One document matched: draft-stumpf-dns-mtamark-00.txt
Network Working Group M. Stumpf
Internet-Draft S. Hoehne
Expires: August 9, 2004 SpaceNet AG
February 9, 2004
Marking Mail Transfer Agents in reverse DNS with TXT RRs
draft-stumpf-dns-mtamark-00
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
In contrast to other more extensive approaches to deal with
unsolicited email, commonly called "spam", this memo discusses a very
simple authentication scheme. It uses marking of hosts in reverse DNS
(in-addr.arpa zone) to allow the receiving mail transfer agents to
decide whether the connecting (sending) host is a designated mail
transfer agent (MTA) or not.
Despite being a weaker scheme than most of the other proposals
currently discussed, it can reduce the amount of spam and viruses/
worms significantly and has the advantage that it can be implemented
based on existing and well-established Internet technology like DNS
without any changes to that technology.
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. PROPOSAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Defining a wellknown subdomain for the reverse DNS tree . . 5
2.2 Protocol specific resource records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 Hints for implementors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Example Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. EFFECTS ON EXISTING MAIL INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Unmarked Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Local Mail Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3 Roaming Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4 Classless IP Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5 IPv6 Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. REGISTRATION OF A NEW DNS RR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1 Why we do not propose a new DNS RR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2 Into the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 16
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1. INTRODUCTION
The problem with spam and viruses/worms has increased and changed a
lot during the last years. At the beginning distributing unsolicited
email was accomplished by abusing relay open mailservers [14]. Spread
of viruses needed humans passing on infected data. The situation
today shows worms coming packed with their own SMTP modules and
utilizing address books and scanning documents for new addresses and
therefore victims. A lot of worms install backdoors and (enable)
proxy servers. These infected hosts are afterwards abused by spammers
to send unsolicited email.
With growing adoption of DSL techniques a significant part of the
Internet, hosts shifted to poorly maintained workstations in homes.
Permanently connected to the Internet, these hosts form an easy and
"paying" prey for worms and abusers. Not only in homes, also in
companies the number of poorly maintained hosts is growing.
History and viruses like VBS/LoveLet class or worms like CodeRed and
Nimda and the zillions of open proxy servers show, we cannot count on
users or administrators to get the problems fixed.
However, what the administrators can decide proactively is whether a
certain host, represented by its IP address, is meant to be a MTA
that should have the ability to talk to other MTAs across the
Internet. Most - if not all - proxy servers or workstations do not
need to have this ability.
We suggest a mechanism to enable the administrator to mark IP
addresses in the Domain Name System [1], [2] with labels meaning
o "This IP address is assigned to a MTA that is intended to send
messages across the Internet"
o "This IP address does not host a MTA, do not accept emails from
that IP address."
and therefore give receiving MTAs a hint as whether to accept
messages from the sending MTA or not.
This document describes such a mechanism that
o is easy, fast and cheap to deploy and implement,
o uses existing Internet technology without modification and without
breaking it or the need for workarounds
While this document specializes on SMTP the proposal ist not limited
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to SMTP, but can be adopted to any protocol and is easily extensible.
1.1 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document are to
be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [11].
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2. PROPOSAL
2.1 Defining a wellknown subdomain for the reverse DNS tree
Storing arbitrary string attributes in the Domain Name System [5] is
a technique described and used at least since 1993.
However this method does not support specific queries and has a high
overhead in parsing the responses, is prone to naming collisions and
will trigger errors and problems in old implementations of DNS
servers with the 512 byte size limit.
Thus we propose expanding the reverse DNS tree by a service subdomain
with the wellknown name
_srv
2.2 Protocol specific resource records
Within this service subdomain there will be another subdomain named
after the protocol for which the service specific records will be
defined. For SMTP the name of the subdomain will be
_smtp
Whether SMTP connections are to be allowed/or disallowed from that
host is specified by a TXT record within the protocol subdomain for
the entry
_perm
The value of the TXT record will be either "1" or "0":
1 - (MTA=yes) indicates that the connection is originating from an
IP address that is intended to be a MTA talking to other MTAs
across the public Internet and that the message SHOULD be
accepted.
0 - (MTA=no) indicates that the IP address of the sending
communication partner is NOT meant to be a MTA and that messages
SHOULD NOT be accepted from that connection, unless successful
authentification via other methods (e.g. ODMR [16]) advise the
contrary.
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2.2.1 Hints for implementors
o The record for a given protocol MUST be unique for a given IP
address within the "_perm" subdomain. In the case of multiple
contradictory records they MUST be treated as one record having
the value 0 (MTA=no).
o If the value of the resource record is other than "1" (MTA=yes) or
"0" (MTA=no) the value MUST be treated as "0" (MTA=no).
o If there are multiple TXT resource records for one protocol with
identical values implementors SHOULD treat them as one record.
2.3 Contact Information
The contact information provides automatic notification of
administrators, if hosts within their responsibility get abused or
infected by viruses.
Currently there is no easy way to get information about contacts for
a given IP address. There are a lot of different sources, where the
best are probably the whois databases of the various (Regional
Internet Registries (RIR) like ARIN, RIPE or APNIC. However, there is
no common agreed upon format for abuse contacts, and for some
allocations referrals have to be followed to other registries like
BRNIC or AUNIC, that again use different record formats.
An easy way to specify contact information for a given IP address is
to use the Responsible Person (RP) resource record as defined in RFC
1183 [4]
Another use of an email address provided with the contact information
is the possibility for a MTA to customize the error message [18], [8]
like in
550-5.7.1 Message rejected. Sender is not labelled a valid MTA.
550 5.7.1 Please contact <abuse@example.com>.
where "abuse@example.com" is derived from the information stored in
the RP records.
The RP resource records SHOULD be inserted into the IN-ADDR.ARPA zone
at the same level as the PTR records for reverse DNS.
However, there may be more than one contact address for various
protocols involved, so protocol specific contact information may also
be provided at the protocol subdomain level. Programs utilizing
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these records should first query for RP records along with the
protocol subdomain and if that fails try again and query for RP
records at the PTR level.
More than one RP resource record may be specified. It is up to the
reporting program or person to choose a random contact to notify or
send notification to all of them.
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3. Example Records
Some examples how records might look like in BIND syntax:
1.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR mail.example.com.
_perm._smtp._srv.1.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. IN TXT "1"
_smtp._srv.1.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. IN RP abuse.example.com. .
2.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR www.example.com.
2.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. IN RP abuse.example.com. .
_perm._smtp._srv.2.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. IN TXT "0"
_smtp._srv.2.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa. IN RP spam.example.com. .
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4. EFFECTS ON EXISTING MAIL INFRASTRUCTURE
One of the main goals of this proposal has been to limit the impact
on existing Internet infrastructure as much as possible.
Putting this proposal in effect will not break existing
infrastructure or widely used mechanisms like gatewaying, forwarding
and (authenticated) relaying of emails
4.1 Unmarked Addresses
Each receiving MTA is free to decide how to classify connections from
IP addresses without the marks as defined in this document.
However, as a general guideline, we propose a grace period of six
months after publication of this document, where missing marks are to
be treated with a default of "MTA=yes" and after the grace period
missing marks are to be treated as "MTA=no".
Implementors are asked to provide a mechanism for the administrator
to easily specify a default behavior for unmarked IP addresses.
4.2 Local Mail Clients
MTAs implementing the policy defined in this document should take
care to provide mechanisms for the administrators to easily specify a
list of "local addresses" which use the receiving MTA as an outgoing
relay. The MTA will accept messages from those IP addresses despite
not being marked as "MTA=no".
4.3 Roaming Users
Typically, roaming users or local users from dialin/dynamic IP
addresses have "MTA=no" set on the connection to the receiving MTA.
The ODMR [16] extension to the SMTP protocol [18] specifies a way for
roaming users to authenticate themselves to the receiving MTA and
validate the connection.
Authenticated connections must be accepted, even when the connecting
IP address is marked as "MTA=no".
Implementors must take care not to reject connections before the
initiator of the connection had the chance to authenticate himself.
4.4 Classless IP Allocations
In case of delegated address spaces covering fewer than 256 addresses
and therefore using an extended IN-ADDR.ARPA tree [12] the
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specification of the resource records must take place in the
corresponding IN-ADDR.ARPA zone of the (autonomous/current)
maintaining authority of the subnet. No other records are allowed to
coexist with a CNAME record [9].
4.5 IPv6 Compatibility
This proposal is fully compatible with IPv6. The same TXT and RP RRs
and lookup mechanisms can be applied to the "ip6.arpa" zone.
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5. REGISTRATION OF A NEW DNS RR
5.1 Why we do not propose a new DNS RR
The problem with a new DNS RR (and one reason why we try to avoid it)
is the resulting need to modify all kinds of DNS software. DNS
servers, DNS resolvers and - probably the strongest argument against
- ISP management software. Internet Service Providers do not edit
zone files with an editor. They have a database and a GUI of some
sort that is capable handling all kinds of "well known" RRs.
We had quick, easy and cheap adoption in mind and if all ISP
management software has to be changed to make use of the new RR, it
will either take a long time or will never happen. TXT and RP records
are well understood for years and our approach is even backed up by a
RFC [18].
5.2 Into the Future
Should the future show that TXT RRs should be better substituted by a
new DNS RR to carry the labels, we are all for it. But for now
something has to happen, and it is better to happen quick.
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6. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The same security issues apply as to other DNS based services.
Probably the worst case scenario is hijacking of a part of the
in-addr.arpa zone and modification of the special TXT record defined
in this document to "MTA=no" to block email sending capabilities for
hosts with that IP addresses.
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References
[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[3] Mockapetris, P., "DNS encoding of network names and other
types", RFC 1101, April 1989.
[4] Everhart, C., Mamakos, L., Ullmann, R. and P. Mockapetris, "New
DNS RR Definitions", RFC 1183, October 1990.
[5] Rosenbaum, R., "Using the Domain Name System To Store Arbitrary
String Attributes", RFC 1464, May 1993.
[6] Berners-Lee, T., "Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW: A
Unifying Syntax for the Expression of Names and Addresses of
Objects on the Network as used in the World-Wide Web", RFC
1630, June 1994.
[7] Berners-Lee, T., Masinter, L. and M. McCahill, "Uniform
Resource Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, December 1994.
[8] Vaudreuil, G., "Enhanced Mail System Status Codes", RFC 1893,
January 1996.
[9] Barr, D., "Common DNS Operational and Configuration Errors",
RFC 1912, February 1996.
[10] Daniel, R. and M. Mealling, "Resolution of Uniform Resource
Identifiers using the Domain Name System", RFC 2168, June 1997.
[11] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[12] Eidnes, H., de Groot, G. and P. Vixie, "Classless IN-ADDR.ARPA
delegation", BCP 20, RFC 2317, March 1998.
[13] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, August
1998.
[14] Lindberg, G., "Anti-Spam Recommendations for SMTP MTAs", BCP
30, RFC 2505, February 1999.
[15] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629, June
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1999.
[16] Gellens, R., "ON-DEMAND MAIL RELAY (ODMR) SMTP with Dynamic IP
Addresses", RFC 2645, August 1999.
[17] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.
[18] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821, April
2001.
[19] Mealling, M. and R. Denenberg, "Report from the Joint W3C/IETF
URI Planning Interest Group: Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs), URLs, and Uniform Resource Names (URNs): Clarifications
and Recommendations", RFC 3305, August 2002.
Authors' Addresses
Markus Stumpf
SpaceNet AG
Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14
Muenchen, 80807
DE
Phone: +49 89 32356-0
Fax: +49 89 32356-299
EMail: maex-rfc@space.net
URI: http://www.space.net/
Steff Hoehne
SpaceNet AG
Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14
Muenchen, 80807
DE
Phone: +49 89 32356-0
Fax: +49 89 32356-299
EMail: steff-rfc@space.net
URI: http://www.space.net/
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledges the contributions of: Christian
Brunner and Sebastian von Bomhard, Elmar Bartel for some good hints
that should plate our English, Scott Nelson for directing us towards
RFC1464 [5] and all the members of the RIPE Antispam list, the IRTF
ASRG group and a lot of our net.friends for their comments and input.
A big 'Thank You' goes also to Marshal T. Rose for the wonderful
xml2rfc
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