One document matched: draft-wu-dime-local-keytran-02.txt
Differences from draft-wu-dime-local-keytran-01.txt
Network Working Group Q. Wu, Ed.
Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Updates: 4072 (if approved) G. Zorn, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Network Zen
Expires: January 8, 2010 July 7, 2009
Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport
draft-wu-dime-local-keytran-02
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
Some AAA applications require the transport of cryptographic keying
material; this document specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs
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(AVPs) providing native Diameter support of cryptographic key
delivery.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. EAP-Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. EAP-Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. EAP-Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. EAP-Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.4. EAP-Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. AVP Occurrence Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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1. Introduction
The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master-
Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting
cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain
EAP [RFC3748] methods (for example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one
instance of either of these AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message.
However, recent work [RFC5295] has specified methods to derive other
keys from the keying material created during EAP method execution
that may require transport in addition to the MSK. In addition, ERP
[RFC5296] specifies new keys that may need to be transported between
Diameter nodes.
This note specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of multiple
cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message.
2. Terminology
The following terms are used in this note.
2.1. Standards Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms
AAA
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (see below).
Accounting
The act of collecting information on resource usage for the
purpose of trend analysis, auditing, billing, or cost allocation
[RFC2989].
Authentication
The act of verifying a claimed identity, in the form of a pre-
existing label from a mutually known name space, as the originator
of a message (message authentication) or as the end-point of a
channel (entity authentication) [RFC2989].
Authorization
The act of determining if a particular right, such as access to
some resource, can be granted to the presenter of a particular
credential [RFC2989].
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DER
Diameter EAP request. [RFC4072]
DEA
Diameter EAP Answer. [RFC4072]
DSRK
Domain Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
EAP
Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC3748].
EMSK
Extended Master Session Key [RFC3748].
ERP
EAP Re-authentication Protocol [RFC5296].
MSK
Master Session Key [RFC3748].
rMSK
re-authentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key,
derived from the rRK.
rRK
re-authentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK or DSRK
[RFC5296].
USRK
Usage Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions
This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys
in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter
applications.
3.1. EAP-Key AVP
The EAP-Key AVP (AVP Code <AC1>) is of type Grouped [RFC3588]. It
contains the name, type and optionally, the usable lifetime of the
key, as well as the keying material itself.
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EAP-Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 >
{ EAP-Key-Type }
{ EAP-Keying-Material }
[ EAP-Key-Lifetime ]
[ EAP-Key-Name ]
* [ AVP ]
3.1.1. EAP-Key-Type AVP
The EAP-Key-Type AVP (AVP Code <AC2>) is of type Enumerated and
signifies the type of the key being sent. The EAP-Key-Type MAY be
included in a DER command as a signal that a certain type of key is
required in the response (e.g., to support ERP). The following
values are defined in this document:
MSK (0)
The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748].
DSRK (1)
A Domain Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
USRK (2)
A Usage Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
rRK (3)
A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296].
rMSK (4)
A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296].
DSUSRK (5)
A Domain Specific Usage Specific Root Key [RFC5295].
If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA
according to the policy stated in Section 6.2.
3.1.2. EAP-Key-Name AVP
The syntax and semantics of the EAP-Key-Name AVP are specified in
Section 4.1.4 of RFC 4072.
3.1.3. EAP-Keying-Material AVP
The EAP-Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code <AC3>) is of type OctetString.
The exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors,
including the link layer in use and the type of the key; it is beyond
the scope of this document.
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3.1.4. EAP-Key-Lifetime AVP
The EAP-Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code <AC4>) is of type Integer64
[RFC3588] representing the period of time (in seconds) for which the
keying material is valid.
Note: Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of
the lifetime to be the point in time when the keying material is
first used.
4. AVP Occurrence Table
The following table lists the AVPs that MAY be present in the DER and
DEA commands [RFC4072].
+---------------+
| Command-Code |
+-+-----+-----+-+
AVP Name | DER | DEA |
-------------------------------|-----+-----+
EAP-Key | 0 | 0+ |
EAP-Key-Type | 0+ | 0 |
EAP-Key-Name | 0-1 | 0-1 |
+-----+-----+
DER and DEA Commands AVP Table
5. Security Considerations
The security considerations discussed in [RFC3588] are applicable to
this document.
6. IANA Considerations
Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign
values as described in the following sections.
6.1. AVP Codes
Codes must be assigned for the following AVPs using the policy
specified in RFC 3588, Section 11.1.1:
o EAP-Key (<AC1>, Section 3.1)
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o EAP-Key-Type (<AC2>, Section 3.1.1)
o EAP-Keying-Material (<AC3>, Section 3.1.3)
o EAP-Key-Lifetime (<AC4>, Section 3.1.4)
6.2. AVP Values
New values may be assigned for the EAP-Key-Type AVP (Section 3.1.1)
using the "First Come, First Served" policy [RFC5226].
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC2989] Aboba, B., Calhoun, P., Glass, S., Hiller, T., McCann, P.,
Shiino, H., Zorn, G., Dommety, G., C.Perkins, B.Patil,
D.Mitton, S.Manning, M.Beadles, P.Walsh, X.Chen,
S.Sivalingham, A.Hameed, M.Munson, S.Jacobs, B.Lim,
B.Hirschman, R.Hsu, Y.Xu, E.Campell, S.Baba, and E.Jaques,
"Criteria for Evaluating AAA Protocols for Network
Access", RFC 2989, November 2000.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.
[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri,
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"Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295,
August 2008.
[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re-
authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008.
Authors' Addresses
Qin Wu (editor)
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd.
Nanjing, Jiangsu 21001
China
Phone: +86-25-84565892
Email: sunseawq@huawei.com
Glen Zorn (editor)
Network Zen
1310 East Thomas Street
#306
Seattle, Washington 98102
USA
Phone: +1 (206) 377-9035
Email: gwz@net-zen.net
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