-Office was able to report on the conditions in seven of the ports along the Baltic coast: Tallinn, Riga, Ventspils, Liepaja, Klaipeda, Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. An observant reader may here come up with an objection, namely that Kaliningrad and Baltiysk did not belong to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania—they were part of German East Prussia—and the stated intelligence requirement was for information about ports in the Baltic states. True, but there is one good reason to include the East Prussian ports in the investigation of this subject. They are situated at a fairly equal distance from the Swedish coast as, for example, Klaipeda not so far away to the north. Were Kaliningrad and Baltiysk a lesser threat as staging ports of an invasion force just because they happened to be situated not in Lithuania, but close to her? Probably not. Moreover, the Kaliningrad area was incorporated in the Soviet Union, just like the three Baltic states. (Unlike them it remains today a part of the Russian Federation). Finally, the word 'Baltic' is in a historical context particularly used to designate the areas ruled by the Teutonic order before 1560: Estonia, Livonia, Courland and Prussia.[183]

By looking at the relevant intelligence reported by the T-Office, we will hopefully see to what degree it was able to respond to this particular requirement and also the timeliness of the reporting. It is logical to do this port by port, from north to south.

Conditions in the Ports in the Intelligence Reports

Tallin (Reval)

By the late January and early February 1946 repairs had put the harbour of the old Hanseatic city of Tallinn back in working condition. Most ships sunk in the harbour had been removed, and the quays had been repaired. Some smaller

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183 Gerner & Karlsson (2002), *Nordens Medelhav. Östersjöområdet som historia, myt och projekt*, pp. 26–27.

cranes could now be used to unload ships arriving from Germany with industrial goods.[184]

To what degree the quays were actually repaired was not specified. Next report dealing with Tallinn, issued on 19th of July the same year, in which it was claimed that 'many of the quays were fully usable' ('*ett flertal kajer äro fullt brukbara*'), does not provide any information as to whether repairs had been done since February. Perhaps the quays were in good conditions already in February, and no further work on them had been considered necessary? The reports do not answer that question. Harbour work was carried out in three-shift by German prisoners-of-war; if it was repair work or cargo handling was not specified. A considerable amount of goods had been imported to Tallin during the spring and the early summer, mainly machinery from Germany and sugar from Pomerania. A former German naval air station west of the main harbour was now used by a Soviet air unit equipped with reconnaissance planes and a few larger seaplanes.[185]

This Tallin report from July 1946 was the last one to deal with the conditions in the port for over a year. In September 1947 we come across the next piece of information on this subject. It was claimed that the port could handle ships and cargo, but was still heavily damaged by the war. One pier was to a large degree demolished, and the rail track on it could only to some extent be used to transport goods. The Nr. 1 dock was the least damaged of the three (or more) docks in the harbour. Additionally, most of the warehouses were destroyed or damaged. There were, however, no problems with the water depths; large ships could enter the harbour. It was mentioned that the battleship *Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya* had once been moored in dock nr. 3.[186] Battleships were large things, and if such a gigantic dinosaur could enter Tallinn port, the water depth would hardly cause any problems for other ships.

Riga

Reconstruction work in the port of Riga had by late June 1946 reached a fairly advanced stage, where quay length was available for two ships in the coal harbour and for six ships in the 'export harbour'. Poland, Holland and Belgium were countries mentioned in the report with which shipping was upheld.[187]

Like Tallinn, Latvia's capital and its port's conditions were not mentioned again until September next year. No larger changes had taken place during that

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184 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 375, 20 February 1946. Source 'mk'.

185 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 30, 19 July 1946. Source 'ak'.

186 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

187 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 27, 17 July 1946. Source 'mk'.

time, and only minor repairs had been done. The port was nevertheless in work-
ing condition, though the existing cranes were few and in bad condition.[188]

Ventspils (Windau)

In early 1946, according to information from a 'temporary observer', the port
was undamaged and the quays were in good condition. No new defensive instal-
lations had been observed, and there were no signs of any military activity apart
from a number of Soviet soldiers guarding German prisoners-of-war working in
the harbour. Large crates, presumably containing machine parts from Germany,
were lying in abundance on the quays and on a nearby field.[189]

The claim that there was no damage may not have been entirely correct,
because in late June the same year ongoing repair work was reported; after all,
the port could hardly have been so lucky as to avoid some damage in the war.
Quays were then said to have been repaired to the extent that three medium-
sized ships could be loaded and unloaded at the same time. Three cranes had
been erected as well.[190]

Over a year later, in September 1947, when the next report on Ventspils was
issued, the harbour was claimed to be in a fully working condition, and only
minor war damages remained to be repaired.[191]

Liepaja (Libau)

In the major port on the Latvian coast, also serving as a naval base, civilian ship-
ping was assessed to have decreased in volume by early February 1946, though
large quantities of machines, iron, steel and sugar still entered Liepaja. In bad
shape already during the Latvian independence before the war, the naval base in
Liepaja had since then probably not been brought up to standard by either the
Germans or the Soviet regime.[192] Judging from what the T-office could report,
it seems that cargo ships could be handled without any great difficulties.

Information on the conditions in Liepaja was absent in reports for over
one and a half years. Here we see the conspicuous time gap already noted for
the ports further north along the coast. Liepaja was, when finally reported in
September 1947, in the same fully working state as its neighbour Ventspils.[193]
Whether any significant repairs had been made during that one and a half years

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188 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.
189 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 353, 5 February 1946.
190 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 27, 17 July 1946. Source 'mk'.
191 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.
192 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 368, 15 February 1946. Source 'mk'.
193 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

A photo of Liepaja harbour taken by a Swedish reconnaissance aircraft, 5 June 1946. A number of ships have been identified by the photo interpreter: The cruiser Admiral Makarov (ex-German Nürnberg), the ex-German radio-controlled target ship Hessen with its controlling vessel Blitz, the ex-German destroyers Z 15, Z 33, T 12, T 17 and T 33, the training ship Smolny, three destroyers of the Silny type, three submarines of the S-class, some ex-German submarines, a minesweeper of the Poluchin type and some floating docks and dry docks. The aircraft probably violated Soviet airspace to be able to take this photo. (Military Archives)

is not clear. This is so much harder to assess by today's researcher since any detailed information on the port was not provided in the report from February 1946.

Klaipeda (Memel)

Klaipeda, Lithuania's only sizeable port, was in the middle of March 1946 in a fairly good and usable condition. There existed, however, some obstacles for normal activities caused by the large quantities of industrial equipment pilfered from Germany and stored on the quays.[194] Since no repair works of any kind in Liepaja port had been initiated, as far as the T-Office knew and as we have just seen, this led in April to a conclusion that the Soviet Navy intended to use Klaipeda as a main naval base in the future.[195]

194 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 7; report nr. 469, 29 March 1946.
195 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 530, 2 May 1946.

That conclusion was further supported by a report describing the conditions three months later, in late June 1946. Plenty of construction materials of all sorts had been delivered to Klaipeda harbour, and the reconstruction work was proceeding at speed. A total of four cranes were functioning, and the largest of them, capable of lifting 45 tons, could lift a light or a medium-sized tank directly from quay to ship.[196]

In September 1947, after the now familiar information gap of over a year, no further details could be provided by the T-Office on Klaipeda. It was, however, known that ships used the port.[197] In case someone in Section II was a little disappointed by the lack of information on Klaipeda for such a length of time, he must have been in a happier mood two months later – when on 18 November 1947 a comprehensive report on the subject was issued.

By that time the port was free from wrecks, with the exception of two remaining outside the entrance. Only the 'winter harbour' had bomb damage remaining from the war, while the other parts of the port were intact. Large amounts of goods transported from Germany were still stored on the quays, and coal from Poland was regularly discharged in Klaipeda. All harbour work, except handling the cranes, which was the work for Soviet females, was done by German prisoners-of-war. Klaipeda's shipyards were completely devastated, and no attempts to tidy up the rubble could be observed. Some 80 minor warships—minesweepers, torpedo boats and patrol boats—were based in Klaipeda, and naval exercises at sea took place almost daily.[198] The claim from 1946 of Klaipeda being intended to become a major naval base does not seem unfounded in the light of these observations. As things turned out in the end, Klaipeda became only a minor naval base for the Baltic Fleet.

Kaliningrad (Königsberg) and Baltiysk (Pillau)

Though the old Prussian city of Königsberg is not situated directly on the coast but lies on a large lagoon, the Kaliningradskiy zaliv, well protected from the Baltic Sea by an enormous sandbar stretching from Poland, it has a harbour big enough to handle large ships. In the summer of 1946 the quays along the river Pregolya (Pregel) were to a large degree damaged and unusable, either as a result of German actions during the retreat or by ships and barges sunk alongside the quays.[199]

Baltiysk, the harbour which is today's main base for the Russian Baltic Fleet, was noted in March 1946 to be moderately damaged, but shipwrecks could

196 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 29, 18 July 1946. Source 'pk'.
197 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.
198 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 31; report nr. 199, 18 November 1947. Source 'mk'.
199 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 25, 16 July 1946. Source 'tk'.

be found in the harbour docks and also outside the entrance. Those wrecks complicated larger ships' movements. Sea areas were not entirely cleared; some minesweeping remained to be done outside the harbour.[200] Some of the Soviet Navy's lighter units—such as destroyers, minesweepers and smaller vessels— were based in Baltiysk in the summer of 1946.[201] It makes sense that a well situated and moderately damaged harbour was put to good use by the Soviets; Baltiysk used to be a German naval base before the German forces had to retreat from the area during the last phase of the Second World War.

The Baltic port information hiatus appears again. Over a year passed before the conditions of Kaliningrad and Baltiysk was reported once again. The information we have just studied about Kaliningrad was from July 1946, and it took until September 1947 for the subject to turn up again in the T-Office's reports. At that time, an intensive reconstruction work had been carried out, especially in Baltiysk. Shipwrecks had been removed, and the Baltiysk harbour was in good condition and fully usable. Nevertheless, improvements were still made in order to turn it into a good naval base. Fortification work had been going on all the time since 1945. The area of the naval base-in-being was also well guarded on all sides.[202]

It is interesting to note that some information about Kaliningrad had actually reached the T-Office in June 1947, but was not reported. This surviving piece of information, emanating from the Danish Intelligence Service (code-named *Total* by the T-Office), claimed that Kaliningrad was transformed into a large naval base with a personnel strength of 17,000 men. A large number of ships in the port was also listed. The observer was classified by the foreign service as 'F6', i.e. the most uncertain level. The T-Office agreed with this classification, evidently after checking the information, and in a letter to Lieutenant Commander Poul Adam Mørch in the Danish Intelligence Service Thede Palm designated the information as 'unreliable in the details' ('*i detaljerna är otillförlitlig*').[203]

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200 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 7; report nr. 469, 29 March 1946.

201 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 25, 16 July 1946. Source 'tk'.

202 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

203 KrA, T-Office, film 20, microfiche 6; documents dated 10 and 12 June 1947. Lieutenant Commander Poul Adam Mørch was one of the driving forces behind the development of the post-war Danish Intelligence Service. He was never elevated to become the formal leader of the service, but remained second-in-command during his professional intelligence career. This was clearly something that caused Mørch some lasting bitterness. Thede Palm remembers that the post-war contacts between the Swedish and Danish Intelligence Service was probably initiated by Mørch, though there had been close contacts between the C-Bureau and the Danes during the war. Christmas-Møller (1995), *Obersten og kommandøren. Efterretningstjeneste, sikkerhedspolitik og socialdemokrati 1945–55*, passim. Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp. 70–74.

Floating Docks

Due to the nature of information given in reports about floating docks captured in German and German-held ports, it is more convenient to deal with them in a separate paragraph instead of under the various ports that we just have worked through. It is a better approach because floating docks were sometimes reported without referrence to any particular port. A lack of information concerning the ex-German floating-docks was only expressed in the first letter from Commander Kull and not repeated in the follow-up letters; it was written as a comment to the intelligence requirement 'Ports of the Baltic States'. At first glance, one may think of floating docks as completely harmless, which they of course are, but a floating dock is an essential 'tool' in an efficient shipyard—and shipyards can produce and repair vessels of more belligerent nature. It happened occasionally that the T-Office could produce intelligence information on floating docks, and this will now be looked at.

In connection with intelligence on ex-German submarines being transferred to the Soviet Union in late February 1946, it was mentioned in passing that submarine parts and equipment were transported eastwards on seized floating docks. No information on types or designations of the floating docks was provided.[204]

A very detailed report from 3 April 1946 about Gdynia, enclosing a map with numbers corresponding to information in the report, informs the reader where a floating dock of 30,000 tons used to be moored before it was towed away to either Baltiysk or Kaliningrad. It was claimed that the battleship *Gneisenau* was transported on it from Kiel to Gdynia.[205] This floating dock probably ended up in Kaliningrad. A floating dock of 35,000 tons (note the difference from earlier information) lay at the Kaliningrad shipyard together with two smaller floating docks in the summer of 1946. The larger one had been transferred to Kaliningrad from Gdynia, according to the report from 16 July 1946, and this information indicates that it actually could have been the *Gneisenau* dock.[206]

An ex-German floating dock, sunk in probably Gdansk or Gdynia, would be salvaged by the Soviet Navy. The information had been officially declared by the Soviets, and subsequently included in a T-report in early September 1946.[207] Two months later, in the middle of November, a more detailed report about floating docks in the Polish ports was issued. Whether it actually was ex-German docks was not specified, but since the ports in Poland had been in German hands for most of the war, the floating docks can be more or less

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204 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 383, 22 February 1946.
205 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 7; report nr. 482, 3 April 1946. Source 'mk'.
206 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 25, 16 July 1946. Source 'tk'.
207 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 111, 4 September 1946. Source 'ek'.

regarded as ex-German property. First, the repaired floating docks that were in working conditions were listed. Two docks of 8,000 and 1,500 tons respectively lay in Gdynia. Furthermore, in Gdansk three floating docks were observed; they displaced 2,000, 9,000 and 10,000 tons. Next, a large floating dock of about 40,000 tons had been sunk in Gdynia, which can very well have been the one mentioned in a report two months earlier. All machinery and other accessible equipment on the dock was removed and transported to the Soviet Union. A minor and unusable floating dock could also be found in Gdynia's harbour.[208]

All the reporting on this specific subject took place during 1946. No reports with information on floating docks was written in 1947.

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After reading through the intelligence information on the Baltic ports, the general impression is a bleak picture of war-ravaged harbours with wrecked quays, sunken ships, loot from Germany piled on the few undestroyed quays, few functioning cranes and German prisoners-of-war doing all the hard work. Thereafter, maybe the most apparent impression is the concentration of the reporting to the first half of 1946 and the subsequent hiatus up to September 1947. What could have caused such a conspicious gap of more than a year? The most obvious answer is that for unknown reasons the T-Office's sources either could not be contacted or were not able to visit the ports. If merchant marine officers were the main sources, which is plausible, decisions by the shipping lines to change the destinations of their ships to other ports than the eastern Baltic ones naturally influenced input to the T-Office. Shipping lines are of course business-driven, and if there was little or no profit to gain from sailing to Soviet-controlled ports, then there was no use sending ships there. There is also the hard winter of 1946-1947 to consider. Another aspect, namely the requirement period, is discussed in the next paragraph.

Reporting was mostly concentrated on the infrastructure of the ports. To what degree was a particular port a functioning place for loading and unloading ships? Qualitative and quantitative factors like quays, railways, cranes, areas for storing goods, water depth, mine danger, repair and construction work then had to be considered when assessing a port's status. As we have seen, the T-Office produced pieces of such information. It is possible to get an idea of the work progress in some ports; at least from Ventspils and southwards they seem to have been in a somewhat better shape in 1947 than they were in 1946.

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208 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 11; report nr. 241, 18 November 1946. Source 'mk + dak'.

Another aspect which should have been of interest to the Naval Desk was intelligence information on indications of where the Soviet Baltic Fleet planned to set up its new bases. With the memory of the war experiences still fresh in their minds, once again concentrating its combat ships in the inner Gulf of Finland could be nothing but anathema to the Soviet Navy commanders. Based on what the T-Office delivered, the Naval Desk probably put Klaipeda first on the list of future naval bases.

Floating docks was a subject on which some reporting was produced, albeit fragmentary and not very detailed. At least the situation in Gdynia and Kaliningrad in 1946 was clarified to some degree.

Only a few pieces of the intelligence information we have just gone through can also be found in the daily communiqués from Section II. It appears that information on conditions and capacities in two of the ports along the Baltic coast was something that could be brought to the attention of a wider circle. Liepaja and Klaipeda figured in the daily communiqués several times, and it seems that the speculations on Klaipeda as the main Soviet naval base-in-being were of a certain interest.[209]

The presence in Kaliningrad of the large *Gneisenau* floating dock from Gdynia, and the two smaller floating docks, was also included in a daily communiqué.[210] It was probably the large dock's potential use for repair and maintenance work on the heavier Soviet naval ships that was behind the decision to put it in a communiqué.

Ports in the Baltic States and the Intelligence Cycle

This subject was in the first of Kull's letters accompanied by a remark saying that information had been collected during the winter. Kull also hinted that a summary was under preparation; whether this was done at the Naval Desk or elsewhere is not known. A request for more information about the ex-German floating docks was also included in the remark. Alas, the intention of compiling a summary seems to have been uttered too early, since the subject was cancelled in the second letter with the motivation that there was too little information available, despite some valuable details received. Baltic ports was not among the requirements listed in the third letter, but it was taken up again in the fourth and last of Kull's letters, though no motivation for the reappearance was then given.

As we have seen, there had obviously been an interest in collecting information on Baltic ports over the winter of 1945-1946. The interest may have origi-

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209 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 18, 12 February 1946; DK 23, 22 february 1946; DK 39, 9 April 1946; DK 46, 2 May 1946; DK 71, 2 August 1946.
210 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 71, 2 August 1946.

nated in the Supreme Commander's strategic study in the summer of 1945, where the Soviet Union was pointed out as the most likely aggressor; an offensive Soviet action against Sweden was of course dependent on well-working ports along the eastern Baltic coast.[211]

First, let us study the complete picture of this subject to get a clearer view of when reports were issued. Issuing dates and requirement periods are listed in table 6.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	
	February	5, 15, 20, 22		February	
	March	29	5	March	
18	April	3		April	
	May	2		May	
	June			June	
	July	16, 17, 18, 19		July	
	August			August	
	September	4	10	September	19
	October			October	
13	November	18		November	18
	December			December	

Table 6. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on the subject Ports in the Baltic States.

Whether the T-Office was aware of the interest in Baltic ports during the winter of 1945–1946 is not clear, but it nevertheless reported such information several times before Commander Kull sat down and wrote his first letter. After all, the subject is very closely related to Soviet sea power, so once information on one subject came in, it is likely there was also information on the other.

On the whole, the year 1946 saw the peak of intelligence on Baltic ports with a maximum in February and July. After November that year, no new reports were issued on the subject until September next year, slightly more than a week after the fourth letter. Thus, it looks like the T-Office stuck fairly well to the requirement periods. If so, then we have a fairly clear case of adherence to an intelligence requirement changing over time. The gap from December 1946 to August 1947 can hardly be blamed on the winter alone.

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211 Wallerfelt (1999), *Si vis pacem—para bellum. Svensk säkerhetspolitik och krigsplanering 1945–1975*, pp. 38–48.

Since the requirement in the first letter explicitly mentioned a lack of details on ex-German floating docks, this allows us to investigate such information more closely from the perspective of the intelligence cycle. In table 7 reports containing information about floating docks are singled out from the complete table and presented together with a modified (shortened) requirement period; it lasted until the second letter.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	
	February	22		February	
	March		5	March	
18	April	3		April	
	May			May	
	June			June	
	July	16		July	
	August			August	
	September	4	10	September	
	October			October	
13	November	18		November	
	December			December	

Table 7. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports dealing with ex-German floating docks.

It is evident that some information was actually provided on floating docks during the requirement period. The Naval Desk surely could upgrade its knowledge, at least a notch or two, thanks to the T-Office. Issuing dates more or less follow the pattern of other reports dealing with the Baltic ports. It is not an exaggeration to claim that intelligence on ex-German floating docks reached the user within the required period.

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It is possible to discern a connection between requirement periods and reporting dates. However, the problem is obvious: how to confirm the connection? Without any written documents referring to a dialogue between Section II and the T-Office, there is not much to do except to note the congruence. Nevertheless, Section II received reports on Baltic ports more or less within the periods when such information was asked for, and the intelligence was therefore timely. As to the question who was ahead of whom, it looks at first glance as the T-Office won. But, since the subject had been worked on before the first letter, and since it is not known when a requirement was expressed for the first time, it is safer to assume that the reports issued before the requirement period

actually were a result of an earlier wish—or perhaps more plausibly a result of sources' access to the ports.

8.3 Soviet Merchant Marine

Maritime power is not measured in terms of 'grey units' only. Suffice it to recall the critical phases of the battle for the Atlantic during the Second World War, when Great Britain's lifeline consisted of a thin line of convoys with merchant ships plying hostile waters under constant threat of torpedo attacks from the efficient German submarine force. Much has been written on that subject. Merchant ships are essential for carrying large amounts of supplies by sea, and are also of great assistance in resupplying naval ships at sea. Last but not least is what probably hovered foremost in the mind of the desk-sailors in Section II: to what extent could Soviet merchant ships provide an invasion force with the necessary capacity to ferry troops, vehicles and supplies over the Baltic Sea to the Swedish coast?

Soviet merchant ships had not suffered as heavy losses as Allied shipping during the war, but the fleet had on the other hand been relatively smaller than its British or American counterparts. It consisted to a large degree of ageing ships.[212] What, then, remained of the Soviet merchant marine, especially in the Baltic Sea? And how many ships had been taken as war booty from Germany and other countries? How many ships were manned and fit for sailing? Such questions, though not expressed in Kull's letters, must reasonably have been asked in the offices of the Naval Desk. Also, Kull mentioned a lack of information on ships handed over to the Soviet Union by western powers. Possibly the T-Office could provide some information on this intelligence requirement, and that is what we shall investigate in this paragraph.

This particular requirement was included in the letter to the naval attachés dated 18 April 1946. In the next letter, issued on 13 November 1946, the subject was put aside hoping for open information to be released. No more intelligence requirements concerning merchant ships were included in the succeeding letters from the Naval Desk. That could mean that sufficient information had been obtained, analysts were satisfied, and that the matter could be closed for the time being. It could also imply that other, more pressing tasks occupied the few persons working at the Naval Desk, and that merchant ships were simply not considered important enough to justify any more effort. The reason for the disappearance of the subject is unclear, but that is not the important thing in

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212 Andersson & Hellström (2002), *Bortom horisonten—Svensk flygspaning mot Sovjetunionen 1946–1952*, pp. 42–43.

this work; what we shall do is investigate what the T-Office was able to do in order to satisfy the requirement from April 1946.

The reports dealing with this subject are of two types. Firstly, attempts to compile available information and assessments and to produce overall summaries resulting in two reports issued during the investigation time frame. Secondly, bits and pieces of information concerning the merchant marine was either issued as separate reports or included in other maritime-oriented reports.

Soviet Merchant Ships in Intelligence Reports

Summaries

In addition to the more detailed reports issued by the T-Office, an assessment of the Soviet merchant marine's efficiency was written in early December 1946. It produced a view which was not exactly positive.

> Despite the Russians having considerably increased the tonnage in the Baltic Sea, partly through obtaining ships from Finland, and partly through seized German tonnage, the tonnage does not meet the Russian need in sea transport.[213]

The report goes on to list a number of reasons for this apparent lack of efficient use of available resources. Firstly, the Soviet shipping organization was heavily centralized and cumbersome, resulting in delays in dispatching ships which subsequently caused unnecessarily long lingering in harbours. Secondly, a serious shortage of trained deck officers and machinists caused both various navigational errors as well as mismanaged machine rooms, altogether resulting in bad performance of the ships. Thirdly, the generally bad maintenance of the ships caused recurring needs of repair at shipyards. In their turn, the shipyards had their own problems with unskilled workers, and so time spent by the ships at the shipyards could be lengthy. Lastly, loading and unloading cargo was to a large extent carried out by prisoners-of-war under unskilled command. This added to the earlier listed delays and incompetent use of available resources.[214]

> The above-mentioned conditions are assessed to result in the Russian tonnage not being available to more than 50 per cent of its capac-

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213 'Oaktat att ryssarna avsevärt utökat tonnagebeståndet i Östersjön, dels genom från Finland erhållna fartyg och dels genom beslag på tyskt tonnage, täcker tonnaget ej det ryska behovet i sjötransporthänseende.' KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 261, 2 December 1946.

214 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 261, 2 December 1946.

> ity, besides which on average a third was unusable, lying at shipyards etc.[215]

There had been attempts to recruit German officers and sailors to serve on Soviet merchant ships, but the campaigns had not had the desirable effect. Therefore, in order to train skilled crews, maritime schools for Soviet students were founded, and the German professional sailors that actually had been recruited, acted as instructors in these schools.[216]

An effort to produce a complete and detailed summary of Soviet Union's merchant marine resulted in a comprehensive report issued in December 1947. It listed the state of the merchant marine as of 1 July 1947, and included all ships larger than 100 tons that could be identified with certainty. Despite this, it was warned in the report that there was still a possibility that some information was incorrect; some ships could have been wrecked or sunk recently. A further difficulty was caused by the fact that one particular name could be given to several ships. Ships sharing the same name could either belong to different types of ships—e.g. tankers, dry cargo ships or sea-going trawlers—or belong to different merchant fleets, for example the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Pacific merchant fleets. A lost ship's name could also be reused, and therefore turn up again and cause confusion for the 'bean-counters'. Nevertheless, 962 merchant ships of various types are listed in the report. The total tonnage was calculated to 2,159,087 tons, though the actual number was assessed to be higher, maybe 2,300,000 to 2,500,000 tons.[217]

Separate Reports

By early January 1946 a total of fifty-nine Soviet merchant ships were registered under the shipping company 'Leningrad-Morflot' in Leningrad. Together, they displaced 145,000 tons, and all ships were listed with names in the report, which also listed merchant ships in the Black Sea.[218]

It has already been noted that the Soviet merchant marine far from equalled in size its counterparts of the great seafaring nations in the west. According to a report from the T-Office, issued in early May 1946, the Soviet merchant tonnage in the Baltic Sea totalled about 300,000 tons in 1939. This decreased during the war to 135,000 tons, a 55 per cent loss. It was estimated that, after having taken possession of ships as war booty from Finland, the Baltic states

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215 'Ovan berörda förhållanden bedömas medföra att det ryska tonnaget endast kan utnyttjas högst med ca 50 % kapacitet, varjämte genomsnittligt en tredjedel är obrukbart, förlagt till varv etc.' KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 261, 2 December 1946.

216 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 261, 2 December 1946.

217 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 33; report nr. 235, 16 December 1947. Source 'AX'.

218 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 382, 21 February 1946.

and Germany, and adding ninety-seven chartered Finnish ships, the total merchant tonnage would reach one million tons. A considerable number of the ex-German merchantmen were in need of repair and maintenance, which in combination with the shortage of skilled seamen to crew the ships, made it unlikely that all the available tonnage could be effectively used. This, in turn, was probably the reason for the noted Soviet efforts to charter additional merchant tonnage on the international market.[219]

Various intelligence information was provided regarding ships from defeated Germany. To start with, a small tanker of German origin was unloading its cargo in Liepaja on 10 February 1946. The oil was transferred to one of four large tanks situated almost in the center of the town in the vicinity of the winter harbour.[220]

It was assessed that at least twenty-four ex-German merchant ships manned by Soviet crews sailed from Great Britain to Baltic Sea ports during March 1946. At least two of them were passenger ships. This transfer was a result of the inter-Allied agreement concerning the dividing of German tonnage.[221]

Many merchant ships were sunk in the Baltic Sea during the war; most were of course from the war-waging nations, but many ships from neutral-proclaimed Sweden also went to the bottom. In August 1946 the Soviet Union officially declared the intention to raise a number of ships standing on the bottom of the harbours in Gdansk and Gdynia and along the Hela peninsula. On the list were three large merchantmen: *Gravenstein* (8,000 tons), *Albert Insen* (12,000 tons) and *Eland von Stein* (5,000 tons).[222] Moreover, in Swinoujscie salvage work had commenced on four other sunk German merchantmen: *Cordillera, Monte Cassino, Erich Finsterwalde* and *Usambara*.[223]

German civilian ships taken by the Soviet forces were gathered in Baltiysk and Kaliningrad. No solid information was reportedly available in September 1947 on the number of ships in these ports, but an estimate made earlier in the spring of 1947 and cited in the report, claimed that at least 150,000 tons of ex-German merchant ships were lying there. Since then further ships had been transferred to these ports, so the number was in any case inaccurate at the reporting date. Many of them were in need of extensive repairs, and for several ships no other fate than the scrapyard was considered to be a realistic alternative.[224]

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219 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 531, 3 May 1946. Source probably 'M'.

220 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 368, 15 February 1946. Source 'mk'.

221 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 431, 12 March 1946. Source 'mk'

222 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 111, 4 September 1946. Source 'ek'.

223 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 26; report nr. 73, 16 August 1947. Source 'mk'. The report actually says the name of one of the ships was *Monte Casino* with only one 's', which is reasonably a case of wrong spelling.

224 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

By using the ex-Finnish ships *Atlanta* and *Bore X* the Soviet Union had by May 1946 started a shipping line for transporting cargo and passengers to New York from the Baltic Sea. Because of the grounding up of the harbour entrances to Leningrad, the Atlantic route would instead use Paldiski west of Tallinn as its staging point.[225]

According to the T-Office there was not all that much of merchant tonnage in the ports along the eastern Baltic Sea coast in September 1947; what existed was well justified by the transport needs. This, however, was not the case in Leningrad, Baltiysk and Kaliningrad where an abundance of ships could be found. Approximately fifty merchant ships with an estimated total tonnage of 250,000 tons were moored in Leningrad. Also, a considerable number of barges lay on the Neva river east of the city. The merchant ships were scantily maintained, but the shortage of trained seamen to crew the ships was—once again—the main obstacle for not using the available tonnage and putting the ships to sea.[226]

As to the size of the merchant tonnage in the Polish ports, and in German ports in the Soviet zone, the same assessment was made by the T-Office: the transport needs equalled the number of available ships.[227]

An odd piece of Soviet use of merchant ships in invasion operations was, albeit to a minor extent, reported in October 1947. During the preceeding month several Soviet army units had conducted landing exercises on the island of Rügen, and among other ships participating in the exercise some small-sized merchant ships were reported.[228]

* * *

Though decimated during the war, the Soviet merchant marine in the Baltic Sea nevertheless had a considerable tonnage one year after the fighting ended; it was estimated at one million tons. Most of it was, however, war booty from Germany, Finland and the Baltic states. The numbers were impressive on paper, but that did not mean that most of the ships were used effectively. Maybe no more than around 50 per cent of the available tonnage was actually in sea-worthy conditions. A bureaucratic and centralized shipping organization in pure Soviet style coupled with neglected maintenance, and bad quality of sailors and shipyard workers resulted in a very inefficient use of the resources. Maritime schools had been established to counter the lack of skilled personnel, and German sailors had been recruited to work as instructors.

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225 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 3; report nr. 571, 27 May 1946. Source 'mk'.

226 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 124, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

227 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; reports nr. 125 and 126, 19 September 1947. Source 'divk'.

228 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 30; report nr. 181, 27 October 1947. Source 'tot'.

Available tonnage did not meet the transport needs in late 1946, but this situation improved during the next year. In general, there were then just enough ships available to meet the transport needs. A concentration of merchant ships moored in Leningrad, Kaliningrad and Baltiysk was reported in 1947, but it was doubtful if these ships would ever be used.

As a sign of a return to peaceful conditions, the Soviet merchant marine had 'gone international' in 1946, and opened a shipping route to New York. It was, perhaps, significant that ex-Finnish ships were used on the route; these ships were presumably in better shape, and therefore more suitable to sail on the high seas.

The T-Office also made an attempt to present a list of the entire Soviet merchant marine, which resulted in a report containing names of nearly 1,000 ships. However, it was warned that there were a lot of uncertainties associated with the information, so the list could be expected to be far from 100 per cent correct.

A few of the pieces presented above also figured in the daily communiqués. By inserting a few lines mentioning that a list of merchant ships in both the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea was available, the compilers announced to the readers within the intelligence community that such information had reached Section II.[229] Numbers concerning the tonnage of the merchant marine before and immediately after the war, and also in the spring of 1946, was quoted in another daily communiqué.[230] One can also find information that the existing Soviet merchant tonnage in the Baltic Sea in late 1946 did not meet the actual need due to the inefficient use of resources.[231]

Soviet Merchant Marine and the Intelligence Cycle

Interest in Soviet Union's merchant marine was a short-lived one; the requirement period lasted only between the first and the second letter. What the Naval Desk asked for, according to the first letter, was information about the size of the merchant marine. No information was then available about merchant ships handed over by the Allies during the war. Nor was there any knowledge about ships taken as war booty from Germany. With the word 'size' the Naval Desk probably aimed at the number of seaworthy ships and also the tonnage.

When the second letter was written, it was simply mentioned that the subject was not on the working list at the moment. The officers at the Naval Desk had put it somewhere in the 'to do later'-tray, hoping for open information to be released. If the merchant marine still remained in that tray by the end of our

229 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 24, 27 February 1946.
230 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 47, 6 May 1946.
231 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 95, 5 December 1946.

investigation period is however unknown; the subject was in any case not taken up again in the next two letters.

What could have caused the decline in interest? Was it only a matter of lack of the desired intelligence? Or had sufficient information been received? Maybe the subject was deemed not important when compared to other pressing tasks at the time? Since there is no reason mentioned, except a hope for open information, today's researcher can do nothing but guess.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	
	February	15, 21		February	
	March	12	5	March	
18	April			April	
	May	3, 27		May	
	June			June	
	July			July	
	August			August	16
	September	4	10	September	19
	October			October	27
13	November			November	
	December	2		December	16

Table 8. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on the subject Soviet Merchant Marine.

Despite the seemingly weak interest in the Soviet merchant marine, at least after the second letter, a number of reports were issued by the T-Office; most of them outside the short requirement period, and the majority during 1946 whereas in 1947 none was issued until after July. This was obviously not a subject frequently reported on, but the T-Office was nevertheless able to hand over at least a few pieces of intelligence to the Naval Desk.

Concerning the specific requirement on ex-German merchantmen, the information can hardly be said to be very detailed; it was scanty. It was also, as is clearly illustrated in table 9 on next page, delivered to the user outside the short requirement period.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. Req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	
	February	15		February	
	March	12	5	March	
18	April			April	
	May			May	
	June			June	
	July			July	
	August			August	16
	September		10	September	19
	October			October	
13	November			November	
	December			December	

Table 9. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports dealing with ex-German merchantmen.

The two lone reports from early 1946 can of course have raised interest at the Naval Desk and caused the requirement to include ex-German ships, although I feel that is stretching reasoning too far. The interest probably existed anyway, without the assistance of a few reports from the T-Office.

* * *

It is obvious that this is not a case where it is possible to discern any connection to the requirement period; reports are not concentrated to a particular period. Therefore it is fairly safe to say that the intelligence requirement period did not have any influence on the report flow.

8.4   German Naval Ships' Fates

Split Up Between the Allies

After the German surrender in early May 1945, the victors started to divide the valuable war booty amongst themselves. Of particular interest was the newest technology and research results in many fields. The *Kriegsmarine*, or rather a third or what was left of it, was also split up. Fate had it that an old, pre-dreadnought battleship and veteran of the Battle of Jutland in 1916, *Schleswig-Holstein*—which also had the dubious honour of having fired some of the first shots of the Second World War on 1 September 1939—was one of the surviv-

ing German naval ships, albeit in bad shape.[232] Far more modern, and eagerly sought after, were the newest submarines of *Type XXI*. In between these extremes many ships of various types and sizes were taken by the Allies.

During the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945 a decision was made to set up a commission tasked with working out the distribution of the German ships. Negotiations were sometimes difficult, but in December 1945 the matter was finally settled and distribution decided upon. For example, of the remaining German submarines, ten each were taken by the Soviet Union, USA and Great Britain. The rest were sunk by the Royal Navy in the Atlantic off Scotland. Apart from the booty the Soviet Union received as a result of the commission's decision, its share was topped off by sunken or uncompleted naval ships left behind in ports conquered by the Red Army.[233] Several of these more or less damaged ships figured, as we will soon see, in the T-Office's reports.

It is quite obvious why the Naval Desk was interested in what had happened to the ships of the *Kriegsmarine*. Any fighting ship or submarine in a not too damaged condition augmented the strength of the Soviet Navy, and could therefore, in a potential conflict where Sweden would be involved, constitute a threat to Swedish naval forces. Besides, the newest German submarines were the most advanced at the time and rightly feared by Allied sailors; a wolf pack of *Type XXI*-submarines with their sights set on the old Swedish armoured ships (*pansarskepp*)[234] was hardly regarded as something desirable. Quite another question was however if the Soviet Navy actually could make good use of the captured German ships; an assessment of this issue was provided in a report from late January 1947. It was thought that the Soviets could hardly use the ex-German ships to a full extent, and the main reason for this inability was, the T-Office wrote, differences in construction of artillery and torpedoes, calibre and machinery.[235]

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232 Massie (2003), *Castles of Steel. Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea*, p. 634. Tarrant (1999), *Jutland. The German Perspective*, pp. 177, 217. Thomas (1990), *The German Navy in the Nazi Era*, p. 182. Though sunk in Gdynia harbour in December 1944 by an air attack, *Schleswig Holstein* was salvaged and towed to Tallinn, and later ended her days in the Gulf of Finland. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Navy*, pp. 181, 268. Alekseyev (1946), *Om uppdelningen av tyska flottan*.

233 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Navy*, pp. 180–181. A contemporary and fairly detailed, though presumably biased, description of the procedures and the negotiations can be found in Alekseyev (1946), *Om uppdelningen av tyska flottan*.

234 The pride of the Swedish Navy was the three heavy armoured ships *HMS Sverige*, *HMS Drottning Victoria* and *HMS Gustaf V*, delivered in 1917, 1921 and 1922 respectively. They displaced 6,850 tons each and were armed with 28.3 centimetres and 15.2 centimetres guns. All three were phased out in the 1950s. Insulander & Olsson (2001), *Pansarskepp*, passim. See also von Hofsten & Waernberg (2003), *Örlogsfartyg. Svenska maskindrivna fartyg under tretungad flagg*, pp. 124–127.

235 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.

On the other hand, the Soviet Navy, despite its relative inactivity, had suffered great losses during the war, and it struggled to regain strength as fast as possible. One way to do this was to use the ex-German naval units taken as war booty. Kotov writes that one cruiser, ten destroyers, ten submarines, forty-four minesweepers and five hundred ninety-five other vessels of various types and sizes were transferred to the Soviet Navy from the *Kriegsmarine*, which make a total of 660 units.[236] According to Alekseyev's article in 1946, the Soviet Union's share was 656 ships and vessels.[237] Rohwer and Monakov lists one cruiser, ten destroyers, forty-three minesweepers and eight submarines in active service.[238] From Moscow, the naval attaché could report 'absolutely satisfactory' (*'absolut betryggande'*) information on the subject. Navy Lieutenant Willy Edenberg listed a total of 654 ships, and among them one cruiser, ten destroyers and ten submarines.[239] The various sources do not differ much on numbers.

Commander Kull and his officers did what they could to sort things out. For example, from the Swedish naval attaché in Washington, Navy Captain O. Angelin, information was requested in February 1946 on the ships that were handed over to USA.[240] Maybe Angelin was unable to fulfill the request from Stockholm? It is with some surprise the modern researcher reads that as late as in September 1947, the Naval Desk had a 'total lack' (*'total avsaknad'*) of information on which ships that went to Great Britain and USA. Therefore, it was not possible for the Naval Desk to cross-check the information they had on ex-German ships in Soviet hands by excluding the British and American booty.[241]

Naturally, the naval attaché in Moscow was also tasked with finding out the fate of the *Kriegsmarine* ships. Navy Lieutenant Edenberg certainly had a hard time working in the secretive Soviet Union, and he had to rely mainly on the not so informative Soviet press for information.[242]

Commanding the Soviet organization charged with transferring the assigned ex-German ships was a former czarist naval officer, Vice Admiral Yuriy F. Rall.

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236 Kotov (2002), *Remont i modernizatsiya byvshikh germanskikh i italyanskikh korabley v sovetskom VMF*, p. 2. According to Kotov, the losses of the Soviet Navy were 34 per cent of surface fighting ships, 39 per cent of submarines and 27 per cent of other naval units.

237 Alekseyev (1946), *Om uppdelningen av tyska flottan*, table nr. 4.

238 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 268–275.

239 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, E II:15, vol. 1; letter from naval attaché in Moscow, Navy Lieutenant Edenberg, to Commander Kull, 30 March 1946.

240 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:1, vol. 1; letter from Commander Kull to naval attaché in Washington, Navy Captain Angelin, 9 February 1946.

241 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:4, vol. 2; letter from Commander Kull to acting naval attaché in London, Navy Lieutenant Aspenberg, 9 September 1947.

242 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, E II:15, vol. 1–2; letter from naval attaché in Moscow, Navy Lieutenant Edenberg, to Colonel Kempff, 17 January 1946; letter from naval attaché in Moscow, Navy Lieutenant Edenberg to Navy Captain Tham, 29 January 1947.

On his staff list was Navy Lieutenant Valentin Sodovskiy, an officer capable of speaking perfect English and Swedish. Sodovskiy's mother, it was said, had been a Swedish citizen.[243]

Ex-German Naval Ships in Intelligence Reports

Summaries

In the paragraph dealing with the specific intelligence requirement regarding the Soviet naval power in the Baltic Sea, a summary from June 1947 is referred to.[244] That summary also included several surface ships and submarines of German origin, either transferred to the Soviet Navy as war booty shared between the Allies after the war, or simply left behind in Baltic Sea harbours and seized during the Soviet advance to the west.

As an introduction to this paragraph let us take a look at the information from June 1947 concerning the ex-German ships, now reported as operative units of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Applying the same method—i.e. comparing the information with the research results of Rohwer and Monakov[245]—table 10 shows that on the whole the T-Office presented the Naval Desk with fairly correct information.

Type of ship (designations used by the T-Office)	Operative ships as reported by the T-Office, spring 1947	Ex-German ships commissioned in the Soviet Navy, according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comments
Light cruiser	Admiral Makarov	Agree	Ex-German *Nürnberg*
Destroyer	Z 14	No information	Ex-German *Z 14 Friedrich Ihn*
-"-	Z 15	No information	Ex-German *Z 15 Erich Steinbrinck*
-"-	—	Ex-German *Z 20 Karl Galster*	Not reported by the T-Office, named *Prochny* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	Z 33	Agree (ex-German Z 33)	Named *Provorny* in the Soviet Navy
Escort destoyer/torpedo boat	*Podvizhny* (ex-German T 12)	Agree	
-"-	*Poryvisty* (ex-German T 17)	Agree	
-"-	*Porazhayushchiy* (ex-German T 107)	Agree	

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243 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 523, 29 April 1946. Rall had served in the Black Sea Fleet before the Second World War, commanded a squadron of the Baltic Fleet during the war, and supervised the weapons trials that led to the sinking of the *Graf Zeppelin* in 1947. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 35, 123, 155, 199.

244 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 22; report nr. 448, 20 June 1947. Source 'No'.

245 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 182, 268–275.

Type of ship (designations used by the T-Office)	Operative ships as reported by the T-Office, spring 1947	Ex-German ships commissioned in the Soviet Navy, according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comments
-"-	*Prozorlivy* (ex-German *T 158*)	Agree	
-"-	*Pronzitelny* (ex-German *T 196*)	Agree (ex-German *T 190* or *T 196*)	Note the difference of the ex-German designations in Rohwer and Monakov[246]
-"-	*T 33*	Agree (ex-German *T 33*)	Named *Primerny* in the Soviet Navy
Submarine	*U 1231*	Agree	Ex-German *Type IXC U 1231*. Carrying the designations *N-26, B-26, KBP-33* and *UTS-33* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 2353*	Agree	Ex-German *Type XXIII U 2353*. Designated *M-31*or *M-51* in the Soviet Navy[247]
-"-	*U 2529*	Agree	Ex-German *Type XXI U 2529*. Carrying the designations *N-28, B-28* and *PZS-34* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 1057*	Agree	Ex-German *Type VII U 1057*. Carrying the designations *N-22* and *S-81* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 3035*	Agree	Ex-German *Type XXI U 3035*. Carrying the designations *N-29, B-29* and *PZS-31* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 1064*	Agree	Ex-German *Type VII U 1064*. Carrying the designations *N-24, S-83, PZS-33* and *UTS-49* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 3041*	Agree	Ex-German *Type XXI U 3041*. Carrying the designations *N-30* and *B-30* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 1058*	Agree	Ex-German *Type VII U 1058*. Carrying the designations *N-23, S-82* and *PZS-3* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 3515*	Agree	Ex-German *Type XXI U 3515*. Carrying the designations *N-27, B-27, Bsh-28* and *UTS-3* in the Soviet Navy
-"-	*U 1305*	Agree	Ex-German *Type VII U 1305*. Carrying the designations *N-25* and *S-84* in the Soviet Navy

Table 10. The ex-German naval ships reported as operative units in June 1947.

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246 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 181, 270. On p. 181 it says *T 196* while it is *T 190* on p. 270.

247 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 182, 275. On p. 182 it says M 51 while it is *M 31* on p. 275.

Whether two ex-German destroyers, with the designations *Z 14* and *Z 15*, were ever transferred to the Baltic Fleet is somewhat unclear according to this comparison. There is no information of that presented by Rohwer and Monakov, and at first it seems possible that the T-Office somehow was given incorrect input in the first place. However, an explanation can be worked out with a first clue coming from the book by Andersson and Hellström about Swedish reconnaissance flights against the Soviet Union. There it is claimed that *Z 14* and *Z 15* were named *Pospeshny* and *Pylkiy* in Soviet service.[248] Turning back to Rohwer and Monakov, we find a note about an ex-German destroyer with the name *Pylkiy* as being earlier named *Erich Steinbrinck*, but no *Pospeshny* can be found in their book. On the other hand, Rohwer and Monakov says that the sister ship of *Erich Steinbrinck* was *Friedrich Ihn*, named *Prytkiy* in the Soviet Navy.[249] It is then reasonable to assume that *Z 14* and *Z 15* actually were those two destroyers. This reasoning is further strengthened by Kotov, who in his article states that *Z 14* became *Prytkiy* and that *Z 15* became *Pylkiy*.[250] Moreover, this is also supported by Commander Ragnar Thorén in his monumental report on the Soviet Baltic Fleet in 1946. There *Z 14 Friedrich Ihn* and *Z 15 Erich Steinbrink* are listed as being handed over to the Soviet Union.[251] It appears that the T-Office was right on that issue after all.

That *Z 20 Karl Galster* was totally missed, is disappointing for the otherwise nearly 100 per cent accurate summary presented by the T-Office, but such things can happen, and it must be remembered that this was a period when it was very hard to obtain reliable information from behind the lowering Iron Curtain.

Aircraft Carrier

Nazi Germany made a slow start in learning the importance of aircraft carriers in modern naval warfare. Construction of the *Graf Zeppelin* was started before the war, but she was never completed.[252] *Graf Zeppelin* was still lying in the harbour of Szczecin in the middle of March 1946. The observer had not noted any work going on on board the carrier, but she was used for housing Soviet naval personnel.[253] By the end of September that year, *Graf Zeppelin* was afloat

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248 Andersson & Hellström (2002), *Bortom horisonten. Svensk flygspaning mot Sovjetunionen 1946–1952*, pp. 43, 71. Both *Z 14* and *Z 15* are identified on air reconnaissance photos from 1946 over the Liepaja area.

249 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 269.

250 Kotov (2002), *Remont i modernizatsiya byvshikh germanskikh i italyanskikh korabley v sovetskom VMF*, p. 3.

251 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 2, p. 7.

252 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocen-Going Fleet*, pp. 113, 181, 199, 268.

253 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 454, 23 March 1946. Source 'mk'.

and the Soviets intended to tow the carrier to a Soviet port as soon as she could be safely transported.[254] This attempt to move *Graf Zeppelin* was, according to the T-Office, carried out on 2 November 1946. After it was discovered that the carrier could not pass over a few sunken barges in the harbour, the towing had to be postponed until the barges had been removed.[255]

It is interesting to compare the information given by the T-Office to what is written by Rohwer and Monakov. As we have just seen, the T-Office reported that *Graf Zeppelin* was still in Szczecin in early November 1946. On the other hand, Rohwer and Monakov write that she was towed to Kronshtadt as early as September 1945.[256] The difference in time is more than one year. The carrier continued to be included in the reporting after November 1946, and she had still not been moved any distance. Doubts existed at the T-Office in January 1947 as to whether the uncompleted carrier would ever be used as a combat unit.[257] (In fact, she never was; *Graf Zeppelin* was sunk in the Baltic Sea in August or September 1947, according to Rohwer and Monakov.[258]) *Graf Zeppelin* had apparently not been transported from Swinoujscie—where she had been moved from Szczecin—at least by early June 1947.[259] The T-Office reported on 10 September 1947 that *Graf Zeppelin* was towed out of Swinoujscie one day in late August or early September. During the preceeding months all interior fittings and machinery had been removed from the uncompleted carrier and loaded on barges. Just before the towing operation got under way, a large number of crates with unknown contents were stowed in the hull.[260] Partly supporting the T-report is a note in a weekly memorandum to the head of Section II, written by Commander Allan Kull at the Naval Desk, where it is reported that a British merchant ship had encountered *Graf Zeppelin* under tow in southern Baltic Sea on 14 or 15 August 1947.[261] A fair guess is that the carrier was on its final voyage when the British ship observed her. Thus the period of *Graf Zeppelin's* departure from Swinoujscie can be narrowed down to the middle of August 1947, and not two years earlier as Rohwer and Monakov claim.

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254 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 7; report nr. 162, 30 September 1946. Source 'mk'.

255 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 11; report nr. 243, 19 November 1946. Source 'mk'.

256 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 181, 268.

257 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.

258 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 181, 268. The date of the sinking is given in the book as either 18 August (p. 268) or 20 September 1947 (p. 181).

259 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 22; report nr. 437, 7 June 1947. Source 'mk'.

260 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 109, 10 September 1947. Source 'mk'. A photo of *Graf Zeppelin* taken during the carrier's last days in Swinoujscie was enclosed with a later report. KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 122, 17 September 1947. Source 'mk'.

261 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, F IIa, vol. 15. Memorandum from the Naval Desk to head of Section II, reporting on the period 10–16 September 1947.

Battleships

Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and *Gneisenau*, the modern and mighty German battleships, had been primary targets for the Allies' efforts to remove any threat to their navies and convoys. At the end of the war, *Bismarck* and *Scharnhorst* lay on the Atlantic's bottom, and *Tirpitz* had capsized in a Norwegian fiord. Only one of the great battleships, *Gneisenau*, made it back to home waters.

The *Gneisenau*, famous for its 'channel dash' in 1942 together with its sister ship *Scharnhorst*, was finally sunk in Gdynia at the end of the war. Attempts by the Soviets to salvage the battleship had earlier been made but halted, and by mid-February 1946 the work had not been resumed.[262] It was rumoured that the work was halted due to explosives placed on board *Gneisenau*, but the T-Office considered this to be an exaggeration, and instead put forward the view that there were other, more pressing tasks to fulfill in Gdynia than removing the sunken battleship. Besides, *Gneisenau* was well placed to protect the harbour from storms, and the hull was, it was said, partly filled with cement; to salvage the battleship would be a time-consuming business.[263] Nevertheless, in August 1946, some work had been initiated on *Gneisenau* by the crews of two Soviet guard ships moored alongside.[264] It was later 'officially declared' by the Soviet Union, and subsequently reported by the T-Office, that the intention was to salvage the *Gneisenau* and use the battleship as a floating artillery battery.[265] To the modern researcher it seems a bit odd that the T-Office chose to report, as classified intelligence, something that it admitted was announced via official channels. To distinguish between information from open sources and information acquired by other means—e.g. covert collection—is, at least today, an important guideline in intelligence activities.

Gneisenau returned in the reporting in November 1946. Soviet intentions were by then to scrap the entire superstructure and remove the machinery. After that, the hull would be salvaged.[266] The battleship was not mentioned again in reports until September 1947, when a photo of *Gneisenau* was enclosed with a report, but no details about its condition were volunteered—the photo possibly told all there was to know.[267] Unfortunately, enclosed photos, with only a few exceptions, are not represented in the surviving T-Office archive. (Though a few photos have actually survived in the Navy Staff's archive, and a number of

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262 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 379, 21 February 1946. Source 'mk'.
263 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 482, 3 April 1946. Source 'mk'.
264 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 88, 27 August 1946. Source 'mk'.
265 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 111, 4 September 1946. Source 'ek'
266 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 11; report nr. 241, 18 November 1946. Source 'mk+dak'.
267 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 122, 17 September 1947, Source 'mk'.

'agent photos' can also be studied in Commander Thorén's report.[268]) No more information on the *Gneisenau* was provided by the T-Office during 1947.

In March 1946, in 'Minister Kuriatowski's Basin' in Gdynia, the old battleship *Schleswig-Holstein* was lying side by side with the Polish sail training ship *Dar Pomorza*, a venerable square-rigger. *Schleswig-Holstein* stood on the basin's bottom having had all it's artillery removed. [269] Later, in August 1946, it was reported from Gdynia that a Soviet crew had been assigned to *Schleswig-Holstein*. The crew had started to carry out work on the battleship, and it was claimed that the intention was to transfer the old ship to a Soviet port. *Schleswig-Holstein's* artillery had not been refitted.[270] Shortly thereafter, a new report claimed that the work had resulted in *Schleswig-Holstein* now being afloat.[271] As was the case with the *Gneisenau*, it was in early September reported as official information that *Schleswig-Holstein* was to be restored to full working condition.[272] The floating veteran had by December 1946 been turned into a troop ship in Gdynia. No artillery and no masts remained on the ship, and the upper bridge was also removed.[273]

No reports mentioned *Schleswig-Holstein* during 1947, but according to Rohwer and Monakov the old battleship was towed to Tallinn in September 1946, which seems a bit odd considering that the T-Office reported her as lying in Gdynia three months later in December 1946. The two authors also claim that the final voyage took place in June 1947, when *Schleswig-Holstein* was sunk in the Gulf of Finland.[274] Unfortunately, the T-Office's reporting is of no help to establish the real circumstances of the old battleship's fate. Better assistance is then offered by Ragnar Thorén's report from 1946, or rather the updated version from 1949, in which aerial photos taken by Swedish reconnaissance flights in November 1948 and January 1949 show *Schleswig-Holstein* grounded northeast of Osmussaar on Estonia's northern coast.[275]

Schleswig-Holstein could very well have been grounded already in June 1947 but certainly not sunk, as Rohwer and Monakov claim. The silhouette of a twin-funneled battleship from the early 1900s was too distinct to be mistaken; the Jutland veteran was still above water in January 1949. For the same reason—the easily recognized silhouette—it is more plausible that she was not

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268 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, F IIa, vol. 13; C-Bureau report nr. 328, 21 January 1946. KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 1–3.
269 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 454, 23 March 1946. Source 'mk'. KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 482, 3 April 1946. Source 'mk'.
270 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 3; report nr. 59, 13 August 1946. Source 'mk'.
271 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 88, 27 August 1946. Source 'mk'.
272 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 111, 4 September 1946. Source 'ek'
273 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 14; report nr. 298, 7 January 1947. Source 'mk'.
274 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 181, 268.
275 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 2, addition from March 1949, pp. 26–27, 59–61.

moved from Gdynia to Tallinn in September 1946, but remained at least three more months in the Polish harbour, since she was observed there in December that year.

Maybe the old battleship 'survived' even longer? Information available on the Internet suggests that *Schleswig-Holstein* was used as target ship until 1956, and then finally sunk in the Gulf of Finland.[276]

The Jutland veteran Schleswig-Holstein grounded off Osmussaar, Estonia, 17 January 1949. The battleship was reported several times in 1946 by the T-Office. (Military Archives)

An older battleship, used by the Germans as a target ship, was reported as scuttled in the entrance to Gdynia's inner harbour and had, before powerful Soviet icebreakers towed the stern aside, blocked the entrance.[277] Unfortunately, no clues are given in the report from early April 1946 regarding its identity. However, all three available pieces of information—an old battleship used as a target ship and blocking the entrance to Gdynia—point to the *Zähringen*, a pre-dreadnought slightly older than the *Schleswig-Holstein*. Old *Zähringen* was commissioned in the Imperial German Navy as early as 1902.[278]

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276 http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/linienschiffe/schleswigholstein/operatrions.html (yes, the word 'operations' is misspelt in the link).

277 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 482, 3 April 1946. Source 'mk'.

278 http://www.german-navy.de/hochseeflotte/ships/battleships/operations.html

Cruisers

Starting its career as the 'pocket battleship' *Deutschland*—later changed to *Lützow* in an attempt to avoid having to broadcast news of the sinking of a fighting ship carrying the name of the country—and re-classed as a heavy cruiser, *Lützow* was sunk by the Royal Air Force in April 1945 in the Kaiserfahrt south of Swinoujscie.[279]

The T-Office reported in late August 1946 that Soviet attempts to salvage the ship had started. At that time only the main turrets with 28 centimetres guns, and also the 15 centimetres guns on one side of the ship, could be seen above the water.[280] Three months later, in November, *Lützow* had been righted and only the stern was still standing on the bottom.[281] A photo from May 1947 of the cruiser is included in Commander Thorén's report, and it seems that the ship was not entirely afloat at that time.[282] Next report mentioning *Lützow* was issued in early June 1947, and as far as could be assessed by the observer, the stern was still not afloat. Fire seemed to have ravaged parts of the bow. Despite these apparent inconveniences, navy personnel was living onboard *Lützow*.[283]

Lützow remained in Swinoujscie for over a month, and was eventually towed out of the harbour on 20 July 1947. A Soviet sea-going tug with two funnels (or an icebreaker; the source was apparently uncertain as to the type of ship) took over the tow from the harbour tug, and set course to the east with *Lützow*. The tug (or icebreaker) returned to Swinoujscie five days later, on 25 July.[284] Was this *Lützow*'s last voyage? Rohwer and Monakov claim that the heavy cruiser was sunk in the central Baltic Sea on 22 July 1947; the war damages making it too demanding to repair. The dates certainly fit fairly well, but, on the other hand the two authors write that she was first towed to Kronshtadt, and towing *Lützow* all the way up to the inner Gulf of Finland would certainly have taken

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279 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 181.

280 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 100, 30 August 1946. Source 'mk'.

281 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 11; report nr. 243, 19 November 1946. Source 'mk'.

282 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 175–176. A pencilled remark urges a comparison with T-report nr. 437 issued on 7 June 1947. That report deals with ex-German destroyers in Rostock and *Lützow*. Photos were enclosed with copy nr. 2 of the report, and the photo of *Lützow* in Thorén's report is most probably a copy of the one referred to in the report.

283 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 22; report nr. 437, 7 June 1947. Source 'mk'. Fires on ships were not uncommon in the Russian Baltic Fleet during the winters of the 1990s. At that time many servicemen, and in some cases also their families, lived on ships in naval bases. Fires for heating were sometimes lit on board the ships in the winter cold, and it happened that fires got out of control. This could very well have been the reason for the fire damage on *Lützow*.

284 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 26; report nr. 73, 16 August 1947. Source 'mk'. Two photos were enclosed with a later report, showing *Lützow* after the cruiser was towed out of the harbour. KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 28; report nr. 122, 17 September 1947, Source 'mk'.

the tug a much longer time than five days back and forth. [285] But of course, there could have been a change of tug somewhere along the route, thus permitting the tug from Swinoujscie to return after five days. So then, maybe *Lützow* was taken to Kronshtadt after all? That is supported by the T-Office which reported on 22 August 1947 that, according to a source 'whose reliability could not be checked' (*'vars vederhäftighet icke kunnat kontrolleras'*), *Lützow* was actually transferred to Kronshtadt.[286] If this really was the case, then she could not have been sunk in July, as claimed by Rohwer and Monakov.

An 'agent photo' of the heavy cruiser Lützow in Swinoujscie in May 1947. The T-Office reported several times on the Soviet attempts to salvage the sunken ship. Here Lützow is afloat except the stern which is still grounded. (Military Archives)

The ex-German cruiser *Nürnberg*, one of the few fairly undamaged fighting ships of the *Kriegsmarine*, was lying in Liepaja's northern closed harbour in early February 1946. The report says that she was moored in a 'well concealed place'.[287] Some of her machinery and equipment were not functioning well after the hand-over, and Germans and Soviets were occupied with repair work.[288] By the middle of April 1946, about 30 Germans worked on the *Nürnberg*, supervising the training of the new Soviet crew. Four German engineers had by then returned to Germany.[289]

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285 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 181, 268.
286 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 26; report nr. 87, 22 August 1947. Source 'dak'.
287 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 354, 5 February 1946.
288 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 368, 15 February 1946. Source 'mk'. KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 451, 22 March 1946. Source 'mk'.
289 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 530, 2 May 1946.

An ex-German naval ship whose identity was not entirely confirmed, but was thought to be *Nürnberg*, was sighted in Tallinn's harbour in July the same year.[290] If it really was the *Nürnberg*, the logical conclusion at the Naval Desk must have been that the cruiser was in good enough shape to allow her to sail for Tallinn some time between April and July 1946. Unless she was towed, of course. However, the presence of *Nürnberg* in Tallinn was confirmed the month after, in August, when it was also reported that she now had an all-Soviet crew and flew the Soviet Navy ensign.[291]

It seems that the T-Office's source was correct, according to information from a somewhat unexpected direction. A piece of Sigint collateral from FRA that slipped through the secrecy net states that the transfer of *Nürnberg* from Liepaja to Tallinn did actually take place in the period 6–10 June 1946. *Nürnberg* steamed northwards accompanied by two ex-German *Z*-destroyers and some Soviet minesweepers.[292]

A typical 'agent photo'. The ex-German cruiser Nürnberg, named Admiral Makarov under Soviet flag. July 1948. (Military Archives)

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290 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 30, 19 July 1946. Source 'ak'.
291 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 87, 26 August 1946. Source 'dk'.
292 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, F IIa, vol. 14. Weekly memorandum from the Naval Desk to the head of Section II reporting on the period 5–11 June 1946. The source is given as 'FRA', which prompted somebody to write an angry comment that the head of the Defence Staff's Foreign Department had been notified of this security breach. The mistake was obviously not repeated in later memorandums.

Next time *Nürnberg* surfaced in the T-Office's reporting was in late January 1947. In this report, the cruiser was for the first time named *Admiral Makarov*, which was the Soviet name given to *Nürnberg*. A new crew had been assigned to *Admiral Makarov* in late 1946, consisting of 68 officers and around 800 non-commissioned officers and men. Most of the men were fresh conscripts with no more than 14 days of military training and dressed in army uniforms. The source also claimed that around 100 boys probably not older than 14 were included in the crew. Due to the fresh and inexperienced crew it was assessed that *Admiral Makarov* could hardly be regarded as a combat unit ready for duty, especially since she had not carried out any exercises at sea since the Soviets took her over. Also, the heavier anti-aircraft guns had been removed from the ship. The report does not mention where the cruiser was based at that time.[293] Next observation of *Admiral Makarov* was from early September 1947. The cruiser was then seen on 9 September lying in the Kronshtadt roads accompanied by a supply ship. A few days later both ships had weighed anchor and departed from Kronshtadt.[294]

According to Kotov, *Admiral Makarov* was on active service on an average of six months each year in the period 1946–1955, so the observations of the cruiser in various ports seem plausible.[295]

Destroyers

A specific number of ex-German destroyers handed over to the Soviet Union was first mentioned in late February 1946; five units had then been transferred into Soviet hands.[296] Of these, three were reported to be in Liepaja in April 1946.[297] In late February 1946 the designations of six ex-German light destroyers of various classes (or torpedoboats, as the T-Office called them) were known. These were *T 12*, *T 17*, *T 33*, *T 107*, *T 158* and *T 196*, and the information corresponds well with Rohwer and Monakov. The ships were small, displacing between 670 and 1,294 tons, and three of them were originally commissioned in the Imperial German Navy before the First World War. Actually, the oldest one, *T 158*, was first in German and then in Soviet naval service between 1908

293 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 325, 29 January 1947. Source 'dak'.
294 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 137, 24 September 1947, Source 'mk'.
295 Kotov (2002), *Remont i modernizatsiya byvshikh germanskikh i ital'yanskikh korabley v sovetskom VMF (1945–1955)*, p. 6.
296 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 391, 26 February 1946. Source 'ek'.
297 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 530, 2 May 1946.

and 1961.[298] An impressive service time for a naval ship considering the developments in ship design that took place during the period.

An ex-German destroyer, probably of the '*Seetier*-class' as it was written in the report, was sighted lying at anchor in Tallinn roads in August 1946. The destroyer had a Soviet flag hoisted, and was manned by a Soviet crew. The destroyer's name was not reported, and was therefore presumably unknown to the source.[299] It is not clear what type of destroyer the T-Office meant by the designation '*Seetier*-class'.

Nine photos taken in late August 1946 of ex-German naval ships lying in Rostock and Warnemünde were enclosed with copy nr. 2 of a report issued in early September. All of the ships were at that time in Soviet possession and had Soviet crews. It had apparently not been possible to identify the ships, since no names are mentioned in the report. Among the ships were a few destroyers, and it was reported that they were the subjects of minor maintenance work. The negatives were not available to the T-Office, which indicates that the photos originated from a foreign partner that had handed over the photos and kept the negatives.[300] In another report issued on the same day more details were given; the mentioned destroyers were located in Rostock, and a guess from the T-Office was that they were possibly the ex-German *Z 23* and *Z 30*.[301] Some time before early November 1946, these two destroyers had been moved to Warnemünde.[302] In Commander Thorén's report, photos from Warnemünde can be studied, which show two destroyers identified as *Z 20 Karl Galster* and *Z 33*. These 'agent photos' were taken in August and October 1946.[303] Thorén's identification is much more plausible than the guess made by the T-Office; both *Z 20* and *Z 33* were in Soviet hands after the war, which *Z 23* and *Z 30* were not. It would seem that *Z 23* did not survive the war since *Z 25*, *Z 29* and *Z 30* were the only survivors of the so-called *Narvik*-class, and all three of them went to Great Britain.[304]

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298 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 391, 26 February 1946. Source 'ek'. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 181, 269–270. Original German class designations were *Torpedoboot 35* (*T 12*), *Torpedoboot 37* (*T 17*), *Flottentorpedoboot 39* (*T 33*) and *Torpedoboot* (*T 107*, *T 158*, *T 196*). The T-Office used the designation torpedoboat (*torpedbåt*), and was therefore closer to the original German designations than the designation light destroyer used by Rohwer & Monakov. A minor printing error can be discerned on p. 270 in Rohwer & Monakov, where it should be *T 196* instead of *T 190*.
299 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 87, 26 August 1946. Source 'dk'.
300 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 119, 9 September 1946. Source 'dk'.
301 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 120, 9 September 1946. Source 'dk'.
302 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 10; report nr. 230, 13 November 1946. Source 'mk'.
303 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 28–29.
304 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 2, part 2, p. 22. *Z 25* was later handed over to the French Navy and renamed *Hoche*.

Another 'agent photo' showing two ex-German destoyers, Z 20 and Z 33, in Warnemünde, October 1946. Hidden behind Z 20 is the former imperial Russian yacht Polyarnaya Zvezda. (Military Archives)

The two destroyers seem to have stayed in the area for some time. Conveniently for the researcher, additional photos from Warnemünde in May 1947 are included in Commander Thorén's report where the ships' identities are established as *Z 20, Z 33*, and *Prochny* (which was actually the Russian name given to *Z 20*), and also two additional destroyers of the Soviet-designed *Silny* type.[305] Because of the mix-up of the two names *Z 20* and *Prochny*, it seems that there actually were only two identified ex-German destroyers in the area—*Z 20 and Z 33*—and possibly a third, unidentified. As late as October the 1st 1947, two ex-German destroyers were undergoing repair work in Rostock, but in the report no clue was given as to their names.[306] Were *Z 20* and *Z 33* still there? No more information is found during the investigation period. The reports, together with the information from Commander Thorén's report, suggest that the two destroyers were moved a few times between Rostock and Warnemünde, two ports closely located.

One ex-German destroyer that was not mentioned in any of the T-Office's reports, but nevertheless was of interest, was the *Z 30*. The destroyer's fate was uncertain, according to the third letter. By the time the fourth letter was issued from the Naval Desk, it was obviously still unknown as to where *Z 30* had finally ended up. Was the destroyer perhaps in Great Britain? Commander Kull asked the acting naval attaché in London, Navy Lieutenant H. Aspenberg,

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305 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 22; report nr. 437, 7 June 1947. Source 'mk'. KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 2, part 3, p. 175. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 269. Kotov (2002), *Remont i modernizatsiya byvshikh germanskikh i italyanskikh korabley v sovetskom VMF*, pp. 4–5, 7.

306 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 29; report nr. 148, 1 October 1947, Source 'mk'.

to confirm whether *Z 30* actually was in British hands. Kull had information that *Z 30* was taken by the Soviet Union, outside the Allies' agreement.[307] Aspenberg answered quickly, and Kull expressed his satisfaction in recieving the information that the destroyer was not in Soviet hands.[308]

It seems that *Z 30* went to Great Britain after all, at least according to Ragnar Thorén who discussed its whereabouts in his report on the Soviet Baltic Fleet. He considered contradictory information about *Z 30* possibly being in Tallinn in the spring of 1947, information emanating from the Swedish naval attaché in Helsinki, as not very accurate. The Finnish intelligence sources that provided the information to the naval attaché were, according to Thorén, 'no longer reliable' (*'ej längre äro tillförlitliga*').[309]

Minesweepers

In early 1946 the presence of one large and two small minesweepers in Ventspils was reported. It was thought that the minesweepers were former German units. No other naval ships were present in Ventspils according to the report, so it is possible that there were no more naval units except the three minesweepers.[310]

Additional minesweepers taken from the German *Kriegsmarine* were observed in Liepaja's 'southern harbour' in early February 1946. They were of type *M 1* (later corrected to *M 37*)[311] and numbered eight in all. It was also reported that six British minesweepers had conducted minesweeping operations just outside Liepaja. No more details about the British activities were provided. Did the Royal Navy assist the Soviet Navy in clearing the waters off Liepaja? In the Latvian port's 'northern harbour' a total of 150-200 smaller ex-German ships of several types were located, according to a 'trustwothy' source, and a number of them were claimed to be small minesweepers.[312]

By early February 1946 a number of German minesweepers had been transferred to Szczecin from harbours to the west by German crews, which were sent back after delivering the ships. However, no Soviet naval ships were observed in the port at that time. A few smaller minesweepers, also of German origin, had been seen in Swinoujscie.[313] Possibly these units remained in the area for some

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307 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:4, vol. 2; letter from Commander Kull to acting naval attaché in London, Navy Lieutenant Aspenberg, 20 August 1947.

308 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B I:4, vol. 2; letter from Commander Kull to acting naval attaché in London, Navy Lieutenant Aspenberg, 9 September 1947.

309 KrA, Navy Staff, H 550a, Ö IV, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 22, 157.

310 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 353, 5 February 1946.

311 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 368, 15 February 1946. Source 'mk'.

312 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 354, 5 February 1946.

313 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 365, 11 February 1946.

time, since around ten minesweepers of *Kriegsmarine* origin, also with Soviet crews, were reported from both Szczecin and Swinoujscie in August 1946.[314]

More minesweepers were during that period were escorted by the British ship *HMS Porcher* from Kiel to Swinoujscie. Due to bad weather the convoy had to seek shelter in Rønne on the island of Bornholm. Despite the fact that the island was occupied by Soviet forces at that time, the T-Office had access to good information via *Total,* its Danish counterpart. The identified ships of the convoy were *K-34, M 34, M 341, KFK 130, KFK 3866, KFK 6331, R 121,* the logistics ship *Tonga,* the trawler *Fahrwohl,* a special ship numbered *3661* and the merchant ship *Helene. M 34, M 341* and *R 121* were minesweepers. All the ex-German ships had German crews, but a Soviet officer was posted on board each ship.[315]

Another convoy led by the merchant ship *Oberhausen* under the British flag brought more ships from Germany to the Soviet Union, among them two motor-minesweepers of the *R*-class. After the transfer—that took place on 9-11 March 1946—*Oberhausen* was to bring the German crews back to their homeland.[316] We will return to this little convoy.

Finally, eight ex-German minesweepers had been sighted in Liepaja's merchant harbour in the middle of April 1946. All of them had Soviet crews.[317]

Submarines

As has already been mentioned, it was agreed in December 1945 that the Soviet Union would receive ten ex-German submarines as war booty. As a result of the advance from the east a number of submarines had been captured in the German ports. The T-Office reported on several occasions in February 1946 on the subject. Some of the captured submarines had been towed to Soviet ports, and submarine parts had moreover been shipped eastwards, loaded on barges and floating docks. A Soviet reluctance to admit how many ex-German submarines the Soviet Navy actually had taken into its possession was also reported. An estimate by the T-Office put the number at a maximum of 50 submarines. The inter-Allied ten-submarine deal was mentioned in the reports, and also the condition agreed upon by the Allies that any excess ex-German submarine would be sunk or scrapped. Whether any sinking or scrapping actually had taken place in the east was not known by the time the reports were issued. It was confirmed that some German submarine crew had volunteered to accom-

314 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report 76, 21 August 1946. Source 'mk'.
315 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 9; report nr. 410, 8 March 1946. Source 'dk'. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet,* pp. 182, 272–273.
316 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 451, 22 March 1946. Source 'mk'
317 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 5; report nr. 530, 2 May 1946.

pany the captured submarines and place themselves at the Soviet Navy's disposal.[318] As a comparison to the T-Office's estimate of 50 submarines, it can be mentioned that in March 1946 the naval attaché in Moscow reported that rumours were circulating of the Soviet forces having confiscated as many as 70 submarines.[319]

Between eight to ten ex-German submarines had by late February 1946 been brought to Liepaja, escorted during the transfer by a British destroyer of the *Orwell*-class.[320] The destroyer's presence in Liepaja had been noted earlier that month, but any information as to why it was there was at that time unavailable,[321] though about two weeks after the first observation the reason for its presence in Liepaja—namely its role as an escort ship—had been confirmed.

More exact details concerning the ten ex-German submarines were also obtained and duly reported in late February 1946 (see table 11 below), though *U 3515* had not yet been transferred into Soviet hands.[322] A comparison with Rohwer and Monakov shows that the T-Office produced correct information on the subject.[323] Since the German designations are exactly the same as those reported in the summary from 1947 discussed earlier in this chapter, it is not impossible that this list was simply included in the summary compiled more than a year later.

Type	German unit designation according to the T-Office, February 1946	German unit designation according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comment
VIIC	*U 1057*	Agree	Carrying the designations *N-22*, *S-81* in Soviet service
VIIC	*U 1058*	Agree	Carrying the designations *N-23*, *S-82*, *PZS-32* in Soviet service
VIIC	*U 1064*	Agree	Carrying the designations *N-24*, *S-83*, *PZS-33*, *UTS-49* in Soviet service

318 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 383, 22 February 1946. KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10, report nr. 394, 27 February 1946. Source 'ek'.
319 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, E II:15, vol. 1; letter from naval attaché, Navy Lieutenant Edenberg, in Moscow to Commander Kull, 14 March 1946.
320 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 373, 18 February 1946.
321 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 354, 5 February 1946.
322 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 391, 26 February 1946. Source 'ek'.
323 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 182, 274–275. Slight discrepancies can be detected in the book. *U 3041* is listed as an ex-German *Type XXI*-submarine commissioned in the Soviet Navy on p. 182. However, in table A6 on pp. 268–275—warships and submarines taken as war booty into the *VMF* 1944–1953—*U 3041* are not listed among the submarines taken by the Soviet Union.

Type	German unit designation according to the T-Office, February 1946	German unit designation according to Rohwer & Monakov	Comment
VIIC	U 1305	Agree	Carrying the designations N-25, S-84 in Soviet service
IXC	U 1231	Agree	Carrying the designations N-26, B-26, KBP-33, UTS-33 in Soviet service
XXI	U 2529	Agree	Carrying the designations N-28, B-28, PZS-34 in Soviet service
XXI	U 3035	Agree	Carrying the designations N-29, B-29, PZS-31 in Soviet service
XXI	U 3041	Agree	Carrying the designations N-30, B-30 in Soviet service
XXI	U 3515	Agree	Carrying the designations N-27, B-27, Bsh-28, UTS-3 in Soviet service
XXIII	U 2353	Agree	Carrying the designations M-31 or M-51 in Soviet service [324]

Table 11. Ex-German submarines handed over to the Soviet Navy as a result of the agreement between the Allied powers.

Finally, a few odd pieces of submarine-related intelligence information reached the users. A few midget submarines, presumably of German origin, were placed on a quay in Kronshtadt in August 1946.[325] And in early September 1946, two smaller ex-German submarines of unidentified types were observed in the Rostock harbour. There were also sections of uncompleted submarines lying around the area.[326]

Miscellaneous Types of Ships

An unspecified number of patrol boats, landing vessels, and motor torpedo boats, probably of German origin, were observed among the large congregation of small ships reported to be moored in Liepaja's 'southern harbour'.[327]

At the same time, a modern submarine depot ship of 5,000 tons, built in Holland, was also moored in Liepaja. It was of German origin and believed to

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324 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 182, 275. On p. 182 it is *M-51* while it is *M-31* on p. 275.

325 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 4; report nr. 87, 26 August 1946. Source 'dk'.

326 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 120, 9 September 1946. Source 'dk'.

327 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 354, 5 February 1946.

have the German name *Carnten*. A submarine salvage ship was also lying in the same part of Liepaja's harbour.[328]

It was expected that in March 1946 24 larger ex-German merchant ships, including a couple of passenger ships, would arrive at Baltic Sea ports after a voyage from Great Britain where they had been picked up by Soviet crews.[329] Then we have the *Oberhausen*-convoy, recently mentioned above. Among the ships in the convoy, T-Office reported, were at least two unknown types of patrol boats.[330]

In early June 1946, it was reported that the Baltic Fleet had at its disposal a total of 130 ex-German landing vessels of various types (the following type designations were used: *AF, ASRI, F, HAL, HFP, L, LC, LOP, LT, MNL, PLC*). In addition to that, six crane ships and salvage ships were now in Soviet possession: *Balangen, Günther Pluschov, Richthofen, BP11, BP31* and *BP45*.[331]

An unspecified number of ex-German torpedo boats were noted in Swinoujscie in late August 1946.[332] Further west, in Rostock, around ten minesweepers or guard ships, an escort ship and a smaller ship with a catapult had been observed. Moreover, in Warnemünde, 34 ships thought to be minesweepers or guard ships of various sizes and a former imperial yacht, believed to be named *Polarstern*, were observed at the same time.[333] The former imperial yacht was probably Czar Nikolay II's *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (Russian for *North Star*, or *Polarstern* in German), which was used by the Soviet Navy as a training ship.[334] Some of these minesweepers—or guard ships—had by early November 1946 been transferred from Rostock to Warnemünde, where also four ex-German torpedo boats of the *Elbing*-class were based.[335] It is unclear in this case what the T-Office really meant by the term 'torpedo boat'. According to tradition, dating back to the imperial days, several types of what in other countries would be called light destroyers were designated *Torpedoboote* in the German Navy, indicating torpedoes as being the main armament of these ships in the first decades of the 20th century. Since many light destroyers, or *Torpedoboote*, were

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328 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 10; report nr. 368, 15 February 1946. Source 'mk'.
329 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 431, 12 March 1946. Source 'mk'.
330 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 6; report nr. 451, 22 March 1946. Source 'mk'.
331 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 2; report nr. 586, 4 June 1946. The name *Günther* is misspelt in the report and written as *Guntner*.
332 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 100, 30 August 1946. Source 'Da'
333 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 120, 9 September 1946. Source 'dk'.
334 Breyer (1992), *Soviet Warship Development, volume 1: 1917–1937*, p. 104. Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 44. *Polyarnaya Zvezda* was built for Czar Alexander III and later used by his son Czar Nikolay II for holidaying in the Finnish archipelago. Tuomi-Nikula (2002), *Kejsaren i skärgården*, pp. 131, 157, 166, 171–172, 175, 196, 209, 219. See also http://www.neva.ru/EXPO96/arm/pz.html and http://www.bz.ru/e052_026.htm
335 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 10; report nr. 230, 13 November 1946. Source 'mk'.

built by the Schichau shipyard in Elbing (today's Elblag in Poland), the *Elbing*-class referred to by the T-Office could simply have been products of this shipyard.[336]

Finally, at the end of the miscellaneous ships' list, we have in Kolobrzeg in early December 1946 an ex-German *Schnellboot* armed with an anti-aircraft gun on the bow and a machine gun on the stern. The hull was, unsurprisingly, painted grey.[337]

* * *

After this investigation it is very clear to us that the T-Office was able to feed the Naval Desk with a steady stream of reports on what had happened to the *Kriegsmarine* ships. Regardless of whether the reporting was timely or contained the information explicitly asked for, the Naval Desk must in any case have been able to fill in some blanks in their tables and index cards with the assistance of the T-Office. Then, of course, it is hard to believe anything else than that the information was compared with collateral information from FRA and other sources, and with some luck all the fragments could be pieced together producing a fairly accurate picture.

An impression of somewhat accurate intelligence information emerges from all these details when we have compared them to the results of modern research. The summary of ex-German ships in Soviet active service from 1947 is almost completely correct. It is to various degrees possible to follow the fates of the larger units: the aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin*, the battleships *Gneisenau* and *Schleswig-Holstein*, and the cruisers *Lützow* and *Nürnberg*. More problematic to follow is the post-war lives of the various destroyers of the *Kriegsmarine*. They were more numerous than the larger ships, and since several destroyer individuals of the same type looked similar, there was a clear problem in identifying particular destroyers. A greater interest seems, not surprisingly, to have been focused on the modern destroyer types. Some uncertainty concerning *Z 30* lasted for quite a long time before it was established that she was actually not in Soviet hands. All ten ex-German submarines taken over by the Soviet Union in accordance with the inter-Allied agreement were correctly reported. More frag-

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336 These *Torpedoboote* were originally designated *T 1* – *T 36*, and all but two of them (T 11 and T 12) were built in Elblag. http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/torpedoboats/torpedoboot1935/index.html (T 1 – T 12)

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/torpedoboats/torpedoboot1937/index.html (T 13 – T 21)

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/torpedoboats/flottentorpedoboot1939/index.html (T 22 – T 36)

337 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 283, 16 December 1946.

mentary intelligence information was produced on various other ex-German vessels such as minesweepers, merchant ships, landing vessels, patrol boats etc.

The strong interest in the ex-German ships is also reflected in the occurence of T-Office information in daily communiqués. As was the case with the Soviet naval ships, the larger units dominated.

Graf Zeppelin was mentioned twice when the carrier was still in Szczecin; the second time when she was afloat again.[338] The assessment that the battleship *Gneisenau*, sunk in Gdynia, happened to be well placed to protect the harbour from storms, as well as the report on repair work under way on *Gneisenau*, were included.[339] Intelligence information on old *Schleswig-Holstein* was also quoted: her presence in Gdynia, the assignment of a crew, the missing artillery, and finally that the battleship was afloat at last.[340] *Lützow* was for some reason an exception among the larger ships; the heavy cruiser did not merit a mentioning in any daily communiqué. Perhaps it was recognized that *Lützow*, in its damaged condition, would never be a fighting unit again? On the other hand *Nürnberg* (or *Admiral Makarov*) was clearly an interesting unit. One reason for that might have been that *Nürnberg* could be put in active Soviet service shortly after the war. *Nürnberg's* presence in Liepaja and the repair work and training carried out by Germans on board the cruiser is mentioned in several daily communiqués.[341] The next piece of information taken from a T-report concerning *Nürnberg* mentioned that she was located in Tallinn, with a Soviet crew.[342]

Less interesting for the compilers was the fate of ex-German destroyers. All information of T-Office origin that can be located in the daily communiqués are a few lines mentioning that three destroyers from the *Kriegsmarine* were seen in Liepaja.[343]

On the other hand, ex-German minesweepers seem to have been slightly more interesting, at least judging from the occurrences in the communiqués. Eight *M 37* minesweepers in Liepaja were included, as well as the presence of an unknown number of small minesweepers in the same port.[344] A vague refer- rence to the *Oberhausen* convoy, which included a pair of minesweepers, can also be detected.[345]

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338 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 34, 28 March 1946; DK 82, 15 October 1946.

339 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 39, 9 April 1946; DK 75, 2 September 1946.

340 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 34, 28 March 1946; DK 73, 19 August 1946; DK 75, 2 September 1946.

341 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 18, 12 February 1946; DK 23, 22 February 1946; DK 35, 30 March 1946; DK 46, 2 May 1946.

342 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 75, 2 September 1946.

343 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 46, 2 May 1946.

344 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 18, 12 February 1946; DK 23, 22 February 1946.

345 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 35, 30 March 1946.

Not surprisingly, submarines of the Soviet Navy was a subject inserted a few times in the daily communiqués. The selected information concerns the ten submarines allotted to the Soviet Union by the inter-Allied agreement.[346]

Finally, we have the information on ex-German ships of various other types reported by the T-Office. A submarine depot ship in Liepaja, six crane ships and salvage ships, and also another referrence to the *Oberhausen* convoy were inserted in daily communiqués.[347]

German Naval Ship's Fates and the Intelligence Cycle

Contrary to the just treated subject of the Soviet merchant marine, the interest for intelligence reports on the naval units of the former *Kriegsmarine* remained in force during almost the entire period of this investigation. It was clearly a prioritized area, and the Naval Desk seems to have worked intensively on the subject, as did the T-Office.

In the first letter the requirement were listed without any comments. The lack of comments indicates a certain lack of knowledge; any information was probably sought after. Later, a remark in the second letter said that work on large artillery ships and destroyers was completed. In the third letter, the requirement did no longer include artillery ships at all, and in the fourth letter the entire subject was said to be completed and the requirement therefore no longer in force. Thus, the work carried out by the Naval Desk seems to have ended satisfactorily. We have already seen that the T-Office provided a lot of input to the Naval Desk, but when did it happen? Let us take a look at table 12.

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346 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 23, 18 February 1946; DK 26, 5 March 1946.
347 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 23, 22 February 1946; DK 35, 30 March 1946; DK 60, 14 June 1946.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	7, 29, 30
	February	5, 11, 15, 18, 21, 22, 26, 27		February	
	March	8, 12, 22, 23	5	March	
18	April	3, 29		April	
	May	2		May	
	June	4		June	7, 20
	July	19		July	
	August	13, 21, 26, 27, 30		August	16, 22
	September	4, 9, 30	10	September	10, 17, 24
	October			October	1
13	November	13, 18, 19		November	
	December	16		December	

Table 12. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on the subject German Naval Ships' Fates.

A study of the table above indicates that there was possibly an expressed interest on ex-German ships even before 1946—which is not surprising given the circumstances after the war. As can be seen, plenty of reports were written in February and March 1946. Or does this circumstance indicate that the T-Office expected an upcoming intelligence requirement—i.e. the fate of ex-German ships—and reported in advance? To presume that the pre-requirement period reporting caused the Naval Desk to show interest is, I think, to underestimate the competence of its officers; they hardly needed reports from a small intelligence service to focus on such an important subject.

During the requirement period the T-Office continued to send in a number of reports dealing with the *Kriegsmarine* remains. Once the the requirement was struck off the list on 10 September 1947 only a few more reports were written. A hiatus is evident between February and May 1947; once again, this was possibly due to the harsh winter of that year.

I dare say that what we see here is a pretty good example of a relation between requirement periods and reports. At least that is the way it looks in the table. Whether the congruence is a coincidence, or if there actually was a connection between the two, is, as usual, very hard to establish. The amount of reports indicates that the various sources, from whom the T-Office obtained their information, were at least to some degree aware of this particular need—or at least had a good nose for what was of interest. Will this conclusion still be persuasive after a more detailed investigation?

If we take a closer look at how the requirement for intelligence on ex-German naval ships' fates changed in detail in the letters, we will find a few

circumstances that possibly will help us in further breaking down this particular intelligence cycle. Initially, in the first letter, it seems that everything was included. According to the second letter, the work on large artillery ships and destroyers had been completed. It is clear enough what a destroyer is, but what did the Naval Desk mean with 'large artillery ship'? Since artillery ships explicitly did not constitute an intelligence requirement at all in the third letter, it must indicate that the remaining category—a category still of interest—from the second letter was a type of artillery ship between large artillery ship and destroyer. Battleships and battlecruisers were certainly large artillery ships—between those types and destroyers, one type of naval ship is traditionally to be found: the cruiser. Therefore, an intelligence requirement for cruisers can be assumed to have been in force for 'one more letter', i.e. between the second and the third letter.

Starting with large artillery ships and destroyers and looking in more detail at when information on these types was issued and compared with the shorter requirement period, we will end up with the result presented in table 13.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	7
	February	21		February	
	March	23	5	March	
18	April	3		April	
	May	2		May	
	June			June	7
	July			July	
	August	13, 26, 27		August	
	September	4, 9	10	September	17
	October			October	1
13	November	13, 18		November	
	December			December	

Table 13. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on ex-German large artillery ships and destroyers.

The cancelling of the interest of these types of ships, as noted in the second letter, did not prevent a few more intelligence reports to flow in to the Naval Desk during 1947. If a good connection between requirement and reporting could be observed earlier in the complete table, the case looks slightly less solid when broken down to the level of two particular types of ships.

Following the discussion above about what can be considered to be found between large artillery ships and destroyers—namely cruisers—reports with

information on such ships of German origin is presented in the table below. The requirement period lasted in this case up to the third letter.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	29
	February	5, 15		February	
	March	22	5	March	
18	April			April	
	May	2		May	
	June			June	7
	July	19		July	
	August	26, 30		August	16, 22
	September		10	September	24
	October			October	1
13	November	19		November	
	December			December	

Table 14. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on ex-German cruisers.

One observation easily made is that reports are fairly evenly distributed over the investigation period; fewer reports were actually issued inside rather than outside the requirement periods. Also in this case there is no longer the clear connection we noted in the complete table.

* * *

The Naval Desk received plenty of reports on ex-German ships, and was probably happy with that. Reporting covered more or less the entire requirement period. It looks as though the T-Office adhered to the user's requirements without a significant number of deviations. When looking in detail at some more specific requirements, a somewhat different picture emerges; reporting is not so congruent with the requirement periods. Therefore, the conclusion is that a clear relation between the two occurrences in the intelligence cycle cannot be established; it depends on at what level of details the process is studied.

8.5 Landing Vessels

'Invasion Scare'

At this stage, it slowly dawns upon us that this research into the T-Office and its reporting resembles more and more a presentation of details behind the threat perception in the Swedish armed forces during the post-war years. After all, as we have already noted, the Soviet Union was perceived as the most likely aggressor to Sweden if a new war started in Europe; the war plans were made accordingly. We started this work with investigating the reporting of the Soviet Navy in general in the Baltic Sea; the navy that would one day face the Swedish Navy, should a critical situation arise. Then we moved on to the ports along the Baltic coast, where an invasion fleet would be assembled, loaded and launched across the sea. No invasion fleet would have been complete without merchant ships on which to load a large number of troops plus heavy and bulky equipment; therefore there was an intelligence requirement for information on the Soviet merchant marine. What remained of the German *Kriegsmarine* that could be put back in fighting shape by the Soviets would of course reinforce their navy, and so increase the threat to Sweden, and that subject has also been investigated.

Continuing along this line of reasoning, one of the lessons from the Second World War was that the first wave of assault troops tasked with securing a beachhead would be most likely to land on a defended beach—to be able to sail calmly into a convenient enemy port with an invasion fleet would really be too much to hope for. Specially designed landing vessels of various sizes and types would then be necessary to bring the troops onto the beach. A large number of such vessels were needed for any invasion task; losses would probably be high, as was amply demonstrated by the many sea-borne invasions of the Second World War. Sweden has a long coast with—despite its often rocky and uneven characteristics—many bays and beaches suitable for an invasion operation. For that reason, it seems natural that there was an interest in receiving information on the number of landing vessels in Soviet possession, and also about the conditions they were in. Neither the Germans nor the Soviets had carried out many landing operations during the war. Therefore, it was perhaps assumed that the size of the Soviet fleet of landing vessels was not as impressive as the British or the American ones, combat proven in the Pacific and along the European coasts as they were. It has been calculated that during the Second World War a total of 36 Soviet landing operations had been made in the Baltic Sea, altogether involving 89,500 soldiers. [348] The need for an amphibious warfare capacity

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348 Andersson & Hellström (2002), *Bortom horisonten—Svensk flygspaning mot Sovjetunionen 1946–1952*, p. 42.

had therefore not been so great. In fact, in 1940 it was clear to the Soviet naval command that its Baltic Fleet did not have the capacity for long-range operations nor for conducting invasions on foreign beaches. As the war with Germany proceeded along somewhat different tracks than the Soviet side had expected, the Baltic Fleet spent most of the war behind mined areas in the Gulf of Finland. Offensive plans made before *Operation Barbarossa* were of little use under those circumstances.[349]

Landing Vessels in Intelligence Reports

The first time landing vessels featured in a report issued by the T-Office, was on 5 February 1946. Among other information concerning ships lying in Liepaja, we find an unspecified number of landing vessels, thought to be ex-German, moored in the closed 'northern harbour' of Liepaja. The types or the sizes of the vessels were not given in the report, and it can be assumed that the observer had no chance to find out more details.[350]

As has already been pointed out, a small convoy led by the ex-German merchant ship *Oberhausen* sailed in March the same year from Germany to the Soviet Union. The convoy contained two landing vessels in addition to the minesweepers and patrol boats already discussed.[351]

A much more detailed report was issued on 4 June 1946, where a total of 130 landing vessels 'or similar sea transport vessels' (*'eller liknande sjötransport-medel'*) of German origin were listed with type designations and numbers. The types were named *AF, ASRI, F, HAL, HFP, L, LC, LOP, LT, MNL,* and *PLC*.[352] The attentive reader will recognize this piece of intelligence information as already briefly dealt with in the chapter on German naval ships' fates.

Apart from using landing vessels specifically designed for the purpose, it was also possible to use barges to transport troops and equipment. The number of Soviet barges in the Baltic Sea was in early November 1946 estimated to be

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349 Åselius (2002), *Det fientliga Finland och det 'fientligt neutrala' Sverige,* pp. 221–222.
350 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 11; report nr. 354, 5 February 1946.
351 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 8; report nr. 451, 22 March 1946. Source 'mk'.
352 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 2; report nr. 586, 4 June 1946. The numbers of the various types were as follows: *AF (10, 11, 20, 26, 27, 31, 33, 40, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 100, 102), ASRI (no numbers given), F (09, 81, 103, 109, 112, 114, 115, 166, 175, 188, 196, 199?, 212, 214, 221, 223, 224, 230, 233, 235, 236, 238, 240, 261, 268, 269, 271, 276, 279, 319, 383, 400, 452 532, 571, 573, 575, 576, 579, 981, 1049, 1062), HAL (38, 47), HFP (108, 113, 187, 192, 204, 208, 220, 225, 226, 246, 262, 265, 267, 286, 287, 384, 385, 390, 392, 600, 840, 842), L (552, 554), LC (391, 533, 534, 537, 543, 552, 555, 557, 559, 560, 561, 816, 831, 834, 837, 843), LOP (013, 027, 301, 311, 316, 372, 374, 381, 558, 571, 813, 817, 818), LT (?21, 490, 605, 821, 867, 875, 876, 879, 881, 976, 979, 980, 1048, 1061, 1063, 1103), MNL (22), PLC (no numbers given).*

around 2,000. In this number all kinds of barges were included: self-powered barges, towed barges and smaller barges without deck. Most of them had been captured during the Soviet advance along the Baltic coast, and later transferred to primarily Leningrad, where also a large number of captured tugs were concentrated.[353] In a follow-up report, issued in late February 1947, it was written that most of the barges were now moored along the Neva River east of Leningrad. A smaller number of captured barges were also found in Riga and Klaipeda. There was no excess number of barges in the other ports along the Baltic coast, what could be observed was estimated to correspond well to existing transport needs. Some of the ex-German barges were also used on the Soviet canals.[354]

What might have caught the attention of the users in Section II was a short piece of information (which we have already touched upon in the chapter on the Soviet merchant marine) in a report from late October 1947 dealing mostly with the port of Stralsund and the adjacent areas. At Hidden See, a small island just west of the island of Rügen, Soviet troops had carried out a landing exercise in September the same year. The participation of special landing vessels was not mentioned, only that a few smaller naval ships and merchant ships had been involved in the exercise.[355] If so, it was probably a minor exercise, but this report is the only one issued during 1946 and 1947 where a landing exercise is actually reported. But, to be honest, reporting military exercises seems not to have been the main task of the T-Office; it can also be argued that Humint is perhaps not the best provider of details concerning, for instance, a landing exercise. The Sigint organization FRA was presumably more adept at reporting such occurrences

During the late summer and autumn of 1947 some of the landing vessels earlier reported lying on the Neva River were moved to Tallinn. To confuse things further, a few of them had also been towed back to Leningrad. Nevertheless, the transfer of landing vessels to a port somewhat closer to Sweden must have been noted with some interest.[356]

* * *

Landing vessels were not, it seems, an easy subject on which to collect intelligence. What we find in the T-Office's archive is mostly information of various landing vessels taken from Germany. Barges of all types and their whereabouts

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353 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 9; report nr. 211, 2 November 1946. Source 'mk'.
354 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 16; report nr. 347, 26 February 1947. Source 'mk'.
355 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 30; report nr. 181, 27 October 1947. Source 'tot'. The report actually says Hiddensöe, but the name Hidden See is printed on a Swedish sea chart from 1951, scale 1:550,000.
356 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 33; report nr. 220, 5 December 1947. Source 'Hu'.

were also reported, but a late-time observer may be forgiven for wondering if such vessels really could be useful in an invasion operation across the Baltic Sea. This could only be possible in very calm weather.

Looking at the daily communiqués we find some information on landing vessels. Once again, the *Oberhausen* convoy was referred to; as we have seen above, it was comprised of several types of smaller naval ships, among them two landing vessels.[357] The number of 130 landing vessels of German origin now in Soviet hands was quoted, as was the estimation of 2,000 mostly ex-German barges in ports along the Baltic coast and the Gulf of Finland.[358]

Landing Vessels and the Intelligence Cycle

Neither was the intelligence requirement for information on landing vessels a short-lived one. From the first to the fourth and last letter these vessels were deemed something worth keeping an eye on. (Though the subject was, in the fourth letter, introduced into the new subject of Post-War Types of Ships, it will be treated fully in this paragraph.) The continuous requirement can also have been a result of the seemingly—at least judging from the T-Office's production—scarce information available on the subject. Limited information on a subject does not automatically strike that intelligence requirement off the list, provided that the subject itself remains considered important.

That there was a lack of information is clearly expressed in the first letter, where it is written that no new information was available, thus indicating that whatever information the Naval Desk had in their safes was not considered up-to-date. Half a year later, in letter number two, the intelligence requirement was slightly modified aiming it at modern types of landing vessels. Since this was not changed in the third letter—the work on landing vessels was simply continued—we can assume that the emphasis remained on modern types. One can of course ask oneself what was meant with 'modern types'. A plausible explanation can be found in the fourth letter, where it says that the subject of landing vessels will henceforth be included in the subject post-war type of ships (the seventh and last of the subjects investigated in this work). And it makes sense that the Naval Desk was looking for intelligence on 'modern' (i.e. post-war) landing vessels, since by the time the fourth letter was sent out it was, two and a half years since the most devastating war in Europe's history had ended. Improvements on ship design based on war experience continued even after the summer of 1945.

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357 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 35, 30 March 1946.
358 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 60, 14 June 1946; DK 90, 14 November 1946.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	
	February	5		February	26
	March	22	5	March	
18	April			April	
	May			May	
	June	4		June	
	July			July	
	August			August	
	September		10	September	
	October			October	27
13	November	2		November	
	December			December	5

Table 15. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on the subject Landing Vessels.

When interpreting table 15 above literally, it looks very much like most reporting was a result of the expressed need of intelligence on landing vessels, with the addition that there could possibly also have been an interest already in the first months of 1946 or even in late 1945; two reports are dated before the first letter. As can be seen, all but these two reports were issued within the requirement period.

However, since the requirement period covers most of 1946 and all of 1947, and since there were few reports issued on the subject, the existence of (or the lack of) any connection between requirement and reporting is impossible to establish. The few reports on the subject can very well have been the result of an awareness of the intelligence requirement—the scarcity can be attributed to other causes; e.g. that the relatively small size and low draught of landing vessels made it possible to moor them in inner, shallow parts of harbours or on rivers, thus making it more difficult for a temporary observer to discover their whereabouts.

* * *

All that can be said is that the T-Office did report on a subject of which there was an intelligence requirement. It did not do so frequently, but the odd pieces of intelligence must in any case have added to the knowledge of the subject at the receiving end. It is not possible to establish who was the driving force in the intelligence cycle.

8.6 Coastal Artillery in Neighbouring Countries

Why the Interest in Coastal Artillery?

Since we have so far dealt with subjects that in one way or another could consti-
tute a threat to Sweden in case of war, it is a bit surprising to find an expressed
interest in coastal artillery. Shore batteries are usually fixed in concrete and
cannot move anywhere. They are installed for defence purposes only. Besides, a
gun has a limited firing range. Why this interest?

From Sweden's point of view, the Swedish Navy would have been the only
fighting service threatened by coastal artillery. The Air Force had no interest in
these weapons. But when would the navy navigate within the firing range of, for
example, Soviet artillery batteries around Liepaja. The only reason would have
been if the Swedish Navy, once a war had been initiated, intended to shell the
port to prevent enemy fighting ships and invasion fleets from going out to sea.
In that case, the navy would be wise to pay attention to the eventual existence
of artillery defending the port. But, on the other hand, air attacks would prob-
ably be a greater threat than coastal artillery to the Swedish ships. Once, during
fights for funds in the 1920s and 1930s, the navy claimed that it, and not the
air force, would be the service best suited to destroy enemy airfields from which
bombers would take off for Sweden.[359] The argument was not persuasive in
those days—suffice it to remember that for such tactics to be successful, the
airfields would have to be situated close to the shore—and nobody can have
thought seriously about it after the Second World War. So, we are back to the
idea of a Swedish Navy going offensive. In that context, the requirement for
information on coastal artillery makes at least some sense. Or can the explana-
tion be that a foreign state had requested such information from Sweden? This
is possibly something we will never know.

The presentation of this subject is divided into geographical areas, starting
with the Baltic states and continuing via the Polish coast to the Soviet occupa-
tion zone in Germany.

Coastal artillery in the Intelligence Reports

Coastal Artillery in the Baltic States

Fortifications were under construction in July 1946 on the northern tip of
the long and thin Neringa sand bar (formerly known as Kurische Nehrung),
stretching from today's Kaliningrad region to Klaipeda. The very narrow strait
between the northern tip of Neringa and Klaipeda on the mainland is also

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359 Böhme (1982), *Svenska vingar växer. Flygvapnet och flygindistrin 1918–1945*, p. 27.

the only way into the port. In order to prevent intruders from forcing their way into Klaipeda the defence of this area is crucial, and it would be natural to fortify at least the tip of Neringa. No more details were reported about the fortifications, and it was then not known whether there were, or intended to be guns facing out to sea. [360] But, unless there were, how could the entrance be effectively defended?

Along the Latvian coast from Ventspils to Ovizi and Pitrags, in the vicinity of Uzava and Paplaka, there were by July 1947 numerous concrete fortifications armed with heavy artillery. The forts in the Paplaka area were tasked with the defence of Liepaja. Large ammunition depots were situated close to the fortifications and also hidden in the adjacent forests.[361]

Further north, in Estonia, the T-Office reported in October 1947 an intensified construction of fortifications. The areas subject to the work were the islands of Hiuumaa, Saaremaa and Osmussaar. Apart from the new constructions, older forts were also improved on. Heavy artillery pieces of unspecified calibre were transported to the islands to arm these fortifications. Large numbers of workers had been brought from the mainland to carry out the work. Since there was not enough cement available in Estonia, additional cement was transported on barges from Poland to the construction sites. At that time, there was no fortification work going on in Paldiski, further east of Osmussaar. It was not known if constructions known to start there earlier in the autumn of 1945 had been temporarily interrupted or simply cancelled.[362]

Coastal Artillery in Poland

Emplacements for heavy guns were completed by March 1946 in the area around today's Ustka. The battery was constructed for six or seven large-calibre guns; calibres up to 40 centimetres were mentioned. A few guns had already been put in place, but the work was not completed, and Soviet engineers were still working at the sealed-off and guarded area. Due to the large calibres, it could not be excluded that the guns had originally been mounted on ships. It was further suggested that some of them could originate from the battleship *Schleswig-Holstein*.[363]

At a place called Orlowo, halfway between Gdynia and Sopot, Soviet shore batteries were constructed. The area was off-limits and guarded. No details concerning the number of guns, calibres etc. were given in the report.[364]

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360 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 2; report nr. 29, 18 July 1946. Source 'pk'.

361 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 26; report nr. 74, 16 August 1947. Source 'H-p'.

362 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 30; report nr. 165, 13 October 1947. Source 'K-g'.

363 KrA, T-Office, film 1A, microfiche 7; report nr. 484, 3 April 1946.

364 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 5; report nr. 110, 4 September 1946. Source 'mk'.

A few kilometres northwest of Nowy Port ex-German shore batteries were observed in early December 1946 in an apparently undamaged, or at least recently repaired state. Polish troops were quartered nearby, but it was not mentioned in the report if the Poles were actually manning the guns.[365] Old German forts in Kolobrzeg were mentioned in a later report, but these forts were not armed with artillery.[366]

Twelve heavy guns were transferred to Gdynia during the autumn of 1946. In December work was under way to assemble the guns and mount them on concrete emplacements west of the entrance to Gdynia harbour.[367]

Coastal Artillery in the Soviet Zone in Germany

Only one piece of information relevant to this subject was reported from eastern Germany during the period of this investigation. In October 1947 a report stated that the demolition of military objects on the island of Rügen had not included shore batteries at Dwarsien. They remained operational, manned by Soviet soldiers. Each battery consisted of three guns of unknown calibre, and there were three batteries in all.[368]

* * *

As could be expected, the few pieces of intelligence dealing with coastal artillery contains information on forts and guns in strategically important areas along the coast (after all, that is where such installations should be set up). Such areas are ports, straits, inlets and potential invasion beaches. The reports are not detailed, and it is doubtful if they could add anything important to what other sources could produce. A planning procedure of naval strike operations against, for instance, Klaipeda, could hardly be assisted by what the T-Office could offer on this subject. Considering the offensive Swedish reconnaissance flights along the Soviet-held coast in those years, it seems more plausible that the interpretation of aerial photos yielded better intelligence information.

Even though there was little information on this subject provided by the T-Office, coastal artillery nevertheless figured in two daily communiqués. There we find the construction of fortifications on the northern tip of the Neringa off Klaipeda, and the gun emplacement constructions in the Ustka area in Poland.[369]

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365 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 265, 6 December 1946. Source 'mke'.
366 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 13; report nr. 283, 16 December 1946.
367 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 14; report nr. 298, 7 January 1947. Source 'mk'.
368 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 30; report nr. 166, 15 October 1947. Source 'da'.
369 KrA, Fst/U, H 202:3, B II, vol. 3; DK 39, 9 April 1946; DK 71, 2 August 1946.

Coastal Artillery Installations and the Intelligence Cycle

In Commander Kull's first letter the requirement was listed as 'coastal artillery installations in neighbouring countries', where there was a particular knowledge gap concerning the Soviet sphere of the Baltic coast. No changes were made to the requirement in the second letter, except that a study of coastal artillery in the neighbouring Nordic countries was said to be completed. However, the Soviet zone still remained an almost unknown area. (Though it is not a question to be answered in this work, one could quietly ponder on which Nordic countries had been under scrutiny—and for what reason.) In the same letter another aspect of coastal artillery was introduced as an intelligence requirement, namely wartime experiences as to its effectiveness as an anti-invasion defence. In the third letter the interest in coastal artillery installations seemingly vanished, while the anti-invasion experiences remained on the list. The latter subject was however considered less relevant, and it was not included at all in the fourth letter. Anti-invasion capacities were however, not among the subjects chosen at the beginning of this work. Besides, it is hardly to be expected that any experiences of that kind could be found in the east, since very few beach landings were carried out by the Soviet forces during the war. The allies had far more experience of attacking a beach defended by artillery, and that information was readily available in the West.

Judging from the letters, the interest in coastal artillery installations in the East lasted barely a year. The limited requirement period could then be expected, as opposed to the subject of landing vessels with its longer requirement period, to provide a somewhat better platform for analysing possible connections between requirement and reporting.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	7
	February			February	
	March		5	March	
18	April	3		April	
	May			May	
	June			June	
	July	18		July	
	August			August	16
	September	4	10	September	
	October			October	13, 15
13	November			November	
	December	6, 16		December	

Table 16. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on the subject Coastal Artillery in Neighbouring countries.

As is clearly evident in table 16 above, no reports dealing with coastal artillery installations were issued during the investigation period until about two weeks before the first requirement letter. The T-Office wrote another five reports within the requirement period. During the second half of 1947 three more reports were produced at a time when the requirement was no longer in force.

At least in this case the T-Office was slightly ahead of the requirement—albeit by only a couple of weeks—adhering to the requirement period with the exception of the reports from August and October 1947. The latter ones were possibly either as a result of the 'system inertia', or the tendency to report whatever intelligence came in from the sources.

* * *

Section II and the T-Office rode out on the track more or less at the same time, so it is difficult to try to determine who pushed whom in the intelligence cycle. The fact that the first T-report was issued two weeks before Commander Kull's first letter could indicate that it raised the attention of the subject at the Naval Desk, and that coastal artillery installations was hastily added to the wish list. There should have been no problems for the Naval Desk to handle matters relatively quickly—if the system claimed to be well functioning. If that was the case, then the T-Office was initially the driving force. In order not to be carried away on a tangent, we need to remind ourselves that this is speculation. We also have no idea what advanced information on upcoming intelligence requirements, in this case and others, Thede Palm received from his meetings with the head of Section II and others.

Suffice it to conclude that the T-Office did report on the subject, though not very frequently, and that most of the reporting was done within the requirement periods.

8.7 Abandoned Types and Post-War Types of Ships

War at sea had developed in a direction where the usefulness of large artillery ships such as battleships had diminished significantly. Soviet pre-war naval thinking had produced ship designs that proved inadequate for modern warfare at sea.[370] These lessons had not been lost on the Soviet Navy, but the more clear-sighted senior naval officers did not only have to tackle the problems of a

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370 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 189.

war-shattered industry and the general difficulties of the country after the war. A much more formidable obstacle had to be negotiated.

No important decision concerning naval matters—like so many other issues, great or small in the Soviet Union—seems to have taken place without the consent of the *Generalissimus* Josef Stalin. He was a shoemaker's son turned dictator, who to a significant degree influenced the naval construction programme after the war. He preferred artillery ships, primarily heavy cruisers with big guns. He was also reluctant to build aircraft carriers. This was a view Comrade Stalin had retained since before the war. The navy commander, Fleet Admiral Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, raised the issue of a construction programme adapted to the war experience already in October 1944. During the autumn of 1945 the construction programme for 1946-1955 was agreed upon after several high-level meetings chaired by Stalin. The undisputed leader of the Soviet Union had the final say on the building list, of course, and thus his decisions resulted in a reduction in the number of battleships and aircraft carriers, an increase in the number of heavy cruisers and battle cruisers, a cancelling of heavy destroyers, a limit on the construction of large submarines to no more than forty units, and so on.[371]

Kuznetsov had apparently grasped what lay in the future for naval warfare and expressed his views in September 1945:

> No battleships! At least aircraft destroyed the *Tirpitz*. Really she didn't operate, but through her service time she was making obstacles for the German Fleet's combat activity... Cruisers and destroyers proved their own value. Submarines are combat ships with good prospects, but they will be in need of support by surface ships and aircraft operations. So there should be aircraft carriers![372]

Discussions on the post-war Soviet Navy were held in an atmosphere of uncertainty; the navy commanders were hampered by their ignorance of the enigmatic Stalin's intentions in global policy.[373] In the end, the construction programme of late 1945 was only partially fulfilled.[374] And no real aircraft carrier was built until the last decades of the 20th century. Rohwer and Monakov write that back in 1946 representatives of the shipyards were in fact opposed to building aircraft carriers at all, blaming lack of experience and shipyard capacity.[375] It took a considerable time to rise up to the task; the first and so far the only full-decked aircraft carrier went into the service of the Russian Navy in the late 1990s. As

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371 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 178, 185–188. Norberg (2002), *Sjökrig i Östersjön. Sovjetiska planer och tysk aktivitet inför uppgörelsen 1941*, pp. 159–161.
372 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 185.
373 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 189.
374 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 185, table 10.2.
375 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 190.

fate would have it, it was in the end named *Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov*—the old admiral probably smiled approvingly in his heaven.[376]

After this discussion it is time to look at what the T-Office could find out about the post-war constructions for the Soviet Navy. The subject has briefly been touched upon when dealing with the other intelligence requirements, but could the T-Office produce specific intelligence information on what was 'in the pipeline'? Or, as must be remembered, what types of ships were intended to be replaced by post-war types? Before we move on, it is perhaps appropriate to define what can be regarded as a 'post-war type of ship'. The simplest and best definition is a type of ship whose construction had been influenced by the experience gained during the war.

Post-War Ship Development and the Intelligence Reports

Compared to several of the other subjects covered so far, one cannot say that the T-Office succeeded in collecting much information on this subject. We have already come across some information about construction work at Soviet shipyards in the chapter dealing with Soviet sea power. A 'foreign expert' had declared his opinion that battleships were outmoded, no construction of aircraft carriers would take place—but the future for cruisers, destroyers and submarines was brighter.[377] With hindsight one can say that this opinion was not too far off the mark. A later report listed a number of surface ships and submarines claimed to be under construction for the Baltic Fleet, comprising one battleship, four cruisers, six to eight destroyers and around ten submarines.[378] The investigation made earlier in this work of other reports showed that the T-Office was not able to provide any more detailed or accurate information on the construction at Soviet shipyards of any of these or other types of ships in 1946 or 1947. What it reported was in essence the existence of a number of ships built before or during the war. Admittedly, as has already been pointed out, the shipyard industry was in poor condition after the war, and did certainly need time to start up production. The wartime loss of its capacity was about 40 per cent, and the output was lower than what it had been back in 1937.[379]

The 'foreign expert' referred to above, also claimed that the Soviets at that moment did not nurture any plans for building aircraft carriers. When tactical co-operation between naval and air forces would be necessary, air support

376 Pavlov (1997), *Voyennye korabli Rossii 1997–1998 g.*, p. 38. Pavlov (1997), *Warships of the USSR and Russia 1945–1995*, pp. 87–90.

377 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.

378 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 27; report nr. 102, 2 September 1947. Source 'no + da'.

379 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, pp. 185–186.

would be provided by land-based aircraft.[380] Naturally, this would limit such operations to the action radius from air bases located adjacent to the coast.

It apparently took some time for the shipyard industry to pick up speed. In January 1947 the T-Office reported, in the same report and once again referring to the 'foreign expert', that no ships of post-war types were laid down at the shipyards. The reason cited was, not unexpectedly, the war-damages.[381] However, shipyards slowly started completing the unfinished pre-war designs, but these efforts did not produce much of a result in the period this work is dealing with.[382]

* * *

Summarizing the reporting on this subject does not result in anything very comprehensive. It was obviously very difficult to collect intelligence on which ships, if any, of post-war types were under planning or under construction. That is not surprising; few things are as tricky as finding out what to expect within a few years, being it military hardware or political actions. Since we are dealing with a period of an emerging Cold War, a secrecy-obsessed Soviet Union and limited possibilities to access needed information, the difficulties for the T-Office to report on this subject is very understandable. It is doubtful whether the Naval Desk became any the wiser from the T-Office's reports.

As can be expected, this intelligence requirement did not figure in any daily communiqué. That is easily explained, since the two relevant T-Office reports we have identified were issued in 1947, and unfortunately, as has been mentioned earlier, the issuing of the daily communiqués ceased in early 1947.

Abandoned Types and Post-War Types of Ships and the Intelligence Cycle

This was probably the most difficult subject on which to produce intelligence reports. To a not negligible extent it has to do with long-term intentions and actions, which are areas hard for a Humint intelligence service to penetrate unless it has access to very well placed sources. Nevertheless, there was an intelligence requirement on the subject.

In the second letter it was introduced as intentions to abandon particular types of ships, and the requirement remained in force after the third letter. In the fourth letter it remained on the list though it was henceforth to be included in the more encompassing subject post-war types of ships (to which the subject

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380 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.
381 KrA, T-Office, film 1, microfiche 15; report nr. 326, 30 January 1947. Source 'dak'.
382 Rohwer & Monakov (2001), *Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet*, p. 192–193.

Data on Landing Vessels was also transferred). It is logical that older ships were replaced by newer ones; it is also logical that, based on experiences, new types would replace old types.

As declared in Commander Kull's letters, the requirement period thus covered more than a year; from late 1946 through the entire 1947. There would not be too much guesswork involved in assuming that this probably was a long-lived intelligence requirement. New combat platforms and new equipment developed and put into service on 'the other side' normally constitute a permanent intelligence requirement for any navy.

1946			1947		
Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date	Intel. req.	Month	Reporting Date
	January			January	30
	February			February	
	March		5	March	
18	April			April	
	May			May	
	June			June	
	July			July	
	August			August	
	September		10	September	2
	October			October	
13	November			November	
	December			December	

Table 17. A comparison of the requirement periods and the dates on issued reports on the subject Abandoned Types and Post-War Types of Ships.

The difficulties in obtaining intelligence on this subject is clearly mirrored by the result of this investigation. Contents of no more than two reports can actually be categorized to belong in table 17. This is not very impressive, keeping in mind the fairly extensive reporting on some other subjects we have already went through.

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Reports were issued on the subject, yes, but in such small numbers and with a requirement period of more than one year, making it impossible to say anything conclusive about the effects on the reporting by the issued intelligence requirements.

9 Conclusions and Discussions

We have come a long way since the initial discussions; a reader equipped with a good memory may recall the ideas the entire work was based upon. An attempt has been made to carry out a study of the intelligence cycle in reality; a reality where we have a set of intelligence requirements directed to one part of the intelligence community (if not explicitly to the T-Office), and a large number of intelligence reports produced by the T-Office that to various degrees answer the asked questions. What we lack is the feedback from the user to the producer, though the existence of some information in various summaries issued to higher military commanders and staff personnel can be regarded as an indication of the importance attached to it by the user—the Naval Desk of Section II—and thus as a sort of an indirect feedback.

The basic idea behind the applied method was that the various intelligence requirements to the naval attachés also in some way were given to the T-Office, since the entire intelligence community can be expected to have strived towards the same goal. If it did not, then there was a terrible fault in the whole system. At least as far as the T-Office is concerned, that was clearly not the case; that has more than satisfactorily been demonstrated in this work. A critical reader may take malicious delight in pointing out that there is no certain evidence of these particular intelligence requirements ever reaching the T-Office. That is true, as I have pointed out several times. However, it is my humble opinion that this study has proved with certainty that there is absolutely no evidence that the requirements *did not* reach the T-Office. On the contrary, I think it is safe to claim that 'circumstantial evidence' has proved beyond doubt that the T-Office

was very well aware of the wishes from the Naval Desk: the T-Office *did* really report on the subjects of interest.

The existence of the intelligence requirements allowed us to attack the reports from the T-Office with two main questions in mind: firstly to find out to what degree the T-Office was able to respond to the various requirements, and secondly to try to establish who was actually the driving force in the intelligence cycle.

The chosen method has thus proved to be fruitful. It has demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to circumvent the lack of a critical link in the intelligence cycle by assuming that the missing information can be found in the archives of closely related organizations. Not even a highly secret intelligence service can live isolated from the rest of the world. On the contrary, such an organization—if any—must be in touch with the real world. It must be in touch with its sources, and it must be in touch with other parts of the intelligence community. Admittedly, a certain amount of luck is needed when researching the field of intelligence history; without Commander Kull's four letters it would probably have been impossible to carry out this investigation. Since some intelligence services have a habit of destroying their documents, the researcher can feel himself on a par with medieval historians; what has survived has survived. On top of that, the problem for the researcher is often to locate the surviving documents in the archives; they may not always be found where they are expected to be.

Our investigation of the reporting has made it clear that the T-Office provided intelligence on some of the intelligence requirements, and less so on others. The results prove, I believe, that reality always rules, and thereby indicates the truth in Michael Herman's words quoted earlier in this work:

> All this rules out a simplistic coupling between requirements with action, which is influenced fundamentally by what is possible.[383]

What about the results then? Not surprisingly, the requirements that the T-Office could best respond to were those dealing with large, easily visible objects such as surface combatants from destroyer size and upwards of both Soviet and ex-German origin, and quays and cranes in ports and merchant ships. It was obviously harder to provide intelligence on smaller objects like landing vessels, which were more easily tucked away in inner corners of the harbours or on rivers. Even less reporting dealt with coastal artillery, objects that may not always have been very visible from the restricted routes merchant ships had to follow when sailing into a Soviet port. New types of ships under construction or in the planning stage were difficult subjects on which to obtain information, which is not surprising considering that to succeed, it is necessary to have access to very

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383 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 291.

well placed sources. Comparisons with modern research have shown us that the T-Office very often produced correct information. It could be argued that in a few cases the T-Office's reports were able to correct some minor discrepancies in the works of modern navy historians.

This generalization of the results is also mirrored in the pieces of information of T-Office origin inserted in the daily communiqués, where the Soviet naval ships and the ex-German naval ships were frequently represented.

Having the sources it had, i.e. apparently mostly merchant marine officers, the T-Office was to a considerable degree dependent on the whims of the shipping companies in routing their merchant ships. If, for some reason, it was not considered profitable to sail to the ports in Soviet-held territory, there were few chances to obtain information from those places. Intelligence was sometimes provided by foreign partners, who may have had better opportunities (or chances) of sending 'sharp eyes' to such places where the T-Office could not. Weather was another factor that influenced the collection. A frozen Baltic Sea severely limited shipping movements during the winter of 1947, a fact that is clearly mirrored in the reporting.

Such factors influenced the T-Office's work. In combination with other factors that could have limited the access to sources and information, this makes it clear to us that Humint at least in those days was a slow business. Quick reactions could not be expected, possibly one of the reasons behind the difficulties we have encountered in establishing who was the driving force in the intelligence cycle; other reasons are the absence of any documents containing intelligence requirements before Commander Kull's first letter in April 1946, and also the lack of feedback. Kull indicated in his first letter that several of the intelligence requirements were not new, and it is therefore not really possible for us to say if the T-Office was ahead of the Naval Desk or not on those subjects.

It is very hard to say something on the working methods applied by the T-Office, though a careful study of, above all, the microfilms containing the correspondence would probably reveal a bit or two. Basically, the process was very simple: information flowed from the wide range of sources through various levels of middlemen to Stockholm and the central part of the T-Office, and there the information was compiled, compared with earlier reporting, credibility of sources assessed, and the result was finally reported to the users. A general impression is that the T-Office did not do very much analysis work before reporting; that seems to have been left for the users themselves to do. Thede Palm's organization reported mostly facts rather than assessments. It is not known whether the T-Office had directives from Section II to stick to reporting, and let the 'professionals' do the analysis. Such a 'conflict' between user and producer seems to be an eternal phenomenon. Actually, the producer may often be able to carry out some of the analysis, and thereby save the user a

lot of work, but the user may not always trust the producer's competence in this respect, and would rather like to do all the analysis himself. It is not rare, in such cases, that the user ends up with frustratingly deep piles of reports on his desk, having precious little time to analyse them properly. That situation does not please the producer, of course, who may become frustrated when understanding that a part of its reporting has been more or less ignored. But, as noted above, we do not know if there was an agreement between Section II and the T-Office where the latter produced no analysis.

Without repeating too much of the discussions from the earlier chapters, I shall conclude by saying that the T-Office definitely, on most subjects, did an excellent job and reported not only within the periods of requirement—but also outside them. Unfortunately, we must realize that it has not been possible for us to establish a clear case of any driving force in the intelligence cycle during the investigation period. Despite that one of the intentions of this work was to prove—or disprove—Michael Herman's reasoning of the producer as the driving force, the result may not be so disappointing after all. The T-Office and the Naval Desk of Section II were not out of phase with each other; the T-Office did definitely not lag behind in reporting on subjects where it had even the slightest chance of collecting intelligence.

Perhaps the result also indicates something else? If we leave aside the uncertainties with the written formal requirements, as we know them, ever reaching the T-Office: is it possible that Palm and his small organization worked along these lines anyway? If there was a good relationship between the T-Office and primarily Section II, as Palm claims in his little book,[384] it could hardly have been difficult to communicate regularly, if not daily. It is not unlikely that the T-Office was aware in the beginning of 1946, or even earlier, of the basic outlines of the intelligence requirements, which Commander Kull formalized in his letters to the attachés starting in April 1946. His letters could have been an attempt to direct and inform the attachés in a more structured way, and, if that was the case, Kull quite possibly did not concoct or formulate the requirements whilst writing the letters. The intelligence requirements were most certainly a result of discussions within the Naval Desk and Section II, discussions which could have been going on for some time and which then no doubt were picked up by Thede Palm long before the attachés were made aware of what they were supposed to be looking for. Admittedly, this is a speculation, but it is a very plausible one. As in all walks of life, relationships are also important in the intelligence community. Where good relationships exist it is likely that a lot of information, such as intelligence requirements, was passed on in an informal way before formal documents were issued—if that ever happened. Could it

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384 Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, p. 61.

even have been the case that the T-Office was ahead, perhaps not of the user, but of another group of producers, namely the naval attachés?

This reasoning makes us inclined to question the practical use of formal intelligence requirements. They may very well have a justified role as a basis for dialogue between user and producer, and as an instrument controlling breaches against the legal mandate.[385] At the same time, it can be argued that formal intelligence requirements shall not constitute the basis for blind obedience; they shall be used as guidelines and not as detailed instructions. What matters most is the relationship between user and producer:

> Intelligence in practice listens to what customers say, not to formal requirements.[386]

An impression of a Swedish 'invasion scare' remains after this study of intelligence requirements and the reports issued by the T-Office. The hereditary foe was once again ruling over the Baltic states, it was in possession of a powerful war machine that had driven the *Wehrmacht* from Moscow to Berlin, and a rift was quickly widening between the western and the eastern victors once Germany had surrendered. It was soon after the war declared by the Swedish supreme commander that the most likely threat would come from the east. The Soviet sea power in the Baltic Sea would then become an important instrument in an invasion. To express it as a slight understatement, it could hardly have been a secret in those days that the Soviet Union possessed an enormous and battle-hardened army, and should a minor part of that army be given orders to invade Sweden, the situation would be very serious indeed for the Swedish armed forces. The unknown factor was, however, if a sea-borne invasion would be practically feasible. Did the Soviet Navy have the capacity to transport army divisions across the Baltic Sea? Did it have the capacity to effectively protect an invasion armada during the crossing? Could the Soviet-held ports handle the massive task of assembling a large number of ships and load the necessary number of troops and equipment? How well protected were these ports? All the naval intelligence requirements we have encountered seem to have originated during the prevailing 'invasion scare'.

Seen from an early-warning perspective, was the T-Office's reports any help in establishing the actual plans and intentions of the Soviet Navy commanders? In a paper published a few years ago, Dr Magnus Peterson expresses the opinion that further research would be valuable in order to understand the significance of intelligence activities for the assessment of not only the Soviet Unions's capabilities but also her intentions.[387]

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385 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 294.
386 Herman (1999), *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, p. 294.
387 Petersson (2002), '*She would not fight unless attacked*', p. 85.

It would then be a good idea to first give a thought to the difference between *capability* and *intention*. Military hardware like ships or airplanes gives the possessor a certain capability; with these tools he can inflict heavy damage on an adversary (and it was evidently such facts that the Naval Desk asked for). Thus, he has the capability to act in this or that way. If a foreign state has an enormous amount of military resources in the vicinity of one's own country, the foreign state would almost automatically be perceived as a threat. A perceived threat should not be taken lightly. The sheer size of the foreign state's military power influences the own country's war planning, organization, equipment procurement and training. What the foreign state is going to do with its capabilities, enormous or not, is however not so clear—and early warning is much more about finding intentions than capabilities. If not so easy in itself, 'bean counting' is a simple task compared to finding out if and how the potential enemy will use his armed forces. What are his intentions? This is made clear with a nice example from a NATO intelligence briefing in 1979 where numbers of tanks, guns, ships, missiles and so on were presented to the audience:

> It concluded with the Supreme Allied Commander saying 'So we're outnumbered then' to the young intelligence-briefing officer. 'Yes, sir!' he replied enthusiastically. 'Will they use them?' came the quiet question. Crestfallen, the briefing officer replied, 'We don't have that information, sir.' Then he brightened up. 'But they *could* do, sir!'[388]

Capabilities can be used, but for one reason or another the intention can be something else. Intentions can change as circumstances change, which can happen quickly, but the capabilities change much slower.

This investigation has clearly shown that the T-Office could provide a good amount of intelligence on the hardware of the Soviet Navy. Such information was of course useful for the Swedish Navy when assessing what it could expect to face on the sea if an armed conflict should break out. The capabilities of the Soviet Navy were thus fairly well known, thanks to the T-Office and others. But the T-Office's reports told the Swedish side nothing about what the Soviets actually intended to do with their capabilities, neither in 1946 nor in 1947. The early-warning function could, in this respect, not be fulfilled by the T-Office. The foreign partners of the T-Office were also unable to help in this area; at least that is the way it would seem to us—but we have really no way of knowing what the foreign partners actually could obtain. It would be naïve to believe that the T-office's foreign partners shared everything they had with their Swedish colleagues. One expression sometimes used in Sweden for describing co-operation between national intelligence services is 'trading apples for pears'. One national intelligence service may have information, which another national intelligence

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388 Hughes-Wilson (1999), *Military Intelligence Blunders*, p. 7.

service does not have—but would like to have. In that case, the latter national intelligence service finds out if it has something that the former national intelligence service would like to have, and then an exchange of information can take place. The entire concept is based on actions of giving and taking in approximately equal amounts and equal values. Though we have no way of knowing it, the subject of Soviet intentions and plans must reasonably have surfaced during the discussions between Thede Palm and his counterparts in at least Denmark and Norway, the two countries with which the intelligence co-operation dated back to the final period of the Second World War.[389]

Thus assessments (or guessings) of intentions was up to the Swedes. When there is a lack of information on a potential enemy's intentions, increased importance tends to be attached to his known capabilities from which his intentions are then deduced, often as worst case scenarios. Then we have a situation liable to be influenced by our own perspectives and wishful thinking, often resulting in exaggerated threat perceptions, and in the end asking for more money from the state budget.

However, the fact that the T-Office was unable to report on Soviet intentions, does not necessarily imply that Thede Palm and his small organization were unaware of the need for such information. If no one explicitly told them so, I think it is safe to assume that the personnel in the T-Office could think that far themselves. Behind all the intelligence requirements more or less centred on military hardware, there lingered most certainly within Section II and the Naval Desk a deep wish to know what the Soviets actually planned to do with all their ships. Was there in a safe somewhere in a Soviet headquarter a complete plan for an attack across the Baltic Sea and an invasion of Sweden? In what way, and when, and under which circumstances would such an attempt be made? If the Swedish defence planners knew such things, their task would of course be made much easier, and various adjustments in training, equipment procurement and readiness could be made accordingly.

A future research attempt along the lines suggested by Magnus Peterson should, in my view, pay considerable attention to the existing threat perceptions among the Swedish armed forces and the Swedish public during the period of research, since deduced intentions of a potential enemy are easily guided (or misguided) by perceptions. Generally speaking, and once again in my view, it is doubtful if intelligence activities ever could, or ever will, be able to provide reliable information for the assessment of another state's future *intentions*. This is a

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389 For the development of intelligence co-operation between Sweden, Denmark and Norway, see Alenius (2002), *Informell allians? Den svenska militära underrättelsetjänstens samarbete med västmakterna 1950–1960*, pp. 166–172. Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp. 70–77. Peterson (2003), '*Brödrafolkens väl*', *svensk-norska säkerhetspolitiska relationer 1949–1969*, pp. 253–263.

wide subject which will not be elaborated upon here, but suffice it to conclude that when it comes to early warning—at least as far as this study goes—the T-Office did not succeed in obtaining any information of intentions.

One researcher, Mikael Alenius, has suggested that, during the early 1950s, Sweden became a part of a 'Western Intelligence Regime' through processes of socialization and institutionalization. By socialization Alenius means a process where values, norms and patterns of behaviour are shared among a group of persons, and which results in the development of professional and personal relationships. An institutionalization process is defined as a process where formal or informal structures, consisting of rules and norms, influence the actions of the persons involved.[390] There is no doubt that professional, and also personal, relationships existed between Thede Palm and his Danish and Norwegian counterparts, relationships which he held in high regard.[391] Traces of established routines for exchanging information, and also a divison of intelligence collection efforts, are discernible in this study, thereby indicating a structured relationship between the three Scandinavian intelligence services. This may lead us to believe that Sweden was a part of the 'Western Intelligence Regime', or well on its way of becoming one, already in 1946–1947. However, it is maybe a good idea to be cautious when drawing such a conclusion. As pointed out earlier, this study has not investigated the T-Office's co-operation with foreign partners; that is a subject that must be carefully and methodically researched before one is able to say anything definite about Sweden's relationship with the 'Western Intelligence Regime'. Therefore it is possibly safer to say, that at this stage of research on the subject, the T-Office in 1946–1947 had some open channels in both directions to an emerging western intelligence community dominated by Great Britain and USA.

The T-Office's archive is a virtual gold mine for the intelligence historian, and will surely be used in many research projects in the future. Despite the access to it being limited at the moment, there is more than enough for the enthusiastic historian to work with. During this work several fascinating subjects have come to my mind. A thorough and patient research of the source designations and the designations of 'other customers' scribbled on the reports would make a very interesting subject for research, and could be looked into from various angles. For example, it would probably be possible to establish what the Danish Intelligence Service was interested in obtaining from Sweden, and what kind of intelligence information it in its turn provided to the T-Office. There are of course many potential uses of the archive in making thematic studies like this

390 Alenius (2002), *Informell allians? Den svenska militära underrättelsetjänstens samarbete med västmakterna 1950–1960*, pp. 143–189 (especially pp. 146, 186–189).
391 Palm (1999), *Några studier till T-kontorets historia*, pp. 70–77.

one, and one example is a study of the Soviet removal of entire industries from eastern Germany. The rocket research in the Soviet sphere is another one.

Thede Palm and his small organization produced an impressive amount of reports, and often the quality is surprisingly good when compared to recent research. Considering its size, the T-Office did a marvellous job in difficult times, and the people who worked in the organization deserve a great deal of credit. Hopefully, one day the history of the T-Office will be written, but that may possibly have to wait until 2015 when Thede Palm's and Curt H. Andreasson's diaries are released from the Military Archives; the picture can hardly be completed before then. In the meantime, I am certain that many trained and patient researchers will be fascinated by the T-Office, and in due time produce good scholarly works. It is also my modest hope that this work may be of some value to students of intelligence history as a small guide to the Swedish intelligence community, and particularly the T-Office, and also stimulate attempts to probe intelligence archives from various angles of attack.

Documentary appendix

In order to give the reader an idea of what the reports from the T-Office look like, a number of the reports used in this study have been selected for this appendix. As a service to the presumably few Swedish-speaking readers—Swedish is, after all, a language spoken by no more than approximately 9 million—the reports appear not only in the English translation but also in Swedish.

The spelling and syntax of the original documents have been preserved in the Swedish text. The original spelling of place names etc. used by the T-Office has been modified, where appropriate, to English spelling in the translated texts. Sometimes, the T-Office was not very consistent in its writings. E.g. ship's names can be written with or without citation marks, and in such cases the English translation follow the original use.

DOCUMENT 1: TRANSFER OF EX-GERMAN NAVAL SHIPS TO THE SOVIET UNION

Report nr. 391
26 February 1946
Film 1A, microfiche 10
Source 'ek'

<u>Report from Germany</u>

As a complement to report nr. 343 of 29 January, concerning German naval ships transferred to Russia, the following is reported:

The delivered submarines are:
Of Type VIIC nr. 1057, 1058, 1064 and 1305.
Of Type IXC nr. 1231.
Of Type XXI nr. 2529, 3035, 3041 and 3515.
Of Type XXIII nr 2353.

The following numbers of delivered torpedo boats are known as: T-12, T-17, T-33, T-107, T-158 and T-196.
The number of destroyers is 5, and not 4 as was claimed by report nr. 343 of 29 January. The name of the fifth destroyer is not known.
Submarine nr. 3515 and T-17 had not been transferred to a Russian port at the turn of the month January-February.

Rapport från Tyskland

Som komplement till rpt nr 343 av 29.1. beträffande till Ryssland överförda tyska örlogsfartyg meddelas följande m m:

De överlämnade ubåtarna äro:
Av typ VIIC nr 1057, 1058, 1064 och 1305.
Av typ IXC nr 1231.
Av typ XXI nr 2529, 3035, 3041 och 3515.
Av typ XXIII nr 2353.

Av de överlämnade torpedbåtarna äro följande nr kända: T-12, T-17, T-33, T-107, T-158 och T-196.
Antalet jagare är 5 st och icke som rpt 343 av den 29.1 angivit 4 st. Namnet på den femte jagaren ej känt.
Ub nr 3515 och T-17 voro ej överförda till rysk hamn vid månadsskiftet januari-februari.

DOCUMENT 2: SOVIET DESTROYERS OF THE *SILNY* AND *GROMKIY* TYPES

Report nr. 463
27 March 1946
Film 1A, microfiche 7
Source unknown

Report from Russia

Concerning Russian destroyers of the Baltic Fleet the following is reported:
12 units of the Silny and Gromkiy types are completed and in service. The Silny type can be regarded as an improved Gromkiy type with, among other things, a completely covered bridge etc. The Silny type comprises the destroyers Strogiy, Strashny, Silny, Storozhevoy, Drozd, Stroyny and Svirepy, a total of 7 units.
The names of the five destroyers of the Gromkiy type in the Baltic Sea are not known with certainty since some units of this type have been based in the Arctic Ocean.
In addition to the information in navy calenders the following can be mentioned regarding the Gromkiy type:
Range 2,200 nautical miles at 25 knots.
Maximum speed of 38–40 knots can probably be reached only under favourable conditions and with reduced amount of fuel on board.
Maximum cruising speed is estimated at 30 knots.

Crew 240 men.

The ships are relatively lightly built with a 1/4" thickness of the sheet metal amidships at the waterline, the plating is of lesser quality, light metal and wood is to a large extent used for interior fittings. Longitudinal stiffenings are said to be underdimensioned. All destroyers have arrangements for minelaying, 100 mines of smaller types can be carried.

Rapport från Ryssland

Beträffande ryska jagare tillhörande Östersjöflottan meddelas följande:

Av typerna Silni och Gromki äro 12 st färdigställda och i tjänst. Silni-typen får anses som en förbättrad Gromki-typ bl a med helt inbyggd bryggkonstruktion m.m.

Silni-typen omfattar jagarna Strogi, Strashni, Silni, Storozhevoi, Drozd, Stroini och Svirepi, sammanlagt 7 st.

Gromki-typens fem jagare i Östersjön ej med säkerhet namnkända enär en del av denna typs fartyg förlagts till Norra Ishavet.

Utöver marinkalendrars uppgifter kan nämnas följande för Gromki-typen:
Aktionsradie 2200' med 25 knop.

Maximifarten 38-40 knop torde endast kunna uppnås under gynnsamma förhåll-anden och med reducerat oljeförråd.

Högsta marschfart bedöms till 30 knop.

Besättningsstyrkan 240 man.

Fartygen äro relativt lätt byggda, plåttjocklek midskepps i vattenlinjen 1/4", bord-läggningsplåtarna av mindre god kvalitet, lättmetall och trä användes i stor utsträck-ning för inredning. Långskeppsförstärkningarna lär vara underdimensionerade.

Samtliga jagare hava anordningar för minutläggning, 100 minor av mindre typ kunna medföras.

DOCUMENT 3: THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE IN THE BALTIC SEA

Report nr. 531
3 May 1946
Film 1A, microfiche 5
Source 'M'

Report from Russia

The Russian tonnage in the Baltic Sea, which in 1939 amounted to approxi-mately 300,000 gross tons, was decimated by war losses to approximately 135,000 gross tons.

According to the conditions in the armistice agreement approximately 83,000 gross tons were handed over to Russia by Finland, and at the moment 97 Finnish ships are chartered by the Russian government, with a total tonnage of approximately <u>195,000</u> gross tons.

Ships belonging to the former Baltic states, and which now sail for Russian interests, amount to a total of nearly <u>60,000</u> gross tons.

When the German merchant tonnage is finally divided, the Russian merchant marine will thereby increase by approximately <u>500,000</u> gross tons.

Thus, in the summer of 1946, Russia will have at its disposal almost 1 million gross tons of merchant tonnage if the ships chartered from Finland are included.

A smaller part of this tonnage is sailing on ports in the Arctic Ocean.

A large number of the ships which Russia has received from Germany are in need of repairs or overhaul, which in combination with the considerable lack of skilled sailors will result in the available tonnage not being able to be fully used.

Probably for that reason, Russia has attempted to charter further additional tonnage on the international freight market, among other things for transporting cargoes of wood

Rapport från Ryssland

Det ryska Östersjötonnaget, som år 1939 uppgick till ca 300 000 brt, decimerades genom krigsförluster till ca <u>135 000 brt</u>.

Enligt vapenstilleståndsvillkoren överlämnades av Finland till Ryssland ca 83 000 brt och f n är 97 finska fartyg förhyrda av ryska regeringen med ett sammanlagt tontal av ca <u>195 000 brt</u>.

F d baltiska staterna tillhöriga handelsfartyg, som nu gå för rysk räkning, uppgå sammanlagt till i det närmaste <u>60 000 brt</u>.

Sedan uppdelningen av det tyska handelsfartygstonnaget slutförts kommer Rysslands handelsflotta därigenom att utökas med ca <u>500 000 brt</u>.

Ryssland kommer sålunda sommaren 1946 att disponera över i det närmaste <u>en million brt</u> handelsfartygstonnage om de av Finland förhyrda fartygen medräknas.

En mindre del av detta tonnage befinner sig i trafik på hamnar utmed Norra Ishavet.

Ett stort antal av de fartyg, som Ryssland erhållit från Tyskland, äro i behov av reparation eller översyn, vilket i förening med betydande brist på yrkeskunnig besättningspersonal kommer att medföra att tillgängligt tonnage ej kan fullt utnyttjas. Sannolikt med anledning härav har Ryssland på internationella fraktmarknaden sökt förhyra ytterligare utländskt tonnage bl a för virkestransporter.

DOCUMENT 4: NEW CONSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE BALTIC FLEET

Report nr, 559
18 May 1946
Film 1A, microfiche 4
Source unknown

Report from Russia

Foreign observers have made the following assessments concerning new constructions etc. of naval ships for the Baltic Fleet:

Available industrial resources will primarily be used for improving the equipment of the Red Army and for expanding the air force. This will cause a restraint in the new construction of naval ships, at least for some time. The lack of skilled workers at the shipyards will also exert some influence.

Concerning new construction of battleships it is doubtful if the two units presently under construction will be completed according to plan. Even if the hulls are completed they will not necessarily become finished battleships, but may instead be used for other purposes.

Concerning new construction of cruisers the Kirov class will shortly consist of four units (Kirov, Maksim Gorkiy and two more under construction and launched). Additional construction of cruisers is probably not on going.

Concerning new construction of torpedo cruisers and destroyers it is known that at least one torpedo cruiser has been completed after the end of the war, and that at least twelve modern destroyers are in service (see report nr. 463, 27 March 1946).

Concerning new construction of submarines a large part of the shipyards' production capacity is probably taken up by the expansion of the submarine fleet. Its reinforcement and improvement by, among other things, profiting from the experiences of the various German submarine types, is probably the main goal of the new construction policy. In this context it should be taken into consideration that the canal between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Sea will be once again in use this coming summer,whereupon it will then be possible to transfer submarines for possible operations in the Atlantic.

Rapport från Ryssland

Beträffande nybyggnad m m av örlogsfartyg för Östersjöflottan ha utländska iakttagare gjort följande bedömning:

Nu tillgängliga industriella resurser komma att i första hand tagas i anspråk för förbättring av röda arméns utrustning samt för utökning av flygvapnet, vilket kom-

mer att medföra återhållsamhet beträffande nybyggnad av örlogsfartyg, åtminstone under närmaste tid. Brist på yrkeskunnig arbetskraft på varven kommer även att utöva visst inflytande.

Beträffande nybyggnad av <u>slagskepp</u> är det tvivelaktigt om de två nu under byggnad varande komma att färdigbyggas enligt plan. Även om skroven färdigställas behöva dessa icke nödvändigtvis utbyggas till slagskepp, utan kunna få användning för annat ändamål.

Beträffande nybyggnad av <u>kryssare</u> kommer Kirov-klassen att inom kort bestå av 4 enheter (Kirov, Maxim Gorki + 2 under byggnad och sjösatta). Ytterligare kryssarbyggen torde icke pågå.

Beträffande nybyggnad av <u>torpedkryssare</u> och <u>jagare</u> är det känt att minst en torpedkryssare färdigställts efter krigets slut samt att minst 12 moderna jagare finnas i tjänst (jfr rpt nr 463 av den 27.3.1946).

Beträffande nybyggnad av <u>ubåtar</u> torde en stor del av varvens produktionsförmåga tagas i anspråk för utbyggnad av ubåtsflottan. Dennas förstärkande och förbättrande, bl a genom att man tillgodogör sig erfarenheterna från de olika tyska ubåtstyperna, torde vara nybyggnadspolitikens närmaste huvudmål. Det bör i detta sammanhang beaktas, att kanalförbindelsen Östersjön – Norra Ishavet instundande sommar åter blir brukbar, varigenom bl a ubåtar kunna förflytats denna väg för eventuella operationer i Atlanten.

DOCUMENT 5: THE PORTS OF KALININGRAD AND BALTIYSK

Report nr. 25
16 July 1946
Film 1, microfiche 2
Source 'tk'

<u>Report from Russia</u>
(Time June–July 1946)

The war damages to <u>Königsberg</u> are very extensive, and no significant rebuilding has yet started.

The railway bridge over the Pregel, detonated by the Germans, has been replaced by a provisional pontoon bridge hardly adequate for traffic. Practically all-industrial equipment has been dismantled and transported to Russia with the exception of the machines etc. at the shipyard installations.

At the shipyard there is one floating dock of 35,000 tons which has been transferred from Gdynia, and two smaller floating docks, all ex-German. Some reparations of war damaged ships have been noted.

The harbour quays are to a large extent useless, either because of German actions or because of ships and barges sunken at their moorings.

The larger part of the German population has been removed from the city, and only around 10,000 people are said to be remaining.

Pillau's harbour is a base for some of the Russian Navy's light units, some destroyers, minesweepers, motor torpedo boats and also smaller patrol ships.

Rapport från Ryssland
(Tid juni–juli 1946)

Krigsskadorna i Königsberg äro mycket omfattande, och någon återuppbyggnad av betydelse har ännu ej igångsatts.

Den av tyskarna sprängda järnvägsbron över Pregel har ersatts av en provisorisk pontonbro, med vilken trafiken nödtorftigt kan upprätthållas.

Praktiskt taget all industriell utrustning har nedmonterats och avtransporterats till Ryssland med undantag för maskiner m.m. tillhörande varvsanläggningarna.

Vid varvet ligger en 35.000 tons flytdocka, som dittransporterats från Gdynia samt tvenne mindre flytdockor, alla f.d. tyska. Viss reparationsverksamhet av krigsskadade fartyg pågår.

Hamnens kajanläggningar i stor utsträckning obrukbara, antingen genom de av tyskarna företagna åtgärderna eller genom att fartyg och prämar sänkts vid tilläggsplatserna.

Större delen av den tyska befolkningen har förflyttats från själva staden, och endast cirka 10.000 lära finnas kvar.

Pillaus hamn utgör bas för en del av ryska örlogsflottans lätta fartyg, några jagare och minsvepare samt motortorpedbåtar och mindre bevakningsfartyg.

DOCUMENT 6: THE PORT OF KLAIPEDA

Report nr. 29
18 July 1946
Film 1, microfiche 2
Source 'pk'

Report from Russia
(Time: the end of June 46.)

With reference to report nr. 530, 2 May 1946 concerning Memel, the following is reported:

The rebuilding of the harbour is proceeding at speed, and large amounts of various building materials have been transported there. Preparatory work on fortifications in the harbour and in its vicinty have been initiated.

Presently, the stock of cranes in the harbour consists of two 7 ton cranes, one 15 ton crane, and one 45 ton crane which is movable and with a lifting radius sufficient to lift light or medium tanks from quay to ship.

A few smaller Russian naval ships are based in Memel.

South of Memel, on the sand bar Kurische Nehrung, some 2,000 Russian marine infantry are billeted. On the northern tip of the sand bar, fortifications are under construction.

Rapport från Ryssland
(Tid: slutet av juni 46.)

I anslutning till rpt nr 530 av den 2.5.1946 meddelas beträffande Memel *följande:*

Arbetena med hamnens återuppbyggnad påskyndas, och stora mängder byggnadsmaterial av olika slag ha dittransporterats. Förberedande arbeten för befästningsanläggningar vid hamnen och i dess närhet äro igångsatta.

Kranbeståndet utgöres f n av 2 st 7-tons, 1 st 15-tons och 1 st 45-tons kran, flyttbar och med sådan lyftvidd att lätta och medeltunga stridsvagnar kunna lyftas från kaj till fartyg.

I Memels hamn äro ett fåtal mindre ryska örlogsfartyg baserade.

Söder om Memel, på landtungan Kurische Nehrung, äro ca 2.000 ryska marintrupper förlagda. På nordspetsen av landtungan uppföres befästningsanläggningar.

DOCUMENT 7: WORK UNDER WAY
ON *SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN*

Report nr. 59
13 August 1946
Film 1, microfiche 3
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland

In early August the ex-German battleship Schleswig-Holstein, lying in Gdynia harbour (see report nr. 482, 3 April 1946), received a Russian crew, which have proceeded with work on board. The intention is to transfer the ship to a Russian port. The battleship's armament has not been reinstalled.

Rapport från Polen

I början av augusti erhöll i Gdynias hamn liggande f d tyska slagskeppet Schleswig-Holstein (jmf rpt nr 482 den 3.4.46) rysk besättning, som igångsatt vissa arbeten

ombord, och avsikten lär vara att bortföra fartyget till rysk hamn. Slagskeppets artilleribestyckning har icke återuppställts.

DOCUMENT 8: THE PORTS OF LENINGRAD AND TALLINN AND KRONSHTADT NAVAL BASE

Report nr. 87
26 August 1946
Film 1, microfiche 4
Source 'dk'

Report from Russia
(Middle of August 1946)

A temporary observer reports:
The rebuilding of Leningrad harbour has advanced so far that it has practically the same capacity as it had before the war with the exception of some oil-handling installations, which are not yet completely finished.
In Kronshtadt naval base there were the heavy cruiser Maksim Gorkiy, 4 modern large destroyers, 4 large submarines and one of a smaller type, and also some motor torpedo boats etc. In Kronshtadt roads was one of the older battleships. On Russian naval ships, which have earlier had only English or American radar types, there are now also radars of German manufacture.
The submarines are not equipped with so called "schnorkel". Some midget submarines, probably ex-German, are lying on a quay in Kronshtadt.
A general observation is that the modern Russian destroyers have been armed with very heavy anti-aircraft artillery.
At the end of July the ex-German cruiser Nürnberg was in Tallinn harbour, flying a Russian flag and carrying a Russian crew, and there were also 3 Russian destroyers and one submarine. An ex-German destroyer of probably the 'Seetier' type, also flying a Russian flag and carrying a Russian crew, was lying at anchor in Tallinn roads.
A couple of anti-aircraft artillery batteries have been deployed close to the harbour, and to the east there is a well-camouflaged fort with heavy artillery.

Rapport från Ryssland
(Medio augusti 1946)

En tillfällig iakttagare meddelar:
Återuppbyggnadsarbetena i Leningrads hamn ha fortskridit så långt att den praktiskt taget har samma kapacitet som före kriget med undantag för att en del oljetankanläggningar ännu icke äro helt iordningställda.

I Kronstadts örlogshamn befunno sig bl a tunga kryssaren Maxim Gorki, 4 moderna större jagare, 4 större ubåtar och en av mindre typ samt en del mtb m m och på Kronstadts redd ett av de äldre slagskeppen.

På ryska örlogsfartyg, som tidigare endast haft radarutrustning av engelsk eller amerikansk typ, förekommer numera även tysktillverkad radar.

Ubåtarna äro icke försedda med s k "Schnorkel"-utrustning. På kaj i Kronstadts hamn ligga några miniatyrubåtar, sannolikt f d tyska.

En allmän iakttagelse är att i synnerhet de moderna ryska jagarna försetts med synnerlig kraftig lv-bestyckning.

I Tallinns hamn befann sig i slutet av juli f d tyska lätta kryssaren Nürnberg under rysk flagg och med rysk besättning samt 3 ryska jagare och en ubåt. På redden låg en f d tysk jagare under rysk flagg och med rysk besättning till ankars, typ sannolikt "Seetier".

Intill hamnen har uppställts ett par lv-batterier och öster om hamnen finnes ett välcamouflerat fort med tungt artilleri.

DOCUMENT 9: THE BATTLESHIPS *SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN* AND *GNEISENAU* IN GDYNIA

Report nr. 88
27 August 1946
Film 1, microfiche 4
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland
(Middle of August 1946)

Temporary observers report that the work on the ex-German battleship Schleswig Holstein has advanced so far that the ship is floating. (See report nr. 59, 13 August 1946.)
In the same harbour, the Russians have once again started work on board the ex-German battleship Gneisenau, this is being carried out by the crews of two Russian patrol ships moored alongside the Gneisenau.

Rapport från Polen
(Medio augusti 46)

Tillfälliga iakttagare meddela att arbetena med f d tyska slagskeppet Schleswig-Holstein i Gdynias hamn fortskridit så långt att fartyget flottlagts. (Jmf rpt nr 59 den 13.8.46.)

Ombord på f d tyska slagskeppet Gneisenau i samma hamn ha ryssarna åter igång-
satt en del arbeten, som ombesörjas av besättningarna på två vid Gneisenau förtöjda
ryska bevakningsfartyg.

DOCUMENT 10: THE SITUATION IN THE PORT
OF SWINOUJSCIE

Report nr. 100
30 August 1946
Film 1, microfiche 5
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland
(End of August 1946.)

In Swinemünde, the Russians have initiated work to salvage the sunken ex-
German cruiser Lützow. At the moment the turrets with the 28 centimetres
guns are visible above the water line, as are the 4 turrets with 15 centimetres
guns on one side.
In the harbour, there is a large number of Russian minesweepers, patrol ships
etc., some Russian submarines and ex-German torpedo boats under Russian
flag.
Smaller patrol boats armed with 3 machine guns are used by the Russians for
guard duty outside the entrance to Swinemünde harbour.
The merchant shipping sailing on Swinemünde and Stettin consists almost
solely of Russian ships which transport dismantled German industrial material
and sugar.
Loading and unloading facilities in these harbours are in a very bad state. Rather,
the ships' own cranes or provisional lifting devices on the quays are used. Some
of the damaged cranes are under repair.

Rapport från Polen
(Slutet av aug 1946.)

I Swinemünde ha ryssarna igångsatt arbeten för att bärga det där sänkta f d tyska
pansarskeppet Lützow. F n synas 28 cm kanonerna med kanontorn ovan vattenytan,
likaså ena sidans 4 torn för 15 cm kanoner.
I hamnen befinna sig ett större antal ryska minsvepare, bevakningsbåtar o. likn.
samt några ryska ubåtar och f d tyska tb under rysk flagg.
För sjöbevakningen utanför Swinemündes hamninlopp använda ryssarna mindre
bevakningsbåtar bestyckade med 3 st ksp.

Sjötrafiken på Swinemünde och Stettin utgöres så gott som enbart av ryska fartyg med vilka utskeppas nedmonterad tysk industrimateriel samt socker.
Lastnings- och lossningsanordningarna i nämnda hamnar i mycket dåligt skick. Företrädesvis användas fartygens egna bommar eller provisoriska lyftanordningar på kajerna. Ett par av de förstörda krananarna äro under reparation.

DOCUMENT 11: ARTILLERY AND FORTIFICATIONS ON THE POLISH COAST

Report nr. 110
4 September 1946
Film 1, microfiche 5
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland

An observer reports that Russian coastal artillery batteries have been built one kilometre south of Orlowo, situated in the coastal area approximately halfway between Gdynia and Zoppot. The place is off limits and guarded.
In May, approximately 5–800 metres north of Orlowo and 500 metres west of the coastal railway, excavations have been made for several bunkers or shelters, which are being built with the roofs at ground level, these are also connected with subterranean tunnels. The bunkers or shelters can probably hold 50–100 men. There are also a couple of barracks in the vicinity.
The Russian military trucks in Danzig are usually marked CB or IB[392] followed by digits.

Rapport från Polen

En iakttagare meddelar att ryska kustbatterier äro uppförda en km söder om platsen Orlowo, belägen i kustområdet ungefär mitt emellan Gdynia och Zoppot. Platsen hålles avspärrad och bevakad.
Under maj månad utgrävdes plats för och anordnades ett flertal bunkrar eller skydds-rum med tak i markytans plan och försedda med underjordiska förbindelsegångar, ca 5–800 m norr om Orlowo och 500 m väster om kustjärnvägen. Bunkrarna eller skyddsrummen torde rymma 50–100 man. Invid platsen finnas även ett par kaserner.

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392 It is somewhat unclear if the cyrillic letters have been correctly transcribed by the T-Office's source . CB can be interpreted either as it is, in the latin alphabet, or as SV in the cyrillic alphabet. IB, on the other hand, looks more like a transcription to the latin alphabet from the cyrillic alphabet, where there is no letter that looks like 'I'.

De ryska militära lastbilarna i Danzig ha i allmänhet beteckningen CB eller IB, åtföljd av ett siffertal.

DOCUMENT 12: *GRAF ZEPPELIN* AFLOAT

Report nr. 162
30 September 1946
Film 1, microfiche 7
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland
(Time end of September 46)

The ex-German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, which in a heavily damaged condition has been standing on the bottom of Stettin harbour, has now been temporarily sealed and refloated by the Russians. The intention is to tow the ship to a Russian harbour as soon as possible.

Rapport från Polen
(Tid slutet av sept 46)

F d tyska hangarfartyget Graf Zeppelin, som svårt skadat stått på botten i Stettins hamn, har provisoriskt tätats och flottagits av ryssarna. Avsikten skall vara att snarast möjligt bogsera fartyget till rysk hamn.

DOCUMENT 13: *GRAF ZEPPELIN* AND *LÜTZOW*

Report nr. 243
19 November 1946
Film 1, microfiche 11
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland

Around 2 November, when the ex-German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was to be towed from Stettin for transfer to a Russian harbour (see report nr. 162, 30 September) the tow had to be interrupted since the ship did not float high enough to pass over some barges standing on the bottom near the carrier's mooring site.
In early November the salvage work on the ex-German cruiser Lützow (see report nr. 100, 30 August) had advanced to a point where the ship was straightened up and standing with the stern on the bottom, but with the forecastle afloat.

Rapport från Polen

Då f d tyska hangarfartyget <u>Graf Zeppelin</u> omkring den 2.11. skulle bogseras från Stettin för förflyttning till rysk hamn (jmf rpt nr 162 av den 30.9.) måste bogsering-en avbrytas enär fartyget icke flöt över några i närheten av förläggningsplatsen på botten stående pråmar, vilka nu bärgas av ryssarna.
I början av november hade bärgningsarbetena med f d tyska pansarskeppet <u>Lützow</u> (jmf rpt nr 100 av den 30.8.) fortskridit så långt att fartyget rätats upp och stod med akterskeppet på botten men förskeppet flott.

DOCUMENT 14: COASTAL ARTILLERY IN POLAND

Report nr. 265
6 December 1946
Film 1, microfiche 13
Source 'mke'

Report from Poland.
(Time December 1946)

In Nowy Port (Neufahrwasser) just to the west of the free port there is an area of barracks, which is used for billeting some Polish troops.

At Brösen (a few kilometres northwest of Nowy Port) some Polish troops are billeted near the former German coastal batteries, which are, judging from the exterior, undamaged or have undergone repairs after the end of the war. In the vicinity there are depots for gathered German war equipment, for instance 75 millimetres guns, searchlights and listening equipment.

Rapport från Polen.
(Tid december 1946)

I Nowy Port (Neufahrwasser) finnes strax väster om frihamnen ett kasernområde med relativt oskadade byggnader vilka tagits i anspråk för förläggning av en del polska trupper.
Vid Brösen (ett par km nordväst om Nowy Port) äro en del polska trupper för-lagda intill de förutvarande tyska kustbatterierna, vilka av det yttre att döma äro oskadade eller också ha de undergått reparation efter krigets slut. I närheten finnes upplagsplatser för insamlad tysk krigsmateriel, bl a 75 mm kan, strålkastare och lyssnarapparater.

DOCUMENT 15: THE CRUISER *ADMIRAL MAKAROV* AND SOVIET RADAR MANUFACTURE

Report nr. 325
29 January 1947
Film 1, microfiche 15
Source 'dak'

<u>Report from Russia.</u>
(Time: turn of the year 46–47)

1) In late autumn 1946, the light cruiser Admiral Makarov (ex-German Nürnberg) receieved a new crew comprising of 68 officers, equals and around 800 non-commissioned officers and men. Most of the latter were fresh recruits who had only had 14 days of military training before embarking, and some of them were dressed in army uniforms. In the crew there were about a hundred young men aged around 14.

Admiral Makarov has not conducted exercises at sea since the ship was taken over by the Russians, and can at the moment hardly be considered as a functional battle unit. Some of the German navy personnel who stayed with the ship after the hand-over are still on board.

2) Russian manufacture of radar has probably not commenced.

The Russians have German radar sets of all the types which existed in Germany at the capitulation.

They also have some American sets of the older type.

During the war the Russians received English radar sets of the types 281, 286 and 291, and Asdic sets of type 123, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 144 and 145.

All German inventions regarding the use of infra-red beams for communication etc. are known by the Russians.

<u>Rapport från Ryssland.</u>
(Tid: årsskiftet 46–47)

1) Lätta kryssaren Admiral Makarov (f.d. tyska Nürnberg) erhöll på senhösten 1946 helt ny besättning bestående av 68 officerare och likställda samt c:a 800 man underofficerare och manskap. Flertalet av de senare voro nyinkallade rekryter, som före embarkeringen endast haft 14 dagars militärutbildning, och en del voro iförda arméuniform. I besättningen ingår ett hundratal ungdomar i åldern omkring 14 år.

Fartygets grövre tyska lv-bestyckning har nedmonterats och ilandförts med tillhörande ammunition.

Admiral Makarov har icke företagit övningar till sjöss sedan fartyget övertagits av ryssarna och torde f.n. näppeligen kunna anses som en funktionsduglig stridsenhet. Den tyska marinpersonal som medföljde fartyget vid överlämnandet finns delvis kvar ombord.

2) Någon rysk radartillverkning torde ännu icke ha igångsatts.

Ryssarna inneha tyska radaranläggningar av varje i Tyskland vid kapitulationen förekommande modell.

De inneha även ett fåtal amerikanska modeller av äldre typ.

Av engelsk radarmateriel erhöllo ryssarna under krigsåren apparatur av typnummer 281, 286 och 291 och av Asdic nr 123, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 144 och 145. Samtliga tyska uppfinningar beträffande utnyttjandet av infraröda strålar vid förbindelsetjänst m.m. äro kända av ryssarna.

DOCUMENT 16: THE SITUATION IN THE BALTIC FLEET

Report nr. 326
30 January 1947
Film 1, microfiche 15
Source 'dak'

<u>Report from Russia</u>

A foreign expert has made the following statement regarding the Russian fleet in the Baltic Sea:

The relatively large number of ships, particularly light surface ships and submarines, at the disposal of the Russians in the Baltic Sea, can probably not be effectively used due to difficulties with the personnel. Russia has always had difficulties in providing the Navy with good sailors, and it is even more difficult now, when Baltic coastal inhabitants cannot be used for naval service to the same extent as before the world war 1914–18 because of present unreliability in political considerations. Furthermore, the training of the Russian naval officer corps has been severely neglected during the war years. The quality of higher as well as lower staffs is likely to be seriously inferior to staffs of a number of other countries. Regarding the ships in the Baltic Sea the remaining battleships may only be considered as floating batteries, which not even the Russians intend for operations at sea other than possibly as support for ground operations.

The Russians have at the moment no plans for building aircraft carriers, and intend therefore, that ground-based aircraft will carry out all necessary co-operations between air and naval forces. It is doubtful whether the Russians will have any use for the ex-German Graf Zeppelin.

The two Kirov-class cruisers are considered as fully battleworthy units. Regarding Admiral Makarov see report nr. 325, 29 January 1947.

The number of destroyers of modern types in the Baltic Sea is 16 including the ex-German ones. Regarding the latter it is probable that the Russians cannot use them to the full extent.

Of Russia's total 220 submarines, which includes ex-German units, 45 are usually in active service in the Baltic Sea. Of these 45 submarines approximately one half is of high seas type, and one half of coastal type. The number of submarines in the Baltic Sea can change quickly since such units can once again transfer through the canal up to the Arctic Ocean.

Officially, 10 submarines were handed over to Russia, but it is known that the Russians have removed almost 50 German submarines in more or less completed condition from German ports on the Baltic Sea.

Regarding all German naval ships handed over to Russia, it is probable that the Russians cannot have much use for them, at least for the moment and possibly not in the immediate future. Differences in artillery and torpedo construction, calibre etc. result in considerable problems, as do differences in all machinery installations on board.

The Russians have received some units of every mine type designed in Germany. At the moment, new models of mines are being manufactured in Russia, in which both Russian and German knowledge is integrated.

Russian shipyards have not yet laid down any naval ships of 'postwar type'. All shipyard activity is severely handicapped due to a shortage of workers and materiel; the completion of surface ships under construction is considerably delayed. On the other hand, it is known that some submarines of the K and M types were completed after the war.

Rapport från Ryssland

En utländsk sakkunnig har gjort följande uttalanden berörande ryska örlogsflottan i Östersjön:

Det förhållandevis stora fartygsbestånd, särskilt av lätta övervattensfartyg och ubåtar, som ryssarna förfoga över i Östersjön, borde icke kunna effektivt utnyttjas på grund av personalsvårigheter. Ryssarna har alltid haft svårigheter med att för örlogsflottan erhålla gott sjöfolk och än svårare är det nu, då baltiska kustbefolkningen icke kan utnyttjas för örlogstjänst i samma utsträckning som före världskriget 1914–18, på grund av nuvarande opålitlighet i politiskt hänseende. Vidare har den ryska sjöofficerskårens träning och fortsatta utbildning blivit avsevärt eftersatt under krigsåren. Kvaliteten hos såväl högre som lägre staber torde vara avsevärt underlägsen ett flertal andra länders.

Beträffande fartygsbeståndet i Östersjön få kvarvarande slagskepp endast betraktas som flytande batterier, som icke ens ryssarna avse för operationer till sjöss annat än möjligen som understöd åt landoperationer.

Ryssarna ha f.n. inga planer på att bygga hangarfartyg och avse erforderligt samarbete flyg-sjöstridskrafter ske medelst landbaserade flygplan. Det torde vara tvivelaktigt, om ryssarna kunna få någon nytta av f.d. tyska Graf Zeppelin.

De båda kryssarna av Kirov-klassen anses som fullt stridsdugliga enheter. Beträffande Admiral Makarov jmf rpt nr 325 av den 29.1.47.

Jagarbeståndet i Östersjön är 16 st. av moderna typer, de f.d. tyska medräknade. Beträffande dessa senare är det troligt att ryssarna f.n. icke kunna fullt utnyttja dem.

Av Rysslands totala *ubåtsbestånd om c:a 220 st — de f.d. tyska inräknade — hållas i allmänhet 45 ubåtar rustade i Östersjön. Av dessa 45 torde ungefär hälften vara av utsjötyp och hälften av kusttyp. Antalet ubåtar i Östersjön kan snabbt ändras sedan sådana enheter nu åter kunna passera kanalen upp till Ishavet.*

Officiellt överlämnades till Ryssland 10 st. tyska ubåtar, men det är känt att ryssarna från tyska östersjöhamnar bortfört i det närmaste 50 tyska ubåtar i mer eller mindre färdigställt skick.

Beträffande samtliga till Ryssland överlämnade tyska örlogsfartyg torde gälla, att ryssarna åtminstone nu och under närmaste framtid icke kunna ha särskild nytta av dem. Olikheter i artilleri- och torpedkonstruktioner, kalibrar etc medför avsevärda olägenheter, ävensom skiljaktigheter i alla maskinella anläggningar ombord.

Ryssarna ha från Tyskland erhållit en del exemplar av varje där konstruerad mintyp. Mintillverkning pågår nu i Ryssland av nya modeller, vid vilka man sammanslagit de ryska och tyska erfarenheterna från tidigare typer.

På ryska varv finnes ännu icke stapelsatt något örlogsfartyg av "efterkrigstyp". All varvsverksamhet är svårt handicappad av arbetar- och materialbrist, och färdigställandet av under byggnad varande övervattensfartyg blir avsevärt fördröjt. Däremot är det känt att några ubåtar efter kriget färdigställts av typerna K och M.

DOCUMENT 17: DESTROYERS IN ROSTOCK; *LÜTZOW* AND *GRAF ZEPPELIN* IN SWINOUJSCIE

Report nr. 437
7 June 1947
Film 1, microfiche 22
Source 'mk'

Report from Germany.
(The Russian zone.)

Attached to copy nr. 2/5 are 5 photographs taken in late May. Photos 1–3 show Russian (ex-German) destroyers being equipped or under repair at the shipyard in Rostock, photo 4 shows a minesweeper off the same harbour, and photo 5 shows 'Lützow' in Swinemünde. The latter ship is lying at the turn toward the

so-called 'Haff'; fire seems to have ravaged some parts of the forecastle, the forward turret among other things. Russian navy personnel live on board. Signs proclaiming a ban on approaching the ship are attached to the sides. The ship is probably standing with the stern on the bottom. In the vicinity of 'Lützow' lies 'Graf Zeppelin', which also has Russian personnel carrying out work on board.

Rapport från Tyskland.
(Ryska zonen).

Med ex 2/5 översändes 5 st fotografier tagna i slutet av maj. Bilderna 1–3 utvisa ryska (f.d. tyska) jagare på varvet i Rostock under utrustning eller reparation, bild 4 msvp utanför samma hamn samt bild 5 "Lützow" i Swinemünde. Sistnämnda fartyg ligger i svängen upp mot det s.k. "Haffet"; brand synes ha härjat en del av förskeppet, bl.a. förliga tornet. Personal ur ryska marinen bor ombord. På sidorna äro anslag uppsatta angivande förbud att nalkas fartyget, som sannolikt står med akterskeppet på grund.
I närheten av "Lützow" ligger "Graf Zeppelin", även denna med rysk personal ombord, vilken utför diverse arbeten.

DOCUMENT 18: THE SITUATION IN SWINOUJSCIE

Report nr. 73
16 August 1947
Film 1, microfiche 26
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland

On 2 July, 'Lützow' was towed out of Swinemünde by a German tug. The tow was taken over by a larger Russian tug or icebreaker (two funnels) off the entrance whereupon the tow continued on an easterly course. On 25 July, the icebreaker returned to Swinemünde.
On 25 July, 'Graf Zeppelin' remained in Swinemünde.
Russian salvage work on the following ex-German merchant ships is continuing in Swinemünde:
Cordillera
Monte Casino
Erich Finsterwalde
Usambara (lying at Feldmühle near Hedwigshytte).

Rapport från Polen

Den 2.7. utbogserades "Lützow" från Swinemünde av en tysk bogserbåt. Utanför inloppet övertogs bogseringen av en rysk större bogserbåt eller isbrytare (två skorstenar) varefter bogsersläpet fortsatte med östlig kurs. Den 25.7. återvände isbrytaren till Swinemünde.

Den 25.7. låg "Graf Zeppelin" fortfarande kvar i Swinemünde.

I Swinemünde pågå ryska bärgningsarbeten med följande f.d. tyska handelsfartyg:
Cordillera
Monte Casino
Erich Finsterwalde
Usambara (ligger vid Feldmühle nära Hedwigshytte).

DOCUMENT 19: NEW CONSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SOVIET NAVY

Report nr. 102
2 September 1947
Film 1, microfiche 27
Source 'no + da'

Report from Russia.
(Time: summer 1947.)

Foreign observers state the number of ships under construction for the Russian Navy is as follows:

The Baltic Fleet:	1 battleship
	4 cruisers
	6–8 destroyers
	Around ten submarines.
The Northern Fleet	1 cruiser
	2 destroyers.

The work on the battleship and all cruisers proceeds very slowly, and judging from the exterior no work at all is under way on some of these ships. The reason for this is partly a shortage of materials, and partly a shortage of skilled labour. At the moment, it is probably impossible to assess when the ships referred to will be completed.

On the other hand, the work on destroyers and submarines is probably proceeding normally.

Rapport från Ryssland.
(Tid: sommaren 1947.)

Utländska iakttagare angiva antalet fartyg under byggnad för ryska örlogsflottan enligt följande:

Östersjöflottan: 1 slagskepp
                    4 kryssare
                    6–8 jagare
                    Ett tiotal ubåtar.
Ishavsflottan: 1 kryssare
                    2 jagare.

Arbeten på slagskeppet och samtliga kryssare fortskrida mycket långsamt och på några av dessa fartyg pågå av det yttre att döma inga som helst arbeten. Anledningarna härtill äro dels materialbrist och dels brist på yrkeskunnig arbetskraft. Det torde f.n. vara omöjligt att ens bedöma när de ifrågavarande fartygen bliva färdigställda. Arbetena på jagare och ubåtar torde däremot fortskrida normalt.

DOCUMENT 20: *GRAF ZEPPELIN* LEAVES SZCZECIN

Report nr. 109
10 September 1947
Film 1, microfiche 28
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland

In July and August, the Russians have dismantled all interior fittings and machinery etc. on 'Graf Zeppelin' and transferred the material to barges. In late August a large number of crates with unknown content were stowed in 'Graf Zeppelin's' hull. Between August and September the 'Graf Zeppelin' was towed out of Stettin.

Rapport från Polen

Under juli och augusti ha ryssarna nedmonterat all inredning och maskinell utrustning m m från "Graf Zeppelin" och överfört materielen till pråmar. Under slutet av augusti inlastades i "Graf Zeppelin":s skrov ett stort antal lådor av obekant innehåll. Någon dag omkring månadsskiftet augusti–september utbogserades "Graf Zeppelin" från Stettin.

DOCUMENT 21: THE HARBOURS OF LENINGRAD
AND KRONSHTADT

Report nr. 137
24 September 1947
Film 1, microfiche 29
Source 'mk'

Report from Russia

The following Russian naval ships were lying in <u>Kronshtadt harbour</u> on 9 September 1947:
The battleship Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya
3 larger destroyers with numbers 10, 20, 21
2 smaller destroyers or torpedo boats with numbers 215 and 218.
4 submarines of which two have numbers 79 and 202
20 minesweepers of various types.

In the harbour are also the wrecks of the battleship Petropavlovsk and some submarines.
On the same date, the cruiser Admiral Makarov and a supply ship were lying in <u>Kronshtadt roads</u>.
In <u>Leningrad harbour</u> early September there were among other ships 2 destroyers of around 2,000 tons in the naval shipyard. The shipyard's large dry dock held a 12,000 tons ex-German merchant ship. The dry dock for ships of 5,000 tons in Leningrad harbour is intact.

Rapport från Ryssland

I <u>Kronstadts hamn</u> lågo den 9.9.1947 följande ryska örlogsfartyg:
Slagskeppet Oktjabrskaja Revolutsia
3 större jagare med nr 10, 20, 21
2 mindre jagare eller tb med nr 215 och 218
4 ubåtar varav två med nummer 79 och 202
20 msvp av olika typer.

I hamnen lågo dessutom vraken av slagskeppet Petropavlovsk och några ubåtar.
På <u>Kronstadts redd</u> låg samma datum kryssaren Admiral Makarov samt ett depåfartyg, båda fartygen hade avgått den 11.9.1947.
I <u>Leningrads hamn</u> befunno sig på örlogsvarvet i början av september bl a 2 st jagare om c:a 2.000 ton, varvets stora torrdocka i bruk med intaget 12.000 tons f d tyskt handelsfartyg. Leningrads hamns torrdocka för 5.000 tons fartyg intakt.

DOCUMENT 22: SOVIET NAVAL SHIPS IN SWINOUJSCIE

Report nr. 189
6 November 1947
Film 1, microfiche 31
Source 'mk'

Report from Poland

The following Russian naval ships were in Swinemünde harbour on 1 November:

3 minesweepers of which one marked T358.

7 minesweepers, all marked MKK plus a number; four of them had numbers 29, 30, 31 and 32.

15 minesweepers, all marked KT and of a somewhat smaller type than the previous.

24 armoured motor boats, marked OK, with a small gun turret aft and depth charge launcher.

2 motor torpedo boats with two torpedo tubes, on the mast top a fixed ball-like object with a diametre of around 50 centimetres.

1 submarine of around 800 tons, apparently newly built.

1 grey-painted tranport ship or hospital ship, no armament but equipped with a range finder, one funnel, high superstructure with cabins on several levels, displacement around 6,000 tons.

Rapport från Polen

I Swinemündes hamn befunno sig den 1.11 följande ryska örlogsfartyg:

3 st msvp, varav en märkt T358.

7 st msvp, alla märkta MKK samt ett nummer, fyra av dem hade nummer 29, 30, 31 och 32.

15 st msvp, alla märkta med KT och av något mindre typ än de förenämnda.

24 st pansrade motorbåtar, märkta OK, med ett mindre kanontorn akterut samt sjunkbombfällare.

2 st mtb med två torpedtuber, på masttoppen ett fast kulliknande föremål med ca 50 cm diameter.

1 st ub om ca 800 ton, till synes nybyggd.

1 st gråmålat transport- eller lasarettsfartyg, ingen bestyckning men försedd med avståndsmätare, en skorsten, hög midskeppsöverbyggnad med förläggningsutrymmen i flera däck, depl ca 6.000 ton.

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Aspenberg, H. Navy Lieutenant, acting naval attaché in London

Björk, Anders. Defence minister 1991–1994

Broms, Carl-Gustaf. Captain, assistant military attaché in Oslo

Christiansson, E. Navy Lieutenant, Naval Desk at Section II

Deksnys, Jonas. Lithuanian resistance fighter and agent for the T-Office, later turned by the KGB

Dreval. Kapitan-Leytenant in the Soviet Navy, commander of submarine chaser *BO-1*

Edenberg, Willy. Navy Lieutenant, naval attaché in Moscow

Ehrensvärd, C.-A. Count, Lieutenant-General, Chief of the Defence Staff 1944–1947

Erlander, Tage. Swedish prime minister 1946–1969

Evang, Wilhelm. Head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service

Flodström, Engelbrekt. Colonel, head of the Attaché Bureau at Section II from 1 october 1946

Grafström, Sven. Head of Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Hallström, A. Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief-of-Staff at VI Military Area Headquarter in Boden

Heppling, K.D. Sixten Employee of the T-Office

Hjelm, Bengt. Major, head of the Intelligence Bureau at Section II from 1 October 1946

Juhlin-Dannfelt, Curt. Colonel, head of Section II from 1 October 1945 to 31 December 1946, thereafter military attaché in Bern, Switzerland

Kempff, Curt. Colonel, head of Foreign Department at Section II from 1 October 1943 to 30 September 1946

Kull, Allan. Commander, head of the Naval Desk at Section II

Kuylenstierna, B. Navy Lieutenant, Naval Desk at Section II

Kuznetsov, Nikolay G. Fleet Admiral, Soviet Navy commander

Lilienberg, Ove. Commander, deputy head of the T-Office

Mørch, Poul Adam. Lieutenant Commander, deputy head of the Danish Intelligence Service

Palm, Thede. Ph.D., head of the T-Office 1946–1964

Palme, Olof. Employee of Section II, later ecclesiastical minister and prime minister, assassinated in 1986

Petersén, Carl. Major, head of the C-Bureau 1939–1946

Rall, Yuriy F. Vice-Admiral in the Soviet Navy

Sjöberg-Silfverling, Gösta. Commander, naval attaché in Helsinki

Sodovskiy, Valentin. Navy Lieutenant in the Soviet Navy, serving in the staff of Vice-Admiral Rall

Stalin, Josef V. Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, notorious dictator

Swedlund, Nils. Lieutenant-General, Chief of the Defence Staff from 1947, Ehrensvärd's successor, later Supreme Commander

Synnergren, Stig. General, Supreme Commander 1970–1978

Tham, Gustaf. Navy Captain, head of Section II after Juhlin-Dannfelt, later general director of FRA

Thorén, Ragnar. Commander, head of the Defence Staff's Photo Establishment

Wahlqvist, Sven. Captain, employee of the T-Office, stationed in Malmö

Westin, Bo. Colonel, head of Section II 1961–1966

Åkerhielm, Samuel. Count, Lieutenant-General, chairman of the 'Åkerhielm Commission'

Abbreviations

FRA   Försvarets Radioanstalt, formerly Försvarsväsendets radioanstalt (National Defence Radio Establishment), the Swedish signals intelligence organization from 1942 to the present day

Fst   Försvarsstaben (Defence Staff)

Fst/Ft   Försvarsstabens fotoanstalt (Defence Staff's Photo Establishment)

Fst/U   Försvarsstabens utrikesavdelning (Defence Staff's Foreign Department), part of Section II

KrA   Krigsarkivet (Military Archives)

UB   Underrättelsebyrån (Intelligence Bureau), the Swedish intelligence organization between 1907 and 1937

UD   Utrikesdepartementet (Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

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Interview

Curt H. Andreasson. Interview on 27 December 2000. Also letter to author, 30 May 2001.

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