One document matched: draft-zorn-emu-team-00.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='http://xml.resource.org/authoring/rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [
<!ENTITY rfc2119 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc1321 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1321.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc4346 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4346.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc3748 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3748.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc5226 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5226.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc4282 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4282.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc4017 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4017.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc1968 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1968.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc1990 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1990.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc2419 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2419.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc2420 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2420.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc2548 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2548.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc2865 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2865.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc5216 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5216.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc3078 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3078.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc3079 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3079.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc4366 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4366.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc3579 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3579.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc3580 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3580.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc3766 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3766.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc4291 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4291.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc3986 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc5996 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5996.xml">
<!ENTITY rfc2315 PUBLIC "" "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2315.xml">
]>
<?rfc strict="yes"?>
<?rfc comments="no"?>
<?rfc inline="yes"?>
<?rfc editing="no"?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocompact="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="3"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="yes"?>
<?rfc rfcedstyle="yes"?>
<?rfc rfcprocack="no"?>
<?rfc tocindent="yes"?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-zorn-emu-team-00" ipr="noModificationTrust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="TEAM">The Tunneled Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (TEAM)</title>
<author fullname="Glen Zorn" initials="G" surname="Zorn">
<organization>Network Zen</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>227/358 Thanon Sanphawut</street>
<city>Bang Na</city>
<region>Bangkok</region>
<code>10260</code>
<country>Thailand</country>
</postal>
<phone>+66 (0) 87-040-4617</phone>
<email>gwz@net-zen.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Qin Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu">
<organization abbrev="Huawei">Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District</street>
<city>Nanjing</city>
<region>Jiangsu</region>
<code>21001</code>
<country>China</country>
</postal>
<phone>+86-25-84565892</phone>
<email>sunseawq@huawei.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Dan Harkins" initials="D.H." surname="Harkins">
<organization>Aruba Networks</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1322 Crossman Avenue</street>
<city>Sunnyvale</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>94089-1113</code>
<country>United States of America</country>
</postal>
<email>dharkins@arubanetworks.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2010"/>
<abstract>
<t>
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) provides support for
multiple authentication methods. This document defines the Tunneled Extensible Authentication
Method (TEAM), which provides
an encrypted and authenticated tunnel based on transport layer security (TLS) that encapsulates
EAP authentication mechanisms.
TEAM uses TLS to protect against rogue authenticators, protect against various attacks on the
confidentiality and integrity of the inner EAP method exchange and provide EAP peer identity
privacy.
TEAM also provides support for chaining multiple EAP mechanisms, cryptographic binding
between authentications performed by inner EAP mechanisms and the tunnel, exchange of
arbitrary parameters (TLVs),
and fragmentation and reassembly.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in <xref target="RFC3748"/>,
provides support for multiple authentication methods. EAP over PPP <xref target="RFC3748"/>
is typically
deployed with leased lines or
modem connections. <xref target="IEEE.802-1X.2004"/>
defines EAP over IEEE 802 local area
networks (EAPOL).
<vspace blankLines="1" />
Since its initial development, a number of weaknesses in the EAP framework have
become apparent. These include lack of support for:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>Identity protection</t>
<t>Protected method negotiation</t>
<t>Protected notification messages</t>
<t>Protected termination messages</t>
<t>Sequences of EAP methods</t>
<t>Fragmentation and reassembly</t>
<t>Exchange of arbitrary parameters in a secure channel</t>
<t>Optimized re-authentication</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In addition, some EAP methods lack the following features:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>Mutual authentication</t>
<t>Resistance to dictionary attacks</t>
<t>Adequate key generation</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
By wrapping the EAP protocol within TLS, TEAM addresses deficiencies in EAP or EAP
methods. Benefits of TEAM include:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Identity protection">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
By encrypting the identity exchange, and allowing client identity
to be provided after negotiation of the TLS channel, TEAM
provides for identity protection.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Dictionary attack resistance">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
By conducting the EAP conversation within a TLS channel, TEAM
protects EAP methods that might be subject to an offline dictionary
attack were they to be conducted in the clear.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Protected negotiation">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Since within TEAM, the EAP conversation is authenticated,
integrity and replay protected on a per-packet basis, the EAP
method negotiation that occurs within TEAM is protected, as are
error messages sent within the TLS channel (TLS alerts or EAP
Notification packets). EAP negotiation outside of TEAM is not protected.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Header protection">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Within TEAM, TLS provides per-packet encryption, authentication,
integrity and replay protection for the EAP conversation. As a
result, the Type-Data field within TEAM (including the EAP header
of the EAP method within TEAM) is protected against modification.
However, the EAP header of TEAM itself is not protected against
modification, including the Code, Identifier and Type fields.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Protected termination">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
By sending success/failure indications within the TLS channel,
TEAM provides support for protected termination of the EAP
conversation. This prevents an attacker from carrying out denial
of service attacks by spoofing EAP Failure messages, or fooling the
EAP peer into accepting a rogue NAS, by spoofing EAP Success messages.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Fragmentation and Reassembly">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Since EAP does not include support for fragmentation and
reassembly, individual methods need to include this capability. By
including support for fragmentation and reassembly within TEAM,
methods leveraging TEAM do not need to support this on their own.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Fast reconnect">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Where EAP is used for authentication in wireless networks, the
authentication latency is a concern. As a result, it is valuable
to be able to do a quick re-authentication on roaming between
access points. TEAM supports this capability by leveraging the
TLS session resumption facility, and any EAP method running under
TEAM can take advantage of it.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Standard key establishment">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
In order to provide keying material for a wide range of link layer
ciphersuites, EAP methods need to provide keying material. Key
derivation is complex. TEAM provides for key establishment by
relying on the widely implemented and well-reviewed TLS <xref target="RFC4346"/>
key derivation mechanism. TEAM provides keying material for any
EAP method running within it.
<!--
If EAP methods will also be deployed
without external protection (e.g. TEAM or IPSec), then the EAP
methods should follow the guidelines in <xref target="MITM-A-P"/>
to prevent the
man-in-the-middle attacks.
-->
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Sequencing of multiple EAP methods">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
In order to enhance security, TEAM implementations may choose to
provide multi-factor authentication that validates different
identities (for example user and machine identities) and/or uses
different credentials of the same or different identities of the
peer (e.g. user password and machine cert). TEAM provides a
standard way to chain different types of authentication mechanisms
supporting different types of credentials.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Protected exchange of arbitrary parameters">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Type-Length-Value (TLV) tuples provide a way to exchange arbitrary
information between peer and EAP server within a secure channel.
This information can include signaling parameters for the EAP protocol,
provisioning parameters, media specific and environment specific
data, and authorization parameters. The advantage of using TEAM
TLVs is that every EAP method does not have to be modified.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Credential provisioning">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
TEAM supports provisioning of certificate trust anchors by the
server using TLVs and can be extended to support provisioning of other peer credentials.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Optimized for light weight devices">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
In order to support peers that may not support certificate
ciphersuites, and may not support provisioning of certificate trust
anchors, TEAM enables negotiation of other TLS ciphersuites.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Server unauthenticated tunnel provisioning mode">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
In some cases, the peer may only support password credentials and
may not be provisioned with a certificate trust anchor.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In server unauthenticated tunnel provisioning mode, a TEAM peer
can authenticate using a password, in order to be provisioned with
a pre-shared key and other credentials that can be used for
subsequent authentication. In server unauthenticated tunnel
provisioning mode the TEAM peer only confirms possession of the
private key corresponding to the public key contained within the
server certificate, but does not otherwise validate the server
certificate. As a result, it is possible for an attacker to act as
a man-in-the-middle during the initial exchange in order to perform
an offline dictionary attack, based on capture of the password-
based authentication exchange.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In TEAM, implementation of server unauthenticated tunnel
provisioning mode is optional and due to the security
vulnerabilities introduced by this mode, it is not recommended for
use with peers that support certificate validation and provisioning
of certificate trust anchors.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Requirements Language">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119"></xref>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Terminology">
<t>
This document frequently uses the following terms:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Access Point">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
A Network Access Server implementing 802.11.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Authenticator">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
The end of the link initiating EAP authentication. This term is
also used in <xref target="IEEE.802-1X.2004"/>.
and has the same meaning in this document.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Backend Authentication Server">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an
authentication service to an Authenticator. When used, this server
typically executes EAP methods for the Authenticator. This
terminology is also used in <xref target="IEEE.802-1X.2004"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="EAP server">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the
peer. In the case where no backend authentication server is used,
the EAP server is part of the Authenticator. In the case where the
authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is
located on the backend authentication server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Link layer ciphersuite">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
The ciphersuite negotiated for use at the link layer.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="NAS">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Short for "Network Access Server".
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Peer">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
The end of the link that responds to the authenticator. In <xref target="IEEE.802-1X.2004"/>,
this end is known as the Supplicant.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLS Ciphersuite">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
The ciphersuite negotiated for protection of Phase 2 of the TEAM
conversation <xref target="T-P-2"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="EAP Master key (MK)">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
A key derived between the TEAM client and server during the
authentication conversation, and that is kept local to TEAM and
not exported or made available to a third party.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Master Session Key (MSK)">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Keying material that is derived between the EAP peer and server and
exported by the EAP method. The MSK is at least 64 octets in
length. In existing implementations, a AAA server acting as an EAP
server transports the MSK to the authenticator.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
Additional keying material derived between the EAP client and
server that is exported by the EAP method. The EMSK is at least 64
octets in length. The EMSK is not shared with the authenticator or
any other third party. The EMSK is reserved for future uses that
are not defined yet.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Type Length Value (TLV)">
<vspace blankLines="0"/>
The TEAM protocol utilizes objects in Type Length Value (TLV)
format. The TLV format is defined in <xref target="TLV-F"/>
of this document.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Protocol Overview">
<t>
TEAM is comprised of a two-part conversation:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers">
<t>
In Phase 1 a TLS session is negotiated, with the server authenticating
to the client and (optionally) the client to the server. The
negotiated key is then used to protect Phase 2 of the
conversation.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>
In Phase 2, within the TLS session, zero or more EAP methods are
carried out. Phase 2 completes with a success/failure indication
protected by the TLS session or a protected error (TLS alert).
</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In the following sections, we discuss the TEAM operational model, its support for EAP method
sequencing and provide an overview of each of the parts of the TEAM conversation.
</t>
<section title="Operational Model">
<t>
In EAP, the EAP server may be implemented either within a Network
Access Server (NAS) or on a backend authentication server. Where the
EAP server resides on a NAS, the NAS is required to implement the
desired EAP methods, and therefore needs to be upgraded to support
each new EAP method.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
One of the goals of EAP is to enable development of new
authentication methods without requiring deployment of new code on
the Network Access Server (NAS). Where a backend authentication
server is deployed, the NAS acts as a "passthrough" and need not
understand specific EAP methods.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This allows new EAP methods to be deployed on the EAP peer and
backend authentication server, without the need to upgrade code
residing on the NAS.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<xref target="fig1"/>
illustrates the relationship between the EAP peer, NAS and EAP
server. As shown in the figure, the EAP conversation occurs
between the EAP peer and EAP server, "passing through" the NAS. In
order for the conversation to proceed in the case where the NAS and
EAP server reside on separate machines, the NAS and EAP server need
to establish trust beforehand.
<figure align="center" anchor="fig1" title="Relationship between EAP client, backend authentication server and NAS"> <artwork><![CDATA[
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| Link | | Link |
| Layer | | Layer |
| Cipher- | | Cipher- |
| Suite | | Suite |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
^ ^
| |
| |
| |
V V
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ Trust +-+-+-+-+-+
| | EAP | |<======>| |
| | Conversation | | | |
| EAP |<================================>| EAP |
| Peer | (over PPP, | NAS | | Server |
| | 802.11,etc.) | |<=======| |
| | | | Keys | |
| | | | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
^ ^
| |
| EAP API | EAP API
| |
V V
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| | | |
| EAP | | EAP |
| Method | | Method |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
In TEAM, the conversation between the EAP peer and the EAP server
is encrypted, authenticated, integrity and replay protected within a
TLS channel.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
As a result, where the NAS acts as a "passthrough" it does not have
knowledge of the TLS master secret derived between the peer and the
EAP server. In order to provide keying material for link-layer
ciphersuites, the NAS obtains the master session key, which is
derived from a one-way function of the TLS master secret as well as
keying material provided by EAP methods protected within a TLS
channel. This enables the NAS and EAP peer to subsequently derive
transient session keys suitable for encrypting, authenticating and
integrity protecting session data. However, the NAS cannot decrypt
the TEAM conversation or spoof session resumption, since this
requires knowledge of the TLS master secret.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Sequences">
<t>
EAP <xref target="RFC3748"/>
prohibits use of multiple authentication methods within
a single EAP conversation, except when tunneled methods such as
TEAM are used. This restriction was imposed in order to limit
vulnerabilities to man-in-the-middle attacks as well as to ensure
compatibility with existing EAP implementations.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Within TEAM these concerns are addressed since TEAM includes
support for cryptographic binding to address man-in-the-middle
attacks, as well as version negotiation so as to enable backward
compatibility with future versions of the protocol.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Within this document, the term "sequence" refers to a series of EAP
authentication methods run in sequence or TLV exchanges before or
after EAP methods. The methods need not be distinct - for example,
EAP-TLS could be run initially with machine credentials followed by
the same protocol authenticating with user credentials.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM supports initiating additional EAP method(s) after a
successful or a failed EAP method. The result of failure of a EAP
method does not always imply a failure of the overall authentication.
The overall result of authentication depends on the policy at EAP
server and the peer. For example, successful authentication might
require a successful machine authentication followed by a successful
user authentication. Alternatively, if machine authentication fails,
then user authentication can be attempted. TEAM does not support
initiating multiple EAP methods simultaneously.
</t>
</section>
<section title="TEAM Phase 1" anchor="T-P-1">
<section title="Initial identity exchange" anchor="I-I-E">
<t>
The TEAM conversation typically begins with an optional identity
exchange. The authenticator will typically send an EAP-
Request/Identity packet to the peer, and the peer will respond with
an EAP-Response/Identity packet to the authenticator.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The initial identity exchange is used primarily to route the EAP
conversation to the EAP server. Since the initial identity exchange
is in the clear, the peer MAY decide to place a routing realm instead
of its real name in the EAP-Response/Identity. The real identity of
the peer can be established later, during Phase 2.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server is known in advance (such as when all users
authenticate against the same backend server infrastructure and
roaming is not supported), or if the identity is otherwise determined
(such as from the dialing phone number or client MAC address), then
the EAP-Request/Response-identity exchange MAY be omitted.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Once the optional initial Identity Request/Response exchange is
completed, while nominally the EAP conversation occurs between the
authenticator and the peer, the authenticator MAY act as a
passthrough device, with the EAP packets received from the peer being
encapsulated for transmission to a backend authentication server.
However, TEAM does not require a backend authentication server; if
the authenticator implements TEAM, then it can authenticate local
users.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In the discussion that follows, we will use the term "EAP server" to
denote the ultimate endpoint conversing with the peer.
</t>
</section>
<section title="TLS Session Establishment" anchor="T-S-E">
<t>
In this section, the protocol is described. While this section will often describe
negotiation of a certificate-based ciphersuite within TLS, TEAM supports negotiation
of other ciphersuites (for example, ciphersuites that do not use
certificates) or extensions. However, the conversation may slightly
differ if other TLS ciphersuites or extensions are used.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Once having received the peer's Identity, and determined that TEAM
authentication is to occur, the EAP server MUST respond with a
TEAM/Start packet, which is an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=TEAM,
the Start (S) bit set, the TEAM version as specified in <xref target="V-N"/>,
and optionally, the Server-Identifier TLV (<xref target="S-I-TLV"/>).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Assuming that the peer supports TEAM, the TEAM conversation will then
begin, with the peer sending an EAP-Response packet with EAP-
Type=TEAM. The Type-Data field of the EAP-Response Packet will
encapsulate one or more TLS records containing the TLS handshake
messages. As defined in <xref target="RFC4346"/>,
the TLS handshake is used to
negotiate parameters and cryptographic keys and may take several
roundtrips between the TLS client and server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The version offered by the TLS client and server MUST be TLS v1.0 or
later. TEAM implementations need not necessarily support all TLS
ciphersuites listed in <xref target="RFC4346"/>.
Not all TLS ciphersuites are
supported by available TLS tool kits and licenses may be required in
some cases.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
To ensure interoperability, TEAMv2 peers and servers MUST support the
TLS v1.1 <xref target="RFC4346"/>
mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In addition, TEAM servers SHOULD support and be able to negotiate
all of the following TLS ciphersuites:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</t>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5</t>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</t>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In addition, TEAM peers SHOULD support at least one of the
following TLS ciphersuites:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA</t>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5</t>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA</t>
<t>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TLS as described in <xref target="RFC4346"/>
supports compression as well as ciphersuite negotiation. Therefore during the TEAM Phase 1
conversation the TEAM endpoints MAY request or negotiate TLS
compression.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the full TLS handshake is performed, then the first payload of
TEAM Phase 2 MAY be sent along with finished handshake message to
reduce number of round trips.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Since after the TLS session is established, another complete EAP
negotiation will occur and the peer will authenticate using a
secondary mechanism, with TEAM the client need not authenticate as
part of TLS session establishment.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Note that since TLS client certificates are sent in the clear, if
identity protection is required, then it is possible for the TLS
authentication to be re-negotiated after the first server
authentication. Alternatively, if identity protection is required,
then it is possible to perform certificate authentication using a EAP
method (for example: EAP-TLS <xref target="RFC5216"/>)
within the TLS session during TEAM Phase 2.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
To accomplish this, the server will typically not request a
certificate in the server_hello, then after the server_finished
message is sent, and before TEAM Phase 2 begins, the server MAY send a TLS
hello_request. This allows the client to perform client
authentication by sending a client_hello if it wants to, or send a
no_renegotiation alert to the server indicating that it wants to
continue with TEAM Phase 2 instead. Assuming that the client permits
renegotiation by sending a client_hello, then the server will respond
with server_hello, a certificate and certificate_request messages.
The client replies with certificate, client_key_exchange and
certificate_verify messages. Since this re-negotiation occurs within
the encrypted TLS channel, it does not reveal client certificate details.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Session Resumption" anchor="S-R">
<t>
The purpose of the sessionId within the TLS protocol and the Server-
Identifier TLV in TEAM is to allow for improved efficiency in the
case where a client repeatedly attempts to authenticate to an EAP
server within a short period of time. This capability is
particularly useful for support of wireless roaming.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In order to help the peer choose a sessionID that belongs to the
specific server, the EAP server MAY send an identifier (Server-
Identifier TLV) that the peer can use as a hint. The Server-
Identifier TLV MAY be sent in the first TEAM packet from the EAP
server to the peer. In order to detect modification of the Server-
Identifier TLV, the Server-Identifier TLV is included in calculation
of the compound MAC.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
It is left up to the peer whether to attempt to continue a previous
session, thus shortening the TEAM Phase 1 conversation. Typically the
peer's decision will be made based on the time elapsed since the
previous authentication attempt to that EAP server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Based on the sessionId chosen by the peer, and the time elapsed since
the previous authentication, the EAP server will decide whether to
allow the continuation, or whether to choose a new session.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server is resuming a previously established session, then
it MUST include only a TLS change_cipher_spec message and a TLS
finished handshake message after the server_hello message. The
finished message contains the EAP server's authentication response to
the peer.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the preceding server_hello message sent by the EAP server in the
preceding EAP-Request packet indicated the resumption of a previous
session, then the peer MUST send only the change_cipher_spec and
finished handshake messages. The finished message contains the
peer's authentication response to the EAP server. The latter contains
the EAP server's authentication response to the peer. The peer will
verify the hash in order to authenticate the EAP server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If authentication fails, then the peer and EAP-server MUST follow the
error handling behavior specified in <xref target="E-H"/>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Even if the session is successfully resumed with the same EAP server,
the peer and EAP server MUST NOT assume that either will skip inner
EAP methods. The peer may have roamed to a network which may use the
same EAP server, but may require conformance with a different
authentication policy, and therefore may require inner EAP
authentication methods.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Version Negotiation" anchor="V-N">
<t>
TEAM packets contain a three bit version field, which enables TEAM
implementations to be backward compatible with previous versions of
the protocol. This specification documents version1 of the TEAM
protocol; implementations of this specification MUST use a version
field set to 1. Version negotiation proceeds as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers">
<t>
In the first EAP-Request sent with EAP-Type=TEAM, the EAP server
MUST set the version field to the highest supported version number.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>
If the EAP peer supports that version of the protocol, it MUST
respond with an EAP-Response of EAP-Type=TEAM, and the version
number proposed by the EAP server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>
If the EAP peer does not support that version, it responds with an
EAP-Response of EAP-Type=TEAM and the highest supported version number.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>
If the TEAM server does not support the version number proposed by
the TEAM peer, it either starts a different EAP type or terminates
the conversation by sending an EAP-Failure, depending on the server policy.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
The version negotiation procedure guarantees that the EAP peer and
server will agree to the latest version supported by both parties.
If version negotiation fails, then use of TEAM will not be possible,
and another mutually acceptable EAP method will need to be negotiated
if authentication is to proceed.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The TEAM version field is not protected by TLS and therefore can be
modified in transit. In order to detect modification of the TEAM
version which could occur as part of a "downgrade" attack, the peer
and EAP server check if the version it sent during negotiation is
same as the version claimed to be received by the other party. Each
party uses the Crypto-Binding TLV (<xref target="Cryp-B-TLV"/>)
to inform the other party of the
version number it received during the TEAM version negotiation. The
receiver of the Crypto-Binding TLV must verify that the version in
the Crypto-Binding TLV matches the version it sent during TEAM
version negotiation.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="TEAM Phase 2" anchor="T-P-2">
<t>
The second part of the TEAMv2 conversation typically consists of a
complete EAP conversation occurring within the TLS session negotiated
in TEAM Phase 1, ending with protected termination using the Result
TLV. TEAM Phase 2 will occur only if establishment of a new TLS
session in Phase 1 is successful or a TLS session is successfully
resumed in Phase 1. In cases where a new TLS session is established
in TEAMv2 Phase 1, the first payload of the Phase 2 conversation MAY be
sent by the EAP server along with the finished message to save a
round-trip.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Phase 2 SHOULD NOT occur if the EAP Server authenticates
unsuccessfully, and MUST NOT occur if establishment of the TLS
session in Phase 1 was not successful or a TLS fatal error has been
sent terminating the conversation.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Since all packets sent within the TEAM Phase 2 conversation occur
after TLS session establishment, they are protected using the
negotiated TLS ciphersuite. All EAP packets of the EAP conversation
in Phase 2 including the EAP header of the inner EAP method are
protected using the negotiated TLS ciphersuite.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Phase 2 may not always include a EAP conversation within the TLS
session, referred to in this document as inner EAP methods. However,
Phase 2 MUST always end with either protected termination or protected
error termination (e.g. TLS alert).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Within Phase 2, protected EAP conversation and protected termination
packets are always carried within TLVs. There are TLVs defined for
specific purposes such as carrying EAP-authentication messages and
carrying cryptographic binding information. New TLVs may be developed for other
purposes.
</t>
<section title="Protected Conversation" anchor="P-C">
<t>
Phase 2 of the TEAM conversation typically begins with the EAP
server sending an optional EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer,
protected by the TLS ciphersuite negotiated in Phase 1 of TEAM. The
peer responds with an EAP-Response/Identity packet to the EAP server,
containing the peer's userId. Since this Identity Request/Response
exchange is protected by the ciphersuite negotiated in TLS, it is not
vulnerable to snooping or packet modification attacks.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
After the TLS session-protected Identity exchange, the EAP server
will then select authentication method(s) for the peer, and will send
an EAP-Request with the Type field set to the initial method. As
described in <xref target="RFC3748"/>,
the peer can NAK the suggested EAP method,
suggesting an alternative. Since the NAK will be sent within the TLS
channel, it is protected from snooping or packet modification. As a
result, an attacker snooping on the exchange will be unable to inject
NAKs in order to "negotiate down" the authentication method. An
attacker will also not be able to determine which EAP method was
negotiated.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The EAP conversation within the TLS protected session may involve a
sequence of zero or more EAP authentication methods; it completes
with the protected termination described in <xref target="P-T"/>
Several TLVs may be included in each Request and Response. EAP packets are
always encapsulated within EAP Payload TLVs.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In a typical EAP conversation, the result of the conversation is
communicated by sending EAP Success or EAP Failure packets after the
EAP method is complete. The EAP Success or Failure packet is
considered the last packet of the EAP conversation; and therefore
cannot be used when sequences need to be supported. Hence, instead
of using the EAP Success or EAP Failure packet, both peer and EAP
server MUST use the Intermediate-Result TLV (<xref target="I-R-TLV"/>)
to communicate the result.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In a typical EAP conversation, the EAP Success or EAP Failure is
considered the last packet of the EAP conversation. Within TEAM,
the EAP server can start another EAP method after success or failure
of the previous EAP method inside the protected session.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In a sequence of more than one EAP authentication method, to make
sure the same parties are involved in tunnel establishment and
successful completion of previous inner EAP methods, before
completing negotiation of the next EAP method, both peer and EAP
server MUST use crypto binding (Crypto-Binding TLV).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Intermediate-Result TLV is used to indicate the result of a
individual successful EAP method, and the Result TLV (<xref target="R-TLV"/>)
is used to indicate result of the entire TEAM conversation.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Intermediate-Result and Crypto-Binding TLVs MUST be sent after
each EAP method that was successful. If the EAP method failed, or if
the EAP method negotiation did not complete, then an Intermediate-
Result TLV MAY be included, and the Crypto-Binding TLV MUST NOT be
included. An exception is that the Crypto-Binding TLV MUST be sent
along with a protected success/failure indication (see
<xref target="P-T"/>).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If these TLVs are not sent after a successful EAP method, it should
be considered a tunnel compromise error by peer and EAP server,
resulting in the termination of the conversation (as described in <xref target="E-H"/>).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
A subsequent EAP conversation can be started after both TLVs are
exchanged in a TLV packet. Alternatively, if a subsequent EAP
conversation is being attempted, then in order to reduce round trips,
both TLVs SHOULD be sent with the EAP-Payload of the first EAP packet
of the next EAP conversation (for example, EAP- Identity or EAP
packet of the EAP method). Alternatively, if the next packet is the
protected success/failure packet, then in order to reduce round
trips, both TLVs MUST be sent with the protected success/failure packet.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server sends a valid Crypto-Binding TLV to the peer, the
peer MUST respond with a Crypto-Binding TLV. If the Crypto-Binding
TLV is invalid, it should be considered a tunnel compromise error by
the peer. If the peer does not respond with a TLV packet containing
the Crypto-Binding TLV, it MUST be considered a tunnel compromise
error by the EAP server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Within a TEAM part 2 conversation, a peer MAY request the trusted
root of a server certificate using a Server-Trusted-Root TLV (<xref target="S-T-R-TLV"/>), and
the EAP server MAY respond with a Server-Trusted-Root TLV to the
peer. The Server-Trusted-Root TLV can be exchanged in regular
authentication mode or server unauthenticated tunnel provisioning
mode.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
After the peer has determined that it has successfully authenticated
the EAP server and determined that the tunnel and inner EAP methods
were between the same peer and EAP server by validating the Crypto-Binding TLV,
it MAY send one or more Server-Trusted-Root TLVs (marked
as optional) to request the trusted root of server certificate from
the EAP server. The peer may receive a response, but is not required
to use the trusted root received from the EAP server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server has determined that it has successfully
authenticated the peer and determined that the tunnel and inner EAP
methods were between the same peer and EAP server by validating the
Crypto-Binding TLV, then it MAY respond with the the server-trusted-
root containing the PCKS#7 TLV (<xref target="PKCS-TLV"/>).
</t>
</section>
<section title="Protected Termination" anchor="P-T">
<t>
Phase 2 of the TEAM conversation is completed by the exchange of
success/failure indications (Result TLV) within a TLV packet
protected by the TLS session.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Even if Crypto-Binding TLVs have been exchanged in previous
conversations, the Crypto-Binding TLV MUST be included in both
protected success/failure (Result TLV) indications. If the TLVs are
not included, or if the TLVs are invalid, it should be considered a
tunnel compromise error, and the peer and EAP server MUST follow the
rules described in <xref target="E-H"/>
to abort the conversation.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Result TLV is sent within the TLS channel. The TEAM client then
replies with a Result TLV. The conversation concludes with the TEAM
server sending a cleartext success/failure indication.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The only outcome which should be considered as successful
authentication is when a Result TLV of Status=Success is answered by
the peer with a Result TLV of Status=Success.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The combinations (Result TLV=Failure, Result TLV=Success), (Result
TLV=Failure, Result TLV=Failure), (no TLVs exchange or no protected
success or failure) should be considered an authentication failure by
both the peer and EAP server. Once the peer and EAP server consider
that authentiation has failed, these are the last packets inside the
protected tunnel. These combinations are considered an
authentication failure regardless of whether a cleartext EAP Success
or EAP Failure packet is subsequently sent.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server wants authentication to fail, it sends the TLV
response with Result TLV=Failure. If the EAP server sends a failure,
the peer MUST respond with Result TLV=Failure and the Crypto-Binding
TLV, without any other mandatory TLVs. The Crypto-Binding TLV is
calculated using the key derivation formula in Section 2.5; if for
some reason one or more inner EAP method MSKs were not derived, then
these MSKs are assumed to be null.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server has sent the success indication (Result
TLV=Success), the peer is allowed to refuse to accept a Success
message from the EAP server since the client's policy may require
completion of certain EAP methods or the client may require
credentials.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server has sent a success indication (Result TLV=success),
and the peer wants authentication to fail, it sends the TLV response
with Result TLV=Failure and Crypto-Binding TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
After the EAP-server returns success, if the peer wants to request
the EAP server to continue conversation, it sends a Result
TLV=Success along with a Request-Action TLV with the appropriate
action (e.g. Negotiate-EAP, or Process-TLV). If the Request-Action
TLV is set to mandatory, then the EAP server MUST process the action,
or return status=failure, closing the conversation inside the tunnel.
If the Request-Action TLV is set to optional, then the EAP server can
ignore the TLV and return Result TLV=Success again, closing the
conversation inside the tunnel.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Provisioning of Credentials" anchor="P-O-C">
<t>
TEAM supports built-in provisioning of certificate trust anchors
and can be extended to provisioning of other types of credentials.
The following two provisioning modes are suported:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers">
<t>Provisioning inside a server authenticated TLS tunnel</t>
<t>Provisioning inside a server unauthenticated TLS tunnel</t>
</list>
</t>
<section title="Provisioning Inside a Server Authenticated TLS Tunnel" anchor="P-I-S-A-T">
<t>
After regular authentication in TEAM Phase 2, the peer and EAP
server can use the Server-Trusted-Root TLV to request and provision
peer credentials. The provisioning payload is exchanged after the
peer and EAP server have determined that both have successfully
authenticated each other (either thru TLS handshake and/or inner
EAP method), and the tunnel and inner EAP methods are between the
same peers.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
After the peer has determined that it has successfully
authenticated the EAP server and determined that the tunnel and
inner EAP methods were between the same peer and EAP server by
validating the Crypto-Binding TLV, it MAY send one or more Server-
Trusted-Root TLVs (marked as optional) to request credentials from
the EAP server. The EAP server will send corresponding credentials
in the Server-Trusted-Root TLVs if its internal policy has been
satisfied. It may ignore the credential provisioning request or
request additional authentication methods if its policy so dictates.
The peer may receive a credential, but is not required to use the
credentials received from the EAP server.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Provisioning Inside a Server Unauthenticated TLS Tunnel" anchor="P-I-S-U-T">
<t>
In some cases, the peer may lack the credentials necessary to authenticate the
server in the TLS handshake. At the same time, bootstrapping the
information to the peer out of band may be prohibitive from a
deployment cost perspective. It can rely on the inner EAP method
using existing credentials to authenticate the server. This
provisioning mode provides ease of deployment at the cost of
introducing man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities. As a result,
implementation of the server unauthenticated tunnel provisioning
mode is OPTIONAL.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In this provisioning mode, as part of TEAM Phase 1, if the peer
does not authenticate, or does not successfully authenticate the
EAP server during TLS negotiation, it can decide to go into server
unauthenticated tunnel provisioning mode. While this section
describes negotiation of a certificate-based ciphersuite within
TLS, TEAM supports negotiation of other ciphersuites (for
example, ciphersuites that do not use certificates such as
anonymous DH) or extensions. However, the conversation may
slightly differ if other TLS ciphersuites or extensions are used.
For example, in a certificate based TLS handshake, the peer
verifies that the EAP server possesses the private key
corresponding to the public key contained in the certificate
presented by the EAP server. However, the peer does not verify
whether the certificate presented by the server chains to a
provisioned trust anchor, as the peer may not be configured with a
certificate trust anchor required to validate the server
certificate. If the peer cannot verify that the server possesses
the corresponding private key, or if the certificate presented by
the server is unacceptable for any reason other than the lack of an
appropriate trust anchor, the peer MUST NOT use this provisioning
mode. Assuming that the server demonstrates possession of the
private key, the peer continues with establishment of the tunnel
(TEAM Phase 2). As a result, it is possible that the TLS channel
(TEAM Phase 2) may be terminated by an attacker.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The TEAM Phase 2 conversation is unchanged in this mode, except
that the peer will only accept an EAP method supporting mutual
authentication and key derivation that is compatible with its
initial credentials (such as a password-based EAP method). The
peer then uses the Crypto-Binding TLV to validate that the same
server terminates both the TLS channel and the successfully
completed EAP method, thereby verifying that the exchange was not
subject to a man-in-the-middle attack. Assuming that the Crypto-
Binding TLV exchange is successful, the peer will request and the
server will subsequently provide a trusted root, using the Server-
Trusted-Root TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Once the initial provisioning exchange completes, the peer is
expected to use the provisioned credentials in subsequent TEAM
authentications, and SHOULD NOT use this provisioning mode.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM servers implementing this provisioning mode MUST support the
following additional ciphersuites, beyond those specified in
<xref target="T-S-E"/>:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM peers implementing this provisioning mode MAY support the
following additional ciphersuites, beyond those specified in <xref target="T-S-E"/>:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Error Handling" anchor="E-H">
<t>
TEAM does not have its own error message capabilities since:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers">
<t>TLS errors are communicated via TLS alert messages.</t>
<t>
Errors within the EAP conversation in TEAM Phase 2 are expected to
be handled by individual EAP methods.
</t>
<t>
Violation of the TLV rules for inner-TLVs are handled using
Result-TLVs together with the Error-Code TLV.
</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If an error occurs at any point in the TLS layer, the EAP server
SHOULD send a TLS alert message instead of the next EAP-request
packet to the peer. The EAP server SHOULD send an EAP-Request packet
with EAP-Type=TEAM, encapsulating a TLS record containing the
appropriate TLS alert message. The EAP server SHOULD send a TLS
alert message rather than immediately terminating the conversation so
as to allow the peer to inform the user of the cause of the failure
and possibly allow for a restart of the conversation. To ensure that
the peer receives the TLS alert message, the EAP server MUST wait for
the peer to reply with an EAP-Response packet.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The EAP-Response packet sent by the peer MAY encapsulate a TLS
client_hello handshake message, in which case the EAP server MAY
allow the TEAM conversation to be restarted, or it MAY contain an
EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=TEAM and no data, in which case the
TEAM server MUST send an EAP-Failure packet, and terminate the
conversation.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
It is up to the EAP server whether to allow restarts, and if so, how
many times the conversation can be restarted. An EAP server
implementing restart capability SHOULD impose a limit on the number
of restarts, so as to protect against denial of service attacks.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If an error occurs at any point in the TLS layer, the peer SHOULD
send a TLS alert message instead of the next EAP-response packet to
the EAP server. The peer SHOULD send an EAP-Response packet with
EAP-Type=TEAM, encapsulating a TLS record containing the appropriate
TLS alert message. The EAP server may restart the conversation by
sending a EAP-Request packet encapsulating the TLS
hello_request_handshake message, in which case the peer MAY allow the
TEAM conversation to be restarted; or the EAP server can response
with EAP Failure.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Any time the peer or the EAP server finds an error when processing
the sequence of exchanges, such as a violation of TLV rules, it
should send a Result TLV of failure and Error-Code
TLV=Unexpected_TLVs_Exchanged (a Fatal error), and terminate the
tunnel. This is usually due to an implementation problem and is
considered an fatal error. The party that receives the Error-Code
TLV=Unexpected_TLVs_Exchanged should terminate the tunnel.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If a tunnel compromise error (<xref target="T-P-2">see</xref>)
is detected by the
Peer or EAP server, the party SHOULD send a Result TLV of failure
without a Crypto-Binding TLV, and Error-Code TLV=Tunnel-compromise-
error (a Fatal error), and terminate the tunnel. The party that
receives the Error-Code TLV=Tunnel-compromise error should terminate
the tunnel.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Fragmentation and Reassembly" anchor="F-R">
<t>
A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS
message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message
may in principle be as long as 16MB.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The group of TEAM messages sent in a single round may thus be
larger than the PPP MTU size, the maximum RADIUS packet size of 4096
octets, or even the Multilink Maximum Received Reconstructed Unit (MRRU).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
As described in <xref target="RFC1990"/>,
the multilink MRRU is negotiated via the
Multilink MRRU LCP option, which includes an MRRU length field of two
octets, and thus can support MRRUs as large as 64 KB.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
However, note that in order to protect against reassembly lockup and
denial of service attacks, it may be desirable for an implementation
to set a maximum size for one such group of TLS messages. Since a
typical certificate chain is rarely longer than a few thousand
octets, and no other field is likely to be anywhere near as long, a
reasonable choice of maximum acceptable message length might be 64 KB.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If this value is chosen, then fragmentation can be handled via the
multilink PPP fragmentation mechanisms described in <xref target="RFC1990"/>.
this is desirable, EAP methods are used in other applications such as
<xref target="IEEE.802-11.2007"/>
and there may be cases in which multilink or the MRRU LCP
option cannot be negotiated. As a result, a TEAM implementation
MUST provide its own support for fragmentation and reassembly.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Since EAP is an ACK-NAK protocol, fragmentation support can be added
in a simple manner. In EAP, fragments that are lost or damaged in
transit will be retransmitted, and since sequencing information is
provided by the Identifier field in EAP, there is no need for a
fragment offset field as is provided in IPv4.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM fragmentation support is provided through addition of flag
bits within the EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets, as well as a
TLV Message Length field of four octets. Flags include the Length
included (L), More fragments (M), and TEAM Start (S) bits. The L
flag is set to indicate the presence of the four octet TLV Message
Length field, and MUST be set only for the first fragment of a
fragmented TLV message or set of messages.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The TLV Message Length field in the TEAM header is not protected,
and hence can be modified by a attacker. The TLS record length in
the TLS data is protected. Hence, if the TLV Message length received
in the first packet (with L bit set) is greater or less than the
total size of TLS messages received including multiple fragments,
then the TLV message length should be ignored.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In order to protect against reassembly lockup and denial of service
attacks, it may be desirable for an implementation to set a maximum
size for a single group of Outer-TLV messages. Since a typical
certificate chain is rarely longer than a few thousand octets, and no
other field is likely to be anywhere near as long, a reasonable
choice of maximum acceptable message length for all the Outer-TLVs in
a group of messages might be 64 KB.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The M flag is set on all but the last fragment. The S flag is set
only within the TEAM start message sent from the EAP server to the
peer. The TLV Message Length field is four octets, and provides the
total length of the TLV message or set of messages that is being
fragmented; this simplifies buffer allocation.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
When a peer receives an EAP-Request packet with the M bit set, it
MUST respond with an EAP-Response with EAP-Type=TEAM and no data.
This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP server MUST wait until it
receives the EAP-Response before sending another fragment. In order
to prevent errors in processing of fragments, the EAP server MUST
increment the Identifier field for each fragment contained within an
EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this Identifier value in the
fragment ACK contained within the EAP-Response. Retransmitted
fragments will contain the same Identifier value.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the M
bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with EAP-Type=TEAM and
no TLS data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait
until it receives the EAP-Request before sending another fragment.
In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the EAP
server MUST increment the Identifier value for each fragment ACK
contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained within an EAP-
Response.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Key Derivation" anchor="K-D">
<t>
Since the normal TLS keys are used in the handshake, and therefore
should not be used in a different context, new keys must be derived
from the TLS master secret to protect the conversation within the
TEAM tunnel.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Instead of deriving keys specific to link layer ciphersuites, EAP
methods provide a Master Session Key (MSK) used to derive keys in a
link layer specific manner. The method used to extract ciphering
keys from the MSK is beyond the scope of this document.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM also derives an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) which is
reserved for use in deriving keys in other ciphering applications.
This draft also does not discuss the format of the attributes used to
communicate the master session keys from the backend authentication
server to the NAS; examples of such attributes are provided in <xref target="RFC2548"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM combines key material from the TLS exchange with key material
from inner key generating EAP methods to provide stronger keys and to
bind inner authentication mechanisms to the TLS tunnel. Both the
peer and EAP server MUST derive compound MAC and compound session
keys using the procedure described below.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The input for the cryptographic binding includes the following:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers">
<t>
The TEAM tunnel key (TK) is calculated using the first 40 octets
of the (secret) key material generated as described in the EAP-TLS
algorithm (<xref target="RFC5216">see Section 2.3 of</xref>)
More explicitly, the TK is the
first 40 octets of the PRF as defined in RFC 5216:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="hanging" hangIndent="29">
<t hangText="Key_Material = TLS-PRF-128(">
master_secret, "client EAP encryption", client.random || server.random )
</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>
The first 32 octets of the MSK provided by each successful inner
EAP method for each successful EAP method completed within the tunnel.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
ISK1..ISKn are the MSK portion of the EAP keying material obtained
from methods 1 to n. The ISKj SHALL be the first 32 octets of the
generated MSK of the jth EAP method. If the MSK length is less than
32 octets, it SHALL be padded with 0x00's to ensure the MSK is 32
octets. Similarly, if no keying material is provided for the EAP
method, then ISKj SHALL be set to zero (e.g. 32 octets of 0x00).
</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The PRF algorithm is based on PRF+ from IKEv2 <xref target="RFC5996"/>
shown below ("|" denotes concatenation).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>PRF (K,S,LEN) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ...</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Where:
<list>
<t>K = Key</t>
<t>S = Seed</t>
<t>LEN = output length, represented as binary in a single octet</t>
</list>
and
<list>
<t>T1 = HMAC-SHA1(K, S | LEN | 0x01)</t>
<t>T2 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T1 | S | LEN | 0x02)</t>
<t>T3 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T2 | S | LEN | 0x03)</t>
<t>T4 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T3 | S | LEN | 0x04)</t>
<t>...</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The intermediate combined key is generated as described below
after each successful EAP method inside the tunnel.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>S-IPMK0 = TK</t>
<t>for j = 1 to k do</t>
<t>
<list style="hanging" hangIndent="15">
<t hangText="IPMKj = PRF+(">
S-IPMK(j-1),"Inner Methods Compound Keys " | ISKj, 60 )
</t>
</list>
</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Where
<list>
<t>
S-IPMKj are the first 40 octets of IPMKj
and CMKj are the last 20 octets of IPMKj used to generate
the intermediate Compound MACs
</t>
</list>
and
<list>
<t>
k = the last successful EAP method inside the tunnel at the point
where the combined MAC key is derived
</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Each IPMKj output is 60 octets. The first 40 octets are used as the
key input to the succeeding IPMK(j+1) derivation and the latter 20
octets are used as the key, CMKj, used to generate the intermediate
Crypto-Binding Compound MAC value at the jth EAP method.
</t>
<section title="Compound Session Key Derivation" anchor="C-S-K-D">
<t>
The compound session key (CSK) is derived on both the peer and EAP server:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>CSK = PRF+(S-IPMKn, "Session Key Generating Function", OutputLength)</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The output length of the CSK must be at least 128 bytes. The first 64
octets are taken as the MSK and the second 64 octets are taken as
the EMSK. The MSK and EMSK are described in <xref target="RFC3748"/>.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Ciphersuite Negotiation" anchor="C-N">
<t>
Since TLS supports TLS ciphersuite negotiation, peers completing the
TLS negotiation will also have selected a TLS ciphersuite, which
includes key strength, encryption and hashing methods. However,
unlike in <xref target="RFC5216"/>,
within TEAM, the negotiated TLS ciphersuite
relates only to the mechanism by which the TEAM Phase 2 conversation
will be protected, and has no relationship to link layer security
mechanisms negotiated within the PPP Encryption Control Protocol
(ECP) <xref target="RFC1968"/>
or within IEEE 802.11 <xref target="IEEE.802-11.2007"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
As a result, this specification currently does not support secure negotiation of link layer
ciphersuites.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="TEAM Protocol Description" anchor="T-P-D">
<section title="TEAM Protocol Layers" anchor="T-P-L">
<t>
TEAM packets may include TLVs both inside and outside the TLS
tunnel. The term "Outer TLVs" is used to refer to optional TLVs
outside the TLS tunnel, which are only allowed in the first two
messages in the TEAM protocol. That is the first EAP server to
peer message and first peer to EAP server message. If the message is
fragmented, the whole set of messages is counted as one message. The
term "Inner TLVs" is used to refer to TLVs sent within the TLS
tunnel.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
In TEAM Phase 1, Outer TLVs are used to help establishing the TLS
tunnel, but no Inner TLVs are used. Therefore the layering of TEAM Phase 1 is as follows:
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLS | Optional Outer TLVs |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TEAM |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EAP |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
In Phase 2 of the TEAM conversation, TLS records may encapsulate zero or more Inner
TLVs, but no Outer TLVs. EAP packets (including EAP header fields)
used within tunneled EAP authentication methods are carried within
Inner TLVs. Therefore the layering of TEAM Part 2 is as follows:
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EAP |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner-TLVs (EAP-Payload TLV) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLS |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TEAM |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EAP |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="TEAM Packet Format" anchor="T-P-F">
<t>
A summary of the TEAM packet format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted from left to right.
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Flags | Ver | Fragment Message Length
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Fragment Message Length | TLS Message Length
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer TLVs...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Code">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="1 -">Request</t>
<t hangText="2 -">Response</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Identifier">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching responses
with requests. The Identifier field MUST be changed on each
Request packet. The Identifier field in a Response packet MUST
match the Identifier field from the corresponding Request.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, Flags,
Version, Fragmented Length, TLS Message Length, TLS Data, and
Outer-TLV fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field
should be treated as Data Link Layer padding and should be ignored
on reception.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<TBD1> - TEAM
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Flags">
<figure align="left" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3 4
+-+-+-+-+-+
|L M S T R|
+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="L =">Length included</t>
<t hangText="M =">More fragments</t>
<t hangText="S =">TEAM start</t>
<t hangText="T =">TLS length included</t>
<t hangText="R =">Reserved (must be zero)</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The L bit (Fragmented Message Length included) is set to indicate
the presence of the four octet Fragmented Message Length field,
and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented TEAM
message or set of messages. The M bit (more fragments) is set on
all but the last fragment. The S bit (TEAM start) is set in a
TEAM Start message. This differentiates the TEAM Start message
from a fragment acknowledgment. The T bit (TLS Message Length
included) is set to indicate the presence of the four octet TLS
Message Length field, and MUST only be set for packet that
contains Outer-TLVs. It can be used to calculate the start of the
Outer-TLVs.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Version">
<figure align="left" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2
+-+-+-+
|R|0|1|
+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
R = Reserved (must be zero)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Fragmented Message Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Fragmented Message Length field is four octets, and is present
only if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of
the data after the Fragmented Message Length field in the TEAM
message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLS Message Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and is present only
if the T bit is set. This field provides the total length of the
TLS Data in the TEAM message. Data after this length of TLS data
are the Outer TLVs.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLS Data">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The TLS data consists of the encapsulated packet in TLS record format.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Outer TLVs">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Outer-TLVs consists of the optional data used to help
establishing the TLS tunnel in TLV format. The start of the
Outer-TLV can be derived from the EAP Length field and TLS Length
field.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Type-Length-Value Tuples" anchor="TLV-T">
<t>
The TLVs used within TEAM are standard Type-Length-Value (TLV)
objects. The TLV objects could be used to carry arbitrary parameters
between EAP peer and EAP server. Possible uses for TLV objects
include: language and character set for Notification messages and
cryptographic binding.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The EAP peer may not necessarily implement all the TLVs supported by
the EAP server; and hence to allow for interoperability, TLVs allow
an EAP server to discover if a TLV is supported by the EAP peer,
using the NAK TLV. The TEAM packet does not have to contain any
TLVs, nor need it contain any mandatory TLVs.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The mandatory bit in a TLV indicates whether support of the TLV is
required. If the peer or server does not support the TLV, it MUST
send a NAK TLV in response, and all the other TLVs in the message
MUST be ignored. If an EAP peer or server finds an unsupported TLV
which is marked as optional, it can ignore the unsupported TLV. It
MUST NOT send an NAK TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Note that a peer or server may support a TLV with the mandatory bit
set, but may not understand the contents. The appropriate response
to a supported TLV with content that is not understood is defined by
the TLV specification.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Outer-TLVs SHOULD NOT be included in messages after the first two
Outer-TLV messages sent by the peer and EAP server respectively. A
single Outer-TLV message may be fragmented in multiple TEAM packets.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
All Outer-TLVs MUST NOT have the mandatory bit set. If an Outer-TLV
has the mandatory bit set, then the packet MUST be ignored.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MUST support TLVs, as well as processing of
mandatory/optional settings on the TLV.
</t>
<section title="TLV Format" anchor="TLV-F">
<t>
TLVs are defined as described below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
<figure align="left" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="0 -">Optional TLV</t>
<t hangText="1 -">Mandatory TLV</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Reserved, set to zero (0)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
A 14-bit field, denoting the TLV type. Allocated types include:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="1 -">Result</t>
<t hangText="2 -">NAK</t>
<t hangText="3 -">Error-Code</t>
<t hangText="4 -">Connection-Binding</t>
<t hangText="5 -">Vendor-Specific</t>
<t hangText="6 -">URI</t>
<t hangText="7 -">EAP-Payload</t>
<t hangText="8 -">Intermediate-Result</t>
<t hangText="9 -">Crypto-Binding</t>
<t hangText="10 -">Calling-Station-Id</t>
<t hangText="11 -">Called-Station-Id </t>
<t hangText="12 -">NAS-Port-Type</t>
<t hangText="13 -">Server-Identifier</t>
<t hangText="14 -">Identity-Type</t>
<t hangText="15 -">Server-Trusted-Root</t>
<t hangText="16 -">Request-Action</t>
<t hangText="17 -">PKCS#7</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The length of the Value field in octets
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Value">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The value of the TLV
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Result TLV" anchor="R-TLV">
<t>
The Result TLV provides support for acknowledged success and failure
messages within TEAM. TEAM implementations MUST support this
TLV, which cannot be responded to with a NAK TLV. If the Status
field does not contain one of the known values, then the peer or EAP
server MUST drop the connection. The Result TLV is defined as
follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Status |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 for Result
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
2
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Status">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Status field is two octets. Values include:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t hangText="1 -">Success</t>
<t hangText="2 -">Failure</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="NAK TLV" anchor="N-TLV">
<t>
The NAK TLV allows a peer to detect TLVs that are not supported by
the other peer. A TLV packet can contain 0 or more NAK TLVs. TEAM
implementations MUST support the NAK TLV, which cannot be responded
to with a NAK TLV. The NAK TLV is defined as follows:
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| NAK-Type | TLVs....
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
2 for NAK
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 6
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Vendor-ID">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Vendor-Id field is four octets, and contains the Vendor-Id of
the TLV that was not supported. The high-order octet is 0 and the
low-order 3 octets are the SMI Network Management Private
Enterprise Code of the Vendor in network byte order. The Vendor-
Id field MUST be zero for TLVs that are not Vendor-Specific TLVs.
For Vendor-Specific TLVs, the Vendor-ID MUST be set to the SMI code.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="NAK-Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The NAK-Type field is two octets. The field contains the Type of
the TLV that was not supported. A TLV of this Type MUST have been
included in the previous packet.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLVs">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This field contains a list of TLVs, each of which MUST NOT have
the mandatory bit set. These optional TLVs can be used in the
future to communicate why the offending TLV was determined to be
unsupported.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Error-Code TLV" anchor="E-C-TLV">
<t>
The Error-Code TLV allows a TEAM peer or server to indicate errors
to the other party. A TLV packet can contain 0 or more Error TLVs.
Error-Code TLVs MUST be marked as Mandatory. TEAM implementations
MUST support the Error-Code TLV, which cannot be responded to with a
NAK TLV. The Error-Code TLV is defined as follows:
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error-Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
3 for Error-Code
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
4
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Error-Code">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Error-Code field is four octets. Error Codes 1-999 represent
successful outcomes (informative messages), 1000-1999 represent
warnings, and codes 2000-2999 represent fatal errors. If an Error-
Code TLV with a fatal error has been sent, then the conversation
must be terminated.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Currently defined values for Error-Code include:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t hangText="2001 -">Tunnel_Compromise_Error</t>
<t hangText="2002 -">Unexpected_TLVs_Exchanged</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Crypto-Binding TLV" anchor="Cryp-B-TLV">
<t>
The Crypto-Binding TLV is used prove that both peers participated in
the sequence of authentications (specifically the TLS session and
inner EAP methods that generate keys).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Both the Binding Request (B1) and Binding Response (B2) use the same
packet format. However the Sub-Type indicates whether it is B1 or B2.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Crypto-Binding TLV MUST be used to perform Cryptographic Binding
after each successful EAP method in a sequence of EAP methods is
complete in TEAM Phase 2. The Crypto-Binding TLV can also be used
during Protected Termination.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Crypto-Binding TLV must have the version number received during
the TEAM version negotiation. The receiver of the Crypto-Binding TLV
must verify that the version in the Crypto-Binding TLV matches the
version it sent during the TEAM version negotiation. If this check
fails then the TLV is invalid.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The receiver of the Crypto-Binding TLV must verify that the subtype
is not set to any value other than the ones allowed. If this check
fails then the TLV is invalid.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This message format is used for the Binding Request (B1) and also the
Binding Response. This uses TLV type CRYPTO_BINDING_TLV. TEAM
implementations MUST support this TLV and this TLV cannot be
responded to with a NAK TLV. The Crypto-Binding TLV is defined as
follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Version | Received Ver. | Sub-Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Nonce ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Compound MAC ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
9 for Crypto-Binding
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
56
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Reserved">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Reserved, set to zero (0)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Version">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Version field is a single octet, which is set to the version
of Crypto-Binding TLV. For the Crypto-Binding TLV defined in this
specification, it is set to one (1).
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Sub-Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Sub-Type field is two octets. Possible values include:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="0 -">Binding Request</t>
<t hangText="1 -">Binding Response</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Nonce">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Nonce field is 32 octets. It contains a 256 bit nonce that is
temporally unique, used for compound MAC key derivation at each
end. This is the S_NONCE for the B1 message and a C_NONCE for the
B2 message.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Compound MAC">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Compound MAC field is 20 octets. This can be the Server MAC
(B1_MAC) or the Client MAC (B2_MAC). It is computed using the
HMAC-SHA1-160 keyed MAC that provides 160 bits of output using the
CMK key. The MAC is computed over the buffer created after
concatenating these fields in the following order:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers">
<t>
The entire Crypto-Binding TLV attribute with the MAC field zeroed out
</t>
<t>
The EAP Type sent by the other party in the first TEAM message
</t>
<t>
All the Outer-TLVs from the first TEAM message sent by EAP-server
to peer. If a single TEAM message is fragmented into multiple TEAM
packets; then the Outer-TLVs in all the fragments of that message
MUST be included.
</t>
<t>
All the Outer-TLVs from the first TEAM message sent by the peer to
the EAP server. If a single TEAM message is fragmented into
multiple TEAM packets, then the Outer-TLVs in all the fragments of
that message MUST be included.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Connection-Binding TLV" anchor="Conn-B-TLV">
<t>
The Connection-Binding TLV allows for connection specific information
to be sent by the peer to the AAA server. This TLV should be logged
by the EAP or AAA server. The AAA or EAP server should not deny
access if there is a mismatch between the value sent through the AAA
protocol and this TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The format of this TLV is defined for the layer that defines the
parameters. The format of the value sent by the peer to the EAP
server may be different from the format of the corresponding value
sent through the AAA protocol. For example, the connection binding
TLV may contain the 802.11 MAC Address or SSID <xref target="IEEE.802-11.2007"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MAY support this TLV and this TLV MUST NOT be
responded to with a NAK TLV. The Connection-Binding TLV is defined as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLVs...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
4 for Connection-Binding
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLVs">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The field contains a list of TLVs, each in the same format defined
in <xref target="TLV-F"/>,
with the Mandatory flag bit cleared (0). These TLVs contain
information on the identity of the peer and authenticator (layer 2
or IP addresses); the media used to connect the peer and
authenticator (NAS-Port-Type); and/or the service the client is
trying to access on the gateway (SSID). The format of these TLVs
will be defined in a separate draft.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Vendor-Specific TLV" anchor="V-S-TLV">
<t>
The Vendor-Specific TLV is available to allow vendors to support
their own extended attributes not suitable for general usage.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
A Vendor-Specific-TLV can contain one or more TLVs,
referred to as Vendor TLVs. The TLV-type of the Vendor-TLV will be
defined by the vendor. All the Vendor TLVs inside a single Vendor-
Specific TLV belong to the same vendor.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MUST support the Vendor-Specific TLV, and this
TLV MUST NOT be responded to with a NAK TLV. TEAM implementations
may not support the Vendor TLVs inside in the Vendor-Specific TLV,
and can respond to the Vendor TLVs with a NAK TLV containing the
appropriate Vendor-ID and Vendor-TLV type.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Vendor TLVs may be optional or mandatory. Vendor TLVs sent in the
protected success and failure packets MUST be marked as optional. If
Vendor TLVs sent in protected success/failure packets are marked as
Mandatory, then the peer or EAP server MUST drop the connection.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Vendor-Specific TLV is defined as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor TLVs....
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
5 for Vendor-Specific
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 4
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Vendor-ID">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Vendor-Id field is four octets, and contains the Vendor-Id of
the TLV that was not supported. The high-order octet is 0 and the
low-order 3 octets are the SMI Network Management Private
Enterprise Code of the Vendor in network byte order. The Vendor-
Id field MUST be zero for TLVs that are not Vendor-Specific TLVs.
For Vendor-Specific TLVs, the Vendor-ID MUST be set to the SMI code.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Vendor TLVs">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This field is of indefinite length. It contains vendor-specificTLVs,
in a format defined by the vendor.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="URI TLV" anchor="U-TLV">
<t>
The URI TLV allows a server to send a URI to the client to refer it
to a resource. The TLV contains a URI in the format specified in
RFC 3986 <xref target="RFC3986"/>
with UTF-8 encoding. Interpretation of the value of the URI
is outside the scope of this document.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If a packet contains multiple URI TLVs, then the client SHOULD select
the first TLV it can implement, and ignore the others. If the client
is unable to implement any of the URI TLVs, then it MAY ignore the
error. TEAM implementations MAY support this TLV; and this TLV
cannot be responded to with a NAK TLV. The URI TLV is defined as
follows:
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| URI
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
6 for URI
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="URI">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This field is of indefinite length, and conforms to the format specified in RFC 3986.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="EAP-Payload TLV" anchor="E-P-TLV">
<t>
To allow piggybacking EAP request and response with other TLVs, the
EAP Payload TLV is defined, which includes an encapsulated EAP packet
and 0 or more TLVs. TEAM implementations MUST support this TLV,
which cannot be responded to with a NAK TLV. The EAP-Payload TLV is
defined as follows:
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EAP-Packet...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLVs...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
7 for EAP-Payload
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="EAP-Packet">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This field contains a complete EAP packet, including the EAP
header (Code, Identifier, Length, Type) fields. The length of
this field is determined by the Length field of the encapsulated
EAP packet.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLVs">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This (optional) field contains a list of TLVs associated with the
EAP-Packet field. The TLVs utilize the same format described
<xref target="TLV-F"/>,
and MUST NOT have the mandatory bit set. The total
length of this field is equal to the Length field of the EAP-
Payload-TLV, minus the Length field in the EAP header of the EAP
packet field.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Intermediate-Result TLV" anchor="I-R-TLV">
<t>
The Intermediate-Result TLV provides support for acknowledged
intermediate Success and Failure messages within EAP. TEAM
implementations MUST support this TLV, which cannot be responded to
with a NAK TLV. The Intermediate-Result TLV is defined as follows:
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Status | TLVs...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
8 for Intermediate-Result
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 2
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Status">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Status field is two octets. Values include:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>1 - Success</t>
<t>2 - Failure</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLVs">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This (optional) field contains a list of TLVs associated with the
Intermediate-Result TLV. The TLVs utilize the same format described
<xref target="TLV-F"/>,
and MUST NOT have the mandatory bit set.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Calling-Station-Id TLV" anchor="Cg-S-TLV">
<t>
This TLV allows a peer to send information to EAP server about the
call originator. This TLV MAY be included in the Connection-Binding-
TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
For dial-up, the Called-Station-ID TLV contains the phone number of
the peer. For use with IEEE 802.1X, the MAC address of the peer is
included <xref target="RFC3580"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
For VPN, this attribute is used to send the IPv4 or IPV6 address of
the interface of the peer used to initiate the VPN in ASCII format.
Where the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the VPN client is
known, it SHOULD be appended, separated from the address with a " "
(space). Example: "12.20.2.3 vpnserver.company.com".
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
As described in <xref target="RFC3748">Section 7.15 of</xref>,
this TLV SHOULD be logged by
the EAP or AAA server, and MAY be used for comparison with
information gathered by other means.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
However, since the format of this TLV may not match the format of the
information gathered by other means, if an EAP server or AAA server
supports the capability to deny access based on a mismatch, spurious
authentication failures may occur. As a result, implementations
SHOULD allow the administrator to disable this check.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MAY support this TLV and this TLV MUST NOT be
responded to with a NAK TLV. The Calling-Station-ID TLV is defined
as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
10 for Calling-Station-Id
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="String">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The field should be the same as the value of the Calling-Station-ID attribute in
<xref target="RFC2865"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Called-Station-Id TLV" anchor="Cd-S-TLV">
<t>
This TLV allows a peer to send information to EAP server about the
NAS it called. This TLV MAY be included in the Connection-Binding
TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
For dial-up, the Calling-Station-ID TLV contains the phone number
called by the peer. For use with IEEE 802.1X, the MAC address of the
NAS is included, as specified in <xref target="RFC3580"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
For VPN, this attribute is used to send the IPv4 or IPv6 address of
VPN server in ASCII format. Where the Fully Qualified Domain Name
(FQDN) of the VPN server is known, it SHOULD be appended, separated
from the address with a " " (space). Example: "12.20.2.3
vpnserver.company.com".
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This TLV SHOULD be logged by the EAP or AAA server, and MAY be used
for comparison with information gathered by other means. However,
since the format of this TLV may not match the format of the
information gathered by other means, if an EAP server or AAA server
supports the capability to deny access based on a mismatch, spurious
authentication failures may occur. As a result, implementations
SHOULD allow the administrator to disable this check.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MAY support this TLV, and this TLV MUST NOT be
responded to with a NAK TLV. The Called-Station-ID TLV is defined as
follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
11 for Called-Station-Id
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
>= 0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="String">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The field should be the same as the value of the Called-Station-ID attribute in
<xref target="RFC2865"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="NAS-Port-Type TLV" anchor="N-P-T-TLV">
<t>
This TLV allows a peer to send information to EAP server about the
type of physical connection used by the peer to connect to NAS. This
TLV MAY be included in the Connection-Binding-TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The value of this field is the same as the value of NAS-Port-Type
attribute in <xref target="RFC2865"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This TLV SHOULD be logged by the EAP or AAA server and MAY be used
for comparison with information gathered by other means. However,
since the format of this TLV may not match the format of the
information gathered by other means, if an EAP server or AAA server
supports the capability to deny access based on a mismatch, spurious
authentication failures may occur. As a result, implementations
SHOULD allow the administrator to disable this check.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MAY support this TLV; and this TLV MUST NOT be
responded to with a NAK TLV. The NAS-Port-Type TLV is defined as
follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
12 for NAS-Port-Type
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
4
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="String">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The String field is four octets.
Values are the same as for the NAS-Port-Type attribute defined in
<xref target="RFC2865"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Server-Identifier TLV" anchor="S-I-TLV">
<t>
This TLV allows a EAP server to send a hint to the EAP peer to help
the EAP peer select the appropriate sessionID for session resumption.
The field is a string sent by the EAP server, and the field should be
treated as a opaque string by the peer. During a full-tls-handshake,
the EAP peer MAY keep track of this field and the corresponding
sessionID, and use it as a hint to select the appropriate sessionID
during session resumption.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MAY support this TLV and this TLV MUST NOT be
responded to with a NAK TLV. The Server-Identifier TLV is defined as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
13 for Server-Identifier
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
≥ 0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="String">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Contains an identifier sent by the EAP server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Identity-Type TLV" anchor="I-T-TLV">
<t>
The Identity-Type TLV allows an EAP-server to send a hint to help the
EAP-peer select the right type of identity; for example; user or
machine.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
TEAM implementations MAY support this TLV, which cannot be
responded to with a NAK TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the Identity-type field does not contain one of the known values
or if the EAP peer does not have an identity corresponding to the
identity-type, then the peer MUST ignore the value. The Identity-
Type TLV is defined as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identity-Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
14 for Identity-Type
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
2
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Identity-Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Identity-Type field is two octets. Values include:
<list>
<t>1 - Human</t>
<t>2 - Machine</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Server-Trusted-Root TLV" anchor="S-T-R-TLV">
<t>
The Server-Trusted-Root TLV allows the peer to send a request to the
EAP server for a trusted root in PKCS #7 format.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Server-Trusted-Root TLV is always marked as optional, and cannot
be responded to with a NAK TLV. TEAM server implementations that
claim to support provisioning MUST support Server-Trusted-Root TLV,
PKCS#7 TLV, and the PKCS#7-Server-Certificate-Root credential format
defined in this TLV. TEAM peer implementations may not support
this TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Server-Trusted-Root TLV can only be sent as an inner TLV (inside the
TEAM Phase 2 conversation), in both server unauthenticated tunnel
provisioning mode, and the regular authentication process.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The peer MUST NOT request, or accept the trusted root sent inside the
Server-Root credential TLV by the EAP-server until it has completed
authentication of the EAP server, and validated the Crypto-Binding TLV.
The peer may receive a trusted root, but is not required to use the
trusted root received from the EAP server.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the EAP server sets credential-format to PKCS#7-Server-
Certificate-Root, then the Server-Trusted-Root TLV MUST contain the
root of the certificate chain of the certificate issued to the EAP
server packages in a PKCS#7 TLV. If the Server certificate is a
self-signed certificate, then the root is the self-signed
certificate. In this case, the EAP server does not have to sign the
certificate inside the PCKS#7 TLV since it does not necessarily have access to
the private key for it.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the Server-Trusted-Root TLV credential format does not contain one
of the known values, then the EAP-server MUST ignore the value.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Server-Trusted-Root TLV is defined as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Credential Format | TLVs...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
15 for Server-Trusted-Root
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
≥ 2
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Credential Format">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Credential Format field is two octets. Values include:
<list>
<t>1 - PKCS#7-Server-Certificate-Root</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLVs">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This (optional) field contains a list of TLVs associated with the
Server-Trusted-Root TLV. The TLVs utilize the same format described
<xref target="TLV-F"/>,
and MUST NOT have the mandatory bit set.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="PKCS#7 TLV" anchor="PKCS-TLV">
<t>
This
TLV contains a certificate or certificate chain requested by the peer in
PKCS#7
format <xref target="RFC2315"/>.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The PKCS#7 TLV is always marked as optional, and cannot be
responded to with a NAK TLV. PEAPv2 server implementations that
claim to support provisioning MUST support this TLV. PEAPv2 peer
implementations may not support this TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If the PKCS#7 TLV contains a certificate or certificate chain that is
not acceptable to the peer, then peer MUST ignore the value.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The PKCS#7 TLV is defined as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PKCS#7 data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0 (Optional)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
17 for PKCS#7
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
≥ 0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="PKCS#7 Data">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
This field contains a certificate or certificate chain in PKCS#7 format.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Request-Action-TLV" anchor="R-A-TLV">
<t>
The Request-Action TLV MAY be sent by the peer along with
acknowledged failure. It allows the peer to request the EAP server
to negotiate EAP methods or process TLVs specified in the failure
packet. The server MAY ignore this TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
PEAPv2 implementations MUST support this TLV, which cannot be
responded to with a NAK TLV.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Request-Action TLV is defined as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<figure align="center" suppress-title="true"><artwork><![CDATA[
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|M|R| TLV Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Action |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="M">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
1 (Mandatory)
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="R">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
0
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="TLV Type">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
16 for Request-Action
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Length">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
2
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="Action">
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Action field is two octets. Values include:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list>
<t>1 - Process-TLV</t>
<t>2 - Negotiate-EAP</t>
</list>
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<!--
<section title="TLV Rules" anchor="TLV-R">
</section>
-->
</section>
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>
TBC.
</t>
<!--
<section title="Authentication and Integrity Protection" anchor="A-I-P">
</section>
<section title="Method Negotiation" anchor="M-N">
</section>
<section title="TLS Session Cache Handling" anchor="T-S-C-H">
</section>
<section title="Certificate Revocation" anchor="C-R">
</section>
<section title="Separation of EAP Server and Authenticator" anchor="S-E-S-A">
</section>
<section title="Separation of TEAM Phase 1 and 2 Servers" anchor="S-T-P-1-2">
</section>
<section title="Identity Verification" anchor="I-V">
</section>
<section title="Man-in-the-Middle Attack Protection" anchor="MITM-A-P">
</section>
<section title="Cleartext Forgeries" anchor="C-F">
</section>
<section title="TLS Ciphersuites" anchor="TLS-C">
</section>
<section title="Denial of Service Attacks" anchor="DoS-A">
</section>
<section title="Server Unauthenticated Tunnel Provisioning Mode" anchor="S-U-T-P-M">
</section>
<section title="Security Claims" anchor="S-C">
</section>
-->
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<t>
TBC.
</t>
<!--
<section title="Definition of Terms" anchor="D-T">
</section>
<section title="Recommended Registration Policies" anchor="R-R-T">
</section>
-->
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
&rfc2119;
&rfc3748;
&rfc1321;
&rfc4346;
&rfc4291;
&rfc3986;
&rfc5226;
&rfc4282;
&rfc4017;
&rfc2315;
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor="IEEE.802-1X.2004">
<front>
<title>IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks: Port-Based Network Access Control</title>
<author>
<organization>IEEE Computer Society</organization>
</author>
<date day="13" month="December" year="2004"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="IEEE" value="Standard 802.1X" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="IEEE.802-11.2007">
<front>
<title>
Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications
</title>
<author>
<organization>IEEE Computer Society</organization>
</author>
<date day="12" month="June" year="2007"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="IEEE" value="Standard 802.11" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="FIPSDES">
<front>
<title>Data Encryption Standard</title>
<author>
<organization>National Bureau of Standards</organization>
</author>
<date month="January" year="1977"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="FIPS PUB" value="46"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DESMODES">
<front>
<title>DES MODES of Operation</title>
<author>
<organization>National Bureau of Standards</organization>
</author>
<date month="December" day="1980"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="FIPS PUB" value="81"/>
</reference>
&rfc1968;
&rfc1990;
&rfc2419;
&rfc2420;
&rfc2548;
&rfc2865;
&rfc5216;
&rfc3078;
&rfc3079;
&rfc4366;
&rfc3579;
&rfc3580;
&rfc3766;
&rfc5996;
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 07:41:13 |