One document matched: draft-schaad-cose-01.txt
Differences from draft-schaad-cose-00.txt
Network Working Group J. Schaad
Internet-Draft August Cellars
Intended status: Informational April 21, 2015
Expires: October 23, 2015
CBOR Encoded Message Syntax
draft-schaad-cose-01
Abstract
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is data format designed
for small code size and small message size. There is a need for the
ability to have the basic security services defined for this data
format. This document specifies how to do signatures, message
authentication codes and encryption using this data format. The work
in this document is derived in part from the JSON web security
documents using the same parameters and algorithm identifiers as they
do.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Design changes from JOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. CBOR Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The COSE_MSG structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Signing Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Encryption object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Key Management Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.1. Direct Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.2. Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.3. Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.4. Direct Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.5. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Encryption Algorithm for AEAD algorithms . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Encryption algorithm for AE algorithms . . . . . . . . . 12
5. MAC objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Key Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. CBOR Encoder Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. AEAD and AE algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix B. Three Levels of Recipient Information . . . . . . . 19
Appendix C. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
C.1. Direct MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
C.2. Wrapped MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
C.3. Multi-recipient MAC message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
C.4. Direct ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C.5. Single Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C.6. Multiple Signers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix D. Processing Parameter Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix E. Key Parameter Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction
The JOSE working group produced a set of documents that defined how
to perform encryption, signatures and message authentication (MAC)
operations for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) documents and then
to encode the results using the JSON format [RFC7159]. This document
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does the same work for use with the Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] document format. While there is a
strong attempt to keep the flavor of the original JOSE documents, two
considerations are taking into account:
o CBOR has capabilities that are not present in JSON and should be
used. One example of this is the fact that CBOR has a method of
encoding binary directly without first converting it into a base64
encoded sting.
o The authors did not always agree with some of the decisions made
by the JOSE working group. Many of these decisions have been re-
examined, and where it seems to the authors to be superior or
simpler, replaced.
1.1. Design changes from JOSE
o Define a top level message structure so that encrypted, signed and
MAC-ed messages can easily identified and still have a consistent
view.
o Switch from using a map to using an array at the message level.
While this change means that it is no longer possible to add new
named parameters to the top level message, it also means that
there is not a need to define how older implementations are
defined to behave when new fields are present. Most of the
reasons that a new field would need to be defined are adequately
addressed by defining a new parameter instead.
o Signed messages separate the concept of protected and unprotected
attributes that are for the content and the signature.
o Key management has been made to be more uniform. All key
management techniques are represented as a recipient rather than
only have some of them be so.
o MAC messages are separated from signed messages.
o MAC messages have the ability to do key management on the MAC key.
o Use binary encodings for binary data rather than base64url
encodings.
o Remove the authentiction tag for encryption algorithms as a
separate item.
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1.2. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
When the words appear in lower case, their natural language meaning
is used.
1.3. CBOR Grammar
There currently is no standard CBOR grammar available for use by
specifications. In this document, we use the grammar defined in the
CBOR data definition language (CDDL)
[I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl].
2. The COSE_MSG structure
The COSE_MSG structure is a top level CBOR object which corresponds
to the DataContent type in [RFC5652]. This structure allows for a
top level message to be sent which could be any of the different
security services, where the security service is identified. The
presence of this structure does not preclude a protocol to use one of
the individual structures as a stand alone component.
COSE_MSG = [sign:1, COSE_Sign] /
[encrypt:2, COSE_encrypt] /
[mac:3, COSE_mac]
The top level of each of the COSE message structures are encoded as
arrays.
We use an integer to distingish bettwen the different security
message types. By looking at the integer in the first element, one
can determine which security message is being used and thus what the
syntax is for the rest of the elements in the array.
Implementations SHOULD be prepared to find an integer in the location
which does not correspond to the values 0 to 2. If this is found
then the client MUST stop attempting to parse the structure and fail.
Clients need to recognize that the set of values could be extended at
a later date, but should not provide a security service based on
guesses of what is there.
NOTE: Alternative syntax with tags would be
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COSE_MSG = COSE_SignedMessage /
#6.998([COSE_encrypt]) /
#6.999([COSE_mac])
Where we would need to define the latter two as tagged arrays like is
currently done for COSE_SignedMessage.
There is no space savings in CBOR, this is strictly about using CBOR
paradymes. It is not clear what would happen if a JOSE serialization
appeared, but that is probably not interesting. If this path is
used, then there is no extensibility for new messages types. They
would need to be defined on their own.
3. Signing Structure
The signature structure allows for one or more signatures to be
applied to a message payload. There are provisions for attributes
about the content and attributes about the signature to be carried
along with the signature itself. These attributes may be
authenticated by the signature, or just present. Examples of
attributes about the content would be the type of content, when the
content was created, and who created the content. Examples of
attributes about the signature would be the algorithm and key used to
create the signature, when the signature was created, and counter-
signatures.
When more than one signature is present, the successful validation of
one signature associated with a given signer is usually treated as a
successful signature by that signer. However, there are some
application environments where other rules are needed. An
application that employs a rule other than one valid signature for
each signer must specify those rules. Also, where simple matching of
the signer identifier is not sufficient to determine whether the
signatures were generated by the same signer, the application
specification must describe how to determine which signatures were
generated by the same signer. Support of different communities of
recipients is the primary reason that signers choose to include more
than one signature. For example, the COSE_Sign structure might
include signatures generated with the RSA signature algorithm and
with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature
algorithm. This allows recipients to verify the signature associated
with one algorithm or the other. (Source of text is [RFC5652].)
More detailed information on multiple signature evaluation can be
found in [RFC5752].
The CDDL grammar structure for a signature message is:
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COSE_Sign = (
protected : (bstr / nil),
unprotected : (header_map / nil),
payload : (bstr / nil),
? signatures: ([+[COSE_signature]] / nil),
? COSE_signature
)
COSE_SignMessage = #6.997([ COSE_Sign ])
keys = int / tstr
header_map = {+ keys => any }
The fields is the structure have the following semantics:
protected contains attributes about the payload which are to be
protected by the signature. An example of such an attribute would
be the content type ('cty') attribute. The content is a CBOR map
of attributes which is encoded to a byte stream. This field MUST
NOT contain attributes about the signature, even if those
attributes are common across multiple signatures.
unprotected contains attributes about the payload which are not
protected by the signature. An example of such an attribute would
be the content type ('cty') attribute. This field MUST NOT
contain attributes about a signature, even if the attributes are
common across multiple signatures.
payload contains the serialized content to be signed.
If the payload is not present in the message, the application is
required to supply the payload separately.
The payload is wrapped in a bstr to ensure that it is transported
without changes, if the payload is transported separately it is
the responsibility of the application to ensure that it will be
transported without changes.
signatures is either a single signature or an array of signature
values.
A single signature value can be represented using either data
type. Implementations MUST be able to parse both data types.
The CDDL grammar structure for a signature is:
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COSE_signature = (
protected : (bstr / nil),
unprotected : (header_map / nil),
signature : bstr
)
The fields in the structure have the following semantics:
protected contains additional information to be authenticated by the
signature. The field holds data about the signature operation.
The field MUST NOT hold attributes about the payload being signed.
The content is a CBOR map of attributes which is encoded to a byte
stream. At least one of protected and unprotected MUST be
present.
unprotected contains attributes about the signature which are not
protected by the signature. This field MUST NOT contain
attributes about the payload being signed. At least one of
protected and unprotected MUST be present.
signature contains the computed signature value.
The COSE structure used to create the byte stream to be signed uses
the following CDDL grammar structure:
Sig_structure = [
body_protected : (bstr / nil),
sign_protected : (bstr / nil),
payload : bstr
]
How to compute a signature:
1. Create a Sig_structure object and populate it with the
appropriate fields.
2. Create the value to be hashed by encoding the Sig_structure to a
byte string.
3. Comput the hash value from the byte string.
4. Sign the hash
5. Place the signature value into the appropriate signature field.
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4. Encryption object
In this section we describe the structure and methods to be used when
doing an encryption in COSE. In COSE, we use the same techniques and
structures for encrypting both the plain text and the keys used to
protect the text. This is different from the approach used by both
[RFC5652] and [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption] where different
structures are used for the plain text and for the different key
management techniques.
One of the byproducts of using the same technique for encrypting and
encoding both the content and the keys using the various key
management techniques, is a requirement that all of the key
management techniques use an Authenticated Encryption (AE) algorithm.
(For the purpose of this document we use a slightly loose definition
of AE algorithms.) When encrypting the plain text, it is normal to
use an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD)
algorithm. For key management, either AE or AEAD algorithms can be
used. See Appendix A for more details about the different types of
algorithms.
The CDDL grammar structure for encryption is:
COSE_encrypt = (
protected : (bstr / nil), ; Contains header_map
unprotected : (header_map / nil),
iv : (bstr / nil),
aad : (bstr / nil),
ciphertext : (bstr / nil),
? recipients : ([+COSE_encrypt_a] / nil)
? COSE_encrypt
)
COSE_encrypt_a = [COSE_encrypt]
Description of the fields:
protected contains the information about the plain text or
encryption process that is to be integrity protected. The field
is encoded in CBOR as a 'bstr' if present and the value 'nil' if
there is no data. The contents of the protected field is a CBOR
map of the protected data names and values. The map is CBOR
encoded before placing it into the bstr. Only values associated
with the current cipher text are to be placed in this location
even if the value would apply to multiple recipient structures.
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unprotected contains information about the plain text that is not
integrity protected. If there are no field, then the value 'nil'
is used. Only values associated with the current cipher text are
to be placed in this location even if the value would apply to
multiple recipient structures.
iv contains the initialization vector (IV), or it's equivalent, if
one is needed by the encryption algorithm. If there is no IV,
then the value 'nil' is used.
aad contains additional authenticated data (aad) supplied by the
application. This field contains information about the plain text
data that is authenticated, but not encrypted. If the application
does not provide this data, the value 'nil' is used.
cipherText contains the encrypted plain text. If the cipherText is
to be transported independently of the control information about
the encryption process (i.e. detached content) then the value
'nil' is encoded here.
recipients contains the recipient information. The field can have
one of three data types:
o An array of COSE_encrypt elements, one for each recipient.
o A single COSE_encrypt element, encoded as an extension to the
containing COSE_encrypt element, for a single recipient. Single
recipients can be encoded either this way or as a single array
element.
o A 'nil' value if there are no recipients.
4.1. Key Management Methods
There are a number of different key management methods that can be
used in the COSE encryption system. In this section we will discuss
each of the key management methods and what fields need to be
specified to deal with each of them.
The names of the key management methods used here are the same as are
defined in [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key]. Other specifications use
different terms for the key management methods or do not support some
of the key management methods.
At the moment we do not have any key management methods that allow
for the use of protected headers. This may be changed in the future
if, for example, the AES-GCM Key wrap method defined in
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms] were extended to allow for
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authenticated data. In that event the use of the 'protected' field,
which is current forbidden below, would be permitted.
4.1.1. Direct Encryption
In direct encryption mode, a shared secret between the sender and the
recipient is used as the CEK. When direct encryption mode is used,
it MUST be the only mode used on the message. It is a massive
security leak to have both direct encryption and a different key
management mode on the same message.
For JOSE, direct encryption key management is the only key management
method allowed for doing MAC-ed messages. In COSE, all of the key
management methods can be used for MAC-ed messages.
The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:
o The 'protected', 'iv', 'aad', 'ciphertext' and 'recipients' fields
MUST be nil.
o At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field SHOULD contain the 'alg'
parameter as well as a parameter identifying the shared secret.
4.1.2. Key Wrapping
In key wrapping mode, the CEK is randomly generated and that key is
then encrypted by a shared secret between the sender and the
recipient. All of the currently defined key wrapping algorithms for
JOSE (and thus for COSE) are AE algorithms. Key wrapping mode is
considered to be superior to direct encryption if the system has any
capability for doing random key generation. This is because the
shared key is used to wrap random data rather than data has some
degree of organization and may in fact be repeating the same content.
The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:
o The 'protected', 'aad', and 'recipients' fields MUST be nil.
o The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
(usually the content layer).
o At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field SHOULD contain the 'alg'
parameter as well as a parameter identifying the shared secret.
o Use of the 'iv' field will depend on the key wrap algorithm.
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4.1.3. Key Encryption
Key Encryption mode is also called key transport mode in some
standards. Key Encryption mode differs from Key Wrap mode in that it
uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm rather than a symmetric
encryption algorithm to protect the key. The only current Key
Encryption mode algorithm supported is RSAES-OAEP.
The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:
o The 'protected', 'aad', and 'iv' fields all use the 'nil' value.
o The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
(usually the content layer).
o At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field SHOULD contain the 'alg'
parameter as well as a parameter identifying the asymmetric key.
4.1.4. Direct Key Agreement
Direct Key Agreement derives the CEK from the shared secret computed
by the key agreement operation.
When direct key agreement mode is used, it SHOULD be the only mode
used on the message. This method creates the CEK directly and that
makes it difficult to mix with additional recipients.
The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:
o The 'protected', 'aad', and 'iv' fields all use the 'nil' value.
o At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field SHOULD contain the 'alg'
parameter as well as a parameter identifying the asymmetric key.
o The 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'epk' parameter.
4.1.5. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping
Key Agreement with Key Wrapping uses a randomly generated CEK. The
CEK is then encrypted using a Key Wrapping algorithm and a key
derived from the shared secret computed by the key agreement
algorithm.
The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:
o The 'protected', 'aad', and 'iv' fields all use the 'nil' value.
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o The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
(usually the content layer).
o At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field SHOULD contain the 'alg'
parameter, a parameter identifying the recipient asymmetric key,
and a parameter with the sender's asymmetric public key.
4.2. Encryption Algorithm for AEAD algorithms
The encryption algorithm for AEAD algorithms is fairly simple.
In order to get a consistent encoding of the data to be
authenticated, the Enc_structure is used to have canonical form of
the AAD.
Enc_structure = [
protected : (bstr / nil),
aad : (bstr / nil)
]
1. If there is protected data, CBOR encode the map to a byte string
and place in the protected field of the Enc_structure and the
COSE_Encrypt structure.
2. Copy the 'aad' field from the COSE_Encrypt structure to the
Enc_Structure.
3. Encode the Enc_structure using a CBOR Canonical encoding
Section 7 to get the AAD value.
4. Encrypt the plain text and place it in the 'ciphertext' field.
The AAD value is passed in as part of the encryption process.
5. For recipient of the message, recursively perform the encryption
algorithm for that recipient using the encryption key as the
plain text.
4.3. Encryption algorithm for AE algorithms
1. Verify that the 'protected' field is empty.
2. Verify that the 'aad' field is empty.
3. Encrypt the plain text and place in the 'ciphertext' field.
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5. MAC objects
In this section we describe the structure and methods to be used when
doing MAC authentication in COSE. JOSE used a variant of the
signature structure for doing MAC operations and it is restricted to
using a single pre-shared secret to do the authentication. This
document allows for the use of all of the same methods of key
management as are allowed for encryption.
When using MAC operations, there are two modes in which it can be
used. The first is just a check that the content has not been
changed since the MAC was computed. Any of the key management
methods can be used for this purpose. The second mode is to both
check that the content has not been changed since the MAC was
computed, and to use key management to verify who sent it. The key
management modes that support this are ones that either use a pre-
shared secret, or do static-static key agreement. In both of these
cases the entity MAC-ing the message can be validated by a key
binding. (The binding of identity assumes that there are only two
parties involved and you did not send the message yourself.)
COSE_mac = (
protected : (bstr / nil),
unprotected : (header_map / nil),
payload : bstr,
tag : bstr,
?recipients : ([+COSE_encrypt_a] / nil)
? COSE_encrypt
)
Field descriptions:
protected contains attributes about the payload which are to be
protected by the MAC. An example of such an attribute would be
the content type ('cty') attribute. The content is a CBOR map of
attributes which is encoded to a byte stream. This field MUST NOT
contain attributes about the recipient, even if those attributes
are common across multiple recipients. At least one of protected
and unprotected MUST be present.
unprotected contains attributes about the payload which are not
protected by the MAC. An example of such an attribute would be
the content type ('cty') attribute. This field MUST NOT contain
attributes about a recipient, even if the attributes are common
across multiple recipients. At least one of protected and
unprotected MUST be present.
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payload contains the serialized content to be MAC-ed.
If the payload is not present in the message, the application is
required to supply the payload separately.
The payload is wrapped in a bstr to ensure that it is transported
without changes, if the payload is transported separately it is
the responsibility of the application to ensure that it will be
transported without changes.
tag contains the MAC value.
recipients contains the recipient information. See the description
under COSE_Encryption for more info.
MAC_structure = {
protected : (bstr / nil),
payload : bstr
}
How to compute a MAC:
1. Create a MAC_structure and copy the protected and payload
elements from the COSE_mac structure.
2. Encode the MAC_structure using a canonical CBOR encoder. The
resulting bytes is the value to compute the MAC on.
3. Compute the MAC and place the result in the 'tag' field of the
COSE_mac structure.
4. Encrypt and encode the MAC key for each recipient of the message.
6. Key Structure
There are only a few changes between JOSE and COSE for how keys are
formatted. As with JOSE, COSE uses a map to contain the elements of
a key. Those values, which in JOSE, are base64url encoded because
they are binary values, are encoded as bstr values in COSE.
For COSE we use the same set of fields that were defined in
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key].
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COSE_Key = {
"kty" : tstr,
? "use" : tstr,
? "key_ops" : [+tstr],
? "alg" : tstr,
? "kid" : tstr,
* keys => values
}
COSE_KeySet = [+COSE_Key]
The element "kty" is a required element in a COSE_Key map.
All other elements are optional and not all of the elements listed in
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key] or [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms]
have been listed here even though they can all appear in a COSE_Key
map.
The "key_ops" element is prefered over the "use" element as the
information provided that way is more finely detailed about the
operations allowed. It is strongly suggested that this element be
present for all keys.
The same fields defined in [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key] are used here
with the following changes in rules:
o Any item which is base64 encoded in JWK, is bstr encoded for COSE.
o Any item which is integer encoded in JWK, is int encoded for COSE.
o
Any item which is string (but not base64) encoded in JWK, is tstr
encoded for COSE.
Exceptions to this are the following fields:
kid is always bstr encoded rather than tstr encoded. This change
in encoded is due to the fact that frequently, values such as a
hash of the public key is used for a kid value. Since the
field is defined as not having a specific structure, making it
binary rather than textual makes sense.
7. CBOR Encoder Restrictions
There as been an attempt to resrict the number of places where the
document needs to impose restrictions on how the CBOR Encoder needs
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to work. We have managed to narrow it down to the following
restrictions:
o The restriction applies to the encoding the Sig_structure, the
Enc_structure, and the MAC_structure.
o The rules for Canonical CBOR (Section 3.9 of RFC 7049) MUST be
used in these locations. The main rule that needs to be enforced
is that all lengths in these structures MUST be encoded such that
they are encoded using definite lengths and the minimum length
encoding is used.
o All parsers used SHOULD fail on both parsing and generation if the
same key is used twice in a map.
8. IANA Considerations
There are IANA considerations to be filled in.
9. Security Considerations
There are security considerations:
1. Protect private keys
2. MAC messages with more than one recipient means one cannot figure
out who sent the message
3. Use of direct key with other recipient structures hands the key
to other recipients.
4. Use of direcct ECDH direct encryption is easy for people to leak
information on if there are other recipients in the message.
5. Considerations about protected vs unprotected header fields.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl]
Vigano, C., Birkholz, H., and R. Sun, "CBOR data
definition language: a notational convention to express
CBOR data structures.", draft-greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-
cddl-05 (work in progress), March 2015.
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[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", draft-ietf-jose-
json-web-algorithms-40 (work in progress), January 2015.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, October 2013.
10.2. Informative References
[AES-GCM] Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", April 2015.
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]
Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-40 (work in progress),
January 2015.
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-key]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
key-41 (work in progress), January 2015.
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-41
(work in progress), January 2015.
[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2]
McGrew, D., Foley, J., and K. Paterson, "Authenticated
Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA", draft-mcgrew-aead-
aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-05 (work in progress), July 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
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[RFC5752] Turner, S. and J. Schaad, "Multiple Signatures in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5752, January
2010.
[RFC5990] Randall, J., Kaliski, B., Brainard, J., and S. Turner,
"Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5990, September
2010.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.
Appendix A. AEAD and AE algorithms
The set of encryption algorithms that can be used with this
specification is restricted to authenticated encryption (AE) and
authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) algorithms.
This means that there is a strong check that the data decrypted by
the recipient is the same as what was encrypted by the sender.
Encryption modes such as counter have no check on this at all. The
CBC encryption mode had a weak check that the data is correct, given
a random key and random data, the CBC padding check will pass one out
of 256 times. There have been several times that a normal encryption
mode has been combined with an integrity check to provide a content
encryption mode that does provide the necessary authentication. AES-
GCM [AES-GCM], AES-CCM [RFC3610], AES-CBC-HMAC
[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] are examples of these composite
modes.
PKCS v1.5 RSA key transport does not qualify as an AE algorithm.
There are only three bytes in the encoding that can be checked as
having decrypted correctly, the rest of the content can only be
probabilistically checked as having decrypted correctly. For this
reason, PKCS v1.5 RSA key transport MUST NOT be used with this
specification. RSA-OAEP was designed to have the necessary checks
that that content correctly decrypted and does qualify as an AE
algorithm.
When dealing with authenticated encryption algorithms, there is
always some type of value that needs to be checked to see if the
authentication level has passed. This authentication value may be:
o A separately generated tag computed by both the encrypter and
decrypter and then compared by the decryptor. This tag value may
be either placed at the end of the cipher text (the decision we
made) or kept separately (the decision made by the JOSE working
group). This is the approach followed by AES-GCM [AES-GCM] and
AES-CCM [RFC3610].
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o A fixed value which is part of the encoded plain text. This is
the approach followed by the AES key wrap algorithm [RFC3394].
o A computed value is included as part of the encoded plain text.
The computed value is then checked by the decryptor using the same
computation path. This is the approach followed by RSAES-OAEP
[RFC3447].
Appendix B. Three Levels of Recipient Information
All of the currently defined Key Management methods only use two
levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure. The first level is the message
content and the second level is the content key encryption. However,
if one uses a key management technique such as RSA-KEM (see
Appendix A of RSA-KEM [RFC5990], then it make sense to have three
levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure.
These levels would be:
o Level 0: The content encryption level. This level contains the
payload of the message.
o Level 1: The encryption of the CEK by a KEK.
o Level 2: The encryption of a long random secret using an RSA key
and a key derivation function to convert that secret into the KEK.
Appendix C. Examples
The examples can be found at https://github.com/cose-wg/Examples. I
am currently still in the process of getting the examples up there
along with some control information for people to be albe to check
and reproduce the examples.
C.1. Direct MAC
This example has some features that are in questions but not yet
incorporated in the document.
To make it easier to read, this uses CBOR's diagnostic notation
rather than a binary dump.
This example is uses HMAC with SHA-256 as the digest algorithm. The
key manangment is uses two static ECDH keys along with HKDF to
directly derive the key used in the HMAC operation.
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[
3,
h'a163616c67654853323536',
null,
h'596f752063616e20747275737420757320746f20737469636b20776974682079
6f75207468726f75676820746869636b20616e64207468696e3f746f20746865
2062697474657220656e642e20416e6420796f752063616e2074727573742075
7320746f206b65657020616e7920736563726574206f6620796f7572733f636c
6f736572207468616e20796f75206b65657020697420796f757273656c662e20
42757420796f752063616e6e6f7420747275737420757320746f206c65742079
6f7520666163652074726f75626c6520616c6f6e652c20616e6420676f206f66
6620776974686f7574206120776f72642e2057652061726520796f7572206672
69656e64732c2046726f646f2e',
h'18adb1630f27643924f584e319b284463ef44116b5f863a5c048a546e26c804a',
null,
{"alg": "ECDH-SS",
"kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example",
"spk": {"kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example"},
"apu": h'4d8553e7e74f3c6a3a9dd3ef286a8195cbf8a23d19558ccfec7d34b8
24f42d92bd06bd2c7f0271f0214e141fb779ae2856abf585a58368b017e7f2a
9e5ce4db5'},
null,
null,
null
]
C.2. Wrapped MAC
This example has some features that are in questions but not yet
incorporated in the document.
To make it easier to read, this uses CBOR's diagnostic notation
rather than a binary dump.
This exmple uses AES-128-MAC trucated to 64-bits as the digest
algorithm. It uses AES-256 Key wrap for the key manangment algorithm
wrapping the 128-bit key used for the digest algorthm.
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[3, h'a163616c676e4145532d3132382d4d41432d3634', null, h'596f75206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', h'474102be6c96d590', [[null, {"alg": "A256KW", "kid":
"018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"}, null, h'711ab0dc2fc4585dc
e27effa6781c8093eba906f227b6eb0', null]]]
C.3. Multi-recipient MAC message
This example has some features that are in questions but not yet
incorporated in the document.
To make it easier to read, this uses CBOR's diagnostic notation
rather than a binary dump.
This example uses HMAC with SHA-256 for the digest algorithm. There
are three different key manangment techniques applied:
o An ephemeral static ECDH key agrement operation using AES-128 key
wrap on the digest key.
o Key transport using RSA-OAEP with SHA-256 for the hash and the mfg
function operations.
o AES 256-bit Key wrap using a pre-shared secret.
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[3, h'a163616c67654853323536', null, h'596f752063616e2074727573742
0757320746f20737469636b207769746820796f75207468726f756768207468696
36b20616e64207468696e3f746f207468652062697474657220656e642e20416e6
420796f752063616e20747275737420757320746f206b65657020616e792073656
3726574206f6620796f7572733f636c6f736572207468616e20796f75206b65657
020697420796f757273656c662e2042757420796f752063616e6e6f74207472757
37420757320746f206c657420796f7520666163652074726f75626c6520616c6f6
e652c20616e6420676f206f666620776974686f7574206120776f72642e2057652
061726520796f757220667269656e64732c2046726f646f2e', h'87072b78b740
be1bd34176983fea202f031675753d74978c5eb6050169766d3b', [[null,
{"alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW", "kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"epk": {"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-521", "x": h'01b77bff3e35f9c9c3b7f
5263911655303dd9a45d5fc6b6c629a8fb34715c73bca4f61dcf25ea57df50ad07
269130298f8fc3476d6c077943ad08214bc0bae80b3bc', "y": h'1b366dcc649
00a6d24fbe9a1d844baf0cfc7e0ffa11cac3ebb4dea7839fa41e244cbc148fa5de
51ecec2d03a76f035e0f0f3d679d26fa6221552efef37e6ea7548'}}, null,
h'3b256a47bb9a9b84616da0165f35eec4f264a4e06dff39a899802fb0665231c2
0f6b0d7b8fc70952', null], [null, {"alg": "RSA-OAEP-256", "kid":
"bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"}, null, h'6b9814171c92c594ab345b4
9023e0ce9628f374f657d3fc6745ccb0fd6a367471a8ab7766e8aace7adb0f59f5
e750f9c7c0deaa503061e46836b04ae69f8aa26cc63ef978cc03a505acccc0b9e0
cc52f9eb82b4590aa2aa33d86da3152a6a2c3b01b33afa471298471f3018bbcd8a
b5aa7b778cc96bc85b65752e71c06ac553661e01fd786413ba26d5d0f4a4406669
b55db6e08af61dd92a287d0e2cd1497b28e4691ab64de9925ae7d41c7ea3015b0c
a3e16d98caeac6828f58a696d3a767682100d13b7c6168ac94e9505eb54b77c598
5dc86edacfd61e063b2aa6b23e24e390c83614cce27e054f0220ee4c6cd5696e2a
237d0d86700d3d7d718b4ff6b9b', null], [null, {"alg": "A256KW",
"kid": "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037"}, null, h'02a8d3017e
57088df19104fa492ede156e6a24f7b2b11eeed0fffefcf8f3f2fcadbfbec97267
7027', null]]]
C.4. Direct ECDH
This example has some features that are in questions but not yet
incorporated in the document.
To make it easier to read, this uses CBOR's diagnostic notation
rather than a binary dump.
Encoded in CBOR - 216 bytes, content is 14 bytes long
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[
2,
null,
{"alg": "A128GCM"},
h'656d6a73ccf1b35fb99044e1',
h'd7b27b67a81b212ee513b148454fe2d571d51bb679239769f5d2299bb96b',
null,
{
"alg": "ECDH-ES",
"epk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": h'00b81ff1de0eeba27613027526d83b5f4cbffaca433488e3805
e7a75c43bd1b966',
"y": h'00d142a334ac8790dc821abe9362434daeb00c1b8b076843e51
a4a4717b30c54ce'},
"kid": "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example"
},
null,
null,
null
]
C.5. Single Signature
This example has some features that are in questions but not yet
cooperated in the document.
To make it easier to read, this uses CBOR's diagnostic notation
rather than a binary dump.
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[
1,
null,
null,
h'436f6e74656e7420537472696e67',
null,
{
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"alg": "PS256"
},
h'5afe80ec9f208b4719a3bd688c803a3154b1ff25af86e054173ad6ddf71
ba77a4a2b793beed077a4e1a8a69ac1277c457f636691cb4a7d3dc67b47
ec84c067076b720236bae498bdb21deebbc0a0f525f9a24b336d51e2b3e
ffd67df3e051405a3599aed83b8a8e94e4194dded2f661e5e6894825779
b79b463bd4f477f33356cf8aecfa8a543344d2620145be8a72a712f9854
57040140176164c77cdae7cc480ae4357683cce79b97ddb10f390862a24
2aae1aa391cc730b1631f020874a8a6efc77b08f027323e2c4ae85eeb3e
5dc715e0e2fa8aec63fb828d7a2c45e361e249117bd8b41e1e12388412d
8ce3809c9a2172afda5ca7c5839896825da66a50'
]
C.6. Multiple Signers
This example has some features that are in questions but not yet
cooperated in the document.
To make it easier to read, this uses CBOR's diagnostic notation
rather than a binary dump.
Encoded in CBOR - 491 bytes, content is 14 bytes long
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[
1,
null,
null,
h'436f6e74656e7420537472696e67',
[
[
null,
{
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"alg": "PS256"
},
h'5afe80ec9f208b4719a3bd688c803a3154b1ff25af86e054173ad6d
df71ba77a4a2b793beed077a4e1a8a69ac1277c457f636691cb4a7d
3dc67b47ec84c067076b720236bae498bdb21deebbc0a0f525f9a24
b336d51e2b3effd67df3e051405a3599aed83b8a8e94e4194dded2f
661e5e6894825779b79b463bd4f477f33356cf8aecfa8a543344d26
20145be8a72a712f985457040140176164c77cdae7cc480ae435768
3cce79b97ddb10f390862a242aae1aa391cc730b1631f020874a8a6
efc77b08f027323e2c4ae85eeb3e5dc715e0e2fa8aec63fb828d7a2
c45e361e249117bd8b41e1e12388412d8ce3809c9a2172afda5ca7c
5839896825da66a50'
],
[
null,
{
"kid": "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example",
"alg": "ES512"
},
h'00e9769c05afb2d93baf5a0c2cace1747b5091f50596831911c67ebf
76f4220adb53698fe7831000d526887893d67de05ead1bbe378ce9e9
731bda4cd37f53dcf8d40186c46d872795b566682c113cc9d5bf5a8c
5321fd50a003237115decf0cb8b09e5c3cb50bc2203af45bebd51e6c
4d0ec51170d5b9ac1b21a2017a50d7c15b6de8f9'
]
]
]
Appendix D. Processing Parameter Table
This table contains a list of all of the parameters for use in
signature and encryption message types defined by the JOSE document
set. In the table is the data value type to be used for CBOR as well
as the integer value that can be used as a replacement for the name
in order to further decrease the size of the sent item.
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+----------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------+
| name | number | CBOR | comments |
| | | type | |
+----------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------+
| alg | * | tstr | presence is required |
| | | | |
| apu | * | bstr | |
| | | | |
| apv | * | bstr | |
| | | | |
| crit | * | tstr* | |
| | | | |
| cty | * | tstr | |
| | | | |
| enc | * | | use alg instead |
| | | | |
| epk | * | map | contains a COSE key not a JWK key |
| | | | |
| iv | * | | use field in array instead |
| | | | |
| jku | * | tstr | |
| | | | |
| jwk | * | map | contains a COSE key not a JWK key |
| | | | |
| kid | * | tstr | |
| | | | |
| p2c | * | int | |
| | | | |
| p2s | * | bstr | |
| | | | |
| tag | * | | tag is included in the cipher text |
| | | | |
| typ | * | | use cty for the content type, no |
| | | | concept of a different wrapper type |
| | | | |
| x5c | * | bstr* | |
| | | | |
| x5t | * | bstr | |
| | | | |
| x5t#S256 | * | bstr | |
| | | | |
| x5u | * | tstr | |
| | | | |
| zip | * | tstr | only used at content level |
+----------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------+
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Appendix E. Key Parameter Tables
This table contains a list of all of the parameters defined for keys
that were defined by the JOSE document set. In the table is the data
value type to be used for CBOR as well as the integer value that can
be used as a replacement for the name in order to further decrease
the size of the sent item.
+----------+--------+-----------+
| name | number | CBOR type |
+----------+--------+-----------+
| kty | * | tstr |
| | | |
| use | * | tstr |
| | | |
| key_ops | * | tstr* |
| | | |
| alg | * | tstr |
| | | |
| kid | * | tstr |
| | | |
| x5u | * | tstr |
| | | |
| x5c | * | bstr* |
| | | |
| x5t | * | bstr |
| | | |
| xt5#S256 | * | bstr |
+----------+--------+-----------+
This table contains a list of all of the parameters that were defined
by the JOSE document set for a specific key type. In the table is
the data value type to be used for CBOR as well as the integer value
that can be used as a replacement for the name in order to further
decrease the size of the sent item. Parameters dealing with keys
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+----------+------+--------+-----------+
| key type | name | number | CBOR type |
+----------+------+--------+-----------+
| EC | d | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| EC | x | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| EC | y | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | e | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | n | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | d | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | p | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | q | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | dp | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | dq | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | qi | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | oth | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | r | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| RSA | t | * | bstr |
| | | | |
| oct | k | * | bstr |
+----------+------+--------+-----------+
Author's Address
Jim Schaad
August Cellars
Email: ietf@augustcellars.com
Schaad Expires October 23, 2015 [Page 28]
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 02:18:16 |