One document matched: draft-ymbk-ghostbusters-00.txt

Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                                                       IIJ
Intended status: Standards Track                         August 12, 2010
Expires: February 13, 2011


                      The RPKI Ghostbusters Record
                       draft-ymbk-ghostbusters-00

Abstract

   In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource
   certificates completely obscure names or any other information which
   might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with
   issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs,
   compromises, etc.  This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record
   containing human contact information to be signed (indirectly) by a
   resource-owning certificate.  The data in the record are those of a
   severely profiled vCARD.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, and it may not be
   published except as an Internet-Draft.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 13, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the



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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  RPKI Ghostbuster Record Payload Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  vCARD Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   6.  Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7























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1.  Introduction

   In the operational use of the RPKI, it can become necessary to
   contact, in a human to human fashion, the party responsible for a
   resource-owning certificate.  The primary example of this need is
   when the owner of a Route Origin Authorizations (ROA) sees that a
   upstream certificate in the chain needed to validate the ROA is soon
   to expire thus placing the routability of the address space described
   by the ROA in jeopardy.

   As the names in RPKI certificates are seemingly intentionally
   obscured hashes, there is no way to use the certificate itself to
   lead to the certificate's maintainer.  So, "Who do you call?"

   This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, signed
   indirectly by the certificate whose maintainer needs to be contacted,
   which contains human usable contact information for that maintainer.

   Note that this record is not an identity certificate, but the
   attestation to the contact data is made by the holder of the
   attesting certificate.

   This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry
   whois data.  It gives information about a certificate maintainer not
   a resource holder.

   This specification has three main sections.  The first, Section 4, is
   the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled
   vCARD.  The second, Section 5, profiles the CMS packaging of the
   payload as a profile of a RPKI signed blob specification.  The third,
   Section 6, describes the proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters
   Record.


2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI,
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure,
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and
   vCARDs [RFC2426].


3.  RPKI Ghostbuster Record Payload Example

   An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all fields
   used is as follows:





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     BEGIN:vCard
     VERSION:3.0
     FN:Human's Name
     ORG:Organizational Entity
     ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern; WA; 98666;U.S.A.
     TEL;TYPE=VOICE,MSG,WORK:+1-666-555-1212
     TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK:+1-666-555-1213
     EMAIL;TYPE=INTERNET:human@example.com
     END:vCard


4.  vCARD Profile

   The goal in profiling the vCARD is not to include as much information
   as possible, but rather to include as few fields as possible while
   providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact the
   certificate maintainer.

   The Ghostbusters vCARD payload is a minimalist subset of the vCARD as
   described in [RFC2426].

   BEGIN -  pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the
      vCARD and MUST have the value "BEGIN:vCARD" as described in
      [RFC2426].

   VERSION -  pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the
      vCARD and MUST have the value "VERSION:3.0" as described in 3.6.9
      of [RFC2426].

   FN -  the name, as described in 3.1.1 of [RFC2426], of a contactable
      person who responsible for the certificate.

   ORG -  an organization as described in 3.5.5 of [RFC2426].

   ADR -  a postal address as described in 3.2.1 of [RFC2426].

   TEL -  a voice and/or fax phone as described in 3.3.1 of [RFC2426].

   EMAIL -  an Email address as described in 3.3.2 of [RFC2426]

   END -  pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCARD
      and MUST have the value "END:vCARD" as described in [RFC2426].

   The BEGIN, VERSION, and END lines MUST be included in a record.  To
   be useful, FN and one or more of ADR, TEL, and EMAIL SHOULD be
   included.





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5.  CMS Packaging

   The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object whose CMS
   packaging is similar to that of a ROA in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format],
   and is a profile of the same RPKI CMS Signed Object Specification (a
   spec which is being extracted from ROA spec).

   Similarly to a ROA, the Ghostbusters Record is signed by an end-
   entity certificate which is, in turn, signed by the resource-holding
   certificate whose maintainer is described in the vCARD.

   The parameters of the RPKI CMS Signed Object Specification which
   differ from those of a ROAare as follows:

   eContentType:  The ContentType for a Ghostbusters Record is defined
      as rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of TO BE
      ASSIGNED.

   eContent:  The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described above in
      Section 4.


6.  Validation

   Though the Ghostbusters payload itself can not be validated, a
   prudent relying party will validate the CMS packaging.  Similarly to
   ROA validation, see Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], the
   following conditions MUST be true:

   1.   The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
        1.2.840.113549.1.7.2).

   2.   The version of the SignedData object is 3.

   3.   The certificates field in the SignedData object is present and
        contains an end-entity certificate whose Subject Key Identifier
        (SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object.

   4.   The end-entity certificate in the certificates field is a valid
        end-entity certificate in the resource RPKI, and there exists a
        valid certification path from a trust anchor to that end-entity
        certificate.

   5.   The public key of the end-entity certificate contained within
        the CMS certificates field can be used to successfully verify
        the signature on the Ghostbusters Record.





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   6.   The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.

   7.   The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is
        rpkiGhostbusters (OID TO BE DETERMINED).

   8.   The version of the SignerInfo is 3.

   9.   The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
        contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
        1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
        1.2.840.113549.1.9.4).

   10.  The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.

   11.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData and SignerInfo objects as
        well as the signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object conform
        to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile specification
        [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-algs].


7.  Security Considerations

   Though there is no on the wire protocol in this specification, there
   are attacks which could abuse the data described.  As the data, to be
   useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoide this
   exposure.

   Phone Numbers:  The vCARDs may contain real world telephone numbers
      which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc.

   Email Addresses:  The vCARDs may contain Email addresses which could
      be abused for purpases of spam.


8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA Considerations.


9.  Acknowledgments

   The author wishes to thank Russ Housley for suggesting profiling the
   vCARD specification, and the authors of [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format],
   from which the author liberally stole.


10.  References




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10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
              Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
              draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-07 (work in progress),
              July 2010.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-algs]
              Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
              use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
              draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-01 (work in progress), May 2010.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2426]  Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
              RFC 2426, September 1998.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-09 (work in
              progress), October 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
              Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
              draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-04 (work in progress),
              May 2010.


Author's Address

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   US

   Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
   Email: randy@psg.com








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