One document matched: draft-williams-ipsec-channel-binding-00.txt
NETWORK WORKING GROUP N. Williams
Internet-Draft Sun
Intended status: Standards Track March 21, 2008
Expires: September 22, 2008
Channel Bindings for IPsec Using IKEv2 and Public Keys
draft-williams-ipsec-channel-binding-00.txt
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
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Internet-Draft IPsec Pubkey Channel Bindings March 2008
Abstract
This document specifies the channel bindings for "IPsec channels"
where the peers used the Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2
(IKEv2) and where they used public keys and/or certificates to
authenticate each other
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. IPsec Channel Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 10
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1. Introduction
Given the ability to construct IPsec channels
[I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching] and the ability to bind
authentication at application layers to such secure channels
[RFC5056] the only missing components are: a definition of IPsec
channel bindings, and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) by
which applications can obtain them.
Here we specify the "end-point channel bindings" [RFC5056] for IPsec
channels when peers use IKev2 [RFC4306] and public keys and/or
certificates. IPsec APIs [I-D.ietf-btns-ipsec-apireq] are out of
scope for this document.
IPsec channels where the peers were authenticated by methods other
than public key cryptography, such as EAP [RFC3748] or pre-shared
keys (PSK), or where IKEv2 was not used (e.g., manual keying), are
out of scope for this document. Channel bindings for such IPsec
channels should be specified elsewhere, if at all.
1.1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. IPsec Channel Bindings
The channel bindings for IPsec channels established via connection
latching [I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching] between peers that use
IKEv2 [RFC4306] and public keys (with or without PKIX certificates
[RFC3280]) SHALL be:
the octet-string that results from the concatenation of the two
peers' raw public keys as they appear in the subjectPublicKey
field of their corresponding certificates' subjectPublicKeyInfo,
or as they appear in their IKEv2 CERT payload when the "Raw RSA
Key" CERT payload type has been used (see section 3.6 of
[RFC4306]. The order of concatenation SHALL be the binary
collation order of the two public keys, in increasing order.
The "binary collation order" is the "i;octet" collation registered in
the "Collation Registry for Internet Application Protocols"
[RFC4790].
Because public keys in certificates are bit strings but the i;octet
collation operates on octet strings, public keys appearing in
certificates MUST be padded with zero bits to a number of bits that
is divisible by eight.
We provide end-point channel bindings (the peers' public keys) as the
IPsec channel binding because the construction of IPsec channels by
connection latching [I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching] does not
unambiguously identify a single IKE_SA or CHILD SA pair from which
"unique channel bindings" could be derived.
We use a binary collation to determine the order of concatenation
because connection latching does not unambiguously identify the
initiator of the channel (besides, even TCP supports a notion of
simultaneous connections, in which case both peers are the
initiators). By using a collation to pick which key follows the
other we obtain an encoding of the end-point channel bindings that
both peers can agree on without negotiation.
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3. IANA Considerations
This document creates a type of channel binding, and so requires
registration in the IANA channel binding registry (set out by
[RFC5056]).
The registration procedure will be followed when this document enters
the RFC-Editor queue. The registration will be as follows:
o Channel binding unique prefix (name): IPsec-end-point-IKEv2-pubkey
o Channel binding type: end-point
o Channel type: IPsec
o Published specification: <TBD>
o Channel binding is secret: no
o Description: see Section 2
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Contact: this document's author/editor
o Owner/Change controller: IETF
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4. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC5056],
[I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching], and IPsec generally [RFC4301]
apply. The security of an application using channel binding to IPsec
channels depends critically on the overall security of each of these
components: IPsec [RFC4301], including the IPsec key exchange
protocol [RFC4306], ESP/AH [RFC4303] [RFC4302], IPsec connection
latching, and the application's authentication and channel binding
mechanism. A compromise of any one of those components may
compromise the application to varying degrees.
This document describes end-point channel bindings for some IPsec
channels. End-point channel bindings do not uniquely identify a
connection, but, in this case, a pair of peers. There are no
additional security considerations, relating to the type of this
channel binding, beyond those described in [RFC5056].
The construction of IPsec end-point channel bindings described herein
depends on the strength of the public keys and public key algorithms
used by the IPsec peers to authenticate each other, as well as on
IKEv2. As such is adds no weakness beyond any weaknesses in the
those cryptosystems. And because these are _public_ keys this
construction does not require confidentiality protection of the
channel bindings.
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5. References
5.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching]
Williams, N., "IPsec Channels: Connection Latching",
draft-ietf-btns-connection-latching-04 (work in progress),
December 2007.
[I-D.ietf-btns-ipsec-apireq]
Richardson, M. and B. Sommerfeld, "Requirements for an
IPsec API", draft-ietf-btns-ipsec-apireq-00 (work in
progress), April 2006.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
December 2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4790] Newman, C., Duerst, M., and A. Gulbrandsen, "Internet
Application Protocol Collation Registry", RFC 4790,
March 2007.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
5.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-btns-core]
Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing-
Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec",
draft-ietf-btns-core-06 (work in progress), January 2008.
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[I-D.ietf-btns-prob-and-applic]
Touch, J., Black, D., and Y. Wang, "Problem and
Applicability Statement for Better Than Nothing Security
(BTNS)", draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-06 (work in
progress), October 2007.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
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Author's Address
Nicolas Williams
Sun Microsystems
5300 Riata Trace Ct
Austin, TX 78727
US
Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
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