One document matched: draft-zhou-rrg-lp-wsn-00.xml
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<front>
<title abbrev="CTA">The Location Privacy of Wireless Sensor Networks:
Attacks and Countermeasures</title>
<author fullname="Lin Zhou" initials="L" surname="Zhou">
<organization>SouthEast University</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>SouthEast University,Nanjing,210012</street>
</postal>
<email>573823136@qq.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Jie Huang" initials="J" surname="Huang">
<organization>SouthEast University</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>SouthEast University,Nanjing,210012</street>
</postal>
<email>jhuang@seu.edu.cn</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="28" month="May" year="2014"/>
<abstract>
<t>With the related applications of wireless sensor networks getting
into our lives quickly, the research of WSN is growing more and more
necessary. The most significant problem which threatens the successful
deployment of sensor systems is privacy, there are many protocols
providing the security of news content for the WSNs. However, due to the
open feature of sensor networks, context information is still in an
exposed state, which makes the network be vulnerable to traffic analysis
attack and hop by hop tracing back packet attack. Thus location privacy
protection programs have been proposed. In this paper, we analyze and
compare the existing major schemes comprehensively, meanwhile illustrate
their theoretical models, principles and the advantages and
disadvantages in detail.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>With the rise of Internet of things, wireless sensor network (WSN)
which is an integral part of Internet of things have a very broad
application prospects.</t>
<t>WSNs consist of a large number of micro sensor nodes, those nodes are
capable of sensing information, computing and communicating. However,
due to the low cost of these nodes, the storage capacity of battery is
small, the computing capability of node processors is low, and the
communication of wireless communication device is limited. Overall
wireless sensor networks have the following characteristics:
large-scale, self-organizing, multi-hop routing, dynamic,
resource-constrained and applications related. These features make the
wireless sensor networks have broad application prospects in military,
environment, medical treatment, smart home.</t>
<t>Wireless sensor networks could be used to collect sensitive
information or deployed in hostile or unprotected environment, which
make protecting the privacy of sensor nodes be crucial in the current
WSNs, the privacy issues in WSNs are divided into two categories:
content privacy and context privacy. In order to solve the problem of
content privacy, for now, many encryption and authentication
mechanisms<xref target="RFC4948"/><xref target="RFC4949"/>have been
proposed and used, and can basically meet the corresponding
requirements. But due to the open feature of WSNs, the exposure of
context information can cause the user's secret leak to the attacker,
especially attacker can locate the source node or destination node (base
station) through traffic analysis and hop track packet stream. The
location of source node and base station are very sensitive in many WSN
applications such as in precious animals detection system, the position
of animals (source node) can’t be exposed to illegal hunters; in
battlefield information collection system, the position of soldier (sink
node) who accepts a variety of information can’t be exposed to the
enemy. Because of the importance and necessity of location privacy, this
paper has a research on principles, advantages and disadvantages of
current main location privacy protection agreement (PhR<xref
target="PhR"/>(GROW<xref target="GROW"/>, PRLA <xref target="PRLA"/>),
PUSBRF<xref target="PUSBRF"/>, LPR <xref target="LPR"/>, LPSS<xref
target="LPSS"/>, DEFP<xref target="DEFP"/>).</t>
<t>Based on the property of object which needs to be protected, this
paper divides the possible attackers into two categories: the attackers
who attack source node and the attackers who attack sink node, and
establishes corresponding models according to their individual features.
According to the attacker models we propose appropriate protection
agreements and discuss their advantages and disadvantages.</t>
<t>The main contributions of this paper are as follows:</t>
<t>(1) We divide possible attackers into two categories based on the
property of object which needs to be protected for the first time, and
establish the corresponding attack models;</t>
<t>(2) We put forward the corresponding settlement agreements in
accordance with attack models on the basis of scientific ideas that
discovering problems then solving them, meanwhile we conduct
comprehensive analyses and comparisons on the main location privacy
protection agreements systematically for the first time;</t>
<t>(3) We summarize the maximum intensity attacker that each privacy
protection agreement can handle by analyzing and comparing, then
conclude the respective applicable scenario of each agreement.</t>
</section>
<section title="The Attack Models">
<t>The objects protected in WSNs are usually the source node (such as in
precious animals detection system, the position of the node which has
monitored animals can’t be exposed to illegal hunters) and the sink node
(such as in battlefield information collection system, the location of
the last node which is responsible for transferring a variety of
information to the soldiers can’t be exposed to the enemy). According to
the property of object which needs to be protected we divide possible
attackers into two categories: the attackers who attack source node
(source attackers) and the attackers who attack sink node (sink
attackers). This article assumes that two types of attackers both have
the following characteristics: ① attackers have excellent hardware,
sufficient storage space and powerful computation ability; ② attackers
can detect traffic only in one region, but are not capable of decrypting
data packets <xref target="PRLA"/>; ③ attackers can only trace the nodes
sending data packets but the nodes receiving data packets.</t>
<section title="The Model of Source Attackers">
<t>The process of attacker tracing back source node’s location is
described as follows: the attacker starts monitoring at the sink node,
when monitored a message, he can deduce that the signal is issued by
node A through wireless signal positioning device, then moves
immediately to node A to continue to wait, when a new message received
he determines that it was issued by node B and then quickly moves to
node B, repeat this process can trace to the location of the source
node.</t>
<t>This paper divides the source attackers into two categories based
on the sources attackers' tracking method: the patient source attacker
and the careful source attacker.</t>
<t>The model of patient source attacker is described as follows: the
attacker follows a simple and natural attack strategy: he starts on
the position of sink node (base station) to wait until a new message
is heard, and then immediately move to the node that generated the
message, repeat this process until the location of the source node is
traced.</t>
<t>The model of cautious source attacker is described as follows:
because some privacy protection technology [3] could lead an attacker
to strand at a location remote from the real source node, the strategy
of cautious source attacker is limiting the eavesdropping time in one
position, if he has not received any new messages within a specified
time interval, he thinks that he was misled to current position, and
then hops back to the previous position to continue listening.</t>
</section>
<section title="The Model of Sink Attackers">
<t>Sink attackers determine which nodes are on the transmission path
according to the time sequence of date packet transmission, then
mobile hop by hop, and finally get to the sink node. The process of
attacker tracking sink node's position is described as follows:
assuming the attacker listening for message transmitting within the
range of one hop at node C, he monitors that node C sends a data
packet at first, then node B transmits a data packet subsequently, the
attacker moves to the node B immediately and infers that the
transmission path at this time is C to B, according to this method,
the attacker tracks the location of the nodes which are one hop from
the base station as having captured the sink node.</t>
<t>Similarly sink attackers are also divided into two categories: the
patient sink attacker and the cautious sink attacker. The principle of
their attacker model is similar to the principle of corresponding
source attacker model, not repeat them.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Location Privacy Protection Agreements">
<t>In order to prevent these attackers from destroying the location
privacy security of wireless sensor networks, a series of security
protocols are proposed, such as: phantom routing (PhR), source location
privacy preservation protocol in wireless sensor networks using
source-based restricted flooding (PUSBRF), location-privacy routing
protocol (LPR), location privacy support scheme (LPSS), differential
enforced fractal propagation (DEFP). This section will classify these
main protocols and describe the principle of each protocol in
detail.</t>
<t>In this paper, we divide the main privacy and security protocols
which are mentioned above into three categories: source location privacy
protection protocols, sink location privacy protection protocols and
both location privacy protection protocol. Source location privacy
protection protocols include: PhR, PUSBRF; sink location privacy
protection protocols include: LPR, DEFP; and both location privacy
protection protocol includes LPSS.</t>
<section title=" Source Location Privacy Protection Protocols">
<section title=" Phantom Routing (PhR)">
<t>Take the panda-hunter model<xref target="PhR"/> for example, the
description of phantom routing is decribed as follows: in PhR , the
transmission of each information goes through two phases:① the
random walk phase , may be a pure random walk or a directional walk
(based on sector or hop count between the node and the sink
node<xref target="PhR"/>);② subsequent flooding/single-path routing
phase, which will send the information to the sink. When the source
node sends a message, the message is unicasted Hwalk hops randomly,
then pass it to the base station based on the baseline (probability)
flooding<xref target="SECH"/>or single-path routing<xref
target="PhR"/>. Because of PhR, after an attacker intercepted
messages i he will wait a long time before receiving the next
message i+1, when he finally receives the message i+1, the instant
sender of this message may lead the attacker to the position which
is away from the true source node.</t>
<t>On the basis of phantom routing (PhR) also proposed the phantom
routing with location angle (PRLA)<xref target="SECE"/>, PRLA is
consist of three phases:① the sink node floods a query message in
the whole network, so that each node can creates the shortest path
to the sink and divides its neighboring nodes into two direction
collections according to the distance between neighboring nodes and
the sink;② the source node produces a limited flooding with the
range of random walk, this process makes each node can get the
inclination angle of respective neighboring nodes and calculate the
transmitting messages possibility of each neighboring node;③ the
source node sends date packets to the sink node, each data packet
will be transmitted Hw hops in a random walk way based on the
inclination angle, then along the shortest route path goes to the
sink node from the phantom source node.</t>
<t>PRLA is essentially an improvement of PhR's random walk phase, to
a degree it avoids the generation of the offset path<xref
target="PUSBRF"/>, on the basis of PhR it further improves the
safety time.</t>
<t>Greedy random walk (GROW) is essentially an improvement of PhR's
random walk phase too, in GROW, the sensor node each time selects a
neighboring node from those who did not participate in the random
walk phase, in this way, random walking is always trying to cover a
area where hasn't accessed to by greedy strategy<xref
target="GROW"/>, thereby improving the ability of sensor networks
against attackers.</t>
</section>
<section title=" Protocol Using Source-based Restricted Flooding (PUSBRF)">
<t>PUSBRF protocol is consist of four phases:① network security
initialization phase;② source node h hops limited flooding phase;③ h
hops directional routing phase, the direction of each hop is
selected by the current node based on the minimum hop value that its
neighboring apart from the source node;④ the shortest path routing
phase.</t>
<t>The process of network initialization phase is described as
follows: complete the establishment of the key, discover the
neighboring nodes to achieve the information of minimum hop value
that each ordinary nodes apart from the base station, and each node
pre-loads the following parameters: the public key (Kpub) used for
message encryption, the list of neighboring nodes (Tu), hop value h,
then generate a base-station broadcast in the whole network, the
base station broadcasts the initialization message
BM={BRO_BASE,ID,hop_bs} in the entire network, in which BRO_BASE
indicates the type of messages, ID indicates the identity of the
node that sent the message, hop_bs indicates the hop count of the
message which is initially 0., PRLA is consist of three phases:① the
sink node floods a query message in the whole network, so that each
node can creates the shortest path to the sink and divides its
neighboring nodes into two direction collections according to the
distance between neighboring nodes and the sink;② the source node
produces a limited flooding with the range of random walk, this
process makes each node can get the inclination angle of respective
neighboring nodes and calculate the transmitting messages
possibility of each neighboring node;③ the source node sends date
packets to the sink node, each data packet will be transmitted Hw
hops in a random walk way based on the inclination angle, then along
the shortest route path goes to the sink node from the phantom
source node.</t>
<t>The process of the source node h hops limited flooding phase is
described as follows: it makes the source node realize the broadcast
in whole network within h hops, each node which is in the rage of h
hops from the source node gets the minimal distance between itself
and the source, then in list Tu adds the minimal hop value that the
neighboring nodes away from the source node and records the
value.</t>
<t>The phantom source nodes generated in h hops directional routing
phase are far enough away from the real source node and their
location is diverse. The shortest path routing achieves transmitting
packets from the phantom source node to the base station in a
shortest period of time.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title=" Sink Location Privacy Protection Protocols">
<section title=" Location-privacy Routing Protocol (LPR)">
<t>Because the goal of routing protocols is to transmit a packet
along the shortest possible path to the destination, the packets’
forwarding direction is always pointing to the receiver. Then the
attacker will determine the wright node which the real package goes
to according to the general trend of path. In order to resist this
kind of problem LPR protocol has been proposed.</t>
<t>LPR randomizes routing path, so that the forward direction of
packages does not always point to the receiver. The route consists
of two phases: ① each sensor node divides his neighboring nodes into
two lists: a closer list which is consist of the neighboring nodes
whose distance to the destination is shorter than its own; a further
list which is consist of the neighboring nodes whose distance to the
destination is longer than equal to its own, the specific
classification criteria refer to the literature <xref
target="LPR"/>. ②When a sensor node forwards a date packet, he
chooses a neighbor node in one of the two lists randomly as the next
hop node of the package, and the selection probability from the
further list as the next hop node is Pf, so the selection
probability from the closer list as the next hop node is 1-Pf.</t>
</section>
<section title="Differential Enforced Fractal Propagation (DEFP)">
<t>DEFP is a simple distributed algorithm based on DFP<xref
target="DEFP"/>. The key idea of the program is to leave early
packet forwarding nodes have a higher chance of false packet
transmission in the next phase, at the beginning DEFP allocates one
vote to every neighboring node. When a node selects one of his
neighboring nodes as the next node which is false packets forwarded
to, the votes of the node increase k. According to this approach,
after using lottery scheduling algorithm <xref target="SECH"/>, when
a node has forwarded a fake packet to one of its neighboring nodes,
it will continue to forward other fake packets to the same
neighboring node with rising probability.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Both Location Privacy Protection Protocols">
<t>The program consists of two phases:① Each sensor node divides his
neighboring nodes into three sets: a small gradient <xref
target="SECT"/>set comprised of the neighboring nodes with smaller
gradient value; an equivalent gradient set comprised of the
neighboring nodes with the same gradient value; a large gradient
comprised of the neighboring nodes with larger gradient value. ② When
a neighboring node transmits a packet, he selects the next hop node
from the equivalent gradient set with the probability Pi, or selects
the next hop node from the small gradient set with the probability
1-Pi. LPSS also can be used combine with the fake package
strategy.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Performance Comparison">
<t>This section compares the performance of the location privacy
security protocols mainly by three parameters: security strength (safety
time), transmission delay, communication overhead.</t>
<t>(1) Safety time (privacy protection strength): the number of packages
sent by the source node before the target node exposed to the enemy
(before hunters capturing the panda or enemy discovering soldiers who
receive information), the more of packages be sent the longer of safety
period, conversely the shorter of safety period;</t>
<t>(2) Energy loss (communication overhead): the average hop value
through which the data packet sent by the source node eventually arrives
at the sink node (base station), and the lager of the hop value the
greeter of communication overhead, conversely the smaller of
communication overhead;</t>
<t>(3) Propagation delay (transmission delay): the period in which the
data packet sent by the source node eventually arrives at the sink node
(base station), obviously lager of the average hop value the longer of
transmission delay, conversely the shorter of transmission delay.
Combining with the consequence in (2) can easily conclude that the
communication overhead is proportional to transmission delay.</t>
<t>In order to facilitate the comparison, source location privacy
protection protocols all use the same simulation configuration: in the
OMNet<xref target="SECT"/>simulation environment, we distribute 10000
sensor nodes uniformly in the network with area of 6000*6000 m2, in
which the communication radius of each node is 110m. So the average
number of neighboring nodes of each node is 8.64, weakly connected nodes
(node number of neighboring nodes is less than or equal to 3) account
for only about 1%, the attackers begin tracking from the base
station.</t>
<t>The communication overhead is closely related to two parameters: the
hop value of random walks and the distance between the source node and
the base station. When research the changing trend with one parameter,
we need to assume the other parameter as a fixed value. Assume that the
distance between the source node and the base station are 60 hops, the
relationship between communication overhead and hop count of random
directional walks shows that:① With the number of random directional
hops increasing, the communication overhead (average transmission delay)
of PhR and PUSBRF both increase. This is because with the number of
random directional hops increasing, date packets need forward more times
during random routing phase to reach phantom source nodes, however, this
phase doesn't make contribution to pass packets to the base station,
thus their communication overhead improves.② When the random directed
hop value is fixed, the communication overhead of PUSBRF is slightly
higher, because the directed walk of PhR is based on the number of hops
between the node to the base station, so PhR only need the base station
broadcast in the whole network, but from the above mentioned phases of
PUSBRF protocol we can see, PUSBRF requires not only the base station
broadcast in the whole network but also needs the source node broadcast
in the whole network within h hops.</t>
<t>Make the value of random directional hops as h=15, then the trend of
the two protocols between the communication overhead and hops from the
source node to the base station shows that: ① the communication overhead
(average transmission delay) of PhR and PUSBRF both increase with the
distance between the source node and the base station increasing. This
is because with increasing distance between the source node and the base
station, the data needs to go through more hops to reach the base
station.② when the hop value of two protocols between the source node
and the base station are the same, the communication overhead of them
are about the same.</t>
<t>(3) The security period is closely related to two parameters: the
value of random directional hops and the distance from the source node
to the base station. Assume that the distance between the source node
and the base station are 60 hops, then the trend of the security period
and the random directional hop value shows that: ① The security period
of PhR and PUSBRF both increase with h increasing. This is because the
increasing h makes the distance between the phantom source nodes
generated by two protocols and the real source node further, then
generates more random paths which make the source attackers more
difficult to trace. ② When the random directional hop value are the
same, the security period of PUSBRF is much longer than PhR's, this
indicates that the safety performance of PUSBRF is better than PhR's.
This is because phantom source nodes generated by PUSBRF are more
diverse geographically than which are generated by PhR<xref
target="PRLA"/>.</t>
<t>Make the value of random directional hops as h=15, the trend of the
security period and the distance from the source node to the base
station shows that: ① With the increasing of the hop count between the
source node and the base station, the security period of PhR and PUSBRF
also increases. This is because when the hop count is larger, the more
hops that source attackers need to trace back to the real source node. ②
When the hop count between the source node and the base station of two
protocols are the same, the safety performance of PUSBRF is better than
PhR's, indicating that the safety performance of PUSBRF better than PhR,
the reason is the same as above.</t>
<t>The performance comparison of above two protocols and LPSS used with
fake packets shows that: the safety performance of pure LPSS is between
PhR and PUSBRF, so are communication overhead and transmission delay,
when LPSS is used with the false packet strategy, the safety time
increased substantially and the communication overhead becomes larger,
but the transmission delay is still close to pure LPSS protocol, which
is because the transmission paths of true packets are the same with pure
LPSS, fake packets just used to confuse attackers, and don’t affect the
transmission of true packets.</t>
<t>In summary, compared to the pure flooding and single- path routing,
PhR can resist the attacker's packet tracing attack to some extent, but
the phantom source nodes generated by PhR concentrate in one area with
high probability; PUSBRF protocol makes up this deficiency, it can
generate phantom source nodes which are geographical diversity with
equal probability, and enhance the security of the source node's
location privacy effectively, however the improvement of security period
at the cost of increasing of communication overhead, so the
communication overhead of PUSBRF is more than PhR's, the transmission
delay is longer too, and can't weigh between the security period and the
communication overhead; gets the weigh between security period and
transmission delay by adjusting the value of the parameters Pi. When
LPSS is used combines with false packet strategy, it can achieve
impressive safety performance, but at the cost of communication overhead
increasing.</t>
<t>The above three protocols can withstand source attackers (including
patient source attackers and cautious source attackers), and are more
resistant to cautious source attackers<xref target="SECW"/>, their pros
and cons make we should select the appropriate protocol according to
specific application requirements.</t>
<t>The simulation results of location privacy protocols which can
protect the sink node (base station) are shown as follows:</t>
<t>In order to facilitate the comparison, sink location privacy
protection protocols all use the same simulation configuration: in the
OMNet simulation environment, we distribute 2500 sensor nodes uniformly
in a sensor network, make the average number of neighboring nodes of
each node be 8, and attackers began tracking from the source node.</t>
<t>(1) At the packet forwarding phase LPR protocol selects the next hop
node from the further list with probability Pf, and get the trend
between the transmission delay and hop count from the source node to the
sink node of pure LPR when Pf is 0.0%, 25%, 37.5%, meanwhile compare
with DEFP. The resulet showa that: ① with the increasing of distance
between the source node and the base station, the transmission delay of
two protocols both increase. This is because when the source node is far
away from the base station, sink attackers at the source node need to
track more hops to reach the base station;② when the distance from the
source node to the base station are the same in LPR, the transmission
delay increases with the increasing of Pf. This is because Pf is the
probability with which we select the next hop from the further list, the
larger of Pf the more likely to choose the next hop from the further
list, which extends the transmission path;③ when the distance between
the source node and the base station are the same, the transmission
delay of LPR is longer than DEFP's.</t>
<t>(2) The trend between security period and Pf of pure LPR protocol and
compare with DEFP shows that: ① with the increasing of Pf, the security
period of LPR increases. This is because Pf is the probability with
which we select the next hop from the further list, the larger of Pf the
more likely to choose the next hop from the further list, which extends
the transmission path, so sink attackers need trace a longer time to
reach the base station;② the security period of LPR is longer than
DEFP's, and the larger of Pf, the higher amplitude of LPR's security
period longer than DEFP's.</t>
<t>The performance comparison of above two protocols with fake packets
strategy, pure LPSS and LPSS with fake packets strategy indicates that:
when DEFP, LPR, LPSS all used with fake packets strategy, the security
period of three protocols all improving, the transmission delay remain
constant, but the energy consumption increasing.</t>
<t>In summary, LPR can get the balance between privacy protection
strength (security period) and energy consumption by adjusting Pf, LPR
with fake packets strategy can effectively improve the safety
performance of the program compared with DEFP, but its transmission
delay and communication overhead are far greater than DEFP's, LPSS get
the trade-off between transmission delay and security period by
adjusting Pi, and with the increasing of hop counts between the source
node and the sink node, the safety strength (security period)of LPSS
increases evidently dramatically than LPR, but LPSS can only play full
advantage when it is used with fake packets strategy, otherwise it isn't
superior than LPR and DEFP comprehensively.</t>
<t>The above three protocols can resist sink attackers (including of
patience sink attackers and cautious sink attackers), and they all have
their pros and cons, we need select the appropriate protocol according
to specific application requirements.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Consideration">
<t>This paper divides attackers into two types based on the properties
of the objects which need be protected: source attackers and sink
attackers, then establishes corresponding attack models, after that we
propose appropriate protocol in accordance with attack models, including
phantom routing (PhR), source location privacy preservation protocol in
wireless sensor networks using source-based restricted flooding
(PUSBRF), location-privacy routing protocol (LPR), location privacy
support scheme (LPSS), differential enforced fractal propagation (DEFP).
At last we have comprehensive analysis and comparison of these location
privacy protection protocols systematically, mean while sum up the
advantages and disadvantages of each protocol.</t>
</section>
<section title="IANA Consideration">
<t> To be completed. </t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references>
<reference anchor="RFC4948">
<front>
<title>Spins: security protocols for sensor networks</title>
<author fullname="A.Perrig" initials="A" surname="Perring"/>
<author fullname="R.Szewczyk" initials="R" surname="Szewczyk"/>
<author fullname="D.Tygar" initials="D" surname="Tygar"/>
<author fullname="V.Wen" initials="V" surname="Wen"/>
<author fullname="D.Culle" initials="D" surname="Culle"/>
<date month="May" year="2007"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4949">
<front>
<title>A key-management scheme for distributed sensor
networks</title>
<author fullname="L.Eschenaur" initials="L" surname="Eschenaur"/>
<author fullname="V.Gligor" initials="V" surname="Gligor"/>
<date month="August" year="2007"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="PhR">
<front>
<title>Enhancing source location privacy in sensor network
routing</title>
<author fullname="P.Kamat" initials="P" surname="Kamat"/>
<author fullname="Y.Zhang" initials="Y" surname="Zhang"/>
<author fullname="W.Trappe" initials="W" surname="Trappe"/>
<author fullname="C.Ozturk" initials="C" surname="Ozturk"/>
<date month="August" year="2005"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="GROW">
<front>
<title>Preserving source location privacy in monitoring-based
wireless sensor networks</title>
<author fullname="Y.Xi" initials="Y" surname="Xi"/>
<author fullname="W.Shi" initials="W" surname="Shi"/>
<author fullname="L.Andersson" initials="L" surname="Andersson"/>
<date month="August" year="2006"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="PRLA">
<front>
<title>A source—location privacy protocol in WSN based on locational
angle</title>
<author fullname="Wang W P" initials="Wang" surname="W P"/>
<author fullname="Chen L" initials="L" surname="Chen"/>
<author fullname="Wang J X" initials="Wang" surname="J X"/>
<date month="August" year="2008"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="PUSBRF">
<front>
<title>A Source—Location Privacy Preservation Protocol in Wireless
Sensor Networks Using Source—Based Restricted Flooding</title>
<author fullname="CHEN Juan" initials="C" surname="Juan"/>
<author fullname="FANG Binxing" initials="F" surname="Binxing"/>
<author fullname="YIN Lihua" initials="Y" surname="Lihua"/>
<date month="August" year="2010"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="LPR">
<front>
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</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 04:40:48 |