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Internet Engineering Task Force T. Tsou, Ed.
Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies
Intended status: Informational July 13, 2009
Expires: January 14, 2010
Diameter Routing Problem Statement
draft-tsou-dime-routing-problem-statement-01
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Internet-Draft Diameter Routing Problem Statement July 2009
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Abstract
This document describes use cases that suggest a requirement to be
able to add constraints to the existing Diameter routing mechanisms
so that subsequent messages in a session pass through specific
proxies that were on the initial path that set up the session.
Routing between these proxies may use the present Diameter rules.
1. Introduction
In [RFC3588], routing of request messages from source to the
destination is based solely on the routing decision made by each node
along the path. This document presents two different cases where the
basic Diameter routing behaviour is not sufficient to meet the
requirements. It then provides a problem statement based on these
two cases. The basic problem rtelates to stateful proxies and the
need to revisit them in subsequent messaging relating to a given
session.
2. Requirements Language
This document contains no requirements language.
3. Use Cases
3.1. 3GPP Wireless LAN (WLAN) Access Architecture
One example of a stateful proxy is in the 3GPP WLAN IP access
architecture [TS23.234]. The 3GPP WLAN interworking architecture
extends 3GPP services to the WLAN access side. It enables a 3GPP
subscriber to use a WLAN to access 3GPP services.
WLAN AAA provides access to the WLAN to be authenticated and
authorised through the 3GPP system. This access control can permit
or deny a subscriber the access to the WLAN system and/or the
interworking with the 3GPP system.
There are two WLAN interworking reference models:
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1. In the non-roaming case, the model includes the WLAN access
network and the 3GPP AAA server in the home network. The 3GPP
AAA server is responsible for access control as well as charging.
2. In the roaming case, the model includes the WLAN access network,
the 3GPP AAA proxy in the visited network and the 3GPP AAA server
in the home network. The 3GPP AAA server is responsible for
access control. Charging records may be generated by the AAA
proxy and/or the AAA server. The AAA proxy relays access control
and charging messages to the AAA server. The AAA proxy will also
do offline charging, if required.
After a successful authentication, a Diameter session is established
involving (at least) the following stateful entities:
o The Diameter client in the WLAN AN,
o a Diameter proxy (the 3GPP AAA proxy) in the selected visited
mobile network, and
o a Diameter server in the UE's home realm.
The functions assigned to the 3GPP AAA proxy include:
o reporting charging information to the offline charging system in
the visited network;
o enforcing policies based on roaming agreements;
o service termination initiated by the visited network operator.
These functions all require that state be maintained within the
visited network. The 3GPP choice is to maintain that state at the
3GPP AAA proxy. This means that the latter must remain in the
messaging path for all subsequent messages relating to the same
session.
The network model with the client, the proxy and the server as
described above is simplistic. Operators would usually deploy more
than one proxy in the visited network and more than one server in the
home network for better availability and load sharing. Relays are
also used at the edges of these networks for topology hiding and load
balancing. Thus a realistic network model would typically involve
some stateless agents also in the session path.
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3.2. Key Management for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)
ERP provides a way to reduce the cost of reauthentication of a peer
by deriving additional keys from the original authentication
exchange. In the case where reauthentication is to be done in a
different domain from the home domain, the process uses a Domain
Specific Root Key (DSRK) which is cached with a domain server in that
other domain. The server is associated with a Diameter proxy which
is capable of ERP support.
Suppose that the DSRK is cached with the Diameter proxy/domain server
in the other domain at the time of the original authentication
exchange. Then if there are multiple such Diameter proxy/domain
server combinations in a given domain, the problem upon
reauthentication is to locate the one that has the cached DSRK. If
the authenticating client needs to reach the home domain, but should
be authenticated en route, then the problem is one of being able to
specify that the route should include the required Diameter proxy.
If, on the other hand, the authentication process stands alone, so
that the erstwhile Diameter proxy can be viewed as a Diameter server
instead, then the problem becomes one of capturing the identity of
that Diameter server during the initial authentication exchange.
4. Problem Statement
This is the statement of the problem posed by the cases presented in
Section 3.
1. Existing Diameter message routing behaviour: each host along the
path makes its own independent routing decisions.
2. Undesirable behaviour in the existing method: routing of all
messages for a given session through the selected proxy is not
guaranteed if the network has multiple eligible proxies or if
there are other Diameter entities between the client and the
target proxy.
3. Desired behaviour: regardless of the intervening set of Diameter
elements, all messages for a given session pass through the proxy
initially selected. This is required for stateful proxies only.
5. Acknowledgements
Text on the 3GPP WLAN use cases was provided by Rajith R. Glen Zorn
provided the problem statement template used in Section 4.
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6. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
7. Security Considerations
It is possible that there are security issues with the problems
stated above, but they are not immediately evident.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
8.2. Informative References
[TS23.234]
3GPP, "TS23.234v7.7.0, 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN) interworking; System description",
June 2008.
Author's Address
Tina Tsou (editor)
Huawei Technologies
Section F, Huawei Industrial Base
Bantian Longgang, Shenzhen 518129
P.R. China
Phone: +86 755 28972912
Email: tena@huawei.com
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